Anil K. Narendran, J.

1. The petitioner, who is the wife of the detenue - Sijo Sebastian @ Sijoni, S/o. Sebastian, Thazhathuparambil House - has filed this writ petition, invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of habeas corpus commanding the respondents to produce the body of the detenue before this Court and set him at liberty; and a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P1 order of preventive detention dated 23.04.2026 passed by the 2nd respondent District Magistrate and District Collector, Kottayam, under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA (P) Act]. The document marked as Ext.P2 is a copy of the grounds of detention, in which the 2nd respondent considered four cases registered against the detenue.

2. In the writ petition, it is contended that out of four cases considered to pass the order of detention, two cases have been registered suo motu by the Sub Inspector of the concerned Police Stations and hence, the detenue cannot be classified as a ‘known rowdy’ under clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act, in view of sub-clause (iii) of clause (p). The detenue was enlarged on bail on 10.04.2026 in the last prejudicial activity registered against him. The 2nd respondent passed Ext.P1 order of preventive detention only on 23.04.2026. Thus, on account of the delay in passing the detention order, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order is snapped. There is no recital in Ext.P1 order of detention as to the bail conditions in the third crime, i.e., Crime No.1792/2025 of Ollur Police Station, and the 2nd respondent mechanically passed the order of detention stating that there is violation of the bail conditions. Other than mere recital in Ext.P1 detention order, no application has been filed before the concerned court for cancellation of bail on account of the alleged violation.

3. On 23.06.2026, when this writ petition came up for admission, it was ordered that a counter affidavit on behalf of the 1st respondent shall be placed on record within two weeks.

4. Along with a memo dated 23.07.2026 filed by the learned Government Pleader, the written instructions dated 02.07.2026 of the 3rd respondent District Police Chief, Kottayam, are placed on record.

5. We heard arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for the respondents.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that out of four cases considered to pass the order of detention, two cases (cases C and D) have been registered suo motu by the Sub Inspector of the concerned Police Stations and hence, the detenue cannot be classified as a ‘known rowdy’ under clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act, in view of sub-clause (iii) of clause (p). The learned counsel further contended that the detenue was enlarged on bail on 10.04.2026 in the last prejudicial activity registered against him. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent passed Ext.P1 order of preventive detention only on 23.04.2026. Thus, on account of the delay in passing the detention order, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order is snapped. Moreover, there is no recital in Ext.P1 order of detention as to the bail conditions in the third crime, i.e., Crime No.1792/2025 of Ollur Police Station, and the 2nd respondent mechanically passed the order of detention stating that there is violation of the bail conditions. Other than mere recital in Ext.P1 detention order, no application has been filed before the concerned court for cancellation of bail on account of the alleged violation.

7. The learned Government Pleader for the respondents contended that the two cases (cases C and D) registered suo motu by the Sub Inspector of the concerned Police Stations can also be considered for classifying the detenue as ‘known rowdy’ under clause (p) of Section 2 of KAA (P) Act, in view of sub-clause (iii) of clause (p). The contention that live link between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order is snapped is untenable and therefore, no interference is warranted on Ext.P1 order of detention on that ground. On the contention that there is no recital in Ext.P1 order of detention as to the bail conditions in the third crime, i.e., Crime No.1792/2025 of Ollur Police Station, the learned Government Pleader contended that the involvement of the detenue in the fourth crime, while he was on bail in the third crime, alone is sufficient to show that the bail conditions imposed by the court are insufficient to restrain the detenue from being involved in criminal activities. The reports of the concerned Station House Officer before the Additional Sessions Court for cancellation of bail granted to the detenue are disclosed in Ext.P1 order of detention and a reading of that order would show that the order of detention is passed by the detaining authority after entering into subjective satisfaction that the bail conditions are not sufficient to restrain the detenue from indulging in anti-social activities. The learned Government Pleader would also point out that the contraventions in all the four crimes are sufficient to make it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

8. KAA (P) Act was enacted by the State Legislature to provide for the effective prevention and control of certain kinds of anti-social activities in the State of Kerala, which came into force on 13.12.2006. Clause (j) of Section 2 of the said Act defines ‘goonda’ to mean a person who indulges in any anti-social activity or promotes or abets any illegal activity which are harmful for the maintenance of public order directly or indirectly and includes a bootlegger, a counterfeiter, a depredator of environment, a digital data and copyright pirate, a drug offender, an hawala racketeer, an hired ruffian, rowdy, an immoral traffic offender, a loan shark or a property grabber.

9. Clause (o) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act defines ‘known goonda’ to mean a goonda who had been, for acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under the Act, - (i) found guilty, by a competent court or authority at least once for an offence within the meaning of the term 'goonda' as defined in clause (j) of Section 2; or (ii) found in any investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer, or other authority or competent court on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in two separate instances not forming part of the same transaction, to have committed any act within the meaning of the term 'goonda' as defined in clause (j) of Section 2. As per the proviso to clause (o) of Section 2, an offence in respect of which a report was filed by a police officer before a lawful authority consequent to the seizure, in the presence of witnesses, of alcohol, spirit, counterfeit notes, sand, forest produce, articles violating copyright, narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, or currency involved in hawala racketeering may be included for consideration though the report had resulted from an action initiated by a police officer. As per the Explanation, an instance of an offence involving a person, which satisfies the conditions specified in the definition of known rowdy referred to in clause (p) of Section 2, can also be taken into consideration as an instance, along with other cases, for deciding whether the person is a known goonda or not.

10. Clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act defines ‘known rowdy’ to mean any person, who had been, by reason of acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under the Act, - (i) made guilty, by a competent court at least once for an offence of the nature under item (i) of clause (t) of Section 2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause; or (ii) made guilty, by a competent court at least twice for any offence of the nature mentioned under item (ii) of clause (t) of Section 2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause; or (iii) found on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2. As per the proviso to clause (p) of Section 2, any offence committed by a person, - (i) by virtue of his involvement as a member of the family or a close relative of the family in an incident which took place by reason of a family dispute or quarrel involving family members of close relatives on either side; or (ii) by virtue of his involvement as a neighbour or as a close relative of the neighbour in an incident which occurred due to a dispute between immediate neighbours; or (iii) by virtue of his involvement as an employee of any establishment in an incident which occurred in connection with a dispute between himself and the establishment with regard to the conditions of service; or (iv) as a member of the student community in a recognised educational institution, by virtue of his involvement, merely by his presence but without any overt act constituting the offence mentioned in clause (t) of section 2 without being involved in any criminal conspiracy facilitating the same, in an incident which occurred due to the general involvement of students of the institution in that particular incident; or (v) as a member of a recognised political party, by virtue of his involvement merely by his presence, but without any overt act constituting the offence mentioned in clause (t) of section 2 without being involved in any criminal conspiracy facilitating the same, in an incident which occurred due to the general involvement of the workers of that party in an agitation or protest or programme organised by the party with prior information given to the police officer or magistrate having jurisdiction; or (vi) by virtue of his involvement in a criminal act committed by him before he had attained the age of eighteen years, shall be omitted from the computation of the number of offences taken into account for deciding whether a person is a known rowdy.

11. Clause (t) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act defines ‘rowdy’ to mean and includes a person who either by himself or as a member of a gang commits or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of any offences under Sections 153A and 153B of Chapter VIII and Chapters XV, XVI, XVII and XXII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, or any offences under the provisions of the Arms Act, 1959, or the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, - (i) punishable with five or more years of imprisonment of any type, or; (ii) with less than five years of imprisonment of any type, except those punishable with less than one year of imprisonment; or (iii) such offences under any other law for the time being in force, coming under item (i) or (ii), as may be notified by the Government, from time to time.

12. Section 3 of the KAA (P) Act deals with the power to make orders for detaining known goondas and known rowdies. As per sub-section (1) of Section 3, the Government or an officer authorised under sub-section (2), may, if satisfied on information received from a Police Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police with regard to the activities of any known goonda or known rowdy, that with a view to prevent such person from committing any anti-social activity within the State of Kerala in any manner, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. As per sub-section (2) of Section 3, if having regard to the circumstances prevailing, or likely to prevail in any area, the Government, if satisfied that it is necessary so to do, may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the said order, the District Magistrate having jurisdiction may exercise the powers under sub-section (1) in respect of such persons residing within his jurisdiction or in respect of such persons not so resident who have been indulging in or about to indulge in or abet any anti-social activities within such jurisdiction. As per sub-section (3) of Section 3, when any order is made under this section by the authorised officer under sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government and the Director General of Police, Kerala, together with a copy of the order and supporting records which, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days, excluding public holidays, from the date of detention of such known goonda or known rowdy, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government or by the Secretary, Home Department if generally so authorised in this regard by the Government.

13. Section 9 of the KAA (P) Act deals with reference to the Advisory Board constituted under Section 8 and Section 10 deals with the procedure of the Advisory Board and further action. Section 12 of the Act deals with the maximum period of detention. As per Section 12, substituted by Act 41 of 2014, in pursuance of the first detention order made against any person under this Act and confirmed under Section 10, he may be detained for a period which may extend up to six months from the date of detention and in pursuance of such subsequent detention order made against such person, he may be detained for a period which may extend up to a maximum of one year.

14. Section 13 of the KAA (P) Act deals with the revocation of a detention order. As per sub-section (1) of Section 13, a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified by the Government. As per sub-section (2) of Section 13, the revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not be a bar for the issuance of another detention order under Section 3 against the same person, if he continues to be a person falling within the definition of known rowdy or known goonda as given in Section 2(o) or Section 2(p) and if, - (i) after release, he is, found to have, again involved in an offence of the nature described in Section 2(o) or Section 2(p) at least in one instance; or (ii) the facts, which came to the notice of the Government or the authorised officer after the issuance of the earlier detention order, considered along with previously known facts are sufficient to cause a reasonable apprehension that he is likely to indulge in or promote or abet anti-social activities; or (iii) the procedural errors or omissions, by reason of which the first order was revoked, are rectified in the procedure followed with regard to the subsequent order, even if the subsequent order is based on the very same facts as the first order.

15. In the instant case, as evident from Exts.P1 and P2 and the statement dated 02.07.2026 filed by the 3rd respondent District Police Chief, the details of the criminal cases against the detenue are as follows;                

                  A. Crime No.501/2025 of Thrikkodithanam Police Station dated 15.04.2025.

                  The detenu is the fourth accused in the above crime, which was registered on 15.04.2025 at Thrikkodithanam Police Station for offences punishable under Sections 118(1), 126(2), 296(b), 351(2), 3(5) of BNS. The de facto complainant's friend had hired a Swift car owned by Vinayakan, a friend of the detenu. Owing to the enmity that arose from the failure to pay the entire rental amount for the vehicle within the time stipulated by the first accused, Vinayakan, the accused persons A1 to A6, acting in furtherance of their common intention, at about 11.00 a.m. on 26.02.2025, called the de facto complainant and his neighbour, Ajesh, to the vicinity of the waiting shed near Venkotta Wreath Church in Madappally Grama Panchayat. There, the first and second accused abused the de facto complainant in filthy language and threatened to kill him. Thereafter, they forcibly took the de facto complainant to the residence of the second accused situated in Karukachal Grama Panchayat. At the said place, the first, second and third accused further abused him, criminally intimidated him by threatening to kill him, and assaulted him with a wooden stick, causing injuries. On the very same day, the second accused called Ajesh, a friend of the de facto complainant, to the courtyard of his residence, where he assaulted him with a wooden stick, causing injuries, and also abused and criminally intimidated him by threatening to kill him. During the course of investigation, the mens rea of the detenu has been clearly established based on the evidence collected. After completing the investigation, the charge sheet in the case was submitted before the Judicial First-Class Magistrate Court, Changanacherry, on 16.06.25, and the court took it on file as C.C.No.1303/25. The next hearing date of this case is on 14.09.2026.

                  B.  Crime No.681/2025 of Changanacherry Police Station dated 30.03.2025

                  The detenu is the first accused in the above crime, which was registered on 30.03.2025 at Changanacherry Police Station for offences punishable under Sections 115(2), 118(1), 351(2), 3(5) of BNS. The detenu, who had been on inimical terms with the de facto complainant Savio Sebastian, a member of a goonda gang operating within the limits of Changanassery Police Station, on account of previous incidents of assault between them, at about 2.30 p.m. on 30.03.2025, along with his associates, assaulted the de facto complainant while he was having tea at a tea shop named Escobar situated on the Palathra Bypass, Changanassery. During the incident, the detenu used a deadly weapon, namely a knife measuring approximately 27 cms. in length, which, if used in the manner employed, was capable of causing death, and stabbed Savio Sebastian, causing an injury to his hand. Thereafter, the detenu struck Savio Sebastian on the head with the blunt side of the knife and criminally intimidated him by stating, “If you send me to jail because of this, I will kill you and your father", etc. During the course of investigation, the detenue’s mens rea has been clearly established based on the evidence collected. The detenu was arrested on 30.03.2025. After completing the investigation, the charge sheet in the case was submitted before the Judicial First-Class Magistrate Court-I, Changanacherry, on 14.07.25, and the court took it on file as C.C.No.1324/25. The next hearing date of this case is on 10.08.2026.

C.  Crime No.1792/2025 of Ollur Police Station dated 30.12.2025

The detenu is the first accused in the above crime, which was registered on 30.12.2025 at Ollur Police Station for offences punishable under Sections 111(3), 310(4) of BNS and Section 27 of the Arms Act. At about 4.25 a.m. on 30.12.2025, the detenu and his associates were found waiting in a vehicle on the Mannuthy-Paliyekkara National Highway near Kattanellur, armed with deadly weapons, with the intention of robbing money and other valuable articles from the occupants of vehicles passing through or parked along the roadside by threatening them. The said activities came to the notice of the de facto complainant, Sri. Jeesmon, Sub Inspector of Police, Ollur Police Station. On noticing the Police vehicle, the accused immediately boarded their Innova car and sped towards Paliyekkara at a high speed. The police party chased the vehicle and intercepted it just before Amballur Junction. Upon searching the vehicle, a pichathi (billhook), a knife, pepper spray, and an iron pipe were recovered from inside the vehicle. During interrogation, the accused gave mutually contradictory explanations regarding their presence and possession of the weapons. Consequently, with the detenu arrayed as the first accused, a case was registered at Ollur Police Station as Crime No.1792/2025 under Sections 111(3), 310(4) of BNS and Section 27 of the Arms Act, dated 30.12.2025. The detenu was arrested on 30.12.2025 and produced before the court, which remanded him to judicial custody. Subsequently, on 19.01.2026, the court granted him bail. After completing the investigation, the charge sheet in the case was submitted before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Thrissur, on 28.05.2026.

                  D. Crime No.360/2026 of Thrikkodithanam Police Station dated 20.03.2026

                  The detenu is the first accused in the above crime, which was registered on 20.03.2026 at Thrikkodithanam Police Station for offences punishable under Section 111 of BNS and Section 25(1-B)(a), 3 of the Arms Act and Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act. The detenu was found unlawfully possessing, without any valid licence or other supporting documents, deadly weapons in his residence in a manner posing a serious threat to the life and property of the public. The weapons seized by the Police on 20.03.2026 included a revolver loaded with four rounds in its magazine, 31 live cartridges kept in a container, four knives, and one axe-shaped weapon. In addition, the detenu was found in possession of 5 grams of ganja, a prohibited narcotic substance, for the purpose of sale. The investigation in the case is currently in progress.”

16. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that out of four cases considered to pass the order of detention, two cases (cases C and D) have been registered suo motu by the Sub Inspector of the concerned Police Stations and hence, the detenue cannot be classified as a ‘known rowdy’ under clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act, in view of sub-clause (iii) of clause (p). On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader contended that the two cases (cases C and D) registered suo motu by the Sub Inspector of the concerned Police Stations can also be considered for classifying the detenue as ‘known rowdy’ under clause (p) of Section 2 of KAA (P) Act, in view of sub-clause (iii) of clause (p).

17. As already noticed hereinbefore, as per clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act, read with sub-clause (iii) of clause (p), ‘known rowdy’ means any person, who had been, by reason of acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under the Act, found on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2, subject to sub-clauses (i) to (vi) of the proviso to clause (p) of Section 2.

18. In Beji v. State of Kerala [2012 (3) KHC 363], one of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that three of the crimes mentioned in the order of detention were under investigation and no final report was filed by the Police in those cases. If so, sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act would not be attracted. The Division Bench noticed that under sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act, the person concerned must be found on investigation or enquiry, by a competent police officer or other authority, in complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction, to have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2. ‘Investigation’, as defined in clause (h) of Section 2 of Cr.P.C., includes all proceedings under the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate), who is authorised by a Magistrate in that behalf. Clause (g) of Section 2 defines ‘inquiry’ to mean every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under the Code by a Magistrate or Court. Sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act stipulates that the finding must be on complaints initiated by persons other than the police officers. The expression ‘complaint’ is not defined in the KAA (P) Act. Clause (d) of Section 2 of Cr.P.C. defines ‘complaint’ to mean any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.

19. In Beji [2012 (3) KHC 363], the Division Bench noticed that sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act nowhere mentions a Court, while in the definition of ‘known goonda, in sub-clause (ii) of clause (o) of Section 2, mention is made about investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer, authority or competent Court. Sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 insists that the investigation or enquiry must relate to a complaint initiated by persons other than police officers. A private person cannot make a complaint to a police officer, if we take the expression ‘complaint’ as having the same meaning as defined in clause (d) of Section 2 of the Cr.P.C. That means, the expression ‘complaint’ is used in sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act in the ordinary parlance and not for conveying the meaning of ‘complaint’, as defined in clause (d) of Section 2 of Cr.P.C. The requirement is that the case is not registered by the Police suo motu, but the case is registered at the instance of an aggrieved person or at the instance of a person who has got relevant information. That is to ensure that cases are not booked without substance in an attempt to see that a person is detained under the KAA (P) Act.

20. In Beji [2012 (3) KHC 363], the Division Bench noticed that there cannot be any investigation if a charge is laid. If the investigation is over, that must result in a final report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of Cr.P.C. If the intention of the Legislature was that the offending acts must be found to have been committed, and that it must be revealed in a final report, there was no difficulty in making it clear in sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act. On the other hand, the specific expression ‘investigation’ is used in sub-clause (iii). The expression ‘enquiry’ is also used, as in ordinary parlance. There cannot be any enquiry by a police officer if it is an ‘inquiry’ as defined in clause (g) of Section 2 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the Division Bench found that the word ‘enquiry’ is used in sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act to mean that after making sufficient enquiries the Investigating Officer is satisfied that the person concerned has committed the offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2. In other words, to found an order of detention on the ground that the person concerned is a ‘known rowdy’, it is not necessary that the final report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of Cr.P.C. should be filed in the cases concerned. It is sufficient if investigation is pending and on investigation made by the Investigating Officer, he is satisfied that the person concerned has committed the offence.

21. In Rajitha K. v. State of Kerala and others [2014 (4) KHC 310], in the context of clause (o) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act, which defines ‘known goonda’, a Division Bench of this Court in which one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J] was a party, held that the proviso to sub-clause (ii) of clause (o) of Section 2 is an exception to the requirement in sub-clause (ii) that the complaints should have been initiated by persons other than police officers. Even if the police suo motu registers a case that can also be taken into account for arriving at the objective satisfaction that the detenue satisfies the term ‘known goonda’, provided the report was filed by the police officer before a lawful authority consequent to seizure, in the presence of witnesses, of alcohol, spirit, counterfeit notes, sand, forest produce, articles violating copyright, narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, or currency involved in hawala racketeering. The seizure of any of the contraband mentioned in the proviso is an assurance that the case is not foisted by the police.

22. In Rajitha K. [2014 (4) KHC 310], the Division Bench held that the stipulation in sub-clause (ii) of clause (o) of Section (2) of the KAA (P) Act that the complaints must be those initiated by persons other than police officers is to ensure that the cases are not foisted against a particular person by the police officer only to see that the person concerned is termed as a ‘known goonda’ and incarcerated under sub-section (1) of Section 3. That does not mean that even in serious cases of the nature mentioned in the proviso to clause (o) of Section (2), a person other than a police officer should complain. In the nature of the offence involved in such cases, the police officer is entitled, or rather bound, to seize the contraband, register the case and deal with the accused according to law, for which the police officer cannot be expected to wait for an individual to complain. It is idle to expect an individual to complain in respect of an offence which does not directly affect him, unless the person concerned is a public-spirited person or a person interested in the welfare of the society as a whole. Such serious cases, as mentioned in the proviso to clause (o) of Section (2), should be dealt with at the utmost speed, and the offender should be dealt with accordingly.

23. In Rajitha K. [2014 (4) KHC 310], the Division Bench noticed that in the proviso to sub-clause (ii) of clause (o) of Section 2, certain offences of serious nature which affect society are included, and if there is a seizure by the police officer and a

report thereof, such offences can also be included for consideration, though the report had resulted from an action initiated by a police officer suo motu. Before the Division Bench, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the words ‘may be included for consideration’ occurring in the proviso would mean that the cases of the nature referred to therein also can be taken into account, provided there is at least one other case which was initiated at the instance of a person other than the police officer. The Division Bench was not inclined to accept the said contention. The Division Bench observed that, if the said contention is accepted, it would mean that even if the person concerned is involved in several serious offences involving narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, cases in respect of which were initiated at the instance of the police, he cannot be ordered to be detained under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the KAA (P) Act, if he is not involved in any other offence initiated by a person other than a police officer. The interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, if accepted, would lead to a situation where a person can cleverly avoid detention under the KAA (P) Act. For example, a seasoned drug-offender as defined under clause (i) of Section 2 may guardedly indulge in his illegal activities without giving any room for a complaint against him by any individual with respect to any offence and thus avoid a detention order being passed against him.

24. In Rajitha K. [2014 (4) KHC 310], the Division Bench noticed that the purpose of the proviso to sub-clause (ii) of clause (o) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act is to avoid deliberate and calculated attempts to brand a person a ‘known goonda’ by falsely registering crimes and detaining him under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the KAA (P) Act. It is not the intention of the legislature that even if a person has committed hundreds of crimes involving narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, he should not be ordered to be detained unless he is involved in any case which was initiated by persons other than police officers. Any such interpretation would defeat the very purpose of preventive detention of a ‘known goonda’.

25. In Joicy v. State of Kerala [2018 (1) KHC 37], the question before the Division Bench was as to whether the detaining authority could place reliance on the cases initiated on the complaints of the police officers to bring the detenue within the meaning of ‘Known rowdy’ as defined under clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act. Among five crimes, in two crimes the de facto complainants were Assistant Sub Inspectors of Police, who sustained injuries in the attack by the detenue and the co-accused were registered. The Division Bench noticed that the provisions of the KAA (P) Act will in no way curtail the rights of the police officers. At no stretch of imagination it could be construed that the words employed in sub-clause clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 that ‘complaints initiated by persons other than police officers’ would mean that when police officers are attacked and complaints are registered against the assailants those cases shall not be reckoned for passing an order under Section 3 of the KAA (P) Act for issuing detention order against the persons who are repeatedly indulging in criminal activities causing threat, fear, nuisance and disturbance to the society at large. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, if accepted, would mean that even if police officers are assaulted any number of times, the assailants could not be brought to book under the KAA (P) Act. The intention of the Legislature could never be so. Sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act would only indicate misuse of powers by police officers and to safeguard the interest of the detenue.

26. In Farsana K. v. State of Kerala [2024 KHC OnLine 1539], before a Division Bench of this Court, it was contended that the first crime reckoned by the authorities concerned for the classification of the detenue as a ‘known rowdy’ has been initiated by the officials of the Customs Department, and hence it ought to have been exempted from being considered. The Division Bench noticed that the embargo incorporated in sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act in respect of complaints initiated by police officers has been stretched by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the extent of putting Customs Officers on par with police officers for the applicability of the aforesaid provision. There is absolutely no basis for the above hypothesis mooted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. This is because of the reason that the proscription in sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act against reckoning the cases based on complaints initiated by police officers for classifying a person as 'known rowdy', is intended to avoid the embarrassing situation of officers associated with the investigating agency, having personal grievance against the accused, trying to get such persons booked under the preventive detention laws as an act of retribution. To put it otherwise, the aforesaid provision is a measure to ensure that the crime reckoned for treating a person as 'known rowdy', is registered and proceeded against by the officers of the investigating agency untainted by any personal bias, and thus to safeguard fairness in the proceedings. Therefore, there is absolutely no disqualification for the first crime reckoned against the detenue which relates to the act of the detenue to cause obstruction to the official duties of Customs officers by refusing to stop the car which he was driving, in spite of being asked to do so, and driving away the car in such a manner as to endanger the life of those officers who were trying to check the car driven by the detenue.

27. In Farsana K. [2024 KHC OnLine 1539], the Division Bench noticed that the disqualification envisaged under sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act for the cases arising out of complaints initiated by police officers has no applicability for those cases where the police officers figure as complainants due to the mere reason that the criminal law is set into motion at their instance, if the crime is one in which they are not having any personal grievance against the accused. Thus, if the crime is in respect of the obstruction caused to the discharge of official duty of the police officer, or assault committed upon a police officer with the intention to deter him from discharging his official duty, as envisaged under Section 353 or Section 332 of the Indian Penal Code, it cannot be classified as a case where the police officer concerned is having personal grievance against the accused. Such cases will not come under the exclusion of complaints initiated by police officers, envisaged under sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act. On the other hand, if the case is one registered on the basis of a complaint of a police officer that he has been assaulted by an accused as a result of the personal enmity of the accused with him in connection with some issues which have no direct nexus with the discharge of official duty of that officer, then such cases which originated on the basis of the complaint of the police officer, may come within the purview of the exclusion envisaged under sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act.

28. In Aaliya Ashraf v. State of Kerala [2024 KHC OnLine 7115], in the context of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act, which defines ‘known rowdy’, a Division Bench of this Court reiterated that the disqualification envisaged under sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act for the cases arising out of complaints initiated by police officers has no applicability for those cases where the police officers figure as complainants due to the mere reason that the criminal law is set into motion at their instance, if the crime is one in which they are not having any personal grievance against the accused. Thus, if the crime is in respect of the obstruction caused to the discharge of the official duty of the police officer or assault committed upon a police officer with the intention to deter him from discharging his official duty, as envisaged under Section 353 or Section 332 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, it cannot be classified as a case where the police officer concerned is having a personal grievance against the accused. Such cases will not come under the exclusion of complaints initiated by police officers, envisaged under sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act. On the other hand, if the case is one registered on the basis of a complaint of a police officer that he has been assaulted by an accused as a result of the personal enmity of the accused with him in connection with some issues which have no direct nexus with the discharge of official duty of that officer, then such cases which originated on the basis of the complaint of the police officer, may come within the purview of the exclusion envisaged under sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2.

29. On analysing the provisions under sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act, in the light of the law on the point, the conclusion is irresistible that, the disqualification envisaged under sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act for the cases arising out of complaints initiated by police officers has no applicability for those cases where the police officers figure as complainants due to the mere reason that the criminal law is set into motion at their instance, if the crime is one in which they are not having any personal grievance against the accused. The purpose of sub-clause (iii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act is to avoid deliberate and calculated attempts to brand a person a ‘known rowdy’ by falsely registering crimes and detaining him under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the KAA (P) Act. It is not the intention of the legislature that even if a person has committed multiple crimes of any offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act, he should not be ordered to be detained unless he is involved in any case which was initiated by persons other than police officers. Any such interpretation would defeat the very purpose of preventive detention of a ‘known rowdy’ under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the KAA (P) Act.

30. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we find absolutely no merits in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the detenue cannot be classified as a ‘known rowdy’ under clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act, read with clause (iii) of clause (p), since out of the four cases considered to pass the order of detention, two cases (cases C and D) have been registered suo motu by the Sub Inspector of the concerned Police Stations and hence the said contention is rejected as untenable.

31. Another contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the detenue was enlarged on bail on 10.04.2026 in the last prejudicial activity registered against him. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent passed Ext.P1 order of preventive detention only on 23.04.2026. Thus, on account of the delay in passing the detention order, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order is snapped. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader argued that the contention of the petitioner that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order is snapped is untenable and therefore, no interference is warranted on Ext.P1 order of detention on that ground.

32. In T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala [(1989) 4 SCC 741], in the context of the provisions under Section 3(1)(iii) and (iv) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA Act), the Apex Court held that the question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances, and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer, and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.

33. In A.K. Gopi v. State of Kerala [2014:KER:2968], before a Division Bench of this Court, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, though the last prejudicial activity in relation to which Crime No.890/2013 of Viyyur Police Station was allegedly committed by the detenue on 26.05.2013, the order of detention [Ext.P1] was passed on 25.09.2013. Therefore, there was inordinate and unexplained delay of four months in passing Ext.P1 order, inasmuch as the last prejudicial activity was committed on 26.05.2013. The Division Bench noticed that, in order to attract clause (p) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act, read with sub-clause (iii) of clause (p), the person concerned must be alleged to have committed at least three offences of the nature specified in the section within a period of seven years. Therefore, the Sub Inspector of Police, Ollur Police Station, could have made the preliminary report on 10.08.2013 only after collecting details from the other five Police Stations. The Court cannot expect him to have completed this process within any unrealistically short period, and if he has taken a reasonable time, he cannot be faulted for having delayed his report. On the facts of the case at hand, the Division Bench noticed that on receipt of the report dated 10.8.2013, the third respondent made his report under Section 3 of the KAA (P) Act on 17.8.2013.

34. In Aswathy K.A. v. State of Kerala [2024 KHC OnLine 1694] a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case in which the detenue was arrested in connection with the last prejudicial act on 16.04.2024, and he was released from custody by the Magistrate on 10.05.2024. After his release, on 20.06.2024, a proposal was submitted pointing out that the detenue was continuing as a ‘known rowdy’ and that initiation of proceedings under the KAA (P) Act was required to curb his activities. Based on the said proposal, the detention order was issued on 04.07.2024 within 14 days of the proposal. Though the last prejudicial act was on 16.04.2024, the detenue remained in judicial custody till 10.05.2024. Having considered the sequence of events and the facts and circumstances, in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala [(1989) 4 SCC 741], the Division Bench held that the delay in passing the order cannot be said to be inordinate so as to snap the live link with the last prejudicial activity.

35. In the instant case, the detenue was enlarged on bail on 10.04.2026. The last prejudicial activity of the detenue was reported by the 4th respondent District Police Chief, the Sponsoring Authority, on 02.04.2026, after collecting the relevant documents, and the 3rd respondent District Magistrate, the Detaining Authority, passed Ext.P1 order of detention on 23.04.2026, which was executed on 24.04.2026, and the detenue was remanded to the Central Prison, Viyyur, on 24.04.2026. Viewed in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman [(1989) 4 SCC 741] and the principles laid down by this Court in A.K. Gopi [2014:KER:2968] and Aswathy K.A. [2024 KHC OnLine 1694], it cannot be said that there was inordinate delay in passing Ext.P1 order of detention so as to snap the live link with the last prejudicial activity of the detenue. The contention to the contra raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected as untenable.

36. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no recital in Ext.P1 order of detention as to the bail conditions in the third crime, i.e., Crime No.1792/2025 of Ollur Police Station, and the 2nd respondent mechanically passed the order of detention stating that there is violation of the bail conditions. Other than mere recital in Ext.P1 detention order, no application has been filed before the concerned court for cancellation of bail on account of the alleged violation. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader contended that the involvement of the detenue in the fourth crime, while he was on bail in the third crime, alone is sufficient to show that the bail conditions imposed by the court are insufficient to restrain the detenue from being involved in criminal activities. The reports of the concerned Station House Officer before the Additional Sessions Court for cancellation of bail granted to the detenue are disclosed in Ext.P1 order of detention and a reading of that order would show that the order of detention is passed by the detaining authority after entering into subjective satisfaction that the bail conditions are not sufficient to restrain the detenue from indulging in anti-social activities. Further, the contraventions in all the four crimes are sufficient to make it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

37. In Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [(2023) 14 SCC 641], a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court noticed that the essential concept of preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. The basis of detention is the satisfaction of the executive of a reasonable probability of the likelihood of the detenu acting in a manner similar to his past acts and preventing him by detention from doing the same. A criminal conviction, on the other hand, is for an act already done which can only be possible by a trial and legal evidence. There is no parallel between the prosecution in a court of law and a detention order under Section 3(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986. One is a punitive action, and the other is a preventive act. In one case, a person is punished on proof of his guilt and the standard is proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in the other a person is detained with a view to prevent him from doing such act(s) as may be specified in the Act authorising preventive detention.

38. In Pesala Nookaraju [(2023) 14 SCC 641], the Three-Judge Bench noticed that the power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution, and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. See: Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal [(1975) 3 SCC 198].

39. In Pesala Nookaraju [(2023) 14 SCC 641], the Three-Judge Bench noticed that the Court on several occasions examined the concepts of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’. Immediately after the Constitution came into force, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi [1950 SCR 605], dealt with a case pertaining to public order. The Court observed that ‘public order’ may well be paraphrased in the context as ‘public tranquillity’. In the Constitution Bench decision in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras [1950 SCR 594], it was held that ‘public order’ is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquillity which prevails among the members of a political society as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established. It must be taken that ‘public safety’ is used as a part of the wider concept of public order.

40. In Pesala Nookaraju [(2023) 14 SCC 641], the Three-Judge Bench noticed that the distinction between ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ has been carefully defined in a Constitution Bench in Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [1965 SCC OnLine SC 9 : (1966) 1 SCR 709], by giving various illustrations that clearly define ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’. Relevant portion of the said decision reads thus: (SCC OnLine SC paras 54-55)

                  “54. … Does the expression ‘public order’ take in every kind of disorder or only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish ‘public order’ from ‘law and order’ because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order, if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight, there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order, but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order, but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act, but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances.

                  55. It will thus appear that just as ‘public order’ in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting ‘security of State’, ‘law and order’ also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting ‘public order’. One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represent the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order, just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State.” (underline supplied)

41. In Pesala Nookaraju [(2023) 14 SCC 641], the Three-Judge Bench noticed that in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration [(1982) 2 SCC 403], the Court clearly spelt out a distinction between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’. In the said case, it was observed that the true distinction between the areas of ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is a fine one, but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

42. In Pesala Nookaraju [(2023) 14 SCC 641], the Three-Judge Bench, after referring to various decisions on the distinction between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’, observed that there is a very thin line between the question of ‘law and order’ situation and a ‘public order’ situation, and sometimes, the acts of a person relating to ‘law and order’ situation can turn into a question of ‘public order’ situation. What is decisive for determining the connection of the ground of detention with the maintenance of public order, the object of detention, is not an intrinsic quality of the act but rather its latent potentiality. Therefore, for determining whether the ground of detention is relevant for the purposes of ‘public order’ or not, merely an objective test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would not be a safe guide, and the potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior for the offences under the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995.

43. In Pesala Nookaraju [(2023) 14 SCC 641], the Three-Judge Bench observed that just because four cases have been registered against the appellant detenu under the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, by itself, may not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The detenu may be punished for the offences which have been registered against him. To put it in other words, if the detention is on the ground that the detenu is indulging in manufacture or transport or sale of liquor then that by itself would not become an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order because the same can be effectively dealt with under the provisions of the Prohibition Act, but if the liquor sold by the detenu is dangerous to public health then under the 1986 Act, it becomes an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, therefore, it becomes necessary for the detaining authority to be satisfied on material available to it that the liquor dealt with by the detenu is liquor which is dangerous to public health to attract the provisions of the 1986 Act, and if the detaining authority is satisfied that such material exists either in the form of report of the chemical examiner or otherwise, copy of such material should also be given to the detenu to afford him an opportunity to make an effective representation.

44. In Pesala Nookaraju [(2023) 14 SCC 641], on the facts of the case at hand, the Three-Judge Bench noticed that the detaining authority has specifically stated in the grounds of detention that selling liquor by the appellant detenu and the consumption by the people of that locality was harmful to their health. Such a statement is an expression of his subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The detaining authority has also recorded his satisfaction that it is necessary to prevent the detenu from indulging further in such activities, and this satisfaction has been drawn on the basis of the credible material on record. The Three-Judge Bench observed that it is well settled that it is not for the courts to decide whether the material was sufficient or not by applying the objective basis, which is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.

45. In Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana [(2024) 17 SCC 294], a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court, in the context of Section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986, observed that, while the expression ‘law and order’ is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, ‘Public order’ has a narrower ambit, and could be affected by only such contravention, which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community, taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention, in its effect, is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of the public, it could raise a problem of ‘law and order’ only. In other words, the true distinction between the areas of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore touches the problem of ‘law and order’ only, while in another it might affect ‘public order’. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different.

46. In the instant case, the third crime, i.e., Crime No.1792/2025 of Ollur Police Station, was registered on 30.12.2025, in which the detenue is the first accused, for offences punishable under Sections 111(3) and 310(4) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1965. On 30.12.2025, at about 4.25 a.m., the detenu and his associates were found waiting in a vehicle on the Mannuthy-Paliyekkara National Highway near Kattanellur, armed with deadly weapons, with the intention of robbing money and other valuable articles from the occupants of vehicles passing through or parked along the roadside by threatening them. The said activities came to the notice of the de facto complainant, the Sub Inspector of Police, Ollur Police Station. On noticing the Police vehicle, the accused immediately boarded their Innova car and sped towards Paliyekkara at a high speed. The police party chased the vehicle and intercepted it just before Amballur Junction. Upon searching the vehicle, a pichathi (billhook), a knife, pepper spray, and an iron pipe were recovered from the vehicle. During interrogation, the accused gave mutually contradictory explanations regarding their presence and possession of the weapons. Consequently, with the detenue arrayed as the first accused, a case was registered at Ollur Police Station as Crime No.1792/2025 under Sections 111(3) and 310(4) of BNS and Section 27 of the Arms Act, on 30.12.2025. The detenue was arrested on 30.12.2025 and produced before the court, which remanded him to judicial custody. Subsequently, on 19.01.2026, the court granted him bail. After completing the investigation, the charge sheet in the case was submitted before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Thrissur, on 28.05.2026.

47. After the release on bail in the third crime, the fourth crime, i.e., the last prejudicial activity of the detenue, was on 20.03.2026 in Crime No.360/2026 of Thrikkodithanam Police Station, for offences punishable under Section 111 of BNS, Sections 25(1-B)(a) and 3 of the Arms Act and Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act. The detenue was found unlawfully possessing, without any valid licence or other supporting documents, deadly weapons in his residence in a manner posing a serious threat to the life and property of the public. The weapons seized by the Police on 20.03.2026 included a revolver loaded with four rounds in its magazine, 31 live cartridges kept in a container, four knives, and one axe-shaped weapon. In addition, the detenue was found in possession of 5 grams of ganja, a prohibited narcotic substance, for the purpose of sale.

48. The aforesaid contraventions in the third and fourth crimes, i.e., Crime No.1792/2025 of Ollur Police Station and Crime No.360/2026 of Thrikkodithanam Police Station, as well as the contraventions in the first and second crimes, i.e., Crime No.501/2025 of Thrikkodithanam Police Station and Crime No.681/2025 of Changanacherry Police Station, in their effect, are not confined only to a few individuals, but disturb the even tempo of life of the community, which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of ‘public order’.

49. The power of preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the KAA (P) Act is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. Based on an order of detention passed under Section 3(1) of the KAA (P) Act, a person is detained with a view to preventing him from doing such act or acts as may be specified in the said Act authorising preventive detention. There is no law that precludes the Government or the officer authorised under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the KAA (P) Act from passing an order of detention under Section 3(1), against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of detention is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the Government, or the officer authorised, to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed by the court are sufficient to restrain such a person from being involved in criminal activities.

50. In Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1315], the challenge before the Apex Court was against the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 04.09.2024 in W.P.(Crl.)No.874 of 2024, whereby a preventive detention order passed under Section 3(1) of the KAA (P) Act was affirmed. The Apex Court noticed that a person who indulges in activities ‘harmful to maintenance of public order’ is sought to be covered by clause (j) of Section 2, which defines the term ‘goonda’. After quoting the observations made in Nenavath Bujji [(2024) 17 SCC 294], which we have referred to hereinbefore at paragraph 45, the Apex Court found that, in consonance with the above expositions of law, the attending facts and circumstances do not fall under the category of a public order situation.

51. In Dhanya M. [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1315], on the facts of the case at hand, the Apex Court noticed that the observations made in the detention order do not ascribe any reason as to how the actions of the detenu are against the public order of the State. Considering the extraordinary nature of the power of preventive detention, no reasons are assigned by the detaining authority as to why and how the actions of the detenu warrant the exercise of such an exceptional power. [Para.19 SCC OnLine] It has been stated by the detaining authority that the detenu is violating the conditions of bail imposed upon him in the cases that have been considered for passing the order of detention. However, pertinently, no application has been filed by the State in any of the four cases alleging violation of such conditions, if any, and moreover, they have not even been spelt out here. [Para.20 SCC OnLine]

52. In Dhanya M. [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1315], the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the preventive detention order was passed against the detenue, based on his involvement in four cases. In all the four cases, the offences alleged were under Section 17 of the Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958, and Section 3/Section 9(1)(a) of the Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2012. In the fourth crime, the offences under Section 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 was also included. Paragraph 3 of the said decision reads thus;

                  “3. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the detenu is running a registered lending firm in the name of ‘Rithika Finance’. On 20th June, 2024, the District Magistrate, Palakkad, issued an order of detention under Section 3(1) of the Act, in furtherance of Recommendation No.54/Camp/2024-PKAA(P)A dated 29th May, 2024 by the Palakkad District Police Head. It was stated therein that the detenu is a ‘notorious goonda’ of the district and is a threat to society at large. The following cases were considered for such declaration:

                  i. Crime No. 17/2020 under Section 17 of Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958, and Section 3, 9(1)(a) of Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2012, at the Kasaba Police Station.

                  ii. Crime No. 220/2022 under Section 3 read with Section 17 of Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958, and Section 9(a)(b) read with Section 3 of Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2012, at the Town South Police Station.

                  iii. Crime No. 221/2022 under Section 294(b), 506 (I) of the Penal Code, 1860, and Section 3 read with Section 17 of Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958, and Section 9(a)(b) read with Section 3 of Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2012.

                  iv. Crime No. 401/2024 under Sections 341, 323, 324, 326 of the Penal Code, 1860; Section 17 of Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958; Section 4 of Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2012, and Section 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989.”

53. In Sujodh K. v. State of Kerala [2025 KHC OnLine 648], a Division Bench of this Court noticed that it cannot be inferred from the judgment of the Apex Court in Dhanya M. [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1315] that the Apex Court has held in the said case as a proposition of law that an order of detention cannot be passed, if an option is available for cancellation of bail already granted. A reading of the said judgment only indicates that the observation made by the Apex Court in paragraph 20 of the judgment [Para.20 SCC OnLine] regarding the application for cancellation of bail is one made on the facts of that case. Essentially, the Apex Court set aside the detention order in Dhanya M. [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1315] on a finding that the facts and circumstances were insufficient to classify the detenue's action as harmful for the maintenance of public order. Notably, the said detention order was passed based on the cases alleging offences under the Kerala Money Lenders Act and the Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act. It was mainly by taking note of the fact that the facts and circumstances in the said cases did not fall under the category of public order, the Apex Court set aside the order of detention and made a finding that the State could approach the competent court for cancellation of bail.

 54. In Sujodh K. [2025 KHC OnLine 648], on the facts of the case at hand, the Division Bench noticed that the cases considered by the detaining authority to pass the impugned order of detention were not cases registered alleging offences under the Kerala Money Lenders Act or the Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act. Rather, the impugned order of detention has been passed based on cases registered alleging offences under the NDPS Act and the IPC, which are certainly harmful for the maintenance of public order, or will fall under the definition of anti-social activities. Therefore, the Division Bench observed that the petitioner cannot be heard to say that instead of passing the impugned order of detention, the remedy was to file an application for cancellation of bail.

55. In the instant case, in the third crime, i.e., Crime No.1792/2025 of Ollur Police Station, registered on 30.12.2025, in which the detenue is the first accused, for offences punishable under Sections 111(3) and 310(4) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1965, the detenue and his associates were found waiting in a vehicle on the Mannuthy-Paliyekkara National Highway near Kattanellur, at about 4.25 a.m., armed with deadly weapons, with the intention of robbing money and other valuable articles from the occupants of vehicles passing through or parked along the roadside by threatening them. In the said crime, he was arrested on 30.12.2025 and produced before the court, and the court remanded him to judicial custody. Subsequently, on 19.01.2026, the court granted him bail. After the release on bail in the third crime, the fourth crime, i.e., the last prejudicial activity of the detenue, was on 20.03.2026 in Crime No.360/2026 of Thrikkodithanam Police Station, for offences punishable under Section 111 of BNS, Sections 25(1-B)(a) and 3 of the Arms Act and Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act. The detenue was found unlawfully possessing, without any valid licence or other supporting documents, deadly weapons in his residence in a manner posing a serious threat to the life and property of the public. The weapons seized by the Police on 20.03.2026 included a revolver loaded with four rounds in its magazine, 31 live cartridges kept in a container, four knives, and one axe-shaped weapon. In addition, the detenue was found in possession of 5 grams of ganja, a prohibited narcotic substance, for the purpose of sale. Therefore, Ext.P1 order of detention under Section 3(1) of the KAA (P) Act has been passed based on cases registered alleging offences under BNS, Arms Act, and the NDPS Act, which are certainly harmful for the maintenance of public order, and fall under the definition of anti-social activities in clause (a) of Section 2 of the KAA (P) Act. The contraventions in the third and fourth crimes, in their effect, are not confined only to a few individuals, but disturb the even tempo of life of the community, which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of ‘public order’. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that instead of passing the impugned order of detention, the remedy of the State was to file an application for cancellation of bail. The contention to that effect raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner can only be rejected as untenable, and we do so.

56. The four crimes registered against the detenue clearly show his continuous involvement in heinous crimes. After being released on bail in the third crime on 22.01.2026, the detenue, without showing any change in his criminal propensity, unlawfully possessed deadly weapons in his residence on 20.03.2026, in a manner posing a serious threat to the life and property of the public. Consequently, the fourth crime was registered against him. On 24.03.2026, the Station House Officer, Ollur Police Station submitted a report before the Additional Sessions Court-I, Thrissur, for cancellation of the bail granted to the detenue. Ext.P1 order of detention explicitly states that all the four crimes registered against the detenue fall under the definition of anti-social activities in the KAA (P) Act and the contraventions are harmful for the maintenance of public order.

57. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [(1984) 3 SCC 14], the Apex Court held that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.

58. In the instant case, though Ext.P1 order of detention states that the detaining authority considered the bail order and found that the bail conditions are not sufficient to deter the detenue from repeating criminal activities, the conditions imposed by the competent court while granting bail to the detenue are not even extracted or stated in Ext.P1 order of detention. Therefore, the mere statement made in Ext.P1 order of detention that the bail conditions are not sufficient to deter the detenue from repeating criminal activities, is not at all sufficient to import subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority on the above aspect, before an order of preventive detention can be made under Section 3(2) of the KAA (P) Act. In that view of the matter, the conclusion is irresistible that Ext.P1 order of preventive detention is one passed by the detaining authority without considering the efficacy of the bail conditions, and without entering any subjective satisfaction as to the bail conditions not being sufficient to restrain the detenue from indulging in anti- social activities. On that sole ground, Ext.P1 order of preventive detention cannot be sustained in law.

59. In the above circumstances, Ext.P1 order of preventive detention is set aside on the sole ground that it is one passed by the detaining authority without considering the efficacy of the bail conditions, and without entering any subjective satisfaction as to the bail conditions not being sufficient to restrain the detenue from indulging in anti-social activities.

In the result, this W.P.(Crl.) is disposed of by setting aside Ext.P1 order of preventive detention on the aforesaid ground and the detaining authority is directed to release the detenue immediately.