Oral Judgment:

1.Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State as well as learned counsel for opposite party No.2.

2. The petitioners have filed this application seeking quashing of the impugned order dated 29.01.2018 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Katihar, in Katihar (N) P.S. Case No. 264 of 2017, whereby cognizance has been taken against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 465, 467 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and they have been summoned for appearance.

3. As per the allegation, the informant entered into an agreement with the power of attorney holders, namely, Deepa Devi and Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra, to purchase 8 decimals and 4 kari of land situated at Plot No. 132, Khata No. 163 in Katihar, while the petitioners are said to be the owners of the land in question. As per the agreement, the same was entered between the informant and co-accused Deepa Devi and Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra, who is the husband of Deepa Devi, and a total sale consideration was fixed at ₹22,80,000/- and, upon execution of the agreement, an advance payment of Rs. Two lakhs was paid by the informant on 20.01.2015. It has further been alleged that over the time, the informant paid a total amount of ₹12,45,000/- through various cheques and cash to the accused persons. It has further been alleged that the informant was called to the Registry Office on 22.04.2016 for the execution of registered sale deed, where both the petitioners were present along with other co-accused persons and one Jai Nandan Paswan. It is thereafter alleged that the informant paid an additional sum of ₹1,00,000/- to one Vishwajeet Kumar, a Clerk working at the Registry Office. It has further been alleged that despite the presence of the parties and payment to the Munshi/Clerk, the registration was not completed that day and the informant was asked to return home and told that she would be called back on some other day for execution of the registered sale-deed. It has further been alleged that after waiting for over a month and as no call was made, when the informant visited the house of Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra, where the petitioners and others were also present, she was informed that due to some disturbance, execution could not be completed and they avoided executing the sale deed. It has further been alleged that thereafter a village panchayati was convened and in the said panchayati, the accused side agreed that if informant cannot wait any longer, they would return the money. Pursuant to the said panchayati, co-accused Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra handed over a cheque of ₹50,000/- to the informant, however, upon presentation, the cheque bounced due to insufficiency of funds.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the petitioners have falsely been implicated in the present case as they happen to be the owners of the land, while the attorney holders were co-accused Deepa Devi and Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that investigation proceeded in a perfunctory manner and charge-sheet too came to be submitted against the petitioners and others and the learned Magistrate took cognizance against the petitioners in a mechanical manner without applying judicial mind. It has further been submitted that from a bare perusal of the FIR, it is apparent that the petitioners have neither executed any agreement for sale with the informant or have received a single penny from the complainant. It has further been submitted that even if the case was accepted to be true against the petitioners, although denying the same, the best remedy available to the informant was to file a suit for specific performance of contract before the competent court of civil jurisdiction, but the present case has been lodged under the criminal forum only to blackmail and to put pressure. It has further been submitted that the FIR was lodged after a delay of 11 days.

                  4.1 Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that co-accused Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra had also filed a complaint case against the present informant, which was sent to the police for institution of the FIR under the provisions of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It has further been submitted that co-accused Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra and Deepa Devi were allowed anticipatory bail on the condition that they would return the money, which goes to show that the money was taken by co-accused Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra and Deepa Devi and the petitioners had no role to play.

                  4.2. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted, referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Rikhab Birani and Another Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 823, that non-payment of money or disregard to and violation of contractual terms does not constitute a criminal offence. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also referred to the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171, and in the case of Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751. He has placed reliance on paragraph 18 of the judgment in the case of Mohd. Ibrahim (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, referring to section 420 of the IPC, observed that the offence under the said Section requires the following ingredients to be satisfied, which is reproduced hereinbelow: -

                  “18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients of the offence of “cheating” are as follows:

                  (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission;

                  (ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and

                  (iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.”

                  4.3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P., reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has highlighted the fine distinction between the offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating observing that the two are antithetical in nature and cannot coexist simultaneously. Police Officers and courts must carefully apply their minds to determine whether the allegations genuinely constitute the specific offence alleged.

                  4.4. It has further been submitted, referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Kunti v. State of U.P., reported in (2023) 6 SCC 109, that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that a breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating, unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep a promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, the dishonest intention on the part of the party, who is alleged to have committed the offence of cheating, should be established at the time of entering into the transaction with the complainant, otherwise the offence of cheating is not established or made out.

                  4.5. It has further been submitted that the petitioners never induced the informant in any manner, rather it was co-accused Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra and Deepa Devi, who had entered into an agreement with the informant and the petitioners were not present at the time of the said agreement. It has further been submitted that the entire money was paid into the account of co-accused Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra and Deepa Devi. It has further been submitted that the cheque was allegedly issued by co-accused Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra, while the complainant has not lodged a complaint, rather a FIR was lodged, which is not maintainable. Moreover, there is no averment that any legal notice was sent and the requirement of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was complied.

5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State as well as learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 has vehemently opposed the prayer of the petitioners. Learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 has submitted that the petitioners have actively defrauded the informant and there was meeting of minds with co-accused Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra and Deepa Devi and the petitioners were well present at the Registry Office and at other places.

                  5.1.  Learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by a coordinate Bench of this Court, dated 18.08.2025, in the case of Manoj Nari Sainani @ Manoj Sainani and Others vs. The State of Bihar and Others (Cr. Misc. No. 29313 of 2025) and has submitted that even though the case was of the civil nature, but since their intention was to cheat, therefore, criminal and civil liability would lie against the petitioners.

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

7. On a careful analysis of the facts of the case what emerges out is that the petitioners never entered into an agreement with the informant even though they are the land owners, while the power of attorney was with co-accused Shravan @ Shravan Kumar Mishra and Deepa Devi, who took the money. The consideration amount was either paid to them in cash or in their bank accounts.

8. At this stage, this Court deems it appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Usha Chakraborty v. State of W.B., reported in (2023) 15 SCC 135, wherein dealing with similar issue, it has been observed in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, as under: -

                  8. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand [Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 76], this Court held : (SCC p. 676, para 12)

                  “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of the facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.”

                  9. In Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala [Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 498] , it was held that : (SCC pp. 297-98, para 13)

                  “13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420IPC. In our view the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and the High Court committed an error in refusing to exercise the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings.”

                  10. In Kapil Aggarwal v. Sanjay Sharma [Kapil Aggarwal v. Sanjay Sharma, (2021) 5 SCC 524 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 634], this Court held that Section 482 is designed to achieve the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to generate into weapons of harassment.

                  11. In the decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the statutory provisions as also the earlier decisions and held as under : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)

                  “102. … (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

                  (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

                  (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

                  (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

                  (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

                  (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

                  (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

                  12. In Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401], a three-Judge Bench of this Court laid down the following principles of law : (SCC pp. 444-45, para 13)

                  “13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in Khawaja Nazir Ahmad [King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29 : (1943-44) 71 IA 203], the following principles of law emerge:

                  13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences;

                  13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

                  13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

                  13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the ‘rarest of rare cases’. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482CrPC is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court);

                  13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

                  13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

                  13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule;

                  13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognized to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482CrPC.

                  13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

                  13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

                  13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

                  13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

                  13.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

                  13.14. However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866] and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; and

                  13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has  to  permit  the  investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.”

9. In view of the aforesaid factual background and in light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Usha Chakraborty (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 29.01.2018, whereby the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Katihar, took cognizance in Katihar (N) P.S. Case No. 264 of 2017, is unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the said order taking cognizance is hereby quashed and set aside with respect to the petitioners only.

10. This application is accordingly allowed.