Nandesh S. Deshpande, J.

1. All these petitions raise a similar grievance and, therefore, are being decided by this common judgment. As agreed by the parties, Writ Petition No. 5681 of 2024 is treated as the lead petition, and the facts narrated herein below are taken from the memo of the said petition.

2. For convenience, the relevant dates and events in each petition are tabulated below:

                   



3. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the parties.

4. The present petition prays for a writ in the nature of mandamus, thereby declaring that the Petitioner is entitled to the benefits regarding payment of arrears of the 6th Pay Commission, difference of 6th Pay Dearness Allowance, arrears of fixation through the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS) of annual grade pay as per the said Pay Commission, and implementation of the 7th Pay Commission and its arrears with all benefits.

5. Facts, as can be seen from the said Writ Petition, are as under:

                    (i) The Petitioner was appointed in the college, i.e., Respondent No. 5, which is run by Respondent No. 4, vide appointment order dated 29th December 2007 as a Lecturer in the subject of Production Engineering (Degree side) in the pay scale of Rs.8000–275–13500 with effect from 1st January 2008.

                    (ii) At the time of his appointment, he was holding a degree of Bachelor of Engineering (B.E.), and the appointment was on probation. The appointment and his service conditions were governed by the Maharashtra Public Universities Act, Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations, and Rules made thereunder from time to time.

                    (iii) Pursuant to the appointment of the Petitioner as aforesaid, the said appointment came to be approved by the Shivaji University vide Approval No. 106 of 7010 on 9th September 2008. During his service tenure, the Petitioner obtained a degree in Master of Engineering (M.E.) in Mechanical Production with First Class with Distinction in the year 2010. Pursuant to the same, he was re-designated as Assistant Professor with effect from 1st January 2008 in the pay scale of Rs.15600–39100 with AGP of Rs.6000 as per the 6th Pay Commission.

                    (iv) Thereafter, he was promoted to a higher pay scale from 1st January 2013 to 31st December 2017, and again from 1st January 2018 till date.

                    (v) It is the narration in the petition that the services of the Petitioner are governed by the Maharashtra Public Universities Act as well as the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the "AICTE Act").

                    (vi) The Petitioner further submits that Respondent No. 7, in exercise of its powers conferred on it under Section 23(1) read with Section 10(1) and 10(5) of the AICTE Act, has published a Notification enacting regulations dated 5th March 2010. The said Regulations are named as the ‘All India Council for Technical Education (Pay Scales, Service Conditions and Qualifications for the Teachers and other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions (Degree) Regulation) 2010’. The said Regulations have been implemented by the State of Maharashtra by issuing a Government Resolution on 20th August 2010 with effect from 1st January 2006.

                    (vii) Likewise, Respondent No. 7 has also published subsequent Regulations in the year 2019, and more particularly on 1st March 2019, by virtue of the powers referred to supra. The 2019 Regulations have also been implemented by the State of Maharashtra by passing a Resolution on the basis of the said recommendations to be made applicable with effect from 1st January 2016.

                    (viii) It is further stated in the petition that in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Hanumant Mahadev Bhosale Vs. All India Council for Technical Education Through its Chairman and Ors(Writ Petition No. 2324 of 2014) the issue regarding Polytechnics and Colleges/Schools being covered by pay scales prescribed by the AICTE Regulations is no more res integra. It is, therefore, the submission of the Petitioner that the Regulations prescribed by the AICTE and adopted by Respondent No. 1 are always applicable to technical colleges, including Respondent No. 5 which runs Respondent No. 4.

                    (ix) In spite of this position and in spite of the fact that the 2019 Regulations are applicable and once implemented/adopted by State Government, it is the grievance of the Petitioners that their legitimate demands, such as arrears of the 6th Pay Commission, Dearness Allowance difference, Career Advancement Scheme (CAS), and 7th Pay Commission implementation, are not being paid available to them. This has constrained them to file the present petition.

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner. The learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the applicability of the Regulations to employees like the Petitioners is never in dispute, and therefore, the refusal by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 to give benefits to them is totally illegal. He submits that in view of the fact that the Regulations of the AICTE of the year 2019 have been adopted by the State, it is obligatory on Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 to grant benefits to the Petitioners who are governed by the said service conditions.

7. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied on following Judgments:

                    I. Secretary, Mahatma Gandhi Mission & Anr. v. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena & Ors(Civil Appeal No. 115/116 of 2017 decided on 05.01.2017).

                    II. Amrutraj Pratapji Vyas and Ors. v. Hind Seva Mandal, Bhusawal & Ors(2018(2) Maharashtra Law Journal 615)

                    III. Lalit Rajendra Gajanan v. Vidya Vardhani & Ors(Writ Petition No. 3125 of 2020 + Connected matters)

                    IV. Sanjay Shrirangrao Surwase And Others Vs. The State Of Maharashtra And Others(Writ Petition No. 6001 of 2013)

                    V. Rutesh S/O Shamrao Lonkar And 2 Others Vs. The State Of Maharashtra, Department Of Technical Education, Through Its Secretary, Mumbai And Ors(Writ Petition No. 2022 of 2020).

8. The State Government has filed its affidavit-in-reply and opposed the contentions raised by the Petitioners. It has relied on the Government Resolution dated 21st May 1983 issued by the State in regard to the opening of new technical and technological colleges and polytechnics on a "no grant-in-aid" basis. The learned AGP relies on Clause 11, specifically provides for not permitting claims for grant-in-aid for non-recurring and recurring expenditure by the Government at any stage or at any time. It is, therefore, the submission of the learned AGP that it is the responsibility of the employer, i.e., Respondent Nos. 4 and 5, to implement the respective pay scales and to pay the arrears to employees like the Petitioner.

9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 opposes the contentions raised in the petition. Even though the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 have not disputed the entitlement, they have stated various grounds to oppose the petition. It is his submission that there is gross, unexplained delay in filing the petition. As far as the lead petition is concerned, he submits that the date of filing the petition is 20th December 2023, while the Petitioner herein was appointed on 29th December 2007. He further submits that the 6th Pay Commission was effective from 2006 and the 7th Pay Commission from 2016. Therefore, it is submitted that the Petitioner was not diligent enough to agitate his rights, if any. He, therefore, submits that the Court of equity should not come to the aid of a person like the Petitioner.

10. It is his further submission that the claim is barred by limitation, since the Petitioner did not approach the Court from 2006 or 2010 till December 2023 when the petition was filed. To buttress his submission, he relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in the case of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak v. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation((2022) 18 SCC 144) and Union of India v. Tarsem Singh((2008) 8 SCC 648).

11. He further raises a ground that there is a concealment of fact regarding the implementation of the 6th and 7th Pay Commission recommendations. He points out that out of 49 permanent employees, 24 have accepted the implementation of the 7th Pay Commission and have given up the claim for any additional benefits. However, the Petitioners before this Court have insisted upon the implementation of the GR dated 11th September 2019, despite the fact that the financial position of Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 was explained to them. It is, therefore, his submission that the petition deserves dismissal.

12. He further submits that the petition is not maintainable against Respondent No. 4, being an Educational Trust, and Respondent No. 5, being a College. To buttress his submission, he relies on the judgments in Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak (supra), Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (supra), Sushmita Basu and Others v. Ballygunge Siksha Samity and Others((2006) 7 SCC 680) and St. Marys Education Society vs Rajendra Prasad Bhargava((2023) 4 SCC 498).

13. We have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned counsel for the respective parties.

14. As far as the maintainability of the petition is concerned, we do not think that the judgments cited by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in Sushmita Basu and St. Mary's Education Society would come to the aid of the Respondents. Those decisions deal with (i) the scope of writ jurisdiction against purely private, unaided institutions not discharging a public function, and (ii) situations where the employment relationship is essentially contractual and lacks a public-law element. On the other hand, the Petitioners rely upon Secretary, Mahatma Gandhi Mission v. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena(supra), the Supreme Court entertained a writ against a charitable trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act and, along with the State, directed implementation of revised pay scales to employees of an aided college, treating the institution as amenable to Article 226 on account of aid, affiliation and State-regulated service conditions., Amrutraj Vyas v. Hind Seva Mandal (supra), Court issued mandamus against a society running a polytechnic to implement a Government Circular on pay and allowances, reinforcing that aided/recognised technical institutions perform a public duty and are subject to writ jurisdiction. Thus, it is a well-settled principle of law that a public trust performing a public duty and registered under the provisions of the relevant Act would be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Petitioners' cases are squarely covered by the above judgments, which recognise that aided/recognised educational institutions discharging the public function of education, and bound by State/AICTE norms, are subject to mandamus for enforcement of statutory or State-mandated service conditions. The reliance on Sushmita Basu and St. Mary's is therefore misplaced. We, therefore, reject the preliminary objection raised by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5.

15. As far as delay, laches, and the petition being barred by limitation are concerned, the dates of appointments of the respective Petitioners and the filing of the present petitions are a matter of record. It is also a matter of record that the 6th Pay Commission was effective from 2006 and the 7th Pay Commission from 2016. However, from the narration made hereinabove, the Petitioners are legitimately entitled to the implementation of the said Regulations which have been adopted by the State, and therefore, to the benefits accrued therefrom.

16. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Petitioner in the present lead petition was appointed on 29th December 2007 and chose to file the petition only on 20th December 2023. As has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak (supra) as well as Tarsem Singh (supra), it would be equitable that the Petitioners should get arrears restricted to three years preceding the date of filing of their respective petitions. We have already taken this view, following the coordinate bench judgment of this Court in Pramod Deshmukh v. State of Maharashtra(Writ Petition No. 7648 of 2023) to which one of us (Coram: Nandesh S. Deshpande, J.) was a member. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced as under:

                    “19. As can be seen from the judgment of Rushibai Pathak (supra) a continuing wrong refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. “Recurring/successive wrong” are those which occur periodically each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. Therefore, insofar as consequent relief of recovery of arrears for past period is concerned the principles relating to the recurring/ successive wrong will apply. It is further held that the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period to three years prior to date of filing of the writ petition.

                    20. Learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to bring his case in one of the exceptions in the judgment of Tarsem singh on premise that it is continuing wrong. However, in view of dictum laid by Supreme Court in various judgments referred supra we are unable to accept his contentions. The case would not be a continuous wrong but of a recurring wrong. Since petitioners as stated above even though continuing in service with the respondent No.4 for considerable period of time did not choose to assert their rights. In our view, therefore, they are not entitled for arrears of salary for more than period of three years preceding the filing of the petition. Our view finds support in a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala and Ors. Vs. Krishnan N.V., Civil Appeal No.10898/2025 In which in paragraph No. 8 and 9 Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon its earlier judgement in State of U.P. vs. Rajmati Singh. Paragraph 8 and 9 reads as under:-

                    “8. Whether repeated representations can justify delay and latches in approaching the Tribunal/court? The law on this issue is well settled. Reference can be made to the judgment of this Court in State of U.P. V. Rajmati Singh reported in 2022 INSC 1261, whereby dealing with the issue of delay and latches, it was held as under:-

                    “12. In our considered view, the respondent like any vigilant citizen, specially given that she does not belong to economically or socially backward segments of the society, was expected to assert her rights before an appropriate forum within a reasonable time. Repeated representations neither give rise nor revive the cause of action, if it had already arisen in the past. The respondent’s difficulties do not end there, given that her services were brought to an end when she was denied to resume her duties in the year 1974. She was, thus, required to seek a declaration of her continuity or have a writ of mandamus issued for her reinstatement. She did not do either.

                    (9) Further reliance is placed on the judgment passed by this Court in State of Orissa vs. Laxmi Narayan Das reported in 2023 INSC 619. It has been opined therein as under:-

                    “16... Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant “a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis... A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons who compete with ‘Kumbhkarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground along the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.”

                    21. Further more we cannot overlook the fact that we are exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which apart from being a discretionary relief is also an equitable remedy. In this regard it would be fruitful to rely upon the observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in judgment of P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1975 (1) SCC 152 “It is not that ‘here is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound an wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse their exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claim and try to unsettled settled matters.

                    22. Further in Tridip Kumar Dingal and others Vs. State of West Bengal and others reported in (2009) 1 SCC 768, Hon’ble Supreme Court states that while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ-Court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ of discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 of 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. It further observed that if the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ Court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime.”

                    23. This principle or law is further enunciated by the Supreme Court in judgment State of Uttaranchal and Another vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 179 by stating that delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by the an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and /or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant. Furthermore in a recent judgment in the case of Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and others reported in 2024 (4) SCR 506 an applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all time to come the delay is not be condoned.

                    24. Thus, for filing a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death.

17. Furthermore, as far as the alleged concealment of facts is concerned, we do not find anything adverse against the Petitioners. The fact remains that the recommendations of the 6th Pay Commission and 7th Pay Commission were recommended but only in part, and employees like the Petitioners have not been granted the entire benefits to which they are legally entitled.

18. Thus, it is settled principle of law even that there is no prescribed period of limitation writ Court has to be approached within the reasonable time and inordinate delay in approaching the care can be crucial fact while adjudicating the claims of the rival purpose. In the present petitions some of the petitioners herein have retired on various dates and yet they along with others have chosen not to approach this Court until now. It can thus be safely said that the petitioners have slept over their rights for more than three years, i.e. reasonable period for filing any legal proceedings to assert their rights, if any. However, since the entitlement of the petitioners is not disputed by the respondents and they only raise an objection regarding the claim being barred by limitation as the petitioners have not approached this Court within three years.

19. In view of the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court, we are afraid that relief prayed in the petitions cannot be granted in its entirety. However, the petitioners are entitled for arrears of salary payable to them preceding three years from the date of filing of the petitions. We, therefore, pass the following order:

ORDER

I. Writ Petitions are partly allowed.

II. It is declared that the Petitioners are entitled to the benefits regarding payment of arrears of the 6th Pay Commission, difference of 6th Pay Dearness Allowance, arrears of fixation through the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS) of annual grade pay as per the 6th Pay Commission as prescribed in Government Resolution dated 20th August 2010, and arrears of the 7th Pay Commission with all benefits as prescribed in Government Resolution dated 11th September 2019.

III. Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are hereby directed to pay to the Petitioners all benefits regarding arrears of the 6th Pay Commission, difference of 6th Pay Dearness Allowance, arrears of fixation through the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS) of annual grade pay as per the 6th Pay Commission as prescribed in Government Resolution dated 20th August 2010, and arrears of the 7th Pay Commission with all benefits as prescribed in Government Resolution dated 11th September 2019, restricted to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of their respective Writ Petitions as mentioned in paragraph 2.

IV. The aforesaid payment shall be released by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 to the Petitioners within a period of six weeks from today.

V. Rule is made partly absolute in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.