P. Krishna Kumar, J.

1. The application filed by accused Nos. 9 and 10 seeking pre-arrest bail under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita was dismissed by the Special Court for the Trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam. The said order is under challenge in this appeal.

2. On 07.02.2026, the Sub Inspector of Police, Thirurangadi, intercepted a lorry parked within the compound of a hollow bricks manufacturing unit near Thirurangadi, based on prior information that explosives were being transported in the said vehicle. Upon inspection, the police team found 35 boxes containing 10,500 non-electric detonators and 448 boxes containing 89,600 gelatin sticks inside the lorry. The explosives and detonators were found buried beneath 133 sacks of onions. The police arrested six persons and registered a case for offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (for short, "the Act"). Subsequently, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) took over the investigation, suspecting a larger conspiracy behind the incident. The NIA alleges that the appellants are the principal conspirators in the crime and have played a central role in facilitating the unlawful activities under investigation.

3. The appellants are the proprietors of M/s. Chetan Enterprises, a firm engaged in the business of explosives. They allegedly purchased the seized articles from M/s. Vetrivel Explosives, Trichy, and, pursuant to the criminal conspiracy, deliberately removed and tampered with the barcode labels affixed on the explosive packages with the intention of concealing their origin, ownership, and movement, and thereafter unlawfully sold them to the first accused for illegal and unlawful purposes, it is alleged.

4. The appellants, on the other hand, contended that they are lawful businessmen engaged in the trade of explosives under a valid licence and permit. According to them, even if the allegations levelled against them are assumed to be true, they do not constitute the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act.

5. We have heard Sri. John S. Ralph, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, and Sri. P. Sreekumar, the learned Additional Solicitor General of India at the High Court of Kerala, on behalf of the prosecution.

6. The learned counsel for the appellants raised the following contentions in support of the plea that they are entitled to the relief of pre-arrest bail. Section 4 of the Act would have no application to the facts of the present case, as admittedly there was no attempt to explode any of the seized articles. Section 5 of the Act can be invoked only where a person "makes or knowingly has in his possession or under his control any explosive substance" with an unlawful object. The expression "unlawful object" is to be understood in the light of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act as well as the legislative purpose underlying its enactment. Therefore, the possession or control of an explosive substance by a person would not amount to possession or control for an unlawful object under Section 5 unless it is for an object made punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Since the appellants are licensed dealers in explosives, it cannot, under any circumstances, be said that their object was unlawful within the meaning of Sections 3 or 4, nor can they be held liable for the unlawful object for which the other accused persons possessed the seized articles, as the alleged causation is too remote and distinct. Even if the appellants had facilitated the removal of the barcode labels to avoid tracking of the materials or manipulated the records to conceal the movement of the explosives while selling them to the other accused persons, such acts would constitute, at best, bailable offences punishable under the provisions of the Explosives Act, 1884. Even assuming that the appellants sold the explosive substances to the other accused persons with the knowledge that they would be used in unauthorised quarries for illegal mining operations, it would not amount to an offence punishable under Section 5 of the Act, as the appellants were not in possession or control of the explosive substances at the time when the police intercepted the other accused persons. As the appellants have been engaged in the business of selling explosives for nearly a decade, certain other criminal cases involving similar allegations have been registered against them, the same would not disentitle them from claiming the benefit of pre-arrest bail, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Others (AIR 2011 SC 312).

7. Refuting the above contentions, the learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that, during the search conducted at the premises of the appellants, the investigating officials recovered the barcode labels that had been removed from the explosive packages. It was further submitted that the appellants had fabricated a document to create the impression that the seized explosives had already been consumed in blasting operations at a quarry. The explosive licence issued in favour of the appellants had already been suspended, and, therefore, even the sale effected by them in favour of the accused persons was unlawful. The appellants generated a sale invoice subsequent to the date of seizure, namely, on 08.02.2026, which clearly indicates that the appellants had continued to retain actual possession or control over the explosive substances even at the time of seizure. The learned Additional Solicitor General further contended that the concealment of the explosives beneath more than 100 sacks of onions and the removal of the barcode labels with a view to prevent the tracking of their movement clearly indicate the unlawful object of the appellants, which requires thorough investigation, for which their custodial interrogation is indispensable. It was further argued that, the possibility of the explosives being intended for use in anti-national activities cannot be ruled out, and therefore the appellants are not entitled to the relief of pre-arrest bail. It was also submitted that the appellants are involved in several other criminal cases involving offences under Section 5 of the Act as well as Sections 149, 326 and 336 of the Indian Penal Code.

8. We have perused the case diary to assess the present stage of the investigation as well as the materials collected thus far by the investigating agency, as against the appellants. Although we do not, at present, find any material indicating that the explosives were procured for the use in any anti-national activities, we are unable to accept the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants for more than one reason.

9. Primarily, Section 5 of the Act appears to be an independent provision, rather than one which is merely ancillary to, or controlled by, Sections 3 or 4. Section 3 of the Act was enacted to deal with persons who unlawfully and maliciously cause an explosion by means of an explosive substance, which is likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to property. Section 4 provides for the punishment for attempt to commit the offence under Section 3. The punishment provided for the above offences includes imprisonment for life. Section 5, on the other hand, is intended to punish the making of, or the possession or control of, an explosive substance for an unlawful object. The punishment prescribed for the offence, in the ordinary course, may extend to ten years' imprisonment; however, no minimum term of imprisonment has been prescribed. Section 5 reads thus:

                  “5. Punishment for making or possessing explosives under suspicious circumstances-

                  Any person who makes or knowingly has in his possession or under his control any explosive substance or special category explosive substance, under such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he is not making it or does not have it in his possession or under his control for a lawful object, shall, unless he can show that he made it or had it in his possession or under his control for a lawful object, be punished,-

                  (a) in the case of any explosive substance, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;

                  (b) in the case of any special category explosive substance, with rigorous imprisonment for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

                  (Emphasis added)

                  What emerges from the text of Section 5 is that the possession or control of an explosive substance by a person, under circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that it was not for a lawful object, attracts the offence under the said provision. The expression "lawful object" is not defined in the Act. It must, therefore, be understood in its ordinary and natural sense. We are unable to find anything in Section 5 to indicate that it applies only where the possession or control of the explosive substance is for an unlawful object contemplated under Sections 3 or 4 of the Act. On the contrary, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act also indicates otherwise. It reads thus:

                  “Statement of object and reasons -

                  Recent events have brought prominently to notice the inadequacy of the existing law to deal with crimes committed by means of explosive substances. The In-dian Explosives Act, 1884, was framed to prevent accidents rather than to prevent crime and its provisions are clearly inadequate to meet the present emergency. No sentence of imprisonment can be imposed under that Act and the maximum penalty is only a fine of three thousand rupees. The Indian Arms Act, 1878, though it applies to the possession of explosives as well as arms, is also inadequate in respect of both of the penalties it allows and the scope of its provisions for dealing promptly with preparations to manufacture bombs and other explosives. The Penal Code provides for the punishment of persons who cause hurt or mischief by means of explosive substances and it also deals with attempts to cause hurt or mischief but only when any act towards the commission of the offence is actually done. But it does not provide any penalty for making or possessing explosive substances with unlawful intent and it does not in other cases always provide such severe penalties as are requisite. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, considers it necessary to supplement the existing law by an Act on the lines of the English Explosive Substances Act, 1883, which was enacted for the expressed purpose of dealing with anarchist crimes. The Bill which has been drafted to give effect to this decision provides for a punishment of any person who causes an explosion likely to endanger life or property, or who attempts to cause such an explosion, or makes or has in his possession any explosive substance with intent to endanger life or property. It further makes the manufacture or possession of explosive substances for any other than a lawful object a substantive offence and throws on the person who makes or is in possession of any explosive substance the onus of proving that the making or possession was lawful. It also provides adequately for the punishment both of principals and acessories."

                  (Emphasis Added)

                  The provisions of the Explosives Act, 1884 and the Rules framed thereunder make it clear that a licensed dealer can sell explosives only to persons holding a valid licence. Hence, it appears prima facie that, the possession or control of explosives, even by a licensed seller, for the purpose of selling them to unlicensed persons for use in unauthorised quarries, would also amount to an "unlawful object" within the meaning of Section 5. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention that the sale of explosives by a licensed dealer would not attract Section 5, even if the sale was knowingly effected for use in unauthorised quarrying operations. Merely because the acts of the appellants may also constitute bailable offences under the Explosives Act, 1884, it does not follow that the same acts cannot simultaneously attract Section 5 of the Act, provided the constituent elements of the said provision are otherwise satisfied.

10. We are also not impressed by the contention that, unless the appellants were found in possession of the explosive substances at the time of interception by the police, they could not be proceeded against for the offence punishable under Section 5 on the basis of their prior possession or control of the explosives, even if such possession or control was for an unlawful object. It appears to us that the offence under Section 5 stands completed the moment a person knowingly possesses or controls an explosive substance for an unlawful object, and the subsequent parting with the explosive substance does not efface the completed offence.

11. The materials available in the case diary, prima facie, suggest that the appellants intentionally aided the first accused with the full knowledge that he would use the explosives in unauthorised quarries. In such circumstances, the appellants may also be liable to be prosecuted under Section 6 of the Act, even if their earlier possession in the above circumstances were ultimately found not to attract Section 5. It is true that the prosecution has not thus far, invoked Section 6 of the Act. However, while considering the question whether pre-arrest bail should be granted, the duty of the Court is to examine the allegations in their entirety and to ascertain whether they, prima facie, disclose the commission of a serious non-bailable offence, and whether the accused is entitled to the discretionary relief of pre-arrest bail. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the acts alleged against them would constitute only bailable offences under the Explosives Act, 1884.

12. For the aforesaid reasons, and having regard to the previous involvement of the appellants in several other criminal cases, including one involving an offence under Section 5 of the Act, the gravity of the allegations levelled against them, the staggering quantity of explosives involved, and the conduct attributed to them in attempting to prevent the tracking of the movement of the explosives, we find no justification for granting them the relief of pre-arrest bail, particularly at this initial stage of the investigation. The custodial interrogation of the appellants appears to be necessary for the effective progress of the investigation.

13. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Judge has rightly rejected the application for pre-arrest bail. Consequently, this appeal is liable to be dismissed.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed. We make it clear that the observations contained in this judgment are confined to the consideration of the prayer for pre-arrest bail. They are purely prima facie in nature and shall not bind either party or prejudice the trial Court at the post-charge-sheet stage.