1. Present petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking following reliefs :

          a) A writ direction order in the nature of mandamus or certiorari as deem fit be issued quashing the order Annexure Pl3

          b) This petition be allowed with costs

          c) Any other relief which this Honble Court deems fit be also granted

2. Pursuant to the earlier order dated 19/12/2023 passed by co=ordinate Bench of this High Court in W.P. no. 7871/2013, para nos. 4 to 7 are reproduced as under :

          4. In view of the said order, the Principal Secretary of the State Government passed the order dated 01.09.2023 and clarified the position and stated that the land should be released from the concerned scheme.

          It was further direted to the petitioner IDA that the concerned petition be reconsidered and appropriate action should be taken in the pending writ petition. The petitioner has also filed IA No.7329/2023 for early hearing of the petition alongwith the said application they have filed copy of the order passed by the State Government dated 01.09.2023 as Anncxure EI2.

          5. Learned counsel for the respondent no.2 submits that as per the provision of section 73 and 52 of the Adhiniyam, 1973, the State Government has been conferred power to give directions and under section 74 of the Adhiniyam, 1973, the power is conferred to the Government to review, plan etc. tor ensuring conformity. It is argued that as per the aforesaid provisions of Adhiniyam, 1973, the order passed by the State Government dated 01.09.2023 is binding on the petitioners- Indore Development Authority.

          6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was not party in the said writ petition, which was decided by this court. However, he could not dispute the legal provisions and the order passed by the State Government which is binding on the petitioner.

          7. In the light of the order passed by the State Government dated 01.09.2023, the order passed by the Director, Town and Country Planning stands affirmed and therefore nothing remains in the petition to examine the validity of the order of the Director. The present petition is dismissed by directing the petitioner to release the land of the respondent no.2 and declaring it free from all kinds of encumbrances of the said scheme no. l69-A.

3. Thereafter the said order was challenged by way of W.A no. 3094/2024 along with other writ appeals, which was decided by order, which is delivered on 16/06/2025 by the Division Bench, For the sake of reference, the relevant paragraph nos. 30 to 32 are reproduced as under :

          "30. It is clear from the aforesaid order that the Principal Secretary, State Government has not decided the application filed under Section 52 of the Adhiniyam of 1973 on merit, therefore, the Writ Court has wrongly held that because of the order dated 01.09.2023, nothing remains to be decided in this writ petition. The Principal Secretary has only directed the IDA to examine the subject matter of W.P. No.7871 of 2013, legal grounds, and current circumstances and do the necessary proceedings before the High Court. There is nothing adverse in the order dated 01.09.2023 against the IDA to challenge the order in the pending writ petition by way of amendment. Pushpa Bai, virtually committed contempt of Court by filing an application under Section 52 of the Adhiniyam of 1973 during the pendency of all these writ petitions. She also committed contempt of Court by suppressing important facts of pendency of the writ petition and order of status quo and obtained the order that the application under Section 52 of the Adhiniyam of 1973 be decided expeditiously. Because of this direction, the Principal Secretary has decided the application under Section 52 of the Adhiniyam of 1973, on the basis of which W.P. No.7871 of 2013 has been dismissed and relying on the said order other writ petitions have also been dismissed without adjudication on merit

          31. The validity of the order dated 30.08.2011 has not been decided by the Writ Court on merit, therefore, we have no reason to entertain these writ appeals on merit. Relying on the order passed in the case of Pushpa Bai (supra), the Writ Court has dismissed all other writ petitions treating them to be identical in facts and grounds, whereas in other writ petitions, there is no such order passed under Section 52 of the Adhiniyam of 1973 by the State Government.

          32. In view of the foregoing discussions, the order dated 19.12.2023 passed by the Writ Court in W.P. No.7871 of 2023 is hereby set aside. Relying on this order all the writ petitions have been dismissed, hence, all the writ appeals are allowed and impugned orders passed by the writ court are also set aside. All the writ petitions are hereby restored to their original number. These writ petitions are remitted back to the Writ Court for adjudication on merit/"

4. Thereafter, the order passed by the Divison Bench was challenged by present petitioner by way of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary no. 62446/2025. For the sake of reference, the relevant paragraph nos. 8 to 13 are reproduced as under :

          8. Para 32 reads thus.

          "32. In view of the foregoing discussions, the order dated 19.12.2023 passed by the Writ Court in W.P. No.7871 of 2013 is hereby set aside. Relying on this order all the writ petitions have been dismissed, hence, all the writ appeals are allowed and impugned orders passed by the writ court are also set aside. All the writ petitions are hereby restored, to their original number. These writ petitions are remitted back to the Writ Court for adjudication on merit."

          9. As such we find no good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court because the High Court thought fit to direct that the Writ Petition No.7871 of 2013 be heard afresh.

          10. The original writ petition was filed by the Indore Development Authority.

          11. The petitioner is an 80 year old lady.

          12. In such circumstances, we request the High Court to take up the Writ Petition No.7871 of 2013 for final hearing at the earliest and see to it that the same is disposed of with appropriate judgment within a period of two months from today.

          13. It is needless to clarify that the writ petition shall be decided by the High Court without being influenced in any manner by any of the observations made in the impugned order.

5. Considering the same and the prayers made in the petition, a requrest is made by counsel for the petitioner that in view of the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the matter is required to be heard as expeditiously as possible, therefore, the matter is segregated from other matters, wherein there is no such direction and this matter was taken up for consideration by fixing date of hearing. Today, the matter is called out.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner is heard at length. Learned counsel for the private respondent and the State are heard at length. They have also filed brief written synopsis in support of their say.

7. It is also pointed out by counsel for the petitioner / Indore Development Authority that an application for grant of interim relief filed under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC for carrying out the amendment in the petition as there are several orders passed, prior to filing of this petition as well as after filing of this petition by various Courts and the some documents, which are relevant for the purpose of consideration, are sought to be placed on record by way of filing amendment application, which was opposed by counsel for the respondent by submitting that the impugned order under challenge is of the concerned Authority / Reviewing Authority passed under section 52 of the Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam (in short " the Adhiniyam") and the documents, which are now sought to be relied, are either part of the record by way of various proceedings and the order passed by the Competent Court, which can be otherwise looked into during the course of argument and other documents, which are not part of the record at the relevant point of time, though the petitioner has filed petition at that point of time, now with a view to delay the hearing of the matter and even though there is specific direction of Hon'ble Supreme Court to conclude the hearing within two months looking to the age of present petitioner and therefore, he has objected that neither such documents are relevant for the consideration of the issue involved in the present petition, nor it can be said that many of the documents like the orders passed by the Courts can also be considered by citing during the course of argument, therefore, he has submitted that such application is not required to be heard and the main matter can be heard

8 I have considered the rival submissions made by both the parties and also the fact that looking to the nature of the amendment application, which is filed, is consisting pages more than the original petition by way of seeking amendments, which are certainly in the nature of producing some documents, sale-deed, photographs and also some orders passed by the Authority. Those documents can be certainly referred at the time of argument to understand the case of the parties in proper manner, but not required to be produced at such belated stage, which is as not necessary pleadings for constitution of this petition also, can change the colour of the litigation to some extent, moreover, looking to the nature of prayers made in the present petition is essentially by challenging the order passed by the concerned Authority of the M.P. State Government under section 52 of the Adhiniyam and therefore, I found it not require to consider by allowing such application at the belated stage, which as such not direct bearing with subject of the present petition,Therefore, the matter is heard at length.

9. The fact of the case in brief is that the IDA had preferred writ petition before this Court on the ground that the respondent no. 2 has failed to carry out development as per sanctioned layout dated 26/09/2005, hence the land could not have been directed to be released. The Writ Petition was disposed of on the ground that since the government has issued an order dated 01/09/2023 the petition does not survive. Thereafter, the IDA preferred Writ Appeal before Division Bench of this Court and the same were disposed of by remanding the matter back to the Writ Court, essentially on the ground that since scheme no. 169-A has been substantially implemented and the Respondent No. 2 had obtained the order of government dated 01/09/2023 based on an order passed in Writ Petition 18970/2020 behind the basis of IDA, Against the order passed in Writ Appeal no. 3094/2024, respondent No. 2 preferred SLP (C) Diary No. 624469/2025, which was disposed of vide order dated 17/11/2025 by requesting the High Court to take up Writ Petition no. 7871/2013 i.e. present petition for final hearing at the earliest and the same be disposed of with appropriate judgment within two months, as also by observing that the Writ Petition shall be decided by the High Court without being influenced in any manner by any of the observation made in the impugned order. Hence present petition is placed before this Court.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner / IDA has submitted that if the land in question is released, it will frustrate the planning of the scheme no. 169-A and 169-B as the huge chunk of is land involved in the present scheme i.e. 14,575 hectors. She has further submitted that from bare reading of section 25 of the Adhiniyam, it is quite clear that any development should be in conformity with development plan Admittedly till today no such development activity has been undertaken or completed by the land owners, therefore even the layout sanctioned lapses as being not in conformity with the master plan.

11. Learned counsel has further submitted that it is quite clear from the bare reading of section 53 of the Adhiniyam that after the declaration of the scheme what is saved is only the development undertaken instituted authorized by the Director. Section 53 does not contemplates release of land from the scheme merely on the ground of there being a layout sanctioned prior to the declaration of the scheme but what is saved is the development undertaken on the land in question in accordance to the development authorized by the Director in accordance to the provisions of the act. Thus the land owner's land could not have been released from the scheme only on account of the fact that the layout was sanctioned prior to the declaration of the scheme as section 53 of the Adhiniyam does not contemplate this exigency. Section 53 does not contemplate release of land but contemplates restrictions on actual use and development of land merely having sanction on paper will not be enough to attract the saving as contemplated in section 53 of the Adhiniyam..

12. She further submitted that there is no averment or pleading in the objection filed by the land owner or even in the revision filed before the Revisional authority U/s. 51 of the Adhiniyam, therefore the layout sanctioned proposing a land use contrary to the master plan is nonest in the eyes of law and such development permission cannot be a ground to release the land from the scheme no. 169-A. In view of the aforestated, it is prayed that the present petition be allowed.

13. Per-contra, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 has submitted that the respondent No. 2 preferred SLP (C) Diary No. 624469/2025, which was disposed of vide order dated 17/11/2025, by observing that it is needless to clarify that Writ Petition shall be decided by the High Court without being influenced in any manner by any of the observation made in the impugned order. Thus, in effect the observation of Division Bench in remand order dated 16/06/2025 in Writ Appeal 3094/2024 IDA Vs Pushpa Bai are not required to be considered, rather the validity of the order of Director in revision (Annexure P/3) is to be examined on merits.

14. Learned counsel has further submitted that a true objective and purposive reading of section 53 of the Adhiniyam shows that no sooner a development authority publishes its intention to frame and prepare a TDS, the land use of every land covered including private lands, stands freezed and even an individual person cannot change the land used thereby prohibiting development due to freezing of the land use. He has also submitted that the last part of quoted section 53 of the Adhiniyam clearly shows that notwithstanding, the freezing of such land use, development of any land included in proposed scheme is not prohibited, provided it is covered by a sanction granted by the Director, "prior to publishing of such declaration". He further submitted that even in a situation, where land use of a land, likely to be included in the scheme to be prepared, is freezed even then such land can be developed if it is covered by sanction of a layout granted by the Director prior to declaration of intention to frame scheme u/s 50 (2) of the Adhiniyam . He has further submitted that this principle has been appreciated by this court in Writ Petition 7732/2016 [UDA Vs Geeta Totla ] by judgment dated 11/07/2018 and land covered by previous layout sanctioned has been directed to be excluded from the scheme. This judgment has been affirmed in Writ Appeal 1481/2018 [UDA VS. Geeta Totla] by judgment dated 22/04/2019 and SLP preferred by UDA being SLP (C) Diary No. 29393/2019 has been dismissed on 06/09/2019. Learned counsel has further submitted that section 53 of the Adhiniyam has been interpreted by the Apex Court in the same. fashion in judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Chairman, IDA Vs. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemical Limited reported in (2007) 8 SCC 705. Therefore, learned counsel prays for dismissal of present petiton.

15. Learned counsel for the respondent / State has submitted that from bare perusal of the said sanctioned map, it clearly transpires that the land belonging to the answering respondents forms part of the land specifically shown as exempted land by the IDA itself. Once the petitioner has itself acknowledged the respondents' land as exempted in the sanctioned map, the petitioner cannot now be permitted to take a contrary stand before this Court. It is further submitted that the present review petition is wholly misconceived and is, in fact, an attempt to seek a rehearing of the matter on merits. The scope of review jurisdiction is extremely limited. A review can be entertained only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record. The petitioner has failed to point out any such apparent error in the judgment under review. On the contrary, the petitioner has sought to re-agitate the factual matrix of the case and invite this Court to undertake a fresh appreciation of facts and evidence, which is impermissible in review jurisdiction. Learned counsel has further submitted that the competent authority acted strictly within the four corners of its statutory jurisdiction while passing the impugned order. The order is well-reasoned, legal, and fully sustainable in the eyes of law. No jurisdictional error, perversity, or patent illegality has been demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this Court. In these circumstances, the petition, being devoid of merit, be dismissed with exemplary costs.

16. I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar. The main contentions of the petitioner

17. The main contention of the petitioner is about the applicability of the Section 53 of the Adhiniyam. It is relevant to note that on 26/09/2005, the JD, TNCP sanctioned a layout plan of Survey No. 36/1 for an area. 1.368 Hec. for industrial purpose. On 16/01/2008, the Respondent No. 2 applied for diversion u/s 172 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code and the SDO sent a letter to the Indore Development Authority (in short "IDA") and the Town and Country Planning (in short "TNCP") department seeking their opinion. On 16/01/2008, the SDO sent a letter to Nazul Officer seeking his opinion. On 10/01/2008, the Gram Panchayat, Kumedi granted NOC for Diversion. On 11/07/2008, the IDA passed resolution no. 198 u/s 50 (1) of Adhiniyam for framing scheme no. 169-A. On 25/07/2008, under section 50 (2) of the Adhiniyam, the intention to frame scheme no. 169-A was published in the newspaper. On 01/08/2008, the same was published in the gazette. On 15/10/2009, the draft scheme no. 169-A was published in newspaper inviting objection. On 23/10/2009, the draft scheme no. 169-A was published in gazette inviting objection. On 23/10/2009, the Respondent No. 2 pushpa bai submitted her objection to draft scheme no. 169-A. On 16/08/2010, the objection of Respondent No. 2 was rejected by the IDA. It also transpires that the final scheme no. 169-A was published in newspaper u/s 50 (1). The Respondent No. 2 filed an revision no. 3 of 2011 before Director, TNCP, Bhopal. On 07/05/2011, the IDA filed a reply in the revision. On 30/08/2011, the Revision of Respondent No. 2 was allowed by the Director and based on the principles flowing from section 53 of the Adhiniyam. The land of Respondent No. 2 of survey no. 36/1, village Kumedi was directed to be excluded from scheme 169-A as its layout was sanctioned on 26/09/2005 much before the IDA declared, its intention to frame the scheme 169-A on 01/08/2008. The IDA submitted representation to the PS, Housing & Environment Department, Bhopal seeking permission to file Writ Petition on 17/04/2013. On 08/05/2013, the Housing and Environment of Department issued a clarification in clause 7.3 stating that on the ground of previous sanction of layout before declaration of intention under section 50 (2) scheme, the land should not be released.

18. Considering these aspects and the factual background, now it is relevant to consider the submissions made by rival parties by referring to the various judgments as under :

          a) Central Coal Fields Vs. State of MP and others [ 1995(2) SCC 11 (para nos. 7 and 8 )

          b) Indore Development Authority Vbs. Burhani Grah Nirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit [ 2023 SCC Online SC 3123]. Para nos. 53 and 67.

          c) Kalicharan and others Vs. State of UP and others [ 2024 SCC Online SC 3472] Para nos 38 and 41.

          d) Ikkisvi Sadi Grah Nirman Samiti Vs. State of MP and othes [ WA no. 69/2020] Para nos. 19, 22, 26 and 27.

          e) Gauradevi Vs. State of MP and othes [ WP no. 5827/2021] Para no. 9.

          f) Bhondu Ramaswami and others Vs. Banglore Development Authority and others [ 2010 (7) SCC 129] Para nos. 103 and 140.

          g) Raipur Development Authority Vs. Anupam Sahakari Grah Nirman Samiti and others [ 2000(4) SCC 357] Page nos. 16 and 17.

          h) Anand Buttons Ltd Vs. State of Haryana and others [ 2005(9) SCC 164].

          i) Mumbai International Airport Vs. Regency Convention Centre and others [ 2010(7) SCC 417].

          j) State of Orisa Vs. Titaghur Paper Mill Company Ltd and another [ AIR 1988 SC 1293]

19. The above mentioned judgments are cited by learned counsel for the petitioner / I.D.A., but on the facts of the case, the above judgments are not helpful to the case of petitioner, though there is no quarrel about the ratio of those judgments delivered by Hon'ble Supreme Courts as well as the High Courts.

20. In the present case, in the factual background and also considering the position of law, it is also relevant to note the judgment cited by learned counsel for the respondent/s, which is in similar facts of the present case. [Writ Petition no. 7732 of 2016 [ UDA Vs. Geeta Totia decided on 11/07/2018]. For the sake of reference, relevant part of which is reproduced as under :

          Facts of the case are not in much dispute. The respondent No.1 was granted permission of development on 08.09.2006. Thereafter, she has constructed one room and fencing. The petitioner has published the notification under Section 50(2) on 23.01.2011 and before that the respondent has already obtained a permission of development. The moment notification under Section 50(2) issued, section 53 comes into operation. Thereafter the respondent No.1 was not in a position to carry out any development over the land. This fact was well within the knowledge of petitioner that the permission had already been granted to the respondent No.1, therefore, the said land ought not to have been included in the scheme.

          Even otherwise, as per the departmental note placed before the committee constituted under Section 50(3) and (4), total area of Survey No.142 is 2.341 hectare and out of 6 which only 1.714 has been included in the scheme and there is no sanction for area 0.627 hectare and as per the spot inspection report, the land owners have constructed their house over Survey No.142 and almost all the land has been developed. The aforesaid note is reproduced below:

IMAGE

By order dated 30.12.2015, the commissioner Bhopal has granted one month's time to the petitioner to prepare an amended scheme. The petitioner took 11 months to file present petition and there is no material available in the writ petition to show that since 2013 any development work has been started by the petitioner. After the lapse of 4 years, no steps have been taken by the petitioner to 7 implement the scheme. Even, the lands included in the scheme have not been acquired by way of mutual agreement or acquisition, therefore, no interference is called for, hence, petition is hereby dismissed.

21. The aforesaid order was challenged by the Authority by way of Writ Appeal nos. 1480 of 2018 and 1481 of 2018, which is like identical to facts of the present petition. For the said of reference, relevant paragraph nos. 11 to 16 are reproduced as under :

          11- The another important aspect of the case is that after issuance of notification under Section 50(2), Section 53 comes into play. Section 53 of the Act of 1973 reads as under:-

          "Restrictions on land use and land development.-As from the date of publication of the declaration to prepare a town development scheme, no person shall, within the area included in the scheme, institute or change the use of any land or building or carry out any development, save in accordance with the development authorised by the Director in accordance with the provisions of this Act prior to the publication of such declaration."

          In light of the aforesaid statutory provision the respondent No.1 was not in a position to carry out any further development activity over the land and the factum of development permission granted in favour of espondent No.1 was well within the knowledge of Ujjain Development Authority and therefore, by no stretch of imagination the land could have been included under the development scheme.

          12- It is also an undisputed fact that the application for diversion of land of respondent No.1 was allowed, which was preferred under Section 172 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 and thereafter, the Town and Country Planning Department has granted development permission on 08/09/2006.

          13- The another important aspect of the case is that large number of area included in the scheme has already been excluded from the scheme and the land belonging to the other identically placed land owners has already been excluded by the Ujjain Development Authority. A list was submitted by Town and Country Planning Department in respect of persons, who were granted development permission, however, the respondent No.1 has been discriminated in the matter and in those circumstances, the Revisional Authority has allowed the revision.

          14- The order passed by the Revisional Authority is a well reasoned order and the learned Single Judge has rightly declined to interfere with the order passed by the Revisional Authority.

          15- The present case reflects a hostile discrimination shown by the Ujjain Development Authority. The land belonging to other persons who were having development permissions, have been excluded from the development scheme and the land belonging to respondent No.1 was not excluded and therefore, as it was a case of hostile discrimination, there is a clear violation of Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Revisional Authority was justified in allowing the revision preferred by respondent No.1.

          16- Learned Single Judge has also given a finding of fact that after lapse of four years, the Ujjain Development Authority has not taken any steps to implement the scheme. The lands which form part of the scheme has not been acquired by way of mutual agreement or by way of acquisition and therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, as there was a sanctioned development plan in respect of land belonging to the respondent No.1 sanctioned way back in the year 2006, the land of the respondent No.1 could not have been included in the scheme as held by the Revisional Authority and as held by the learned Single Judge. This Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, the admission is declined in both the appeals and the appeals are dismissed.

22. It also further transpires that there being aggrieved by that order, the Ujjain Development Authority i.e. UDA had challenged that order by way of filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary no. 29393 of 2019 and by order dated 06/09/2019, passed the following order by dismissing the S.L.P. :

          "Delay condoned.

          We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. The special leave petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.

          Pending applications shall also stand disposed of."

23. Therefore, in these factual background and the position of law, which is coming on record, the section 53 of the Adhiniyam is required to be quoted as under :

          53. Restrictions on land use and land development.- As from the date of publication of the declaration to prepare a town development scheme, no person shall, within the area included in the scheme, institute or change the use of any land or building or carry out any development, 'save in accordance with the development authorized by the Director in accordance with the provisions of this Act prior to the publication of such declaration'

24. From the bare reading of the Adhiniyam, later part, which clearly stipulates that " 'save in accordance with the development authorized by the Director in accordance with the provisions of this Act prior to the publication of such declaration" therefore, considering the objective and purposive reading of section 53 of the Adhiniyam shows that no sooner a development authority publishes its intention to frame and prepare a TDS, the land use of every land covered including private lands, stands freezed and even an individual person cannot change the land use thereby prohibiting development due to freezing of the land use. However, the last highlighted and underlined part of quoted section 53 of the Adhiniyam clearly shows that notwithstanding, the freezing of such land use, development of any land included in proposed scheme is not prohibited, provided it is covered by a sanction granted by the Director, "prior to publishing of such declaration". Therefore, in view of the aforesaid exception created in second part of section 53 clearly spells out the legislative intent that even in a situation where land use of a land, likely to be included in the scheme to be prepared, is freezed even then such land can be developed if it is covered by sanction of a layout granted by the Director prior to declaration of intention to frame scheme u/s 50 (2). It is also revevant to note the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Chairman, IDA Vs. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemical Limited reported in (2007) 8 SCC 705, which is cited by counsel for the respondent in support of his contention. For the sake of reference, relevant paragraph nos. 41, 43, 46, 47, 48, 53, 54, 57, 60, 75 and 77 are reproduced as under :

          41. When a draft development plan is prepared, the same is subject to grant of approval and/or modification thereof. We will deal with the matter in some detail a little later but at this stage, we may notice that end use of the land is not frozen until a final sanction plan comes into being. A town planning scheme, as would appear from its definition contained in Section 2(4) of the Act, is prepared only for the purpose of implementation of a development plan. Yet again, we would deal with the question as to whether the same would bring within its sweep the draft development plan or only final development plan a little later, but it may be noticed that once a valid town planning scheme comes into force, indisputably, there may be freezing of land use as also freezing of development and, thus, a total embargo is placed except in such cases where the Director had granted permission. Section 53 of the Act, however, in the event a valid town planning scheme is made, places a total embargo both on land use as also the development. Even the Director is denuded of its power to issue any further permission.

          Existing land use, draft development plan and final development plan envisage two-stage exercise. In drafting or finalising a zonal plan, a similar exercise is undertaken. In making a town development scheme, however, the process undertaken is a three-stage one inasmuch as an intention therefor is declared which entails serious consequences and, as noticed hereinbefore, by reason thereof, a total embargo is imposed both on land use as also the development. For the said purpose, a time- limit within which a draft town planning scheme has to be finalised is provided but the same can be subject to modification by the State which ordinarily should be with a view to deal with the same in line with the final development plan.

          43. There are two competing interests viz. one, the interest of the State vis-à-vis the general public and, two, to have better living conditions and the right of property of an individual which although is not a fundamental right but is a constitutional and human righ

          46. Where, however, a scheme comes into force, although it may cause hardship to the individual owners as they may be prevented from making the most profitable use of their rights over property, having regard to the drastic consequences envisaged thereunder, the statute should be considered in such a manner as a result whereof greater hardship is not caused to the citizens than actually contemplated thereby. Whereas an attempt should be made to prevent unplanned and haphazard development but the same would not mean that the court would close its eyes to the blatant illegalities committed by the State and/or the statutory authorities in implementation thereof. Implementation of such land development as also building laws should be in consonance with public welfare and convenience. In United States of America zoning ordinances are enacted pursuant to the police power delegated by the State. Although in India the source of such power is not police power but if a zoning classification imposes unreasonable restrictions, it cannot be sustained. The public authority may have general considerations, safety or general welfare in mind, but the same would become irrelevant, as thereby statutory rights of a party cannot be taken away. The courts must make an endeavour to strike a balance between public interest on the one hand and protection of a constitutional right to hold property, on the other.

          47. For the aforementioned purpose, an endeavour should be made to find out as to whether the statute takes care of public interest in the matter vis-à-vis the private interest, on the one hand, and the effect of lapse and/or positive inaction on the part of the State and other planning authorities, on the other.

          48. The courts cannot also be oblivious of the fact that the owners who are subject to the embargos placed under the statute are deprived of their valuable rightful use of the property for a long time. Although ordinarily when a public authority is asked to perform statutory duties within the time stipulated it is directory in nature but when it involves valuable rights of the citizens and provides for the consequences therefor it would be construed to be mandatory in character.

          53. The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional right but also a human right.

          54. The Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26-8-1789 [Ed.: This historic declaration also known as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, 1789 was adopted by the French National Assembly after the French Revolution.] enunciates under Article 17:

          "17. Since the right to property is inviolable and sacred, no one may be deprived thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained, obviously requires it and just and prior indemnity has been paid".

          Further under Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 dated 10-12-1948, adopted in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution it is stated that: (i) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (ii) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."

          57. The Act being regulatory in nature as by reason thereof the right of an owner of property to use and develop stands restricted, requires strict construction. An owner of land ordinarily would be entitled to use or develop the same for any purpose unless there exists certain regulation in a statute or statutory rules. Regulations contained in such statute must be interpreted in such a manner so as to least interfere with the right to property of the owner of such land.

          Restrictions are made in larger public interest. Such restrictions, indisputably must be reasonable ones. (See Balram Kumawat v. Union of India [(2003) 7 SCC 628] ; Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Pilibhit Pantnagar Beej Ltd. [(2004) 1 SCC 391] and Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. [(2004) 2 SCC 747] ) The statutory scheme contemplates that a person and owner of land should not ordinarily be deprived from the user thereof by way of reservation or designation.

          60. The question has also been addressed by a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Pt. Chet Ram Vashist v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi [(1995) 1 SCC 47] , wherein R.M. Sahai, J., speaking for the Bench opined: (SCC p. 54, para 6) "6. Reserving any site for any street, open space, park, school, etc. in a layout plan is normally a public purpose as it is inherent in such reservation that it shall be used by the public in general. The effect of such reservation is that the owner ceases to be a legal owner of the land in dispute and he holds the land for the benefit of the society or the public in general. It may result in creating an obligation in nature of trust and may preclude the owner from transferring or selling his interest in it. It may be true as held by the High Court that the interest which is left in the owner is a residuary interest which may be nothing more than a right to hold this land in trust for the specific purpose specified by the coloniser in the sanctioned layout plan. But the question is, does it entitle the Corporation to claim that the land so specified should be transferred to the authority free of cost. That is not made out from any provision in the Act or on any principle of law. The Corporation by virtue of the land specified as open space may get a right as a custodian of public interest to manage it in the interest of the society in general. But the right to manage as a local body is not the same thing as to claim transfer of the property to itself. The effect of transfer of the property is that the transferor ceases to be owner of it and the ownership stands transferred to the person in whose favour it is transferred. The resolution of the Committee to transfer land in the colony for park and school was an order for transfer without there being any sanction for the same in law." (See also Raju S. Jethmalani v. State of Maharashtra [(2005) 11 SCC 222 : (2005) 4 Scale 688] .)

          75. The purpose of declaring the intent under Section 50(1) of the Act is to implement a development plan. Section 53 of the Act freezing any other development is an incidence arising consequent to the purpose, which purpose is to implement a development plan. If the purpose of declaring such an intention is merely to bring into play Section 53, and thereby freeze all development, it would amount to exercise of the power of Section 50(1) for a collateral purpose i.e. freezing of development rather than implementation of a development plan. The collateral purpose also will be to indirectly get over the fact that an owner of land pending finalisation of a development plan has all attendant rights of ownership subject to the restraints under Section 16. If the declaration of intent to formulate a town development scheme is to get over Section 16 and freeze development activities under Section 53, it would amount to exercise of power for a collateral purpose.

          78. The essence of planning in the Act is the existence of a development plan. It is a development plan, which under Section 17 will indicate the areas and zones, the users, the open spaces, the institutions and offices, the special purposes, etc. Town planning would be based on the contents of the development plan. It is only when the development plan is in existence, can a town planning scheme be framed. In fact, unless it is known as to what the contents of a possible town planning scheme would be, or alternatively, whether in terms of the development plan such a scheme at all is required, the intention to frame the scheme cannot be notified.

25. It is also relevant to note that this Court has also found similar issue and is dealt in some other matters also as in Writ Petition no. 3658 of 2026 by order dated 19/06/2017 has observed as under :

          " This Court has carefully gone through the order passed by the respondent No.1. The undisputed facts of the case further reveal that prior to declaration of Scheme No. 171, the respondent No.2 got sanctioned the layout plan of his land from the Joint Director, Town & Country Planning Department, Indore. It is also an admitted fact that against the sanction of layout play of respondent No.2, the Indore Development Authority filed a revision before the State Government though the said revision was not entertained, but the State Government in exercise of its suo-motu powers initiated revisional proceedings and stayed / suspended operation and effect of the sanction granted to respondent No.2 and such stay / suspension order has not been revoked, as reflected from the return. Finally the revision was allowed and the sanction granted in favour of respondent No.2 was cancelled. Thereafter the order passed by the State Government was challenged by filing Writ Petitions and the Writ Petitions were alowed and the order of the State Government was set aside by directing the State Government to afford an opportunity of hearing to respondent No.2 and other persons and to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. The said revision is still pending.

          It is also an undisputed fact that the sanction / development permission granted to respondent No.2 is still in operation. The undisputed facts also reveal that Scheme No. 171 was declared on 19/6/2009 and the Notification of the final Scheme was published after more than 3 years on 12/10/2012. The Indore Development Authority took no steps to implement the said Scheme even after expiry of 8 years from the date of declaration of the Scheme and 5 years from the final publication of the Scheme.

          Sec. 53 of the Adhiniyam of 1973 reads as under :

          53. Restrictions on land use and land development.- As from the date of publication of the declaration to prepare a town development scheme, no person shall, within the area included in the scheme, institute or change the use of any land or building or carry out any development, save in accordance with the development authorised by the Director in accordance with the provisions of this Act prior to the publication of such declaration.

          The aforesaid statutory provision of law makes it very clear that in respect of the land for which development permission has already been granted, cannot be included in a Scheme declared by a Development Authority like the present petitioner. The respondent has brought enough material on record to establish that in more than 100 of cases under various Schemes, the Indore Development Authority itself has excluded such lands for which development permission was already granted. Not only this, the revisional Authority has also excluded various lands from various Schemes on the ground that development permission for such lands was already granted prior to declaration of Schemes. The Indore Development Authority in all the aforesaid cases has accepted the revisional order and the respondent No.2 has filed Annexure R/2-B which is on record in respect of such orders which have been implemented by the Indore Development Authority. There is no denial on behalf of the Indore Development Authority in respect of the aforesaid contention. Not only this, Annexure R/2-C is again a document which includes a list of cases where the Indore Development Authority itself has excluded lands from various Schemes where development permission was granted prior to issuance of Notification about the Development Schemes. Thus, the aforesaid action of the Indore Development Authority establishes that the Indore Development Authority has adopted a pick and choose method and is not having a uniform policy in respect of land owners in whose case the development permissions were already granted prior to Notification of the Schemes under the Adhiniyam of 1973. The Revisional Authority, in the light of the fact that the development permission was already granted in case of the petitioner, has simply observed that the land of respondent No.2 should be excluded from the Scheme and a revised plan after excluding the land of respondent No.2, be notified.

Another important aspect of the case is that the earlier Scheme ie., Scheme No. 132 was declared as illegal by this Court in a judgment delivered in Writ Petition No. 1455/2007 (supra) and a liberty was granted to declare another Scheme in accordance with law. The Revisional Authority was justified in holding that the land of the petitioner could not have been included in the subsequent Scheme ie., Scheme No. 171. The most shocking aspect of the case is that similar order was passed in case of one Shriram Builders, an identically placed person, excluding the land from Scheme No. 171 on the same ground on the basis of which the impugned order has been passed in case of respondent No.2. The Indore Development Authority has filed an identical Writ Petition in case of M/s. Shriram Builders ie., W.P.No. 3656/2016, however, for the reasons best known to the Indore Development Authority, the petition in respect of Shriram Builders was withdrawn on 3/10/2017.

The Indore Development Authority cannot be permitted to adopt a pick and choose policy and being a statutory body has to follow a uniform policy in all identical cases and once the benefit has been extended to Shriram Builders and the petition against identical order has been withdrawn, there cannot be any justification on the part of the Indore Development Authority in contesting the present matters. However, otherwise also the order passed by the learned Commissioner, which is based upon the statutory provisions f law, does not warrant any interference. The learned Commissioner has rightly arrived at a conclusion that the land of the petitioner cannot be included in the development as the development permission was granted prior to issuance of notifications notifying the Scheme in question. The net result is that the present Writ Petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly hereby dismissed. The other connected Writ Petitions are also dismissed.

26. It is also relevant to note that looking to the prayer of the present petitioner, it is essentially in the nature of writ of certiorari asked under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For this purpose, it is required to be considered two judgments, i.e. Central Counsel for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and another Vs. Bikartan Das and othes reported in (2023) 16 SCC 462, of which, Paragraph no. 48 to 63 and 76 to 78 are reproduced as under :

          "48. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context:

          "Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari."

          49. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking.

          50. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.

          51. The essential features of a writ of certiorari, including a brief history, have been very exhaustively explained by B.K. Mukherjea, J. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another, reported in AIR 1954 SC 440. The Court held that a writ in the nature of certiorari could be issued in 'all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner' so long as the broad and fundamental principles were kept in mind. Those principles were delineated as follows:

           "7. ... In granting a writ of 'certiorari', the superior court does not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous, but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal .....

          8. The supervision of the superior court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points, as has been expressed by Lord Summer in King v. Nat Bell Liquors Limited [(1922) 2 AC 128, 156]. One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. ....

          9. Certiorari may lie and is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction."

          52. Relying on T.C. Basappa (supra), the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), laid down the following propositions as well established:

          "24.....24.1. Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it.

          24.2. Certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous."

          53. This Court explained that a court which has jurisdiction over a subject matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy if a superior court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own finding in certiorari.

          54. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others, reported in AIR 1964 SC 477, P.B. Gajendragadkar, CJ., speaking for the Constitution Bench, placed the matter beyond any position of doubt by holding that a writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. The observations of this Court in para 7 are worth taking note of:

          "7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised....."

          55. . In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai and Others, reported in 2003 (6) SCC 675, a Bench of two Judges held that the certiorari jurisdiction though available, should not be exercised as a matter of course. The High Court would be justified in refusing the writ of certiorari if no failure of justice had been occasioned. In exercising the certiorari jurisdiction, the procedure ordinarily followed by the High Court is to command the inferior court or tribunal to certify its record or proceedings to the High Court for its inspection so as to enable the High Court to determine, whether on the face of the record the inferior court has committed any of the errors as explained by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others, AIR 1955 SC 233 occasioning failure of justice.

          56. From the aforesaid, it could be said in terms of a jurisdictional error that want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject matter so that the inferior court or tribunal might not have the authority to enter on the inquiry. It may also arise from the absence of some essential preliminary or jurisdictional fact. Where the jurisdiction of a body depends upon a preliminary finding of fact in a proceeding for a writ of certiorari, the court may determine, whether or not that finding of fact is correct. The reason is that by wrongly deciding such a fact, the court or tribunal cannot give itself jurisdiction.

          57. . In Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and Another, reported in (1969) 2 AC 147, the House of Lords has given a very broad connotation to the concept of 'jurisdictional error'. It has been laid down that a tribunal exceeds jurisdiction not only at the threshold when it enters into an inquiry which it is not entitled to undertake, but it may enter into an enquiry within its jurisdiction in the first instance and then do something which would deprive it of its jurisdiction and render its decision a nullity. In the words of Lord Reid:

          "But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive."

          58. So far as the errors of law are concerned, a writ of certiorari could be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. To attract the writ of certiorari, a mere error of law is not sufficient. It must be one which is manifest or patent on the face of the record. Mere formal or technical errors, even of law, are not sufficient, so as to attract a writ of certiorari. As reminded by this Court time and again, this concept is indefinite and cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively and so it has to be determined judiciously on the facts of each case. The concept, according to this Court in K.M. Shanmugam v. The S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd. and Others, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1626, 'is comprised of many imponderables... it is not capable of precise definition, as no objective criterion could be laid down, the apparent nature of the error, to a large extent, being dependent upon the subjective element.' A general test to apply, however, is that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it is not 'self-evident' or 'manifest'. If it requires an examination or argument to establish it, if it has to be established by a long drawn out process of reasoning, or lengthy or complicated arguments, on points where there may considerably be two opinions, then such an error would cease to be an error of law. (See : Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Others v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, reported in AIR 1960 SC 137.)

          59. However, in our opinion, such a test should not be applied in a straitjacket formula and may fail because what might be considered by one Judge as an error self-evident, might not be considered so by another Judge.

          60. At this stage, it may not be out of place to remind ourselves of the observations of this Court in Syed Yakoob (supra) on this point, which are as follows:

          "Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior court or tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or something in ignorance of it, or may be even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Certiorari would also not lie to correct mere errors of fact even though such errors may be apparent on the face of the record. The writ jurisdiction is supervisory and the court exercising it is not to act as an appellate court. It is well settled that the writ court would not re- appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion of fact for that recorded by the adjudicating body, be it a court or a tribunal. A finding of fact, howsoever erroneous, recorded by a court or a tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the court or the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. It is also well settled that adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal and these points cannot be agitated before the writ court."

          61. In the aforesaid context, it will be profitable for us to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union and Another, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1508. This Court observed as under:

          "... The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ Court to warrant those findings at any rate, as long as they are based upon such materials which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can be reasonably and possibly undertaken. ..."

          62. However, we may clarify that findings of fact based on 'no evidence' or purely on surmises and conjectures or which are perverse points could be challenged by way of a certiorari as such findings could be regarded as an error of law.

          63. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, we have no hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that a writ of certiorari is a high prerogative writ and should not be issued on mere asking. For the issue of a writ of certiorari, the party concerned has to make out a definite case for the same and is not a matter of course. To put it pithily, certiorari shall issue to correct errors of jurisdiction, that is to say, absence, excess or failure to exercise and also when in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, there has been illegality. It shall also issue to correct an error in the decision or determination itself, if it is an error manifest on the face of the proceedings. By its exercise, only a patent error can be corrected but not also a wrong decision. It should be well remembered at the cost of repetition that certiorari is not appellate but only supervisory.

          64. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, is issued by a superior court in respect of the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions by another authority when the contention is that the exercising authority had no jurisdiction or exceeded the jurisdiction. It cannot be denied that the tribunals or the authorities concerned in this batch of appeals had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. However, the argument would be that the tribunals had acted arbitrarily and illegally and that they had failed to give proper findings on the facts and circumstances of the case. We may only say that while adjudicating a writ-application for a writ of certiorari, the court is not sitting as a court of appeal against the order of the tribunals to test the legality thereof with a view to reach a different conclusion. If there is any evidence, the court will not examine whether the right conclusion is drawn from it or not. It is a well-established principle of law that a writ of certiorari will not lie where the order or decision of a tribunal or authority is wrong in matter of facts or on merits. (See: King v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd., (1922) 2 AC 128 (PC)) "

27. Whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the earlier law laid down and has come to the conclusion that writ of certiorari is required to be considered in given case, however, there cannot a straitjacket formula, but considering the ratio of the above judgment, the present case does not warrant any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by issueing writ of certiorari. One more recent judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in Civil Appeal no. 13801/2025 [ Shri Digant Vs. M/s. P.D.T. Trading C. and others,] of which paragraph nos. 22 and 23 are relevant, which indicates about the restrictions of the interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the consideration of writ of certiorari

          22. The scope of High Court's jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 fell for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath & Ors.1 This Court held that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226, though they may be questioned in the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.

          23. In the case on hand, the appellate court had considered in detail the issue as to whether the trial court was justified in proceeding with the case, without further notice to the defendants, after submission of pursis (Exh.42) by defendants' counsel, claiming no instructions. After a threadbare analysis and taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances, the appellate court held that the trial court committed no wrong in proceeding with the matter. The appellate court noticed that the advocate representing the defendants had claimed no instructions but not sought withdrawal of his Vakalatnama and the matter thereafter remained pending for over three months till it was decided in March 2015. In between no effort was made by the defendants to engage another lawyer. Moreover, the defendants did not come up with a case that their lawyer's notice was not served on them therefore, they could not engage another counsel. Besides that, the record also indicated that the intention of the defendants was to delay the proceedings because earlier also the suit had proceeded ex parte against them though, later, those orders were recalled. Therefore, in our view, once the appellate court took into consideration all relevant aspects including the fact that pursis (Exh.42) did not seek withdrawal of the Vakalatnama, and withdrawal was not even permitted, there was no such jurisdictional error which warranted exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court without any justification went on to consider the procedure prescribed for withdrawal of Vakalatnama when neither withdrawal of Vakalatnama was permitted by the Trial Court nor the pursis prayed for its withdrawal. In such circumstances, the entire exercise of the High Court was misconceived. More so, when the view taken by the appellate court that defendant cannot take advantage of his own wrong was a plausible view based on materials available on record. Hence, in our view, appellate court's order was not amenable to interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in interfering with a well reasoned order of the appellate court.

28. In the present case, on this count as well as on merit also, I am of the opinion that no reason is made out to interfere by issuing writ of certiorari by exercising my powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

29. Considering the settled position of law and also the facts of the present case, I found no valid reason for interfering with the order passed by the concerned Authority of the M.P. State Government. therefore, no case is made out to exercise my jurisdiction contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the order passed by the concerned respondent / Authority is found in accordance with law and after appreciating all the relevant facts of the present case in appropriate manner and there is no perversity or arbitrariness found in the saido order.

30. With the aforesaid observations, present petition is dismissed.

31. Let the necessary procedure may be followed. As the matter is pending since the year 2013 and the petitioner is more than 81 years old lady, while dismissing the present petition of the petitioner, it is appropriate to direct the petitioner / IDA to do the needful to release the land in question from the Town Planning Scheme as early as possible and implement the order accordingly, preferably within a period of four weeks from today.

C.C as per rules.