1) Respondent No.3 is owner of the suit property, which comprises of land bearing Survey Nos.119/2 and 119/3 of Village Raiwadi, Tah. Saoner, Dist. Nagpur. The petitioner and respondent No.3 are related to each other. On 06.02.1991, the father of petitioner and respondent No.3 entered into an agreement by executing a document in Hindi titled as, ‘Muawja Compensation Pavti Receipt (Sammati Patra)’, whereby respondent No.3 stated that he had received entire compensation for the suit property from the father of petitioner and accordingly stated that lease with respect to the suit property can be granted to the father of petitioner for mining of clay for setting up for a brick kiln. The said agreement is entered into for a consideration of Rs.75,000/-. Thereafter, on 16.11.2015, the father of petitioner and respondent No.3 have executed another document titled as Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), whereby the respondent No.3 has received an amount of Rs.5,00,000/-from the father of petitioner and, in lieu thereof, has issued a declaration that the suit property is owned by the father of petitioner and that respondent No.3 has no right, title or interest in the same. The MOU ratifies the earlier agreement dated 06.02.1991. It is stated that ever-since 06.02.1991, the father of petitioner is in possession of the suit property. The document confirms that amount of Rs.5,00,000/- is received by respondent No.3 from the father of petitioner through RTGS. Both the aforesaid documents are not in dispute. Likewise, it is also not in dispute that respondent No.3 had received aforesaid amount of Rs.75,000/- under the earlier agreement and Rs.5,00,000/- under the subsequent MOU. It must also be stated that respondent No.3 has executed a Power of Attorney dated 10.01.2018 in favour of father of petitioner. The said Power of Attorney is a registered document. Respondent No.3 has authorized the father of petitioner to take appropriate steps in relation to proceedings relating to acquisition of the suit property.

2) Shortly thereafter, respondent No.3 issued legal notice dated 26.02.2018 to the father of petitioner, cancelling the Power of Attorney. It will be pertinent to state that although the Power of Attorney is executed on 10.01.2018, the date is erroneously mentioned as 10.01.2017. The petitioner issued reply notice dated 24.03.2018 stating that respondent No.3 had no right, title or interest over the suit property in view of the agreements dated 06.02.1991 and 16.11.2015.

3) Proceeding for acquisition of lands, including suit property, was initiated for Kanhan River Project (Kochhi Barrage). The Land Acquisition Officer passed award with respect to the suit property in the name of respondent No.3. The petitioner had filed an application for making reference for apportionment of compensation as per Section 76 and 77 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (herein-after referred to as “the RFCTLARR Act,” for brevity).

4) The petitioner filed a petition before this Court being Writ Petition No.3979 of 2023, inter alia, contending that application for reference under Section 76 was not accepted by the Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition). This Court allowed the said petition directing the petitioner to re-tender the application under Section 76 with further directions to the Deputy Collector to pass appropriate orders on the application. Thereafter, the Deputy Collector made a reference to the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority (hereinafter referred to as “Authority” for brevity), constituted under Section 51 of the RFCTLARR Act, which came to be registered as Case No.3/NGP/NEP/2025, Mouza – Raiwadi.

5) In the meantime, in view of dispute that arose between the parties, the father of the petitioner had instituted a suit for specific performance of contract, being Special Civil Suit No.78 of 2022. The said suit was initially filed before the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur and was registered as Special Civil Suit No.882 of 2018. The suit came to be transferred to the Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Saoner and was re-registered as Special Civil Suit No.78 of 2022. In the said suit, an order of temporary injunction was filed vide Exhibit 5, which has been allowed vide order dated 08.08.2025. By the said order, respondent No.3 is restrained from disturbing possession of the petitioner’s father (plaintiff) over the suit property and also from creating third party interest over the same till final decision of the suit. The suit is pending as on date. Respondent No.3 has filed an application for dismissal of suit on the ground that the suit property was acquired by the State Government, possession of the land is taken and Land Acquisition Officer has passed award with respect to compensation. It is contended that in view of the subsequent development the agreements on the basis of which suit was filed were rendered void. The petitioner, who is now prosecuting the suit after the demise of his father, filed an application for amendment of plaint stating that in view of acquisition of the suit property, he is entitled to receive the entire compensation payable for the suit property. Both these applications for dismissal of suit and amendment of plaint are pending.

6) In this backdrop of facts, the petitioner filed an application before the Authority under the RFCTLARR Act seeking stay of the proceedings. Respondent No.3 strongly opposed the said application. The learned Authority has rejected the said application vide order dated 05.01.2026. This order dated 05.01.2026, refusing to grant stay to proceedings under Section RFCTLARR Act, is subject matter of challenge in the present petition.

7) Mr. R. M. Bhangde, learned advocate for the petitioner, argues that the execution of agreements in question and receipt of consideration under the same is not in dispute. He further contends that the petitioner's father was placed in possession of the suit property and till possession of the suit property was taken by authorities under the RFCTLARR Act, possession of the suit property remained with the petitioner. The learned advocate also contends that in the subsequent agreement dated 16.11.2015, respondent No.3 has declared that he has no subsisting right, title or interest in the suit property. The learned advocate states that the right of the petitioner is admitted and is undisputable. He, however, contends that before the sale deed could be executed, the suit property is acquired by the State Government. Mr. Bhangde claims that since his claim is based on agreements, the same can be adjudicated only by a Civil Court. The learned advocate contends that the Authority under the RFCTLARR Act will not have jurisdiction to decide the claim for specific performance of contract. The learned Advocate contends that if the proceedings before the Competent Authority are decided prior to adjudication of the civil suit, his claim to receive compensation will obviously be rejected, since the said Authority does not have jurisdiction to grant relief of specific performance of contract. The learned advocate contends that Civil Court alone will have the jurisdiction to decide the claim of petitioner for specific performance of contract. The learned advocate states that application for stay of proceedings was therefore required to be filed before the Competent Authority. He argues that the learned Competent Authority has erred in law in rejecting the said application. The learned advocate has placed strong reliance on judgment of the Hon’ble Suprme Court in the case of Sukhbir Vs. Ajit Singh, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 54.

8) Per contra, Mr. D. L. Dharmadhikari, learned advocate for respondent No.3, supports the impugned order. The contention of Mr. Dharmadhikari is that the initial agreement dated 06.02.1991 is not an agreement of sale, inasmuch as the said agreement merely allow the petitioner’s father to extract clay from the suit property for the purpose of his brick kiln. It is contended that the suit property is acquired by the State Government and possession thereof is already taken, as a consequence of which the agreement has become void since it is impossible to be performed. The learned advocate would contend that in such a situation, although claim for damages may survive, the plaintiff has not claimed any specified amount of damages in the civil suit. Drawing attention to the application for amendment, the learned advocate argues that by way of amendment, the petitioner does not intend to seek compensation of any specified amount, but entire amount of compensation for the acquired land. The learned advocate states that such a claim will not be maintainable before the Civil Court. It is his contention that the prayer made by the petitioner before the Competent Authority and the prayer sought to be incorporated by way of amendment is the same. He argues that since the same prayer cannot be made before two separate forums the suit itself is not now maintainable and consequently proceedings under Section 76 cannot be stayed in view of pendency of such suit. The learned advocate further argues that jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred with respect to all matters relating to acquisition of land, which the Collector or the Authority under the Act are competent to decide. He states that since the Authority is competent to decide the issue of apportionment under Section 76 of the RFCTLARR Act, jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred in view of Section 63.

9) The learned advocate has placed reliance on judgment of this Court in the case of Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) No.4, Mumbai Sub-Urban Vs. Ibrahim Musa Athoniya and ors, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2608, to contend that the Authority constituted under the Act alone has the jurisdiction to decide issue of apportionment and that Civil Court does not have jurisdiction to decide the same. Likewise, reliance is also placed on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd., and anr. Vs. B. Gurappa Naidu and ors, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 745 to draw attention to limited scope of interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

10) The learned advocate seeks to distinguish the judgment in the case of Sukhbir (supra) on the ground that in the said case, before acquisition of the land, decree for specific performance was already passed by the Trial Court, resulting in adjudication of right and that the land was acquired after the decree was passed.

11) Before coming to merits of the matter, it will be appropriate to recapitulate certain fundamental principles with respect to jurisdiction of a Civil Courts and Tribunals/Authorities constituted under different enactments. The jurisdiction of Civil Court is all pervasive. It has jurisdiction to decide all disputes of civil nature except in cases where the jurisdiction is barred either expressly or by necessary implication. It must also be remembered that even in cases where a statute specifically bars jurisdiction of a Civil Court, yet the Civil Court can entertain the dispute, if all the reliefs claimed are not capable of being granted by Authority/Tribunal constituted under an enactment. It is well settled that in cases where an Act provides for a special forum for adjudication of certain claims and simultaneously bars jurisdiction of Civil Court, yet the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to decide issues which fall within the jurisdiction of such Statutory Authority, if all the issues raised and all the reliefs claimed cannot be adjudicated or granted by the special forum.

12) Sections 76 and 63 of the Act are required to be considered in view of this legal position. Section 76 of the Act confers jurisdiction upon the Authority under the Act to decide disputes with respect entitlement and/or apportionment of compensation. Section 63 of the Act bars jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain any dispute relating to land acquisition, jurisdiction in relation to which is vested with the Authority under the said Act.

13) Section 63 and 76 of the Act are reproduced herein-below for ready reference:-

                    “63. Jurisdiction of civil courts barred.

                    - No civil court (other than High Court under article 226 or article 227 of the Constitution or the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction to entertain any dispute relating to land acquisition in respect of which the Collector or the Authority is empowered by or under this Act, and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any such matter.

                    76. Dispute as to apportionment.

                    - When the amount of compensation has been settled, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such disputes to the Authority.”

14) Before dealing with the core issue involved, it is necessary to consider the nature of a suit for specific performance. A suit for specific performance of contract is not a suit for property forming subject matter thereof. The suit for specific performance is a suit for enforcement of contract. The dispute in a suit for specific performance of contract is a contractual dispute and not a dispute relating to property forming subject matter thereof. Reliance in support of this legal proposition can safely be placed on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Adcons Electronics Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Daulat and Anr., reported in (2001) 7 SCC 698.

15) There are two provisions for reference to the Authority under RFCTLARR Act, viz. Sections 64 and 76. Section 64 deals with a reference with respect to quantum of compensation awarded by the Collector/LAO. Section 76 deals with entitlement to, or apportionment of, compensation awarded inter se between persons claiming right over the land acquired. Whereas Sections 64 uses the word, “shall”, the word, “may” is used in Section 76. This is so because in every case, adjudication of right to entitlement or apportionment thereof may not be within the scope of jurisdiction of the Authority. The Legislature was alive to this situation and has, therefore, designedly used the word “may” in Section 76 in contrast to the word “shall” in Section 64.

16) There are several claims, such as serious title disputes, serious disputes of fraud, etc., as also a claim for specific performance of contract, which will not fall within the jurisdiction of the Authority constituted under the Act. Such claims will have to be decided by a Civil Court alone. Particularly, a claim for specific performance of contract can only be decided by a Civil Court. The Authority under the Act is not clothed with the said jurisdiction.

17) In this regard it will also be appropriate to refer to Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter, “the L.A. Act” for brevity) which is a pari materia with Section 76 of the RFCTLARR Act. Both the provisions are identically worded. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the scope of Section 30 of the L.A. Act in the case of Ramesh Chand and ors Vs. Tanmay Developers Pvt. Ltd., and ors, reported in (2017) 13 SCC 715, in the said case, the land owners had entered into five agreements of sale and had received earnest money under the said agreement. The purchaser failed to make payment of sale consideration within the period stipulated for performance of contract, which expired in the months of September and October, 2006. Consequently, the land owners forfeited the earnest money. Thereafter, notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act was issued on 18.03.2008. The purchaser instituted three suits for recovery of earnest money and one suit for specific performance of contract. The suit for specific performance of contract filed in March, 2008 was decreed on 18.04.2014. The land acquisition officer passed award under Section 11 of the Act on 19.09.2008. The purchaser also filed application seeking reference under Section 30 of the L.A. Act for apportionment of compensation. The Reference Court rejected the reference on the ground that the claim for refund of earnest money and specific performance of contract cannot be adjudicated under Section 30 of the L.A. Act. In Appeal preferred before the High Court, order of refund of earnest money was passed in favour of the purchaser. The land owner, therefore, approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court contending that High Court had erred in passing an order for refund of earnest under the guise of apportionment of compensation. Accepting the said contention the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

                    “7. It was not rightly disputed that several civil suits with respect to refund of the earnest money and for specific performance of the agreement to sell were filed by Respondent 1 before reference was sought under Section 30 of the Act. Once remedy in the form of civil suits had been resorted to, in our considered opinion, it was not at all proper exercise of power to invoke provisions under Section 30 of the Act with regard to apportionment of the compensation by directing refund of earnest money. It is not mandatory to make a reference to the civil court under Section 30 and adjudication of dispute in an appropriate case can be ordered by way of the civil suit. In the instant case civil suits had already been preferred by Respondent 1. It was not appropriate to decide the same dispute under Section 30.

                    8. In the instant case, there were serious disputed questions as to whether earnest money had been rightly forfeited by the landowners due to the failure of Respondent 1 to obtain the sale deeds executed within stipulated time fixed under the agreements, whether the respondents were ready and willing to purchase the property and had arrangement of balance consideration for payment to the landowners. Whether the power of forfeiture was rightly exercised by the landowners as claimed by them. The civil court was already in seisin of the matter as such the Reference Court had rightly rejected the reference made under Section 30 of the Act and rightly asked the parties to await outcome of the regular civil suits.”

18) The Rajasthan High Court also recently, in the case of Municipal Council v. Rajasthan Information Commission, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Raj. 4348, held that Section 63 of the RFCTLARR Act does not bar a suit for specific performance of contract.

19) It will also be appropriate to refer to judgment of this Court in the case of Sandeep Vs. Suchita, reported in 2020 (1) All MR 551. In the said case, a suit for declaration that sale deed executed in favour of defendants was illegal, sham and obtained by fraud with a consequential relief for permanent injunction was filed. The suit property was under acquisition under the provisions of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development), Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred as “the CBA Act” for brevity). Section 26 of the CBA Act, bars jurisdiction of Civil Court with respect to matters which the Competent Authority under the said Act is empowered to determine. The defendants, therefore, filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, contending that jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred and as such the plaint was liable to be rejected. The Competent Authority under the said Act is vested with jurisdiction to decide claims for entitlement to receive compensation and/or apportionment thereof, under Section 14(5) and 14(6). Dealing with the aforesaid provisions this Court has held that a provision which bars jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be strictly construed. It is held that in cases where civil suits are filed in order to establish title over the acquired land, the jurisdiction of Civil Court will not be ousted. Section 14(5) and 14(6) and 26 of the CBA Act, are pari materia with Section 76 and 63 respectively, of the RFCTLARR Act.

20) In the case like the present, where a dispute pertaining to entitlement over the suit property is already pending before a Court of competent jurisdiction, it will not be necessary to make a reference, since the dispute is pending before a competent Civil Court.

21) As regards maintainability of the suit for specific performance with respect to claim for compensation/damages, it will be appropriate to refer to Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, which provides that in a suit for specific performance of contract, plaintiff may also claim compensation for its breach. The provision also enables the Court to award compensation in situations where it arrives at conclusion that specific performance ought not to be granted or in cases where the Court is of the opinion that compensation must be awarded in addition to relief of specific performance. Section 21(4) provides that in determining the amount of compensation, the Court will be guided by Section 73 of the Contract Act. Section 73 of the Contract Act does not impose an obligation on the plaintiff to quantify the amount of compensation/damages. Such amount is for the Court to determine. In view of the aforesaid, in the considered opinion of this Court, the contention of Mr. Dharmadhikari that the alternate prayer for compensation/damages cannot be granted does not appear to be correct.

22) In this regard it will be appropriate to refer to judgment of the Hon’ble in the case Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 647. In the said case, suit for specific performance and first appeal arising therefrom were dismissed. The purchaser had preferred a second appeal. While the second appeal was pending the suit property was acquired. A contention was raised before the High Court that the acquisition of land, the agreement was no longer capable of performance and the cause in the appeal had become infructuous. The High Court rejected the said contention, holding that, in view of acquisition of land, the subject matter of the suit got transformed from land to money and that the cause in appeal was not rendered infructuous. The Hon’ble Supreme Court did not approve of the aforesaid finding recorded by the High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that upon acquisition of the land, it is impossible to direct specific performance of the agreement. However, it is held that in such case, the purchaser/plaintiff can be granted relief of compensation as provided under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It is further held that in cases where the land is acquired, the compensation awarded towards acquisition of land will be a fair measure of compensation.

23) In this regard, it will be appropriate to refer to judgment of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Mohammad Abdul Jabbar V. Lalmia, reported in 1946 SCC OnLine MP 36, which is dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Singh (supra). In the case before Nagpur High Court, land forming subject matter of suit for specific performance was acquired while suit for specific performance was pending. Suit for specific performance was dismissed on this ground. The High Court upheld the dismissal of the suit for specific performance by recording the following :-

                    "We accordingly conclude that specific performance is now impossible and we cannot decree it for 'equity like nature does nothing in vain'. We cannot hold the plaintiffs-appellants entitled to the compensation money into which the property was converted because they had no right nor interest in that property.…"

This is confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

24) In the aforesaid case in Mohammad Abdul Jabbar (supra) another issue that fell for consideration before the High Court was whether prayer for amendment of plaint to include a claim for damages was rightly rejected by the learned Trial Court. The High Court held that application for amendment was also rightly rejected since claim for damages could be entertained only if the agreement was capable of specific performance and since the agreement was not capable of being specifically enforced, alternate prayer for damages also could not be entertained. Relevant observations of the High Court in the judgment are as under:-

                    "We would not allow amendment also because on the facts found by the trial court (with which we see no reason, whatever, to differ) we would have refused specific performance, and the claim for damages on this account would also have been negatived because damages could have been awarded only if specific per-formance could rightly have been claimed. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs."

This is reversed by the Supreme Court.

25) Dealing with the rejection of prayer to amend the plaint to claim damages, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Jagdish Singh (supra) that the Indian Law makes a specific departure from English Law dealing with award of damages in cases where the contract becomes unenforceable without any fault of the plaintiff. It is held that in such cases, prayer for compensation/damages can be made by the plaintiff. Relevant observations in paragraph 22 and 24 of the judgment are quoted herein-below for ready reference:-

                    “22. The second part of the observation of the Nagpur High Court, with great respect to the learned Judges proceeds on a fallacy resulting from the non-perception of the specific departure in the Indian law. In Lord Cairn's Act, 1858 damages could not be awarded when the contract had, for whatever reason, become incapable of specific performance. But under the Indian law the explanation makes a specific departure and the jurisdiction to award damages remains unaffected by the fact that without any fault of the plaintiff, the contract becomes incapable of specific performance.

                    24. When the plaintiff by his option has made specific performance impossible, Section 21 does not entitle him to seek damages. That position is common to both Section 2 of Lord Cairn's Act, 1858 and Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. But in Indian law where the contract, for no fault of the plaintiff, becomes impossible of performance Section 21 enables award of compensation in lieu and substitution of specific performance.”

26) The contention of Mr. Dharmadhikari that the claim for damages must be for a specified amount is also liable to be rejected in the light of Jagdish Singh (supra), which holds that the compensation awarded for the acquired land which forms subject matter of agreement may well be a fair measure of compensation to be awarded to the plaintiff, if the land forming subject matter of suit for specific performance is acquired, rendering the prayer for specific performance infructuous. Relevant observations in paragraph 29 of the judgment are reproduced herein-below:-

                    29. In the present case there is no difficulty in assessing the quantum of the compensation. That is ascertainable with reference to the determination of the market value in the land acquisition proceedings. The compensation awarded may safely be taken to be the measure of damages subject, of course, to the deduction therefrom of money value of the services, time and energy expended by the appellant in pursuing the claims of compensation and the expenditure incurred by him in the litigation culminating in the award.”

27) The upshot of the above discussion is that where a claim to compensation for acquired land is based on an agreement, the right has to be adjudicated by the Civil Court ant not by Authority constituted under the Act. In cases where a civil suit for specific performance is already filed, it is not even necessary for the plaintiff to apply for reference under Section 76 of the RFCTLARR Act. The rival claims and entitlement to compensation are required to be adjudicated by the Civil Court.

28) In view of the legal position as discussed above, the contention of Mr. Dharmadhikari that suit for specific performance is not maintainable cannot be accepted. Likewise, although the contention that the civil suit is rendered infructuous in view of acquisition of the land is acceptable with respect to prayer for specific performance, the same cannot be accepted with respect to prayer for compensation. The submission that suit for compensation in lieu of specific performance will be maintainable only if the amount of compensation is quantified also cannot be accepted in view of Jagdishsing (supra). As recorded above, Section 21(4) of the Specific Relief Act states that the compensation to be awarded in view of specific performance should be decided by following principles under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act and Section 73 does not postulate that claim for compensation/damages must necessarily be quantified by the plaintiff.

29) An agreement of sale does not, by itself, create interest in the property in view of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The right conferred by an agreement is only an inchoate right, which fructifies upon execution and registration of a document of conveyance. In the present case, the petitioner is prosecuting a suit for specific performance in order to obtain such conveyance. The entitlement of the petitioner to obtain such conveyance can be adjudicated only by the Civil Court and not by Authority under the Act. In such circumstances, if the proceedings before the Authority are not stayed pending the final adjudication of the civil suit, the petitioner will face fait accompli. In that view of the matter, it is necessary that proceedings before the Competent Authority are stayed till the suit for specific performance is adjudicated.

30) The prayer of the petitioner is just, proper and reasonable. The learned Authority under the RFCTLARR Act had clearly erred in rejecting the application for stay filed by the petitioner.

31) In view of the above, the petition deserved to be allowed and is allowed in the following terms:-

I. Order dated 05.01.2026 passed by the learned Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, Authority Nagpur on application at Exhbiit 8 in Case No.3/NAG/NGP/2025, Mouza – Raiwadi, Tahsil Saoner, District Nagpur is quashed and set aside and the said application at Exhbit 8 is allowed by directing that the proceedings in the aforesaid case before the Authority shall remain stayed till final disposal of Special Civil Suit No.78 of 2022 pending on the file of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Saoner.

II. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Saoner is requested to decide Special Civil Suit No.78 of 2022 as expeditiously as possible and preferably before 31.07.2027.