1. Heard learned AGP Mr. D.R. Korde for the appellant-State and learned counsel Mr. A.H. Koralkar assisted by learned counsel Mr. V.D. Bhise for the respondents-claimants.

2. By this First Appeal, the appellant-State assails the Judgment and Award dated 19.01.2016 passed by the learned 4th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jalna in Land Acquisition Reference No.902 of 2010 (Old L.A.R. No.270 of 2008), whereby the learned Reference Court partly allowed the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and enhanced the compensation payable to the respondents-claimants together with statutory benefits.

3. The lands admeasuring 1 Hectare 05 R and 1 Hectare 10 R from Gut No.214, situated at village Takle Pokhari, Taluka and District Jalna, belonging to the respondents-claimants, came to be acquired for the public purpose of construction of Percolation Tank No.3 at Takle Pokhari. The notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on 21.11.2005. Thereafter, the Special Land Acquisition Officer passed an award under Section 11 of the Act on 29.01.2008, determining the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs.710/- per R for jirayat land, Rs.1,065/- per R for seasonally irrigated land and Rs.1,420/- per R for irrigated land.

4. Being dissatisfied with the compensation so awarded, the respondents-claimants accepted the same under protest and sought a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, claiming enhancement of compensation on the ground that the market value determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was grossly inadequate.

5. During the pendency of the reference proceedings, after filing their affidavit of examination-in-chief, the respondents-claimants preferred an application for amendment of the reference petition seeking to incorporate a plea that 80 mango trees standing on the acquired land had also been acquired and claiming compensation therefor. The said amendment came to be allowed by the learned Reference Court.

6. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, including the valuation report, revenue record and other documents produced before it, the learned Reference Court enhanced the compensation for the acquired land. It further awarded compensation towards 80 mango trees, together with statutory benefits under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

7. Aggrieved by the enhancement granted by the learned Reference Court, particularly the compensation awarded towards the alleged acquisition of 80 mango trees, the appellant-State has preferred the present appeal.

8. Learned AGP Mr. D.R. Korde appearing for the appellant-State vehemently submits that the learned Reference Court has committed a serious error in awarding compensation towards the alleged acquisition of 80 mango trees, though neither the acquisition proceedings nor the award passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer disclose acquisition of any such trees. According to him, the impugned award, to the extent it grants compensation for the alleged trees, is contrary to the evidence on record and, therefore, deserves to be set aside.

9. Learned AGP submits that the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was initially filed only seeking enhancement of compensation for the acquired land. There was absolutely no pleading in the original reference petition that 80 mango trees standing on the acquired land had also been acquired or that the claimants were entitled to compensation therefor. Even after institution of the reference, the matter proceeded for evidence and the claimants filed their affidavit of examination-in-chief. It was only thereafter that an application for amendment came to be filed seeking incorporation of an altogether new claim for compensation towards 80 mango trees. According to him, such amendment itself creates serious doubt about the genuineness of the claim.

10. Learned AGP further submits that the award passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 of the Act, the draft award as well as the e-statement prepared during the acquisition proceedings nowhere record that any mango trees were acquired from the respondents'-claimants’ land. Had such trees actually existed and been acquired, the same would have found place in the acquisition record maintained by the Land Acquisition Officer. The complete absence of any such reference in the acquisition proceedings clearly falsifies the subsequent claim made before the Reference Court.

11. Inviting attention to the revenue record, learned AGP submits that the respondents sought to rely upon Mutation Entry No.199, the 7/12 extract, panchanama, joint measurement report and valuation report to establish the existence of the alleged mango trees. According to him, a careful scrutiny of these documents itself reveals serious inconsistencies rendering the entire claim highly doubtful.

12. Learned AGP submits that Mutation Entry No.199 was certified on 30.05.2005, wherein it is recorded that 80 small mango trees existed in Gut No.214. However, the valuation report (Exhibit-39), prepared after the valuer's visit on 06.12.2005, describes the very same trees as approximately 30 years old, having a height of 4.50 metres (about 14 feet 9 inches) with substantial girth and spread. According to him, these two documents are wholly irreconcilable. Trees described as "small mango trees" in May 2005 could not have become fully matured, 30-year-old fruit-bearing trees within a span of a five months. This inherent contradiction, according to him, completely destroys the credibility of the documentary evidence relied upon by the claimants.

13. Learned AGP further submits that even the panchanama dated 06.01.2006 (Exhibit-35) joint measurement report dated 20.07.2005 (Exhibit-42) relied upon by the claimants were never reflected in the acquisition award, the claimants neither referred to them nor claimed compensation for any trees in the original reference petition. These documents surfaced only after commencement of evidence, which, according to him, clearly indicates that they were prepared and relied upon only with a view to secure higher compensation.

14. Learned AGP submits that the acquiring body remained absent before the learned Reference Court and, the documents produced by the claimants remained substantially unchallenged. Taking undue advantage of such situation, the claimants succeeded in obtaining an award for compensation towards trees which, according to the State, were never acquired. It is further submitted that the learned Reference Court accepted the revenue entries and valuation report without properly examining the inconsistencies appearing on the face of the record. Learned AGP, therefore, submits that the material placed on record unmistakably indicates that back dated revenue entries were prepared and supporting documents were brought into existence only to gate higher compensation. According to him, the award granting compensation towards 80 mango trees has resulted in serious prejudice to the public exchequer and warrants interference by this Court.

15. On the aforesaid grounds, learned AGP prays that the impugned Judgment and Award be modified by setting aside the compensation awarded towards the alleged 80 mango trees.

16. Per contra, learned counsel Mr. A.H. Koralkar, assisted by learned counsel Mr. V.D. Bhise, appearing for the respondents-claimants, supported the impugned Judgment and Award and submitted that the learned Reference Court has rightly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record while awarding compensation for the acquired land as well as the 80 mango trees.

17. Learned counsel submitted that the respondents-claimants were the owners and cultivators of the acquired lands and had planted the mango trees long prior to the acquisition in the year 1991. According to him, the revenue record clearly reflects the existence of the mango trees, and the learned Reference Court has rightly relied upon the relevant revenue entries while determining the compensation payable to the claimants.

18. It is submitted that the respondents have no control over the maintenance of the revenue record. The entries in the 7/12 extract and Mutation Entry No.199 were recorded by the competent revenue authorities in the discharge of their statutory duties. In the absence of any material establishing that those entries were fabricated or fraudulently recorded, the appellant-State cannot be permitted to challenge their authenticity on the basis of mere presumptions without evidence.

19. Learned counsel further submitted that the valuation report (Exhibit-39), the panchanama (Exhibit-35), the 7/12 extract (Exhibit-36) and the joint measurement report (Exhibit-42) consistently establish the existence of 80 mango trees on the acquired land. He submits that the learned Reference Court rightly relied upon the said evidence while awarding compensation. He further submits that once the amendment to the reference petition was allowed, the claim relating to the mango trees became part of the pleadings and cannot now be questioned on the ground that it was not incorporated in the original reference petition.

20. Learned counsel further submitted that merely because the Special Land Acquisition Officer omitted to mention the mango trees in the award or the e-statement, the claimants cannot be deprived of lawful compensation. According to him, the omission on the part of the acquiring authorities cannot deprive the landowners of their legitimate rights, particularly when the existence of the trees is otherwise established by documentary evidence.

21. Learned counsel also submitted that respondent No.3-the acquiring body chose not to contest the proceedings before the Reference Court and was proceeded ex parte. In such circumstances, the claimants cannot be blamed for the absence of any rebuttal evidence. The learned Reference Court, therefore, rightly appreciated the evidence available on record and recorded findings in favour of the claimants.

22. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the following decisions:

                (i) Maltibai Navnath Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 206;

                (ii) Navnath and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 14 SCC 480;

                (iii) Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 141;

                (iv) Chindha Fakir Patil (D) through L.Rs. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Jalgaon, AIR 2012 SC 481;

                (v) Chimanlal Hargovinddas vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona and another, AIR 1988 SC 1652;

                (vi) Bhupendra Ramdhan Pawar vs. Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation, 2021 Law (SC);

                (vii) Pandhari Dhondiba Nukulwad vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2021 (1) All MR 331.

23. Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel further submitted that if this Court entertains any doubt regarding the documentary evidence produced before the Reference Court, instead of setting aside the award outright, the matter may be remanded to the Reference Court for fresh adjudication after granting an opportunity to both sides to lead additional evidence.

24. I have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties. With their able assistance, I have gone through the impugned Judgment and Award, the original record and proceedings, the documentary evidence relied upon by the parties and the authorities cited.

25. The principal controversy involved in the present appeal is whether the respondents-claimants have satisfactorily established that 80 mango trees were acquired and whether the learned Reference Court was justified in awarding compensation of Rs.19,27,840/- towards the said trees. The determination of this issue necessarily requires examination of the pleadings, the acquisition record and the documentary evidence relied upon by the claimants.

26. I find that when the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was initially filed, the respondents sought enhancement of compensation only in respect of the acquired land. There was no pleading whatsoever that 80 mango trees standing on the acquired land had also been acquired. Likewise, there was no reference to any panchanama, joint measurement report or valuation report regarding the trees. It was only after filing the affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief that the respondents sought amendment of the reference petition by introducing, for the first time, a claim for compensation towards 80 mango trees. Though the amendment was allowed by the learned Reference Court, the belated introduction of such a substantial claim assumes significance while appreciating the subsequent documentary evidence.

27. I have also gone through the acquisition record, i.e. the award passed under Section 11 of the Act, the draft award and the e-statement prepared during the acquisition proceedings. I find that none of these documents records acquisition of a single mango tree from Gut No.214. Even the relevant column relating to trees has been left blank. If, in fact, 80 fruit-bearing mango trees had been standing on the acquired land on the date of acquisition, it is difficult to accept that such an important fact would not find place in any of the acquisition proceedings. The complete absence of any reference to the alleged trees in the statutory acquisition record creates a serious doubt about the claim subsequently raised before the learned Reference Court.

28. The respondents have placed considerable reliance upon Mutation Entry No.199 and the corresponding entry in the 7/12 extract. Mutation Entry No.199, certified on 30.05.2005, records the existence of 80 small mango trees in Gut No.214. The respondents have also relied upon the valuation report (Exhibit-39), which was prepared after inspection of the land on 06.12.2005. However, the valuation report describes the same trees as about 30 years old, fully grown and fruit-bearing, having a height of about 4.50 metres (14 feet 9 inches). I find that these two documents are not consistent with each other. Trees described as "small mango trees" in May 2005 could not have become 30-year-old fully grown fruit-bearing trees within a five months.

29. I have also carefully examined the original 7/12 extract produced on record. Upon such examination, prima facie, it is noticed that the entry relating to 80 mango trees appears in handwriting different from the remaining contemporaneous entries. The ink used for recording the said entry also appears visibly different from the ink employed in recording the other entries in the revenue record. The manner in which the said entry has been incorporated clearly distinguishes it from the original entries already existing in the record. It is equally significant that while the crop pattern entries do not disclose the existence of any mango orchard, the entry regarding 80 mango trees appears only in the "other rights" column pursuant to Mutation Entry No.199. These features materially affect the evidentiary value of the said revenue entry.

30. The claimants have also relied upon the joint measurement report and panchanama. However, neither document finds any reflection in the acquisition proceedings. More importantly, despite their alleged existence, no reference thereto is found in the original reference petition. These documents surfaced only after commencement of evidence. Their belated production, coupled with the complete absence of corresponding pleadings and the omission in the acquisition record, materially diminishes their evidentiary value.

31. The aforesaid circumstances cannot be viewed in isolation. The original reference petition was completely silent regarding the alleged acquisition of 80 mango trees and the claim was introduced only by way of amendment after commencement of evidence. The statutory acquisition record, namely the award, the draft award and the e-statement, does not record acquisition of a single mango tree. Mutation Entry No.199, on which heavy reliance has been placed by the claimants, merely records the existence of 80 small mango trees, whereas the valuation report prepared within a few months describes the very same trees as approximately 30 years old, having a height of 4.50 metres (14 feet 9 inches) and fully developed fruit-bearing characteristics. The original 7/12 extract, on careful examination by this Court, further reveals that the entry relating to the alleged mango trees appears in handwriting and ink different from the remaining contemporaneous entries and finds place only in the "other rights" column without any corresponding reflection in the crop pattern. The joint measurement report and other supporting documents also surfaced only after commencement of evidence and are conspicuously absent from the original pleadings as well as the acquisition proceedings. These circumstances are not isolated discrepancies. On the contrary, they constitute a continuous and interlinked chain of circumstances which completely erodes the credibility of the respondents' claim regarding acquisition of 80 mango trees.

32. Thus, the record discloses that the original reference petition did not contain any claim regarding acquisition of mango trees; the statutory acquisition record is completely silent about the existence of such trees; Mutation Entry No.199 and the valuation report do not appear to be consistent with each other; and the joint measurement report and the panchanama were relied upon only after commencement of the evidence. These circumstances are required to be examined cumulatively while determining whether the respondents have satisfactorily established their claim.

33. In view of the material placed on record, this Court cannot be blind to the inconsistencies appearing therein. This Court is, therefore, satisfied that the cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances unmistakably establishes that the respondents-claimants succeeded in obtaining compensation towards the alleged 80 mango trees by playing fraud upon the learned Reference Court. Any judgment or award obtained by plying fraud upon the Court is a nullity in the eyes of law and cannot be permitted to stand.

34. It is well settled that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhaurao Dagadu Paralkar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Or,, reported in AIR 2005 SC 3330, has held in paragraph Nos. 9 to 16, which reads as under:-

                “9. By “fraud” is meant an intention to deceive; whether it is from any expectation of advantage to the party himself or from ill will towards the other is immaterial. The expression “fraud” involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss, that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable or of money and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver, will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied. [See Vimla (Dr.) v. Delhi Admn. [1963 Supp (2) SCR 585 : AIR 1963 SC 1572] and Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd.

                10. A “fraud” is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (See S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath.

                11. “Fraud” as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letters or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letters. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations, which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. (See Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi)

                12. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros. [(1992) 1 SCC 534] , it was observed as follows : (SCC p. 553, para 20)

                “Fraud” and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton's sorcerer, Camus, who exulted in his ability to, “wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him into snares”. It has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary “fraud” in equity has been defined as an act or omission to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. In Black's Law Dictionary, “fraud” is defined as an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender a legal right; a false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, it has been defined as criminal deception, use of false representation to gain unjust advantage; dishonest artifice or trick. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, a representation is deemed to have been false, and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at the material date false in substance and in fact. Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines “fraud” as an act committed by a party to a contract with intent to deceive another. From the dictionary meaning or even otherwise fraud arises out of the deliberate active role of the representator about a fact, which he knows to be untrue yet he succeeds in misleading the representee by making him believe it to be true. The representation to become fraudulent must be of fact with knowledge that it was false. In a leading English case i.e. Derry v. Peek what constitutes “fraud” was described thus : (All ER p. 22 B-C)

                “Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.”

                But “fraud” in public law is not the same as “fraud” in private law. Nor can the ingredients, which establish “fraud” in commercial transaction, be of assistance in determining fraud in administrative law. It has been aptly observed by Lord Bridge in Khawaja v. Secy. of State for Home Deptt. that it is dangerous to introduce maxims of common law as to the effect of fraud while determining fraud in relation of statutory law. “Fraud” in relation to the statute must be a colourable transaction to evade the provisions of a statute.

                “ ‘If a statute has been passed for some one particular purpose, a court of law will not countenance any attempt which may be made to extend the operation of the Act to something else which is quite foreign to its object and beyond its scope.’ Present day concept of fraud on statute has veered round abuse of power or mala fide exercise of power. It may arise due to overstepping the limits of power or defeating the provision of statute by adopting subterfuge or the power may be exercised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations. The colour of fraud in public law or administrative law, as it is developing, is assuming different shades. It arises from a deception committed by disclosure of incorrect facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke exercise of power and procure an order from an authority or tribunal. It must result in exercise of jurisdiction which otherwise would not have been exercised. That is misrepresentation must be in relation to the conditions provided in a section on existence or non-existence of which power can be exercised. But non-disclosure of a fact not required by a statute to be disclosed may not amount to fraud. Even in commercial transactions non-disclosure of every fact does not vitiate the agreement. ‘In a contract every person must look for himself and ensure that he acquires the information necessary to avoid bad bargain.’ In public law the duty is not to deceive.” (See Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros. [(1992) 1 SCC 534] , SCC p. 554, para 20.)

                13. This aspect of the matter has been considered recently by this Court in Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal, Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Ram Chandra Singh case and Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N.

                14. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. (See Gowrishankar v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu case)

                15. “Fraud” is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. Although negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud; as observed in Ram Preeti Yadav case.

                16. In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 (CA)] Lord Denning observed at QB pp. 712 and 713 : (All ER p. 345 C)

                “No judgment of a court, no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything.”

                In the same judgment Lord Parker, L.J. observed that fraud vitiates all transactions known to the law of however high a degree of solemnity. (p. 722) These aspects were recently highlighted in State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao.’

35. The present case also discloses a disturbing feature regarding the manner in which the proceedings were contested. Despite the serious nature of the claim, the acquiring body failed to effectively contest the proceedings before the Reference Court and was ultimately proceeded ex parte. Had the original acquisition record been properly produced and scrutinized, the discrepancies noticed herein could have been detected at the earliest, thereby preventing an unwarranted burden on the public exchequer.

36. Once the claim regarding acquisition of 80 mango trees fails, the compensation awarded towards the said trees cannot be sustained. The respondents-claimants shall, however, remain entitled to compensation in respect of the 80 R land together with the statutory benefits admissible under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

37. Consequently, the impugned Judgment and Award deserves to be set aside the compensation awarded towards the alleged 80 mango trees, while maintaining the compensation awarded in respect of the acquired land. Hence, the following order:-

                ORDER

                (i) The First Appeal is partly allowed.

                (ii) The Judgment and Award dated 19.01.2016 passed by the learned 4th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jalna in Land Acquisition Reference No.902 of 2010 (Old L.A.R. No.270 of 2008) is set aside to the extent that the compensation awarded towards the acquisition of 80 mango trees, together with all consequential statutory benefits thereon, is quashed and set aside.

                (iii) The respondents-claimants had withdrawn 75% of the amount on furnishing an undertaking and the remaining 25% on furnishing solvent security/surety, pursuant to the interim orders passed by this Court. They shall refund the amount which was withdrawn by them towards the compensation awarded for the alleged 80 mango trees, together with interest at the prevailing bank rate from the date of withdrawal till repayment, within eight weeks from today.

                (iv) In the event of failure to refund the aforesaid amount within the stipulated period, the Collector, Jalna is directed to take immediate steps to recover the amount, together with interest at the prevailing bank rate, by enforcing the undertaking and the solvent security/surety furnished by the respondents-claimants, in accordance with law.

                (v) After refund of the aforesaid amount, the respondents-claimants shall be entitled to compensation in respect of the land admeasuring 80 R at the rate of Rs.4,000/- per R, as granted by the learned Reference Court, together with the statutory benefits admissible under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

                (vi) The respondents-claimants shall be entitled to interest under Section 34 of the acquired Land Acquisition Act, 1894 strictly in accordance with the Full Bench decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Kailas Shiva Rangari, 2016 (3) Mh.L.J. 457.

                (viii) Save and except the aforesaid, the Judgment and Award dated 19.01.2016 passed by the learned 4th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jalna in Land Acquisition Reference No.902 of 2010 (Old L.A.R. No.270 of 2008) shall remain unaltered in all other respects.

                (ix) Modified Award be drawn accordingly.

38. After dictation of the order, the learned counsel for the respondents-claimants prayed for stay to the operation of the present order. Considering that the claimants have obtained the enhanced compensation on the basis of a wrongly prepared record, I am not inclined to grant the request. The prayer for stay is accordingly rejected.

39. Place this matter for compliance after 3 months.