(Prayer in W. A. (MD) No.3096 of 2026: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, praying to set aside the Order dated July 07, 2025 passed in W.P. (MD) No.12833 of 2025 on the file of this Court.
In C.M.P. (MD) No.18094 of 2025: Civil Miscellaneous Petition filed praying to stay the operation of the Order dated July 07, 2025, passed in W.P. (MD) No.12833 of 2025, pending disposal of the Writ Appeal and pass such further or other orders.)
R. Sakthivel, J.
1. This Writ Appeal is filed at the instance of the respondents in W.P. (MD) No.12833 of 2025, challenging the Order dated July 07, 2025 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court therein. The prayer in the Writ Petition was for a Writ of Mandamus directing the third appellant herein to register the writ petitioner's Sale Agreement dated March 20, 2025 and then register the Sale Deed to be executed pursuant thereto, with the prospective purchaser - Mr.Sethuraman, S/o.Sadaiyan or any other prospective purchaser of the land in Survey Nos.191 and 193 of Veeraraghava Mudaliyar Chatram Village, [V.M.Chatram Village] Palayamkottai Taluk, Tirunelveli District, as per the earlier Order dated March, 03, 2023 passed by this Court in another Writ Petition in W.P. (MD) No.20950 of 2022, in order to avoid unnecessary refusal on the registration of the aforesaid Sale Agreement.
2. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the respondent herein who had filed the aforesaid Writ Petition will be addressed as the writ petitioner, while the appellants herein will be continued to be addressed as appellants.
3. Gist of the appellants' case in this Writ Appeal is that the land in question was partitioned between one Velayutham and one Pandaram, through a Partition Deed dated June 29, 2012 registered as Document No. 3831 of 2012 on the file of third appellant. In the said Partition Deed, it has been stated that the said property was acquired by their ancestors in the year 1885 vide a Sale Deed registered as Document No.1774 of 1885 on the file of District Registrar, Palayamkottai. Hence, if the writ petitioner's sale agreement is registered, there would be a double entry. Accordingly, the writ petitioner was directed by the third appellant to obtain an appropriate Order qua Title from competent Civil Court, and a Refusal Check Slip was issued to that effect. Challenging the said Refusal Check Slip, the writ petitioner approached this Court by way of the aforesaid Writ Petition in W.P. (MD) No.12833 of 2025, where the appellants submitted before the learned Single Judge that if the writ petitioner's Sale Agreement dated March 20, 2025 is registered, there would be a double entry. Despite the appellants' objection, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition directing the appellants to register the writ petitioner's Sale Agreement dated March 20, 2025 and make an entry as 'double entry' in appropriate registration records. Hence, the Writ Appeal.
ARGUMENTS
4. Mr. M.P.Senthil, learned State Counsel appearing for the appellants, who are the respondents in the Writ Petition, submitted that the property in question was partitioned by one Velayutham and one Pandaram through a registered Partition Deed dated June 29, 2012 on the file of third appellant tracing title from their ancestor's Sale Deed dating back to 1885. Thereafter, in the year 2025, the writ petitioner presented his Sale Agreement dated March 20, 2025 relating to the very same property for registration. According to the learned Counsel, if the Sale Agreement were to be registered in respect of a property that had already been conveyed under a registered Sale Deed and subsequently partitioned via registered Partition Deed, it would result in a double entry in the registration records. Therefore, in order to avoid such a situation, the third appellant rightly refused to register the document and directed the writ petitioner to obtain appropriate orders qua Title from a competent Civil Court. It was further submitted that the Check Slip was issued on valid grounds and in the larger public interest.
4.1.Further he contended that, if at all the writ petitioner was aggrieved by the Refusal Check Slip dated March 20, 2025 issued by the third appellant, he has an appeal remedy under Section 72 of 'the Registration Act, 1908' ['the Act' for short] and he ought to have pursued the same. Further, in such a course, if any of the parties are aggrieved by the Order passed under Section 76 of the Act, a Statutory Suit under Section 77 of the Act would lie. He went on to contend that in the presence of the alternative and efficacious remedy of appeal and the further remedy of Statutory Suit under Section 77 of the Act, the Writ Petition would not lie and would not be maintainable. The learned Single Judge failed to consider the said aspect.
4.2. Further, he drew attention to Page Nos.117 and 118 of the typed set of papers, namely Extracts from the Town Survey Land Register [TSLR] pertaining to Survey Nos.191 & 193 and submitted that in the TSLR's Adangal Column in respect of Survey Nos.191 and 193, it has been mentioned as 'Kasi Viswanatha Swami Thirukarthigai Kattalai and Vijaya Easwarai Ammal Kovil Kappalar Tharakala Member A.Subramania Mudaliyar'.
4.3. Further, the writ petitioner did not file any revenue records supporting the document sought to be registered. Though the writ petitioner filed a registration copy of his alleged Title Deed viz., Sale Deed dated August 2, 1890 bearing Document No.1836 of 1890, he failed to file its original, which factor gains immense significance in view of the fact that the writ petitioner did not file any revenue records or other records for anytime between the date of the Sale Deed (1890) and the Sale Agreement (2025), in order to prima facie show that his title and possession remained with him / with his family members throughout as alleged by him. Cumulative facts would clearly show that the Sub-Registrar's refusal to register Sale Agreement and issuance of Refusal Check Slip was only to remove ambiguities and get a clear title from competent Civil Court. The learned Single Judge miserably failed to consider the said facts and erred in allowing the Writ Petition. Accordingly, he prayed to allow the Writ Appeal and set aside the Order of the learned Single Judge.
5. Per contra, Mr.S.Radhakrishnan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent herein / writ petitioner submitted that the subject property mentioned under the Sale Agreement sought to be registered by the writ petitioner, was owned by his predecessor in title vide Sale Deed dated August, 2, 1890 registered as Document No.1836 of 1890. Some third parties who didn't have any right or possession over the subject property falsely created and executed a Partition Deed dated June 29, 2012 and the same was registered by the third appellant as Document No.3831 of 2012. In this regard, at the instance of the writ petitioner's family members, a criminal case in Crime No.37 of 2015 on the file of the Perumalpuram Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was registered against one Velayutham, one Pandaram and one P.A.Mohammed Rafiq. Instead of initiating prosecution against the aforesaid fraudulent transaction under Section 83 of the Act which the third appellant / Sub-Registrar is entitled to, and cancelling the fraudulent document so registered, the third appellant has refused to register the bona fide transaction of the genuine owner / writ petitioner. The writ petitioner, who is an age old person, and his right is being jeopardized by the act of third parties who had no right over the subject property and further by the act of the third appellant / Sub-Registrar in not following the procedure laid down by law. The learned Single Judge after considering the entire facts and circumstances directed the third appellant to register his Sale Agreement and the pursuant Sale Deed to be executed between the parties. There is no irregularity or illegality in the said Order and no prejudice would be caused if writ petitioner's Sale Agreement is registered. There is no warrant to interfere with the Order of the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, he prayed to dismiss the Writ Appeal and to vacate the interim stay.
5.1.He also relied upon the following case laws in support of his contentions:
(i) Judgement of this Court in S.R.M. Packiri Rajan -vs- The Inspector General of Registration, reported in MANU/TN/5171/2021.
(ii) Judgement of this Court in G.Sureshbabu -vs- The District Registrar, made in W.P. No.45981 of 2025 dated November 27, 2025; and
(iii) Judgement of this Court in N.Muhammed Ashfaq -vs- The District Registrar, made in W.P. (MD) No.19918 of 2025 dated July 22, 2025;
DISCUSSION
6. This Court has considered both sides' submissions and perused the materials available on record.
7. Before entering into the factual aspects, this Court would first like to deal with the aspect of maintainability of the Writ Petition, in the presence of alternate remedy. For the said purpose, this Court deems fit to refer to the Judgment in the case of Whirlpool Corporation -vs- Registrar of Trade Marks reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court enumerated three cases of exception to the alternate remedy rule qua the writ jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portion of the said Judgement is extracted hereunder:
"15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a Writ Petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restriction one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the Writ Petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged."
8. It is also pertinent to refer to a Judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court (of which one of present coram member is a part) in the case of Aarshita Jain -vs- The Adjudicating Authority (PMLA), bearing neutral citation 2023:MHC:3224, reported in MANU/TN/4095/2023. After considering the relevant case laws in respect of the alternative remedy rule, it was held in that case that the alternative remedy rule is not an absolute one. It is a rather a rule of discretion and would not act as a bar in cases of violation of principles of natural justice, breach of fundamental rights, excess of jurisdiction and challenge to vires of the statute or statute legislation. Though alternative remedy is available, Writ Petition under Article 226 of Constitution can be entertained in the aforesaid cases having due regard to the facts and attending circumstances of the case. Relevant extract from the Judgment reads thus:
"8.As regards alternate remedy, law is well settled that alternate remedy is not a bar for exercise of writ jurisdiction and that alternate remedy qua writ jurisdiction is a self imposed restraint. In other words, alternate remedy rule is not a absolute rule and it is a rule of discretion. Be that as it may, as regards the alternate remedy rule which is not a absolute rule and a rule of discretion, Hon'ble Supreme Court in a long line of authorities has repeatedly held that in fiscal law, the rigor of application of alternate remedy rule is very high. The oft quoted relevant case law qua alternate remedy rule are Dunlop India [Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and others reported in (1985) 1 SCC 260], Satyawati Tandon [United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110], K.C.Mathew [Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore Vs. Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85], Commercial Steel [The Assistant Commissioner of State Tax and Others Vs.M/s Commercial Steel Limited reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 884] and Greatship [State of Maharashtra and Others Vs.Greatship (India) Limited reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1262]."
8.1. After referring the relevant portions from the afore-cited case laws, the Court went on to enumerate the exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy in Paragraph No.14 thereof, which reads thus:
"14.As regards exceptions to the aforementioned alternate remedy rule which is not a absolute rule and a rule of discretion, they are: (a)violation of principles of natural justice; (b)breach of fundamental rights; (c)excess of jurisdiction; and (c)challenge to vires of a statute or delegated legislation."
9. Thus, there is no ambiguity in the legal position that, mere existence of a statutory remedy would not be a bar to entertain a petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India. Generally, if an alternative and efficacious remedy is available, in such a case, a Writ Petition is not maintainable. But, it is only a general rule and does not apply to all cases. It is subject to exceptions. To put it in a different way, the alternative remedy rule is not an absolute rule but one of discretion. Exceptions thereto are (a) violation of principles of natural justice (b) breach of fundamental rights (c) excess of jurisdiction and (d) challenge to vires of a statute. When a Writ Petition falls under any of these exceptions, even though alternative remedy is available, it would still be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
10. Coming to the facts of the case at hand, when the writ petitioner presented his Sale Agreement with a prospective purchaser dated March 20, 2025, the third appellant / Sub-Registrar refused registration and issued the Refusal Check Slip dated March 20, 2025 on the ground that an earlier document relating to the same property had already been registered. The Sub-Registrar observed that registration of the writ petitioner's Sale Agreement would result in a double entry and create confusion among the general public. That is the reason why the Sub-Registrar issued the said Refusal Check Slip.
11. At this juncture, this Court deems it proper to extract Sections 72 and 75 to 77 of the Act hereunder:
''72. Appeal to Registrar from orders of Sub-Registrar refusing registration on ground other than denial of execution.-
(1) Except where the refusal is made on the ground of denial of execution, an appeal shall lie against an order of a Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document to registration (whether the registration of such document is compulsory or optional) to the Registrar to whom such Sub-Registrar is subordinate, if presented to such Registrar within thirty days from the date of the order; and the Registrar may reverse or alter such order.
(2) If the order of the Registrar directs the document to be registered and the document is duly presented for registration within thirty days after the making of such order, the Sub-Registrar shall obey the same, and thereupon shall, so far as may be practicable, follow the procedure prescribed in sections 58, 59 and 60; and such registration shall take effect as if the document had been registered when it was first duly presented for registration.
75. Order by Registrar to register and procedure thereon.-
(1) If the Registrar finds that the document has been executed and that the said requirements have been complied with, he shall order the document to be registered.
(2) If the document is duly presented for registration within thirty days after the making of such order, the registering officer shall obey the same and thereupon shall, so far as may be practicable, follow the procedure prescribed in sections 58, 59 and 60.
(3) Such registration shall take effect as if the document had been registered when it was first duly presented for registration:
(4) The Registrar may, for the purpose of any enquiry under section 74, summon and enforce the attendance of witness, and compel them to give evidence, as if he were a Civil Court and he may also direct by whom the whole or any part of the costs of any such enquiry shall be paid, and such costs shall be recoverable as if they had been awarded in a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).
76. Order of refusal by Registrar.-
(1) Every Registrar refusing—
(a) to register a document except on the ground that the property to which it relates is not situate within his district or that the document ought to be registered in the office of a Sub-Registrar, or
(b) to direct the registration of a document under section 72 or section 75, shall make an order of refusal and record the reasons for such order in his Book No. 2, and, on application made by any person executing or claiming under the document, shall, without unnecessary delay, give him a copy of the reasons so recorded.
(2) No appeal lies from any order by a Registrar under this section or section 72.
77. Suit in case of order of refusal by Registrar.-
(1) Where the Registrar refuses to order the document to be registered, under section 72 or a decree section 76, any person claiming under such document, or his representative, assign or agent, may, within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal, institute in the Civil Court, within the local limits of whose original jurisdiction is situate the office in which the document is sought to be registered, a suit for a decree directing the document to be registered in such office if it be duly presented for registration within thirty days after the passing of such decree.
(2) The provisions contained in sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 75 shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to all documents presented for registration in accordance with any such decree, and, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the documents shall be receivable in evidence in such suit.''
12. It is also just and necessary to extract the Rules 166 and 167 under Chapter XXIV of the Registration Rules framed by the Tamil Nadu State Government under Section 69 of the Act vide Gazette Notification Part II of the Fort St. George Gazette dated June 28, 1949. Said Chapter XXIV is titled as 'Appeals and Enquiries' and Rules 166 and 167 thereunder sets out the procedure for filing of an appeal. Relevant extract reads thus:
"CHAPTER XXIV (Sections 41(2) and 72 to 76 of the Act) APPEALS AND ENQUIRIES
166. (i) An appeal under section 72 of the Act or an application under section 73 shall be presented in writing to the Registrar of the district or to the officer incharge of the Registrar's Office, accompanied by a copy of the refusal order appealed against and the original document in respect of which the order was passed.
(ii) When the document is stated to be in the possession of some person other than the appellant and the latter desire time to obtain and produce it or the issue of a summons for its production, the request may be complied with and the appeal or application admitted pending receipt of the document.
167. (i) An, appeal under section 72 shall be presented either by the appellant or by a certificated pleader duly authorised on his behalf by a vakalat attested in the manner prescribed in the Civil Rules of Practice applicable to Mofussil Civil Courts or by an agent holding a power of attorney authenticated as laid down in section 33 of the Act.
(ii) An application under section 73 shall be presented in person by the party or by an agent holding a power of attorney authenticated as aforesaid.
(iii) An appeal or an application shall not be accepted or acted upon if sent by post.''
13. From a bare reading of Sections 72, 75 to 77 of the Act, it is vivid that, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, there exists an appeal remedy under Section 72 of the Act for the writ petitioner if he is not satisfied or feels aggrieved by the Refusal Check Slip issued by the third appellant refusing to register his document. And if the decision rendered in appeal is not satisfactory to any of the party to the document sought to be registered, they are given another option to knock the doors of Civil Court by way of Statutory Suit under Section 77 of the Act. Thus, there exists an alternative course of remedy to the aggrieved writ petitioner in the parent statute itself viz., the Act, containing an appeal remedy on the Refusal Check Slip and followed by the remedy to file a Statutory Suit when aggrieved by the decision in the former. This is also accompanied by rules setting out the procedure for filing an appeal. There is clearly a presence of alternative and efficacious course of action / remedy for the writ petitioner, which in fact would be more appropriate for reasons set out infra.
14. The writ petitioner does not claim any violation of principles of natural justice or fundamental rights. Nor there seems to be any apparent or gross violation thereof. Further, there neither any claim of excess of jurisdiction nor any challenge to the vires of a statute. In such a scenario, the Writ Petition simply does not slot itself under any of the aforementioned exceptions to the alternative remedy rule. Therefore, this Court decides that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the presence of alternative course of remedy under Sections 72 and 77 of the Act.
15. Moreover, as stated supra, pursuing the alternative course of remedy is the best and most appropriate option given that the case involves title dispute. According to the appellants, there exists some registered documents in favour of a few individuals who claim title from their ancestor's registered Sale Deed dating back to 1885 and partitioned the subject property vide registered partition in 2012 as stated above. On the other hand, the writ petitioner claims title from a registered Sale Deed dating back to 1890 and seeks to registered his Sale Agreement in respect of the subject property. Both parties seem to be claiming title based on documents dating back more than a century. As there are some documents already registered, it is the duty of the writ petitioner to prima facie establish his title. It would involve deciding on multiple factual aspects. Further, the TSLR in the typed set of papers annexed along with file of the Writ Appeal, would show that Adangal for Survey Nos.191 and 193 (subject property) has mention of names of a religious endowment and a temple viz., 'Kasi Viswanatha Swami Thirukarthigai Kattalai' and 'Vijaya Easwarai Ammal Kovil Kappalar Tharakala Member A.Subramania Mudaliyar'. It states their names and nothing further. At the same time, no individual person's name has been mentioned. This could mean that the endowment and the temple have some right over the subject property. If it is so, Section 22A of the Act would come into picture and there arises a need for sanction from competent authority to register any document in respect of the subject property [See Judgment of this Court in Sudha Ravi Kumar -vs- The Special Commissioner and Commissioner, HR & CE Department, reported in AIR 2017 Mad 203, wherein the procedure to be followed when it is a Temple Land and Section 22A of the Act comes into picture].
15.1. Further, Survey Nos.191 and 193 were converted into Town Survey Number (T.S.No.2 & 4 respectively) Palayamkottai Town, Veeraraghava Mudaliyar Chatram, Part-II (ward). But, the writ petitioner's Sale Agreement dated March 20, 2025 sought to be registered, no Town Survey Number has been mentioned for the reasons best known to the writ petitioner. When this Court specifically put a question to the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent herein / writ petitioner as to why the Town Survey Number has not been mentioned, there was no satisfactory answer. The writ petitioner failed to annex the original of his alleged Title Deed and the whereabouts of the original was also not satisfactorily explained before this Court. Further, the writ petitioner's alleged Title Deed viz., the Sale Deed registered in Document No.1836 of 1890, the property covered therein has only been described by four boundaries. The same is quite natural as there may not have been any survey numbers assigned or any practice of including survey number in those days, but in such a case, the writ petitioner ought to have let in documents to corroborate that the property covered under his alleged Title Deed and that under his Sale Agreement are one and the same, or at least that the latter forms a part of the former. But he failed to do so. The writ petitioner did not satisfactorily establish his prima-facie title or possession as described in the Sale Agreement dated March 20, 2025.
16. Similarly, upon perusal of the alleged Title Deed of the third parties namely Velayutham and Pandaram, which is a photocopy of a Sale Deed dating back to 1885 (Document No.1774 of 1885) annexed in the types-set of papers on the file of this Writ Appeal, the property covered therein has also been described by four boundaries alone which leads to the same doubt as to whether the property covered therein is the same subject property in the alleged Partition Deed dated June 29, 2012.
17. In these circumstances, there needs to be an in-depth factual inquiry into the matter, which cannot be done by this Court under writ jurisdiction. For this reason, it is apt to pursue the alternative course of remedy available to the writ petitioner under Sections 72 and 77 of the Act.
18. The learned Single Judge in their Order directed the third appellant to register the document and remark as 'double entry' in the appropriate records. The concept of noting 'double entry' in the relevant registers and records maintained by the Registration Department is unknown to the Registration Act and Rule thereon, and it in the opinion of this Court is not justifiable.
19. Coming to the case laws relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent herein / writ petitioner, in Packiri Rajan's Case [cited supra], a learned Single Judge of this Court held that once upon conducting an enquiry the competent authority finds a transaction to be fraudulent, the same must be reflected in the registration records and the procedure and guidelines set out in Circular of the Inspector General of Registration in Letter No.41530/U1/2017 dated July 31, 2018 must be followed. This Court has no quarrel with the same. It is not relevant to the facts of the present case, as in the present case, there was no enquiry or finding qua fraudulent transaction.
19.1.In Sureshbabu's Case [cited supra], a learned Single Judge of this Court held that once the commission of an offence of forged document comes to the knowledge, the affected person is supposed to file a complaint before Police. In the case on hand, the writ petitioner alleges that his family filed a complaint before Police in Crime No.37 of 2015, however its status is unknown. No document has been submitted by the writ petitioner in this regard. Anyhow, while there is no serious quarrel with the view of the learned Single Judge, the same does not come to the aid of the writ petitioner in this case. It is not of much relevance.
19.2. In Muhammed Ashfaq's Case [cited supra], a learned Single Judge directed the concerned authority to conduct enquiry under Section 83 of the Act and pass appropriate orders. The prayer in the Writ Petition in hand is limited to a direction for registration of Sale Agreement and pursuant Sale Deed to be executed. There is no prayer qua enquiry. Hence, this Court is of the view that Muhammed Ashfaq's Case does not help the writ petitioner.
20. As stated above, the Writ Petition is not maintainable as there is an alternative course of remedy available to the writ petitioner under Sections 72 and 77 of the Act, which are best suited to the facts and attending circumstances of the case. Therefore, this Court is inclined to intervene with the Order passed by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, this Writ Appeal is liable to be allowed and the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed.
21. It is to be noted that an appeal under Section 72 of the Act must be filed within thirty days from the date of issuance of the Refusal Check Slip. In this case, the date of Sale Agreement is March 20, 2025. The Sale Agreement was presented and the refusal Check Slip was registered on the same day viz., March 20, 2025. The writ petitioner chose to file the Writ Petition and accordingly, filed on April 24, 2025. The same was allowed on July 7, 2025. Thereafter, copy application was filed on July 8, 2025 and the same was received on October 25, 2025 by the appellants. The appellants filed Writ Appeal on October 29, 2025 and an Order of 'status qua' was passed vide order dated November 11, 2025 in C.M.P.(MD).No.18094 of 2025. As there is no serious delay on the part of the writ petitioner, in the interest of justice, this Court is inclined to direct the second appellant who is the appellate authority under Section 72 of the Act, to take on file the writ petitioner's appeal over the impugned Refusal Check Slip dated March 20, 2025, if any filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order, if otherwise found in order.
CONCLUSION
22. Resultantly, the Writ Appeal is allowed and the Order of the learned Single Judge is set aside with the following observations:
(i)The writ petitioner is at liberty to file an appeal under Section 72 of the Registration Act, 1908 within 30 days from the receipt of a copy of this Order.
(ii)If the same is found in order except for the delay, the second appellant / appellate authority under Section 72 of Registration Act, 1908 shall take the same on file and pass appropriate orders untrammelled or uninfluenced by any observations made by this Court.
(iii)To be noted, any observation made by this Court touching upon the merits of the case is solely for the purpose of deciding the Writ Appeal.
22.1.The Stay Petition in C.M.P. (MD) No.18094 of 2025, and the Vacate Interim Order petition in CMP.(MD).SR.No.55079 of 2026 filed by the respondent herein / writ petitioner shall stand closed.
22.2.In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
