Soumen Sen, C.J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 29th November, 2026 passed against one Gokul (the detenu), aged 26 years, under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities Prevention Act, 2007 [‘KAA(P)A’, for brevity]. The petitioner herein is the mother of the detenu. The said order of detention was confirmed by the Government under Section 10(4) of KAA(P)A vide order dated 6th April, 2026 and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months from the date of detention.

2. The detention order was passed on the basis of a proposal submitted by the District Police Chief, Palakkad who is the Sponsoring Authority, on 22nd October, 2025 alleging that the detenu was involved in four crimes registered under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), during the period from 2019 to 2025. The proposal submitted by the Sponsoring Authority was thereafter recommended and the impugned detention order was issued on 29th November, 2026.

3. The Detaining Authority has relied upon the following criminal cases in which the detenu is alleged to be involved, for passing the impugned order of detention by treating the detenu as a "known rowdy".

                 

                

4. We heard Sri. M.H. Hanis, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri. Biju Meenattoor, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the impugned detention order on several grounds. The first and foremost challenge is regarding the non-compliance of the mandatory provisions under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the KAA(P)A. It was contended that the arresting officer had neither read over the detention order to the detenu nor informed him in writing of his right to make a representation to the Government and the Advisory Board. It was further submitted that no material had been produced by the Detaining Authority to establish compliance with the statutory mandate.

6. The second ground of challenge is regarding illegibility of certain documents supplied to the detenu. It is contented by the learned counsel for the petitioner that several pages of the documents supplied to the detenu (Documents in Page Nos. 189, 191, 192, 234, 235 and 236) were illegible, thereby depriving him of an effective opportunity to make a meaningful representation. He further states that the supply of these illegible documents amounted to violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India as well as Section 7(2) of the KAA(P)A. To substantiate the said contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the decisions in the cases of Aleena Alex v. State of Kerala (2026 KHC Online 437) and Jyothi R. v. State of Kerala (2026:KER:49384 para 50)

7. The third ground of challenge is with regard to non-compliance of the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 3(3) of the KAA(P)A, since the detention order and the connected records were not forthwith forwarded to the Government and the State Police Chief for approval. It was further submitted that the detention order did not indicate the constitutional time limits contemplated under Article 22(4) of the Constitution of India.

8. The fourth ground of challenge pertains to the delay in passing and executing the order of detention. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, there was an unexplained delay of 38 days in passing the impugned order of detention after the receipt of the proposal from the Sponsoring Authority. It was submitted that there was a delay of 46 days from the date on which the detenu was released on bail in the last prejudicial activity to the issuance of the detention order, and a further delay of nearly three months from the date of the last prejudicial activity. It was also submitted that there was a delay of 79 days in executing the detention order, during which period the detenu had regularly appeared before the Station House Officer, Mararikulam Police Station in compliance with the bail conditions in the last prejudicial activity. It is, therefore, argued that the unexplained delay had snapped the live and proximate nexus between the alleged prejudicial activities and the order of detention.

9. Lastly, it was submitted that although the petitioner had submitted a representation specifically pointing out that the supplied documents were illegible, the same had not been properly considered by the authorities.

10. Per Contra, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor contended that the detenu is a "known rowdy" within the meaning of Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A, having been involved in four criminal cases falling within the ambit of Section 2(t) of the Act. It was submitted that the criminal antecedents of the detenu clearly disclose a consistent pattern of violent criminal activities affecting public order, thereby justifying the invocation of the provisions of the Act.

11. He further submitted that all the mandatory procedural requirements contemplated under the KAA(P)A had been strictly complied with. According to him, at the time of execution of the detention order, the detenu was served with the detention order, the grounds of detention and all the relied upon documents, and was informed of his right to make representations to the Government and the Advisory Board. The detenu had acknowledged  receipt  of  the  documents  and  the acknowledgements formed part of the official records. It was, therefore, submitted that the allegation regarding non-compliance with Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the KAA(P)A is factually incorrect.

12. He also submitted that the detaining authority had duly complied with Section 3(3) of KAA(P)A. According to him, the detention order, together with the connected records, had been forwarded to the Government and the Director General of Police within the statutory period. It was further submitted that, upon execution of the detention order, the Government accorded approval within the period prescribed under the Act and thereafter confirmed the detention in accordance with law.

13. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor further submitted that the petitioner's argument that Crime No. 23 of 2019 of Kongad Police Station, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324, 447 and 427 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Kerala Prevention of Damage to Private Property and Payment of Compensation Ordinance, arose out of political rivalry and, therefore, could not be relied upon for passing an order of detention under the KAA(P)A is misconceived. According to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor, the exemption contemplated under the proviso to Section 2(p) of the KAA(P)A is attracted only where the person's involvement is merely by reason of his presence as a member of a recognised political party, without any overt act constituting the offence or participation in any criminal conspiracy, in an incident arising out of an agitation, protest or programme organised by the political party after due prior intimation to the police or the jurisdictional Magistrate. It was submitted that the facts of the present case do not satisfy the said statutory requirements and, therefore, the said crime was rightly taken into consideration by the detaining authority while arriving at its subjective satisfaction. Likewise, it was submitted that Crime No. 334 of 2024 discloses specific overt acts attributed to the detenu and involves offences attracting the provisions of the KAA(P)A. Insofar as Crime No. 993 of 2025 is concerned, it was argued that the mere pendency of investigation does not preclude the detaining authority from taking the same into consideration, particularly in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Stenny Aleyamma Saju v. State of Kerala (2017(3) KHC 517) , which recognises that pending investigation cases may also be relied upon for preventive detention.

14. As regards the delay in execution of the detention order, it was submitted that the delay of 79 days in executing the detention order was solely attributable to the conduct of the detenu, who had absconded from the district to evade arrest. According to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor, the police had made earnest efforts to trace and apprehend the detenu for executing the detention order. In the meanwhile, proceedings under Sections 6(1)(a) and (b) of the KAA(P)A were initiated by submitting a detailed report before the District Collector, Palakkad. Thereafter, the District Collector forwarded the report to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palakkad, and a notification was published in the Kerala Gazette on 16th December, 2025 and was also affixed at the residence of the detenu in the presence of witnesses. It was further submitted that, pursuant to the continuous efforts of the special police squad constituted for executing the detention order, the detenu was apprehended on 17th February, 2026 and on the very same day was lodged in the High Security Prison, Viyyur. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor further contended that the reasons for the delay in execution, as well as the statutory steps taken under Section 6 of the KAA(P)A were specifically recorded in the report submitted before the District Collector and were also explained to the detenu at the time of his arrest. It was, therefore, argued that the delay in execution was satisfactorily explained and that the contention advanced by the petitioner in this regard is devoid of merit.

15. It was also submitted by the learned Senior Public Prosecutor that the last prejudicial activity i.e. Crime No. 993/2025 of Mannarkad Police Station was reported on 4th September, 2025 and the arrest was recorded on 5th September, 2025. After collecting the details of cases involved by the detenu, including the bail order of previous cases, the proposal was submitted on 22nd October, 2025. The reason for delay is clearly mentioned in the proposal itself.

16. It was also submitted that the representation preferred by the petitioner was duly considered by the competent authority before the order of confirmation was passed.

17. The merits of the impugned detention order require consideration taking into account the submission made on behalf of the parties and original record produced by the learned Senior Public Prosecutor.

18. The first issue before us for consideration is whether the procedure prescribed under Section 7(1) and (2) of the KAA(P)A was duly complied with by the detaining authority or not. At the very outset, it will be appropriate to refer to Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows:

                  “Art. 22(5): When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.”

19. Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the KAA(P)A read as follows:

                  “7. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed - (1) When a person is arrested in pursuance of a detention order, the officer arresting him shall read out the detention order to him and give him a copy of such order.

                  (2) The grounds of detention, specifying the instances of offences, with copies of relevant documents, as far as practicable, on the basis of which he is considered as a “known goonda” or “known rowdy” and giving such materials relating to his activities on the basis of which his detention has been found necessary, shall be furnished to him as soon as possible nevertheless, in any case, within five days of detention and he shall also be informed in writing, under acknowledgement, of his right to represent to the Government and before the Advisory Board against his detention: Provided that nothing in this section shall require any authority to disclose to the detained person any fact, the disclosure of which will reveal the identity of any confidential source or the disclosure of which will be against the interests of internal security or national security.”

20. In Najmunnisa v. State of Kerala (2009 SCC OnLine Ker 5360) , this Court held as follows:

                  “11. Having so understood Art. 22(5) of the Constitution, we now look at S. 7(2) of the KAAPA. Irreducible constitutional obligation under Art. 22(5) finds statutory expression and reiteration in S. 7(2) of the KAAPA also. We repeat that whether S. 7(2) is there in the statute book or not the constitutional obligation of the detaining authority to communicate/furnish the relevant documents to the detenu will remain unabated. The obligation/right under S. 7(2) of the KAAPA falls within the constitutional umbrella of protection provided under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. In short, whether such statutory right is there or not, the constitutional obligation/right under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution shall occupy the field.”

21. On a consideration of the materials placed on record, we find that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding non-compliance of Section 7(1) and (2) of the KAA(P)A is devoid of merit. The records clearly establish that the detenu has acknowledged the receipt of the impugned detention order by affixing his signature evidencing that the grounds of detention were furnished to him on 17th February, 2026, which is within the statutory period of five days prescribed under Section 7(2). Accordingly, we find that there is no violation of Section 7(1) and (2) of KAA(P)A.

22. The second issue that arises for consideration is whether the detention order is vitiated on account of illegibility of the documents supplied to the detenu. On this ground of non-supply of legible copies to the detenu, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, at the time of execution of the detention order, though copies of the relevant documents were furnished to the detenu, pages 189, 191, 192, 234, 235 and 236 were illegible, thereby depriving him of an effective opportunity to make a meaningful representation.

23. This Court while considering a similar issue, in Aleena Alex v. State of Kerala and Ors (Judgment dated 5th day of June 2026 in WP(Crl.) No. 599 of 2026) , has held as follows:

                  “…..As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and as is apparent from the original documents produced before us pursuant to our direction in a sealed cover, certain pages of the Exhibit P1 order that had been furnished to the detenu were illegible and could not be read. The specific reference made by the learned counsel to page Nos.33, 34 and 35 of Exhibit P1 in the W.P.(Crl.) being illegible and unreadable is found to be factually correct upon our perusal of the original records produced before us. It is trite and settled that unless a legible copy is provided to the detenu, he may not be able to exercise his right to respond to the same by way of a representation/explanation validly and adequately.

                  Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in this respect is valid and tenable…..”

24. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pramod Singla v. Union of India (2023 SCC OnLine SC 374) , has held as follows:

                  “34. In cases where illegible documents have been supplied to the detenue, a grave prejudice is caused to the detenue in availing his right to send a representation to the relevant authorities, because the detenue, while submitting his representation, does not have clarity on the grounds of his or her detention. In such a circumstance, the relief under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and the relevant statutory provisions allowing for submitting a representation are vitiated, since no man can defend himself against an unknown threat.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

25. It is also pertinent to refer to the decision of this Court in Sneha Vijayan v. State of Kerala (2025 KHC OnLine 108) , wherein it was held thus:

                  “12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Manipur v. Buyamayum Abdul Hanan (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1455) while considering a detention order passed under PITNDPS Act held that:

                  "The right of personal liberty and individual freedom which is probably the most cherished is not, in any manner, arbitrarily to be taken away from him even temporarily without following the procedure prescribed by law and once the detenu was able to satisfy while assailing the order of the detention before the High Court in the exercise of jurisdiction Art.226 of the Constitution holding that the grounds of detention did not satisfy the rigors of proof as a foundational effect which has enabled him in making effective representation in assailing the order of detention in view of the protection provided under Art.22(5) of the Constitution the same renders the order of detention illegal."

                  13. In the case at hand, it is established that the copies supplied on the detenu were not legible making him incapacitated to file an effective representation. The said serious lapse is a ground to interfere with the impugned order. An order of detention, under KAA(P) Act has wide ramifications as far as the personal as well as the fundamental rights of an individual are concerned. Therefore, the detaining authority should have acted with much alacrity in ensuring that all the procedural formalities are adhered to.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

26. However, in order to verify the correctness of the contention that the copies of the relied-upon documents served on the detenu are illegible, we have perused the pages made available before us. On such perusal, we are satisfied that the copies of the pages 189, 191, 192, 234, 235 and 236 were illegible. The contents in the pages are material documents concerning the cases relied upon by the Detaining Authority for passing the order of detention, thereby depriving the detenu of an effective opportunity to understand the material relied upon by the Detaining Authority and to make an effective representation against the order of detention as guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

27. The third issue that arises for consideration before us is whether there has been non-compliance with the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 3(3) of the KAA(P)A, inasmuch as the detention order and the connected records were not forthwith forwarded to the Government and the State Police Chief for approval, and whether the omission to indicate in the detention order the constitutional time limits contemplated under Article 22(4) of the Constitution of India vitiates the order of detention.

28. To understand the procedural requirement provided in the aforesaid provision, it is pertinent to refer to the decision of this Court in Silpa Mol v. State of Kerala represented by Addl. Chief Secretary and Others (2023 SCC OnLine Ker 4784) , wherein it was held as follows:

                  “4. Section 3(3) says that when any order is made under this section by the authorised officer under sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government and the Director General of Police, Kerala, together with a copy of the order and supporting records which, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days, excluding public holidays, from the date of detention of such Known Goonda or Known Rowdy, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government or by the Secretary, Home Department if generally so authorised in this regard by the Government. Therefore, the approval of the order by the Government must be within 12 days (which is excluding holidays) from the date of detention.

                  (emphasis supplied)

29. From the records, it appears that the detention order was passed on 29th November, 2025, whereas the order of approval was passed only on 26th February, 2026, which is far beyond the period of twelve days prescribed under Section 3(3) of the KAA(P)A. The explanation offered by the learned Senior Public Prosecutor for the said delay was that the detenu had absconded and, therefore, the detention order could not be executed. It was submitted that, in the meanwhile, the statutory formalities contemplated under Section 6(1)(a) and (b) of the KAA(P)A were duly complied with. Accordingly, a report was submitted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palakkad and a notification was published in the Kerala Gazette on 16th December, 2025.

30. We are satisfied that, immediately after the detention order was passed by the District Magistrate and District Collector, Palakkad, the authorised officer under the KAA(P)A, the fact of such detention, together with a copy of the order and the supporting records, was forwarded to the Government and the State Police Chief on 29th November, 2025 itself, as required under Section 3(3) of the KAA(P)A. However, the Government approved the detention order only on 26th February, 2026, which is far beyond the statutory period of twelve days prescribed under Section 3(3) of KAA(P)A. The explanation offered by the learned Senior Public Prosecutor for the said delay is not satisfactory, as it pertains only to the delay in the execution of the detention order on account of the detenu having absconded and the consequential compliance with the procedure under Section 6 of the Act. Such circumstances may justify the delay in executing the detention order, but they do not explain or condone the delay in obtaining the Government's approval under Section 3(3). As the approval of the Government within the prescribed period is a mandatory requirement under the statute, failure to obtain such approval within the stipulated time renders the order of detention legally unsustainable.

31. The fourth issue that arises for consideration before us is whether the delay in passing the detention order after receipt of the proposal submitted by the Sponsoring Authority and the subsequent delay in its execution have remained unexplained, thereby snapping the live and proximate nexus between the prejudicial activities attributed to the detenu and the order of detention.

32. It appears from the records that the last prejudicial activity relied upon by the detaining authority was in Crime No. 993/2025 of Mannarkad Police Station, which was registered on 4th September, 2025. The detenu was arrested on 5th September, 2025 and was subsequently released on bail. The proposal for preventive detention was submitted by the Sponsoring Authority only on 22nd October, 2025, after a delay of about 48 days from the date of the last prejudicial activity and about 46 days from the date of arrest of the detenu. Thereafter, the detention order came to be passed on 29th November, 2025, after a further delay of 38 days from the date of receipt of the sponsoring proposal. The detention order was ultimately executed only on 17th February, 2026, nearly 79 days after it was passed.

33. In the counter affidavit, the explanation offered by the learned Senior Public Prosecutor was that the delay in passing the detention order is due to the time taken for the Sponsoring Authority to collect the details of the criminal cases in which the detenu was involved, including the bail orders passed in those cases before forwarding the proposal to the Detaining Authority.

34. As regards the delay in execution, it was submitted that the detenu had absconded from the district to evade arrest and, therefore, despite earnest efforts made by the police to apprehend him, the detention order could be executed only on 17th February, 2026. It was further submitted that, in the meantime, the procedure contemplated under Section 6 of the KAA(P)A was duly complied with by submitting the necessary report before the competent authority and by publishing the notification in the Kerala Gazette.

35. In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu ((1979) 1 SCC 465) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the phrase “live and proximate link” in the following words:

                  “It is further true that there must be a “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention, namely the prevention of smuggling activities. We may in appropriate cases assume that the link is “snapped” if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case, we may strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the “link” not snapped but strengthened.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

36. While dealing with the question of delay, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Licil Antony v. State of Kerala (2014) 11 SCC 326) , wherein it was observed as follows:

                  “9. While dealing with the question of delay in making an order of detention, the court is required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. No hard-and-fast formula is possible to be laid or has been laid in this regard. However, one thing is clear that in case of delay, that has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the purpose of preventive detention is to take immediate steps for preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activity. If there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activity and making of the order of detention and the delay has not been explained, the order of detention becomes vulnerable. Delay in issuing the order of detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is a ground to quash the order of detention. No rule with precision has been formulated in this regard. The test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of undue and long delay the court has to investigate whether the link has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

37. Similarly, in Adishwar Jain v. Union of India ((2006) 11 SCC 339) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

                  “15. Delay, as is well known, at both stages has to be explained. The court is required to consider the question having regard to the overall picture. We may notice that in Sk. Serajul v. State of W.B. [(1975) 2 SCC 78 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 425] this Court opined: (SCC p. 80, para 2)

                  “There was thus delay at both stages and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Burdwan recited in the order of detention. It would be reasonable to assume that if the District Magistrate of Burdwan was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude both in making the order of detention as also in securing the arrest of the petitioner, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

38. In light of the above, we find that no satisfactory explanation has been offered by the Detaining Authority for the delay of about 48 days in submitting the proposal for preventive detention and the further delay of 38 days in passing the detention order. The explanation offered by the Detaining Authority that time was required to collect the details of the criminal cases and the bail orders, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, cannot be regarded as sufficient to account for the inordinate delay at each stage of the proceedings. Therefore, the unexplained delay in submitting the proposal for preventive detention and passing the impugned order of detention will definitely snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention.

39. The final issue that arises for consideration is whether the representation submitted by the detenu was duly considered by the Government and the Advisory Board in accordance with law.

40. In the instant case, it is evident from the records that the petitioner submitted a representation before the Additional Chief Secretary, Home and Vigilance Department, Thiruvananthapuram, on 27th February, 2026, i.e., after the Government had approved the order of detention on 26th February, 2026. A copy of the said representation was thereafter forwarded by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Advisory Board on 5th March, 2026. On 6th April, 2026, the Government after considering the case afresh with reference to the relevant records, including opinion of the Advisory Board, representation submitted on behalf of the detenu and the circumstances of the case, confirmed the order of detention. In this regard, we deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Kumari A.V. v. State of Kerala (2024 KHC Online 646) , wherein it was held that the Government shall independently consider the representation and not to wait for the decision of the Advisory Board.

41. This Court in Lamiya A.P. v. State of Kerala (Judgment dated 22nd July 2026 in WP(CRL.) No. 753 of 2026) while dealing with an issue of non-consideration of representation independently by the Government, has held as follows:

                  “15. The question is whether the Government was legally obliged to independently consider the representation before forwarding the files to the Advisory Board.

                  a) S.7 of KAAPA reads as under:

                  S.7. Grounds of detention shall be disclosed.

                  (i) When a person is arrested in pursuance of a detention order, the officer arresting him shall read out the detention order to him and give him a copy of such order.

                   (ii) The grounds of detention, specifying the instances of offences, with copies of relevant documents, as far as practicable, on the basis of which he is considered as a "known goonda" or "known rowdy" and giving such materials relating to his activities on the basis of which his detention has been found necessary, shall be furnished to him as soon as possible nevertheless, in any case, within five days of detention and he shall also be informed in writing, under acknowledgement, of his right to represent to the Government and before the Advisory Board against his detention:

                  Provided that nothing in this section shall require any authority to disclose to the detained person any fact, the disclosure of which will reveal the identity of any confidential source or the disclosure of which will be against the interests of internal security or national security.

                  (iii) The Superintendent of the Jail where such person is detained shall afford him reasonable opportunity to consult a lawyer and reasonable assistance in making a representation against the detention order to the Government or to the Advisory Board.

                  (iv) The order of detention shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because one or more of the facts or circumstances cited among the grounds are vague, non - existent, irrelevant or invalid for any reason whatsoever and such order shall be deemed to have been made by the Government or the Authorised officer after having been satisfied about the need for detention with reference to the remaining facts and circumstances, provided that the minimum conditions for being classified as a known goonda or known rowdy are satisfied.

                  Sub-section (2) clearly says that the grounds for detention, detailing specific instances of offenses and including copies of relevant documents, must be provided to the detainee as soon as possible, but no later than five days after the detention. The detainee must be informed in writing of their right to make a representation to the Government and the Advisory Board against their detention. Sub-section (3) says that the Superintendent of the Jail where the detainee is held must provide reasonable opportunities for the detainee to consult a lawyer. The detainee must be given reasonable assistance in making a representation against the detention order to the Government or the Advisory Board.

                  b) In Pramod Singla v. Union of India, (2023 SCC OnLine SC 374) a Division Bench of the Apex Court had occasion to consider whether there is any conflict between the principles of law laid down in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi & B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union Of India, (1991 (1) SCC 476) and Ankit Ashok Jalan v. Union Of India, [2020 (16) SCC 127] both of which are Constitution Bench judgments, which state that the Central Government must wait for the decision of the Advisory Board, with the Constitution Bench judgments of the Apex Court in Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty v. State of West Bengal, [1969 (3) SCC 400] and the Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal, [1970 (1) SCC 219]. After considering the ratio of the law laid down in the judgments it was held that there is no friction between the judgments. The Apex Court held that the detention order under both laws can be passed either by the Government or by the specially empowered officer. However, under S.3 of the Preventive Detention Act, the specially empowered officer, within 12 days of the detention, has to seek for approval from the Government for continued detention, and only if the Government approves the same can the detention be continued. This process of seeking approval from the Government is essentially a transfer of power from the empowered officer to the Government, making the Government the detaining authority after the initial lapse of 12 days. In the COFEPOSA Act however, no such approval is required from the Government, and hence the detaining authority and the Government remain to be two separate bodies independent of each other. The provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1980 is in pari materia the provisions of the KAAPA. K.M. Abdulla Kunhi (supra) was rendered in the context of the COFEPOSA Act. In that view of the matter, the principles laid down in Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty (supra) and Jayanarayan Sukul (supra), would squarely apply. In Pankaj Kumar (supra), after careful consideration, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the Government must act independently from the Advisory Board and that there exists no mandate on the Government to wait for the decision of the Advisory Board. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being extracted herein:

                  10. "It is true that clause (5) does not in positive language provide as to whom the representation is to be made and by whom, when made, it is to be considered. But the expressions "as soon as may be" and "the earliest opportunity" in that clause clearly indicate that the grounds are to be served and the opportunity to make a representation are provided for to enable the detenu to show that his detention is unwarranted and since no other authority who should consider such representation is mentioned it can only be the detaining authority to whom it is to be made which has to consider it. Though clause (5) does not in express terms say so it follows from its provisions that it is the detaining authority which has to give to the detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation and to consider it when so made whether its order is wrongful or contrary to the law enabling it to detain him. The illustrations given in Abdul Karim case [Abdul Karim v. State of W.B., 1969 (1) SCC 433] show that clause (5) of Art.22 not only contains the obligation of the appropriate Government to furnish the grounds and to give the earliest opportunity to make a representation but also by necessary implication the obligation to consider that representation. Such an obligation is evidently provided for to give an opportunity to the detenu to show and a corresponding opportunity to the appropriate Government to consider any objections against the order which the detenu may raise so that no person is, through error or otherwise, wrongly arrested and detained. If it was intended that such a representation need not be considered by the Government where an Advisory Board is constituted and that representation in such cases is to be considered by the Board and not by the appropriate Government, clause (5) would not have directed the detaining authority to afford the earliest opportunity to the detenu. In that case the words would more appropriately have been that the authority should obtain the opinion of the Board after giving an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and communicate the same to the Board. But what would happen in cases where the detention is for less than 3 months and there is no necessity of having the opinion of the Board? If counsel's contention were to be right the representation in such cases would not have to be considered either by the appropriate Government or by the Board and the right of representation and the corresponding obligation of the appropriate Government to give the earliest opportunity to make such representation would be rendered nugatory. In imposing the obligation to afford the opportunity to make a representation, clause (5) does not make any distinction between orders of detention for only 3 months or less and those for a longer duration. The obligation applies to both kinds of orders. The clause does not say that the representation is to be considered by the appropriate Government in the former class of cases and by the Board in the latter class of cases. In our view it is clear from clauses (4) and (5) of Art.22 that there is a dual obligation on the appropriate Government and a dual right in favour of the detenu, namely, (1) to have his representation irrespective of the length of detention considered by the appropriate Government and (2) to have once again that representation in the light of the circumstances of the case considered by the Board before it gives its opinion. If in the light of that representation the Board finds that there is no sufficient cause for detention the Government has to revoke the order of detention and set at liberty the detenu. Thus, whereas the Government considers the representation to ascertain whether the order is in conformity with its power under the relevant law, the Board considers such representation from the point of view of arriving at its opinion whether there is sufficient cause for detention. The obligation of the appropriate Government to afford to the detenu the opportunity to make a representation and to consider that representation is distinct from the Government's obligation to constitute a Board and to communicate the representation amongst other materials to the Board to enable it to form its opinion and to obtain such opinion.

                  11. This conclusion is strengthened by the other provisions of the Act. In conformity with clauses (4) and (5) of Art.22, S.7 of the Act enjoins upon the detaining authority to furnish to the detenu grounds of detention within five days from the date of his detention and to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity to make his representation to the appropriate Government. S.8 and S.9 enjoin upon the appropriate Government to constitute an Advisory Board and to place within 30 days from the date of the detention the grounds for detention, the detenu's representation and also the report of the officer where the order of detention is made by an officer and not by the Government. The obligation under S.7 is quite distinct from that under S.8 and S.9. If the representation was for the consideration not by the Government but by the Board only as contended, there was no necessity to provide that it should be addressed to the Government and not directly to the Board. The Government could not have been intended to be only a transmitting authority nor could it have been contemplated that it should sit tight on that representation and remit it to the Board after it is constituted. The peremptory language in clause (5) of Art.22 and S.7 of the Act would not have been necessary if the Board and not the Government had to consider the representation. S.13 also furnishes an answer to the argument of the counsel for the State. Under that section, the State Government and the Central Government are empowered to revoke or modify an order of detention. That power is evidently provided for to enable the Government to take appropriate action where on a representation made to it, it finds that the order in question should be modified or even revoked. Obviously, the intention of Parliament could not have been that the appropriate Government should pass an order under S.13 without considering the representation which has under S.7 been addressed to it.

                  12. For the reasons aforesaid we are in agreement with the decision in Abdul Karim case [Abdul Karim v. State of W.B., 1969 (1) SCC 433]. Consequently, the petitioners had a Constitutional right and there was on the State Government a corresponding Constitutional obligation to consider their representations irrespective of whether they were made before or after their cases were referred to the Advisory Board and that not having been done the order of detention against them cannot be sustained. In this view it is not necessary for us to examine the other objections raised against these orders. The petition is therefore allowed, the orders of detention against Petitioners 15 and 36 are set aside and we direct that they should be set at liberty forthwith."

                  c) In Haradhan Saha (supra), yet another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court considered the distinction between the consideration of the representation made by the detenu in cases of preventive detention, and it was stated that if the representation was made before the matter is referred to the Advisory Board, the detaining authority must consider such representation, but if the representation is made after the matter is referred to the Advisory Board, the detaining authority would first consider it and then send it to the Advisory Board. It was held as under:

                 “29. Principles of natural justice are an element in considering the reasonableness of a restriction where Art.19 is applicable. At the stage of consideration of representation by the State Government, the obligation of the State Government is such as Art.22(5) implies. S.8 of the Act is in complete conformity with Art.22(5) because this section follows the provisions of the Constitution. If the representation of the detenu is received before the matter is referred to the Advisory Board, the detaining authority considers the representation. If a representation is made after the matter has been referred to the Advisory Board, the detaining authority will consider it before it will send representation to the Advisory Board."

                  d) The Apex Court has held that representation submitted by the detenu relates to the liberty of the individual, the highly cherished right enshrined in Art.21 of our Constitution. Clause (5) of Art.22 therefore, casts a legal obligation on the government to consider the representation as early as possible. The words "as soon as may be" occurring in clause (5) of Art.22 reflect the concern of the Framers that the representation should be expeditiously considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency without an avoidable delay. Though there is no period prescribed either under the Constitution or under the concerned detention law, within which the representation should be dealt with, there shall not be any supine indifference or slackness in considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of representation would be a breach of the constitutional imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal. This is because the confirmation of detention does not preclude the government from revoking the order of detention upon considering the representation. Secondly, there may be cases where the government has to consider the representation only after confirmation of detention. Clause (5) of Art.22 suggests that the representation could be received even after confirmation of the order of detention. The words 'shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order' in clause (5) of Art.22 suggest that the obligation of the government is to offer the detenu an opportunity to make a representation against the order before it is confirmed according to the procedure laid down under the relevant statutory provisions.

                  16. In view of the principles laid down above, the Government was legally obliged to consider the representation expeditiously before forwarding the documents to the advisory board. We are of the view that the rights of the detenu guaranteed under Art.22(5) of the Constitution has been violated.”

42. In view of the above decisions, the consideration of a representation made by or on behalf of a detenu is not an empty formality but a valuable constitutional safeguard flowing from Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The failure of the Government to independently consider the representation amounts to a serious procedural irregularity, which has deprived the detenu of his constitutional right to have his representation effectively considered.

43. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, we find that although the challenge based on non-compliance with Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the KAA(P)A is devoid of merit, the petitioner has succeeded in establishing several other substantial grounds which vitiate the order of detention such as illegibility of certain documents supplied to the detenu, non-compliance of Section 3(3) of the KAA(P)A regarding approval of the detention order within the prescribed period, unexplained delay in initiating the preventive detention proceedings and in passing the order of detention, which has snapped the live and proximate nexus between the alleged prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention and non consideration of representation submitted on behalf of the detenu by the Government nor by the Advisory Board, thereby resulting in a complete non-application of mind and a violation of the constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

44. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Exhibit-P1 order of detention dated 29th November, 2025 passed by the District Magistrate and District Collector, Palakkad, under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P)A and Exhibit-P2 order of confirmation passed by the Government under Section 10(4) are hereby set aside.

45. The 5th respondent, Superintendent of Jail, Central Jail, Viyyur, is directed to release the detenu, Sri. Gokul P.A., forthwith, if his continued detention is not required in connection with any other case.

46. The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the 5th respondent, forthwith.

47. The records produced in the sealed cover shall be returned to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor forthwith.