1. Heard Sri D.Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri M.Damodar Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants; Sri V.Narsimha Goud, learned Standing Counsel for Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority appearing for respondent Nos.2 and 3; Sri Pradeep Reddy Kata, learned Standing Counsel for Gram Panchayat, appearing for respondent No.5 and Sri A.Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri C. Naresh Reddy, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.7 and perused the record.
2. This Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is filed by the Appellants (respondent Nos.6 to 23 in W.P.Nos.18776 of 2019), who are the plot purchasers under the Grampanchayat layout, challenging the order dated 08.06.2026 passed by the Learned Single Judge in W.P.No.18776 of 2019. The Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by Respondent Nos.7 to 11 herein (the purchasers from the 6th Respondent herein) and set aside the revocation order dated 27.07.2019 passed by the Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA), which had revoked the draft layout permission granted in favour of the 6th Respondent.
Factual matrix
The factual matrix of the case as it emerges from the record is as follows:
3. The dispute pertains to land in Survey Nos.40, 46 and 47 at Surmaiguda Village, Abdullapurmet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Originally, the land was owned by three pattadars: (i) Mereddy Shantha (6th Respondent herein), (ii) Anthati Balraju, and (iii) Anthati Vishwanadam.
4. The said three owners pooled their lands admeasuring Ac.14-26 Gts and obtained a layout from the Lashkarguda Grampanchayat. Thereafter, they formed a real estate venture under the name and style of “Prithvi Sai Real Estate Private Limited” and proceeded to sell plots under a monthly installment scheme from the year 1995 onwards. The Appellants herein are purchasers of plots under the said Grampanchayat layout. They claim to have paid the entire sale consideration and obtained registered sale deeds executed by the original owners and/or Prithvi Sai Real Estate Private Limited.
5. The Grampanchayat layout comprised 296 plots. The Appellants and several other purchasers, who are stated to be retired Government employees and persons of modest means, came into possession of their respective plots after purchase thereof under the Grampanchayat layout.
6. After a lapse of nearly 21 years, the 6th Respondent—one of the original owners—claimed that she still retained an extent of Ac.5-11 Gts of land in Sy.Nos.40 and 47 which she had not alienated. On the basis of this claim, she executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of her husband and made an application to HMDA for sanction of a new layout. HMDA, acting upon her application, granted a draft layout permission dated 09.11.2018 in respect of Ac.5-11 Gts.
7. Aggrieved by the grant of the HMDA draft layout, the Appellants and other plot purchasers (who were already in possession of plots under the Grampanchayat layout) filed objections before HMDA on 10.12.2018. They contended that the 6th Respondent had already alienated the entire extent of her land by participating in the Grampanchayat layout and selling plots thereunder, and that she could not now claim fresh title over the same land and obtain a new layout. They also approached this Court by filing W.P.No.910 of 2019, which was disposed of with a direction to the HMDA to examine the objections and pass appropriate orders.
8. Pursuant thereto, HMDA conducted an enquiry and passed the impugned order dated 27.07.2019, revoking the draft layout permission granted to the 6th Respondent. The operative portion of the revocation order reads as follows:
"In view of the above the material records submitted by the both parties it is a true that the plots were register in these Sy.Nos before issue of layout approval by HMDA the layout applicant has not disclosed the fact of alienations took place in the land under reference at any point of time and there are alienation of lands by way of registrations were already took place in the lands under reference and noticed through the above complaint. Therefore, until and unless the dispute is decided at the appropriate forum, the layout issued vide reference 1st cited is here by revoked under section 22 of HMDA Act 2008."
9. The revocation order was challenged by two sets of persons: (i) Respondent Nos.7 to 11 herein (purchasers from the 6th Respondent herein) filed W.P.No.18776 of 2019 challenging the revocation order; (ii) The 6th Respondent herself filed W.P.No.4326 of 2020 challenging the same revocation order.
10. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned common order dated 08.06.2026, dismissed W.P.No.4326 of 2020 (filed by the 6th Respondent herein) on the ground that she had no locus standi after alienating the subject land. However, the Learned Single Judge allowed W.P.No.18776 of 2019 (filed by Respondent Nos.7 to 11), holding that the revocation order suffered from several infirmities, including lack of opportunity to the petitioners therein and the fact that HMDA had adjudicated upon disputed questions of title. The learned Single Judge accordingly set aside the revocation order.
11. Aggrieved by the common order of the Learned Single Judge dated 08.06.2026 in W.P.No.18776 of 2019, the Appellants (who were respondent Nos.6 to 23 in the writ petition and are original plot purchasers under the Grampanchayat layout) have preferred the present Writ Appeal.
Submissions on behalf of the appellants
12. Sri D.Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Damodar Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants, assailed the impugned order of the learned Single Judge and has advanced the following submissions:
i) That W.P.No.18776 of 2019, instituted by respondent Nos. 7 to 11, was not maintainable in law, as they were neither the applicants for the draft layout nor the original beneficiaries thereof. It was contended that the draft layout permission had been granted exclusively in favour of the 6th respondent, who herself had questioned the order of revocation by filing W.P.No.4326 of 2020. According to the learned Senior Counsel, respondent Nos. 7 to 11, being subsequent purchasers, could not independently challenge the revocation of the draft layout, particularly when the alienation in their favour was effected in violation of the conditions governing the draft layout.
ii) That the 6th respondent had furnished an undertaking to HMDA that no plot or portion of the land covered by the draft layout would be alienated until the land was developed in accordance with the sanctioned layout and the final layout was released. Notwithstanding the said undertaking, the 6th respondent executed registered Sale Deed No.9600 of 2018 dated 19.11.2018 in favour of respondent Nos. 7 to 11 within a short span of obtaining the draft layout permission dated 09.11.2018. It was, therefore, contended that the transfer itself was contrary to the conditions of the draft layout and incapable of conferring any enforceable right upon the purchasers.
iii) That the 6th respondent had obtained the draft layout permission by suppressing material facts and by misrepresenting before HMDA that she continued to hold an extent of Ac.5-11 Gts. free from any prior layout or alienation. It was argued that she had consciously failed to disclose that she was one of the joint pattadars who had obtained the common Gram Panchayat layout in the year 1995 and had herself alienated plots covered thereunder. It was submitted that the suppression of these material facts fully justified the exercise of power by HMDA under Section 22 of the HMDA Act to revoke the layout.
iv) That the plea subsequently raised by the 6th respondent disputing her signature on the Gram Panchayat layout was a clear afterthought and stood contradicted by her own conduct. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the registered sale deeds executed by the 6th respondent, including Document Nos.2203, 2204 and 2205 of 1995, expressly referred to the Gram Panchayat layout and the plot numbers assigned therein. Having acted upon the layout and conveyed plots in accordance therewith, the 6th respondent was precluded from disputing either its existence or its validity.
v) That a party who has acted upon a document, derived benefits thereunder and induced third parties to alter their position cannot subsequently be permitted to question the validity of the very document. It was contended that the 6th respondent had not only participated in the formation of the Gram Panchayat layout but had also alienated plots thereunder and received valuable consideration. Therefore, the 6th respondent’s subsequent attempt to disown the layout was legally impermissible.
vi) That respondent Nos.7 to 11, claiming title solely through the 6th respondent, could not assert any higher or better right than their vendor. Since the 6th respondent had already alienated plots covered by the Gram Panchayat layout and had exhausted her rights therein, she possessed no subsisting right, title or interest in the property.
vii) That although HMDA is not competent to adjudicate disputed questions of title, Section 22 of the HMDA Act expressly empowers the authority to revoke permissions obtained by fraud, suppression or misrepresentation of material facts. It was contended that the impugned order of revocation was founded not upon an adjudication of title but upon the finding that the 6th respondent had suppressed the earlier Gram Panchayat layout and the alienations effected thereunder while securing the draft layout permission.
viii) That the HMDA had acted strictly in accordance with the directions issued by this Court in W.P.No.910 of 2019 by issuing notices to all concerned, affording opportunity of hearing, considering the written submissions and documentary material placed on record, and thereafter passing a reasoned order. Learned Senior Counsel argued that HMDA had merely observed that serious title disputes existed and had left the parties to work out their remedies before the competent Civil Court. Therefore, the learned Single Judge erred in interfering with a well-reasoned administrative order passed within the statutory limits of Section 22 of the HMDA Act.
ix) That the sale deed executed by the 6th respondent in favour of respondent Nos. 7 to 11 conveyed no valid title, inasmuch as the 6th respondent herself had no subsisting right, title or interest remaining in the property. Reliance was placed upon the well-settled maxim nemo dat quod non habet, namely, that no person can convey a better title than that which he himself possesses. It was contended that respondent Nos. 7 to 11 could not derive any legally enforceable rights under the sale deed executed in their favour.
x) That the appellants and several other purchasers had acquired plots under the Gram Panchayat layout after paying valuable consideration under the monthly instalment scheme floated by Prithvi Sai Real Estate Private Limited and had remained in possession and enjoyment of their respective plots for over two decades. It was contended that many of the purchasers were retired Government employees and persons of modest means who had invested their life savings in acquiring residential plots.
xi) That if the draft layout obtained by the 6th respondent were permitted to stand, it would seriously prejudice the rights of numerous bona fide purchasers and unsettle long-standing possession. Therefore, it is submitted that the balance of convenience and the equities of the case overwhelmingly favoured the appellants and warranted restoration of the order of revocation passed by HMDA.
Submissions on behalf of respondent Nos.7 to 11
13. Sri A.Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri C.Naresh Reddy, learned counsel for respondent Nos.7 to 11 advanced the following submissions:
i) That respondent Nos.7 to 11 are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration, having purchased the subject property from the 6th respondent after due verification of her title and subsequent to the grant of draft layout permission by HMDA. It was contended that, being purchasers of the property covered by the draft layout, they had acquired a direct and substantial interest in the subject land and were, therefore, competent to challenge the order revoking the draft layout permission, as the same directly affected their proprietary rights.
ii) That respondent Nos. 7 to 11, being persons directly affected by the impugned proceedings, were entitled to question the legality of the revocation order. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the revocation adversely affected the rights acquired by them under the registered sale deed and was, therefore, amenable to challenge in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
iii) That the Gram Panchayat layout relied upon by the appellants is neither genuine nor authentic. It was submitted that the 6th respondent had categorically disputed her signature appearing on the said layout and that the alleged layout was not traceable in the records of the Lashkarguda Gram Panchayat, as confirmed by the Panchayat authorities.
iv) That the layout relied upon by the appellants was inherently improbable, as it purportedly depicted 296 plots in an extent of Ac.6-30 Gts, whereas, according to the respondents, such an extent could accommodate only about 90 plots, thereby rendering the document wholly unreliable.
v) That the burden of establishing the existence, execution and validity of the alleged Gram Panchayat layout squarely rested upon the appellants. Mere production of a photocopy of the layout, unsupported by official records or other cogent evidence, was insufficient to establish its genuineness or legal validity.
vi) That the power conferred upon HMDA under Section 22 of the HMDA Act is confined to cases where the permission has been obtained by making a false statement, misrepresentation or suppression of material facts. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the 6th respondent had disclosed all relevant title documents while seeking layout approval and had also relied upon the decree passed in O.S. No.873 of 2011 recognising her possession over the subject property. It was, therefore, contended that the essential ingredients for invoking Section 22 were absent in the present case.
vii) That the jurisdiction of HMDA is confined to examining prima facie title and compliance with the statutory requirements governing layout permissions and does not extend to adjudication of disputed questions relating to title or ownership. Learned Senior Counsel contended that, by revoking the draft layout on the basis of rival claims of title, HMDA had exceeded the limits of its statutory jurisdiction and effectively assumed the role of a Civil Court. In this regard, reliance was placed upon the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in SSPDCL Limited v. Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority ((2017) 6 ALT 253), wherein it was held that the authorities functioning under the HMDA Act are not empowered to adjudicate disputed questions of title and that grant or refusal of layout permission neither confers title nor determines the inter se rights of rival claimants.
viii) That the impugned order of revocation had serious civil consequences upon respondent Nos.7 to 11, who had purchased the subject property under a registered sale deed. It was, therefore, contended that any decision affecting their proprietary rights ought to conform strictly to the principles of natural justice and fair procedure.
ix) That respondent Nos.7 to 11 had invested substantial amounts towards the purchase of the subject property and had altered their position on the strength of the draft layout permission granted by HMDA. Consequently, the order of revocation, which adversely affected their rights and interests, could not have been sustained unless preceded by due compliance with the requirements of natural justice.
x) That the 6th respondent had instituted O.S. No.873 of 2011 before the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, seeking perpetual injunction in respect of the remaining extent of land, and the said suit was decreed on 12.02.2014. It was contended that the decree recognised her possession over the subject property and constituted a significant circumstance supporting the grant of layout permission.
xi) That the appellants were not parties to the said suit and, therefore, could not seek to indirectly assail the rights recognised thereunder by invoking the jurisdiction of HMDA or by initiating collateral proceedings before this Court.
xii) That respondent Nos.7 to 11 had purchased the subject property under a registered conveyance after grant of the draft layout permission and had acquired valuable rights thereunder. It was contended that if the revocation order were to be sustained, they would suffer serious prejudice and irreparable loss, whereas the appellants had failed to establish any legally enforceable right warranting interference with the draft layout permission granted in favour of the 6th respondent.
Submissions on behalf of the respondent Nos.2 and 3 (HMDA)
14. Sri V.Narasimha Goud Learned Standing Counsel for HMDA appearing for respondent Nos.2 and 3 advanced the following submissions:
i) That HMDA had acted strictly in accordance with the provisions of the HMDA Act and in compliance with the directions issued by this Court in W.P.No.910 of 2019. It was contended that, upon receipt of objections from the appellants and other plot purchasers, notices were issued to all concerned parties, an enquiry was conducted, written submissions and documentary evidence were received from both sides, and adequate opportunity of hearing was afforded before passing the impugned order. It was, therefore, submitted that the order of revocation was passed after due consideration of the entire material available on record and in adherence to the principles of natural justice.
ii) That the 6th respondent had secured the draft layout permission by suppressing material facts relating to the earlier Gram Panchayat layout and the alienations already effected thereunder. Learned Standing Counsel pointed out that the registered Sale Deed Nos.2203, 2204 and 2205 of 1995 executed by the 6th respondent specifically referred to the Gram Panchayat layout and the plot numbers assigned therein.
iii) That despite being fully aware of the earlier layout and the transactions effected pursuant thereto, the 6th respondent failed to disclose the same while applying for the draft layout permission. Such suppression attracted the conditions governing the draft layout, which expressly provided that any permission obtained by false statement, misrepresentation or suppression of material facts was liable to be cancelled.
iv) That HMDA had not undertaken any adjudication of disputed questions of title. It was argued that the impugned proceedings merely exercised the statutory power of revocation under Section 22 of the HMDA Act upon finding that the draft layout permission had been obtained by suppression and misrepresentation of material facts. According to the learned Standing Counsel, HMDA had only recorded that serious disputes regarding title existed between the rival claimants and had expressly left such disputes to be adjudicated by the competent Civil Court. The revocation, therefore, was not founded upon any determination of title but was well within the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon HMDA under Section 22 of the HMDA Act.
v) That HMDA had faithfully complied with the directions issued by this Court in W.P.No.910 of 2019 by considering the objections submitted by the appellants, conducting an enquiry in accordance with law, and thereafter passing a reasoned order assigning cogent reasons for revoking the draft layout permission. It was, therefore, contended that the learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with a valid administrative order passed by HMDA within the scope of its statutory powers.
Consideration by this Court
15. We have note of the respective contentions urged and carefully perused the entire record, including the revocation order dated 27.07.2019, the draft layout permission, the objections filed by the Appellants, the reply filed by the 6th Respondent, and the order of the learned Single Judge.
16. In our considered opinion, inasmuch as the revocation order dated 27.07.2019 passed by the HMDA prejudicial affected the rights accrued to the respondent Nos.7 to 11 under registered sale deeds, the revocation order is clearly amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution at their instance. A registered purchaser who holds a direct and substantial interest in the property cannot be said to lack locus standi to challenge an action that directly impinges upon his property rights. Accordingly, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the respondent Nos.7 to 11 lack the locus to file the W.P.No.18776 of 2019 cannot be countenanced.
17. At the outset, we need to examine the revocation order dated 27.07.2019. The relevant portion of the revocation order reads as under:
"In view of the above the material records submitted by the both parties it is a true that the plots were register in these Sy.Nos. before issue of layout approval by HMDA the layout applicant has not disclosed the fact of alienations took place in the land under reference at any point of time and there are alienation of lands by way of registrations were already took place in the lands under reference and noticed through the above complaint. Therefore, until and unless the dispute is decided at the appropriate forum, the layout issued vide reference 1st cited is here by revoked under section 22 of HMDA Act 2008."
18. A plain reading of the above order reveals that it suffers from several fatal defects:
i. Absence of Reasons: The order does not assign any reasons whatsoever for the conclusion that the draft layout permission should be revoked. It merely records that “plots were register [sic] before issue of layout approval” and that “alienations took place.” There is no discussion as to which plots were registered, what was the nature of the alienations, whether the alienations affected the entire land or only a part thereof, and whether such alienations constituted suppression of material facts by the 6th Respondent.
ii. Mere Recording of Submissions: A substantial portion of the order (running into several pages) comprises verbatim reproduction of the submissions of the parties, including the written arguments of the complainants, the objections, and the reply of the 6th Respondent. The operative part of the order is cryptic and does not even refer to the evidence or documents relied upon by the parties. It appears that HMDA merely reproduced the pleadings and then, in one paragraph comprising merely a few lines, concluded that the layout should be revoked. This is not a reasoned order. A quasi-judicial authority is required to apply its mind to the facts and evidence and record findings on each contentious issue. That has not been done in the present case.
iii. Non-Application of Mind: The order does not demonstrate that HMDA applied its mind to the crucial question: whether the 6th Respondent had obtained the Grampanchayat layout and acted upon it by selling plots, thereby losing any subsisting right over the land. The 6th Respondent had taken a specific stand that her signatures on the Grampanchayat layout were forged. The Appellants had relied upon registered sale deeds executed by the 6th Respondent herself to demonstrate that she had acted upon the layout. The order does not even discuss this critical aspect. It merely observes that the "dispute should be decided at the appropriate forum," without recording any finding on the allegation of misrepresentation or suppression of facts.
iv. Failure to Consider the Scope of Section 22 of the HMDA Act: Section 22 of the HMDA Act, 2008 empowers HMDA to revoke any development permission if it is found that the same was obtained by making any false statement or misrepresentation or suppression of any material fact. The power to revoke is a quasi-judicial power, and its exercise must be preceded by a proper inquiry and a reasoned order. In the present case, while HMDA claims to have conducted an enquiry, the final order does not reflect any analysis of the evidence or any application of mind to the issue of misrepresentation. The order is, therefore, unsustainable in law.
v. Vague and Unsubstantiated Observations: The order states that “it is a true that the plots were register [sic] in these Sy.Nos before issue of layout approval.” This observation is vague and does not identify which plots, which Survey Numbers, and when the registrations took place. The order is silent on whether the registrations were in respect of the plots covered by the draft layout or some other land. The observation is also unsupported by any reference to the evidence on record. It is trite law that quasi-judicial order must contain a clear and unambiguous finding on the facts, based on the evidence on record. Vague observations, like in the present case, cannot sustain a revocation order.
19. It is well settled that an administrative or quasi-judicial authority, while exercising powers affecting the rights of the parties, is required to pass a reasoned order. The rules of natural justice, embodied in the maxim audi alteram parte, does not stand exhausted merely upon the grant of a hearing; it inherently extents to the requirement that the final decision must be backed by cogent reasons. Such reasons must explicitly consider the contentions of the parties, thereby demonstrating that they were afforded a meaningful, not merely illusory, opportunity of hearing. To reflect that the parties were afforded a meaningful opportunity of hearing after consideration of contentions, the recording of reasons is indispensible, as they constitute the vital link between the evidence on record and the conclusion arrived at, which alone enables the appellate authority or the writ Court to exercise effective judicial review. The reasons serve as a bridge between the evidence and the conclusion and facilitate effective judicial review.
20. In the present case, HMDA had before it the following facts: (i) The 6th Respondent had obtained the draft layout permission. (ii) The Appellants (plot purchasers under the Grampanchayat layout) had filed objections alleging that the 6th Respondent had already alienated the land and had suppressed the fact of alienation. (iii) The 6th Respondent had denied the allegations and claimed that her signatures on the Grampanchayat layout were forged. (iv) Both parties had filed registered sale deeds, layout plans, revenue records, and other documents.
21. Given this factual matrix, HMDA was required to: (i) Identify the specific issues in dispute. (ii) Analyse the evidence on record. (iii) Record findings on each issue, particularly on the question of misrepresentation. (iv) Apply the provisions of Section 22 of the HMDA Act. (v) Assign reasons for revoking the layout permission.
22. None of these requirements have been fulfilled. The revocation order does not address the contentions of the parties, does not discuss the evidence, does not record findings on the allegations of misrepresentation, and does not even refer to the provisions of Section 22 of the HMDA Act in the operative part.
23. A non-speaking or cryptic order vitiates the exercise of power and renders the decision arbitrary and liable to be set aside. The principle is well established by a catena of judicial pronouncements.
24. In Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ((1978) 1 SCC 248), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the absence of reasons in a decision affecting the rights of an individual is a violation of natural justice, as it deprives the affected person of the opportunity to challenge the decision effectively.
25. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi ((1991) 2 SCC 716), it was held that an order passed without recording reasons is a nullity in the eyes of law.
26. In the present case, the respondent Nos.7 to 11 were entitled to know the reasons for the revocation of the draft layout permission, as it affected their rights and pass a reasoned order. The cryptic, non-speaking order not only violates the principles of natural justice but also makes it impossible for this Court to ascertain the basis of HMDA's decision.
27. HMDA is a statutory authority exercising quasi-judicial functions under the HMDA Act, 2008. When it exercises the power of revocation under Section 22 of the Act, which is quasi-judicial in nature, it is required to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The revocation order dated 27.07.2019 falls far short of the standards expected of a quasi-judicial authority.
28. We are conscious of the principle laid down in SSPDCL Limited (supra 1) as cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents, that HMDA is not a civil Court and cannot adjudicate upon disputed questions of title. However, that does not mean HMDA can bypass the requirement of a reasoned order. Even while deciding prima facie issues of misrepresentation or suppression, HMDA is required to pass a speaking order, particularly when its decision revokes a development permission and affects the rights of multiple parties.
29. In the present case, HMDA was only required to examine whether the 6th Respondent had made a false statement or suppressed any material fact while obtaining the draft layout permission. That inquiry required a consideration of the evidence on record, including the Grampanchayat layout, the registered sale deeds, and the revenue records. Instead of conducting a proper inquiry and passing a reasoned order, the HMDA merely recorded the submissions of the parties and concluded that the dispute should be decided by a civil Court. This approach is not only improper but also amounts to abdication of the statutory duty conferred upon it under Section 22 of the HMDA Act.
30. The learned Single Judge, while allowing W.P.No.18776 of 2019 ought to have remanded the matter to the HMDA for fresh consideration as the impugned revocation order suffered from non-application of mind and was cryptic, being devoid of any reasons.
31. The Appellants are purchasers of plots under the Grampanchayat layout who have been in possession for nearly two decades. The 6th Respondent, after having participated in the Grampanchayat layout and selling plots, sought to obtain a fresh layout from the HMDA. The question whether she had suppressed material facts was central to the legality of the revocation order. The learned Single Judge ought to have directed HMDA to pass a fresh, reasoned order in a time bound manner after conducting a proper inquiry, rather than merely setting aside the revocation order.
32. We are of the considered view that the revocation order cannot stand. It is cryptic, based on a complete non-application of mind and does not meet the minimum standards of a reasoned quasi-judicial order. The order is not sustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. The HMDA is empowered to revoke the draft layout if it is satisfied that the permission was obtained by misrepresentation or suppression of material facts, in accordance with Section 22 of the HMDA Act.
33. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to set aside the revocation order and direct HMDA to re-examine the matter afresh. HMDA shall conduct a proper inquiry, give a reasonable opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties, and pass a reasoned order in accordance with law, strictly in terms of Section 22 of the HMDA Act, 2008.
34. The fresh order shall be passed within a period of three(3) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
Conclusion
35. For the foregoing reasons, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. The order dated 08.06.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.18776 of 2019 is upheld and modified to the extent indicated herein above. The revocation order dated 27.07.2019 passed by HMDA in Proceedings No. 013034/GHT/LT/U6/HMDA/2018 is quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to HMDA for a fresh decision in accordance with the observations made hereinabove.
36. All the parties shall appear before HMDA on a date to be fixed by the said Authority for the purpose of conducting the fresh inquiry. The status quo regarding the nature and possession of the land as existing as on today shall be maintained by all the parties till the fresh order is passed by the HMDA.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, stand closed. No costs.
