Cav Judgment:
1. Heard the learned counsel for petitioner and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State.
2. The present writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:-
“(i) That this application is being filed praying for issuance of an appropriate writ/s, order/s or direction/s for undoing the fraudulent facilitation of the private respondent no. 8 to man the post of Panchayat Teacher of Chipura Panchayat within Sampatchak Block of Patna District SO without her selection/appointment by the competent employment unit with declaring the said wrongful act of the errant respondent/s as vitiated under fraud and misrepresentation as in setting aside the order dated 15.7.2019 passed by the chairpersons of the State Appellate Authority in connection with Appeal No. 544/2017 whereby and where under the aforesaid fraudulent facilitation/entry of the pvt. respondent was not looked into upheld and petitioner's claim for employment has been denied in ignoring her merit and further for quashing the order dated 5.6.2015 passed by, the District Appellate Authority in case No. 80/14 to the extent it allowed the appeal of the private respondent which was earlier dismissed by the same authority on same prayer, inter-alia, for the following;
(i) Respondents' impugned act of putting the pvt. respondent to man the post of panchayat teacher without her selection be highly deprecated and accordingly a direction be given to immediately expel the private respondent from the post with making recovery of money taken by her in lieu of salary on the basis of the said fraudulent entry to the post of Panchayat Teacher;
(ii) The respondents be directed to consider the case of the petitioner for selection/appointment to the post of panchayat teacher on the basis of higher merit marks obtained by her entitling her (petitioner) placement as above to that of the private respondent but no selection process taken up and pvt. respondent has been allowed to man the post without selection/appointment;
(iii) The respondents be directed to grant all the consequential benefits to the petitioner for which the petitioner is found entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the case.
(iv) Erring respondents be dealt with sternly for their misdeed, misdemeanor and fraudulent act committed in connivance with the pvt. Respondent.
(v) A heavy cost be awarded against the erring respondents to be paid in favour of the petitioner.
(vi) Any other relief or reliefs be granted to the petitioner for which the petitioner is found entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
BRIEF FACTS
3. The brief facts which are essential for adjudication of the present writ petition are that an advertisement was published for appointment of Panchayat Teacher in the State of Bihar, including the Gram Panchayat Raj, Chipura under the Sampatchak Block of Patna District. The petitioner, the respondent no. 8 and several others submitted their respective applications, for the said recruitment. Counselling was held on 10.11.2007, wherein a list of altogether 18 candidates was prepared, who participated in the said counselling. The name of the petitioner was at serial no. 3, whereas the name of the respondent no. 8 figures at serial no. 6 of the said list. One nitu Sinha was finally selected. The respondent no. 8 herein, filed a writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 14884 of 2009, before this Hon’ble Court against the selection of the Panchayat Teacher, since her application, wherein she made complaint with regard to her non-selection and illegalities committed in the selection process was not being considered by the local authorities. Vide order dated 09.02.2010, the writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the respondent no. 8 to file an appeal before the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna. In compliance of the order dated 09.02.2010, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 14884 of 2009, the respondent no. 8 filed Case No. 24 of 2010 before the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna. The Tribunal proceeded to dispose of the application filed by the respondent no. 8 vide order dated 12.04.2010, whereby the entire appointment of the Chipura Panchayat for the year 2006 and 2007 was cancelled and direction was issued to initiate fresh appointment process. One Shila Kumari filed C.W.J.C. No. 9764 of 2010 before this Hon’ble Court whereby a prayer was made for quashing the order passed by the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna on 12.04.2010, in Case No. 24 of 2010, filed by the respondent no. 8. The writ petition filed by Shila Kumari was disposed of vide order dated 28.02.2011 by a Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court whereby the matter with regard to Shila Kumari was set aside and was remitted back to the appellate authority for proceeding afresh with regard to Shila Kumari. It is further case of the petitioner that the respondent no. 8 herein, filed C.W.J.C. No. 15708 of 2010, before this Hon’ble Court for compliance of the order dated 12.04.2010, passed by the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna in Case No. 24 of 2010. The Hon’ble Court vide order dated 20.11.2014 was pleased to dispose of the writ petition filed by the respondent no. 8 with a direction to approach the appellate authority for implementation of the order dated 12.04.2010. It is further case of the petitioner that one Nitu Sinha filed a writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 6659 of 2011 before this Hon’ble Court, whereby the order dated 12.04.2010, passed by the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna in Case No. 24 of 2010 was assailed. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 12.07.2017 with a direction to the said Nitu Sinha to file her appeal before the State Appellate Authority, assailing the order dated 12.04.2010, passed in Case No. 24 of 2010. Nitu Sinha did not file any appeal against the order dated 12.04.2010, passed by the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna in Case No. 24 of 2010. Subsequently, one Puja Kumari filed C.W.J.C. No. 1324 of 2014, before this Hon’ble Court on 03.01.2014, assailing the order dated 12.04.2010, passed by the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna in Case No. 24 of 2010. The said writ petition was dismissed by this Hon’ble Court vide order dated 16.05.2014. Puja Kumari filed Letters Patent Appeal bearing L.P.A. No. 1366 of 2014 on 08.09.2014, whereby she assailed the order dated 16.05.2014, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1324 of 2014. The said appeal was allowed vide order dated 11.01.2016 by setting aside the order of the Tibunal dated 12.04.2010. In terms of the directions given by this Hon’ble Court on 20.11.2014 in C.W.J.C. No. 15708 of 2010, the respondent no. 8 filed appeal Case No. 80 of 2014, before the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna. The said appeal filed by the respondent no. 8 was disposed of vide order dated 05.06.2015 with a direction to the Panchayat Secretary to take appropriate actions within 30 days from the date of passing of the order with respect to the respondent no. 8. In the appeal preferred by the respondent no. 8, no notices were issued to the petitioner and other claimants. The Panchayat Secretary, without any notice to other claimants, including the petitioner, directly appointed the respondent no. 8 for extraneous consideration. The respondent no. 8 gave her joining on 10.09.2015 and is said to have been discharging her duties since then. The petitioner filed C.W.J.C. No. 13217 of 2016 before this Hon’ble Court whereby she assailed the order dated 05.06.2015 passed in appeal Case No. 80 of 2014, which resulted in appointment of respondent no. 8 herein. The writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 22.08.2017, with a direction to the petitioner to file her appeal before the State Appellate Authority. The petitioner filed an appeal bearing appeal Case No. 544 of 2017 before the State Appellate Authority, whereby she assailed the order dated 05.06.2015 passed by the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal in appeal Case No. 80 of 2014, filed by the respondent no. 8 herein. The State Appellate Authority proceeded to dismiss the appeal filed by the petitioner vide a reasoned order dated 15.07.2019 without considering all the documents and also on the ground of limitation.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on the appeal filed by the respondent no. 8 before the District Appellate Authority bearing Case No. 24 of 2010, the District Appellate Authority after hearing the parties and without hearing any of the affected parties went on to hold that the entire selection process made in the year 2006-07 is null and void and cancelled all the appointments. He submits that since the order dated 12.04.2010 passed in Case No. 24 of 2010, was passed without hearing any of the affected candidates, the affected candidates approached this Hon’ble Court by filing different writ petitions and this Hon’ble Court after quashing the order dated 12.04.2010, remitted the matter back to the District Appellate Authority for hearing the matter afresh and passing fresh order. The private respondent no. 8 herein also preferred a writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 14884 of 2009, which was disposed of vide order dated 09.02.2010 with a direction to the Tribunal to decide and dispose of the matter, considering the merit of the case, within a fixed time frame. The Tribunal without any jurisdiction passed the order dated 12.04.2010, which was assailed by one Nitu Kumari vide C.W.J.C. No. 6659 of 2011 wherein the private respondent no. 8 herein, was arrayed as respondent no. 12. The said writ petition was heard by a Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court and notices were issued to the private respondent no. 12 therein. However, she did not choose to appear in the writ petition and filed a case bearing Case No. 80 of 2014 before the District Teachers Tribunal with a prayer to implement the order dated 12.04.2010 passed in Case No. 24 of 2010. The case preferred by the respondent no. 8 bearing Case No. 80 of 2014 was allowed by the District Teachers Appellate Tribunal, Patna and vide order dated 05.06.2015, a direction was issued to the employment unit, Gram Panchayat - Chipura to implement the order passed by the District Teachers Employment Tribunal in Case No. 24 of 2010 dated 12.04.2010 and it was further directed that the petitioner Nita Kumari (respondent no. 8 herein) be placed in the merit list at appropriate position considering her merit marks.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in compliance of the order dated 05.06.2015, the Block Education Officer and the Block Development Officer without any authority to make selection/appointment of Panchayat teacher, straightaway issued appointment letter to the private respondent no. 8 herein. The petitioner filed an appeal before the State Appellate Authority against the order dated 05.06.2015 passed in Case No. 80 of 2014 by the District Teachers Appellate Tribunal, Patna. The appeal bearing Appeal No. 544 of 2017 preferred by the petitioner was finally dismissed vide order dated 15.07.2019 passed by the Chairperson, State Appellate Authority.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the State Appellate Authority while passing the order dated 15.07.2019 in appeal Case No. 544 of 2017did not discuss anything about the fraudulent action on the part of the private respondent no. 8 herein, since she was appointed on the post of Panchayat Teacher without her selection/appointment by a competent selection body. He further submits that the appointment of the private respondent no. 8 was made by committing forgery by the concerned authorities, since the private respondent no. 8, was having lesser marks/qualification and the petitioner having higher qualification, was not considered, despite her objections. He further submits that once the District Appellate Authority rejected the plea of the private respondent no. 8 for her appointment, later on, the same authority allowed her prayer and directed for her appointment. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner was at Sl. No. 3 having got 560 marks and the private respondent no. 8 was placed at Sl. No. 6, having 540 marks, therefore, the appointment of the private respondent no. 8, is in complete violation of the provisions contained in the Panchayat Teachers Appointment Rules. He further submits that the petitioner was neither noticed nor was heard and a finding has been recorded that the petitioner was noticed, however she did not appear. No chit of paper has been brought on record to suggest that the notice was issued and served to the petitioner.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that once the order of the Tribunal dated 12.04.2010 was set aside vide order dated 11.01.2016 passed in L.P.A. No. 1366 of 2014, then there was no justification for the Tribunal, directing for compliance of order dated 12.04.2010 passed in Appeal No. 24 of 2010. He further submits that since the private respondent no. 8 was pursuing parallel proceeding, therefore, her joining was stayed, however, later on sanction was given for payment of salary to her, which is fraudulent act on the part of the respondent authorities. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the entire action on the part of the respondent authorities in giving appointment to the respondent no. 8 is in violation of the order dated 11.01.2016 passed in L.P.A. No. 1366 of 2014 and even before issuance of appointment letter to the respondent no. 8, no notices were issued to the petitioner or any of the candidates in the merit list, to appear for any counselling.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 8
8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondent no. 8 submits that the process of appointment was completed in the year 2007. The writ petitioner had no grievance with the selection process for the appointment of Panchayat Teacher, therefore, she did not approach any authority or Forum. She woke up from her slumber for the first time in 2016 and filed C.W.J.C. No. 13217 of 2016 before this Hon’ble Court with regard to the selection process which was completed more than seven years ago. The respondent no. 8 kept on agitating the matter before different authorities since 2010 and finally succeeded in the year, 2015. He further submits that the petitioner has got no concern with her appointment, but has grievance with regard to appointment of the respondent no. 8. He submits that after her appointment, the respondent no. 8 was sent for training and has also completed the Teachers training in the year, 2019. She subsequently qualified the Teachers Ability Test in the year, 2023 and is working as exclusive Vishisht Shikshak in the State of Bihar. He submits that pursuant to the advertisement bearing advertisement no. PR153/2024, the ability test (Teachers Ability Test-II) was held and after publication of the result, the respondent no. 8 appeared in counselling. Thereafter, a fresh appointment letter i.e. provisional appointment letter was issued on 25.02.2025. Subsequent thereto, her services has been confirmed as Vishisht Shikshak since 01.03.2005 and she is working in upgraded Middle School Baruna, Sampatchak, Patna.
9. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 8 further submits that since the respondent no. 8 has been appointed as Vishisht Shikshak, there is no post of Panchayat Teacher in the Panchayat in question and on this ground alone, the present writ petition is fit to be dismissed. He further submits that in a similar matter, this Hon’ble Court vide its order dated 02.04.2024 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 338 of 2011 (Ram Udgar Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) in paragraph nos. 28 and 29, has held as follows:-
`28. In the present case, admittedly, the respondent no. 11 was not appointed and worked as P.S.M. as on 01.07.2006, i.e. at the time of conversion of P.S.M. as Panchayat Teacher. Applying the principle laid down by the Full Bench of this Court, it is difficult to hold that merely because respondent no. 11 was having higher marks, in the intermediate examination, and was not appointed/joined as P.S.M., prior to 01.07.2006, he is entitled to be appointed as Panchayat Teacher on the basis of his having higher marks in the intermediate examination after conversion of P.S.M. as Panchayat Teacher. The Full Bench decision, in the case of Kalpana Rani (supra), fully applies in the facts of the present case and in view of the law laid down thereunder, it is difficult for this Court to hold that the respondent no. 11 is entitled to be appointed as Panchayat Teacher in place of the petitioner.
29. The respondent no. 11 is not entitled to claim employment/deemed employment as P.S.M. or has right to be absorbed in service as Panchayat Teacher as per Rule 20(iii) of the 2006 Rules.
10. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 8 further submits that the issue herein is fully covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court reported in 2011 (4) PLJR 297 (Smt. Renu Kumari Panday vs. the State of Bihar) wherein the Hon’ble Division Bench has held has follows:-
While dealing with the above C.W.J.C. No. 10113 of 2007 the learned single Judge felt that it was unfair to absorb the Panchayat Shiksha Mitra employed as on 1st July 2006 as Panchayat Shiksha under the Rules as there may be some persons who may not have found the terms and conditions of the Panchayat Shiksha Mitra attractive and may not have applied for employment as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra. Had they been told that ultimately they would be absorbed in permanent service as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra they might have opted for employment as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra. In the opinion of the learned single Judge, Clause (iii) of Rule 20 of the Rules is arbitrary, discriminatory and ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The learned single Judge was also concerned about the pending claims of the aggrieved persons who were not selected as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra or were not continued as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra. Whether such persons, if their grievance were found to be genuine, can be granted relief of deemed employment as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra and consequent absorption in the cadre of Panchayat Shikshak under the Rules.
In our opinion, the issue referred to us is imaginary and does not arise in any of the matters. Neither the aforesaid Clause (iii) is under challenge before us in any of the above matters nor there is one case before us where the writ petitioner has claimed that he/she did not apply for employment as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra as the terms and conditions of the said employment were not attractive and that had he/she known about ultimate absorption in permanent service as Panchayat Shikshak he/she would have opted for employment as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra.
Clause (iii) of Rule 20 of the Rules reflects the policy decision of the State Government. We are of the considered opinion that no legal provision can be held to be arbitrary or discriminatory or ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution on hypothetical set of facts. We, therefore, hold that Clause (iii) of Rule 20 of the said Rules is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Coming to the second issue, we are of the opinion that the Rules are statutory in nature and have to be implemented in letter and spirit. Under Clause (i) of Rule 20 of the Rules all earlier resolutions, orders, directions issued in respect of employment of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra are repealed. Consequently, the posts of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra stood abolished. Thereafter, no person can be employed as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra; nor can there be a deemed employment as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra; nor can there be a deemed absorption in the service as Panchayat Shikshak by operation of Rule 20(iii) of the Rules. In our opinion, even in a case where a person has a legitimate grievance in respect of his or her non-selection as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra at the relevant time or non-continuance as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra, such person
cannot be deemed to have been appointed as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra; nor can he/she be deemed to have been employed as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra as on 1st July 2006; nor can such person be deemed to have been absorbed in service as Panchayat Shikshak under the Rules.
We may also note here that though the State Government framed a complete scheme for employment of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra at Gram Panchayat level in furtherance of its goal of “Education for All”, in none of the aforesaid Resolutions the Government had provided for an adjudicatory machinery. In other words, the State Government did not make any provision for redressal of grievance in respect of selection and employment of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra or their reemployment after the expiry of the contractual period. On perusal of the records of the above writ petitions, we find that in absence of such machinery, the aggrieved persons approached the authority whom such persons considered to be the competent/the convenient authority. In our opinion, in absence of powers expressly conferred upon any such authority the reports or the orders made by such authority are of no consequence. No relief can be granted on the basis of the finding recorded by such authority. We may also point out that Elementary Teachers Appellate Authority constituted under Rule 18 of the Rules, as amended by Bihar Panchayat Elementary Teacher (Employment and Service Conditions) (Amendment) Rules, 2008 is empowered to entertain, hear and decide the appeals arising out of the employment of elementary teachers under the Rules. The said appellate authority has no jurisdiction to entertain, hear or decide the disputes relating to the employment of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra under the then prevalent Resolutions, Circulars, Orders, Instructions.
11. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 8 further submits that the order passed by the State Appellate Authority in case of the petitioner was passed on 15.07.2019 and the petitioner has filed the present writ petition in 2022 i.e. after about three years of the passing of the order and moreover, the respondent no. 8 is working as a Teacher pursuant to her appointment on 08.09.2015.
12. A counter affidavit has also been filed on behalf of State-respondents wherein it has been stated that the matter relates to appointment made in the year 2006, as per 2006 Rules and at that relevant time the Department of Education had got no concern/jurisdiction to interfere in the same. As such the Panchayat Secretary was the competent authority to make any reply to the writ petition. It has further been stated in the counter affidavit that since despite notices to the petitioner and others, they did not choose to appear before the authority concerned or the Panchayat Secretary, therefore, the respondent no. 8, although below in the merit list, has been selected and appointed as a Panchayat Teacher and is working since, 2015.
CONSIDERATION
13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the records, it appears that for appointment of Panchayat Teacher in the Gram Panchayat Raj, Chipura under the Sampatchak Block of Patna District, process was initiated and counselling was held on 10.11.2007. List of altogether 18 candidates was published/prepared, who participated in the counselling. The name of the petitioner was at Sl. No. 3 in the merit list, whereas the name of the respondent no. 8 was at Sl. No. 6 in the said merit list. One Nitu Kumari was finally selected. The respondent no. 8 assailed the same by filing a writ petition before this Hon’ble Court bearing C.W.J.C. No. 14884 of 2009. The writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 09.02.2010 with a direction to the respondent no. 8 to file an appeal before the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna. The respondent no. 8 filed her appeal, which was numbered as Case No. 24 of 2010 before the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna. The Tribunal vide its order dated 12.04.2010 proceeded to cancel the entire selection of Chipura Panchayat and directed for initiation of fresh selection process. Since no notices were issued to anyone, therefore, one Shila Kumari filed C.W.J.C. No. 9764 of 2010 before this Hon’ble Court, with a prayer to set aside the order dated 12.04.2010 passed in Case No. 24 of 2010. The writ petition was disposed of/allowed vide order dated 28.02.2011 and the order of the Tribunal dated 12.04.2010, so far it related to Shila Kumari, was set aside and the matter was remitted back for reconsideration of the matter with regard to Shila Kumari. The respondent no. 8 also filed a writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 15708 of 2010 for compliance of order dated 12.04.2010 passed by the Tribunal, whereby a direction was issued to initiate selection process afresh. The writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 20.11.2014 with a liberty to approach the appellate authority for seeking implementation of the said order dated 12.04.2010. One Nitu Sinha who was initially selected, pursuant to the advertisement issued in 2006, also filed a writ petition before this Hon’ble Court, by which she assailed the order dated 12.04.2010 passed by the Tribunal in Case No. 24 of 2010. The said writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 6659 of 2011 filed by Nitu Sinha was disposed of vide order dated 12.08.2017 with a direction to file her appeal before the State Appellate Authority. Nitu Sinha did not file any appeal before the appellate authority. Subsequently, one Puja Kumari filed C.W.J.C. no. 1324 of 2014 before this Hon’ble Court, assailing the order dated 12.04.2010 passed by the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna in Case No. 24 of 2010. The said writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 16.05.2014. Being aggrieved with the order dated 16.05.2014, Puja Kumari filed Letters Patent Appeal bearing L.P.A. No. 1366 of 2014. The appeal preferred by her was allowed vide order dated 11.01.2016 whereby the Hon’ble Division Bench proceeded to set aside the order dated 12.04.2010 passed by the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, Patna in Case No. 24 of 2010. In the meantime, the respondent no. 8 herein filed appeal Case No. 80 of 2014 before the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal, in terms of the liberty given to her vide order dated 21.01.2014 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 15708 of 2010. The appeal filed by the respondent no. 8 was disposed of vide order dated 05.06.2015 with a direction to the Panchayat Secretary to take appropriate action within thirty days from the date of passing of the order with respect to the respondent no. 8. In terms of the directions given by the Tribunal on 05.06.2015, the respondent no. 8 was appointed on 08.09.2015 and she gave her joining on 10.09.2015. The petitioner, who did not take any action after her non-selection in 2007, filed a writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 13217 of 2016 before this Hon’ble Court, whereby she assailed the order dated 05.06.2015 passed in appeal Case No. 80 of 2014, which resulted in appointment of the respondent no. 8. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was disposed of vide order dated 22.08.2017 with a liberty to her to file her appeal before the State Appellate Authority. The petitioner filed an appeal bearing appeal Case No. 544 of 2017 before the State Appellate Authority, whereby she assailed the order dated 05.06.2015 passed by the District Teachers Employment Appellate Tribunal in appeal Case No. 80 of 2014. The State Appellate Authority vide its order dated 15.07.2019 proceeded to dismiss the appeal filed by the petitioner. The petitioner again slept over her rights and all of a sudden woke up from her slumber and filed the present writ petition on 27.07.2022 i.e. almost three years after dismissal of her appeal bearing appeal Case No. 544 of 2017 by the State Appellate Authority. It appears from the record that the respondent no. 8, after giving her joining on 10.09.2015 is performing her duties and later on was sent for training, which she completed in the year 2019. She qualified the Teachers Ability Test in the year 2023 and is at present working as Exclusive Vishisht Shikshak in the State of Bihar. Subsequently, she appeared and cleared the Teachers Ability Test-II and fresh appointment letter was issued to her on 25.02.2025. Her services as Vishisht Shikshak has been confirmed w.e.f. 01.03.2025 and she is working in the upgraded Middle School, Baruna, Sampatchak, Patna. The petitioner, who did not had any grievance with the selection process in 2006-2007, all of a sudden woke up from slumber in 2016 and filed a writ petition before this Hon’ble Court. In terms of the liberty given by this Hon’ble Court, she filed an appeal before the State Appellate Authority bearing appeal Case No. 544 of 2017. Her appeal was dismissed on 15.07.2019 and again she slept over her rights. All of a sudden she again woke up from slumber after three years and filed the present writ petition, assailing the order dated 15.07.2019 passed by the State Appellate Authority. The law with regard to delay and laches and waiver and acquiescence is very much clear.
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a case reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 (State of Uttar Pradesh and Others versus Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors) in paragraph nos. 20, 21, 22.2 and 23 has held as follows:-
“20. The Court also quoted the following passage from Halsbury's Laws of England (para 911, p. 395) : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, para 12)
“12. … ‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’”
21. Holding that the respondents had also acquiesced in accepting the retirements, the appeal of U.P. Jal Nigam was allowed with the following reasons : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC p. 471, para 13)
“13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?”
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
23. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated 22-6-1987. The respondents before us did not challenge these cancellation orders till the year 1996 i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not only was there unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after a period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appellants to give them appointment as of today i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above.”
15. Similarly this Court vide its order dated 24.04.2026 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6052 of 2026 (Manoj Kumar versus the State of Bihar and Others), in paragraph no. 7 & 8 has held as follows:-
“7. Similarly a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide oral judgment dated 25.02.2020, passed in C.W.J.C. No.2276 of 2020 (Arun Kumar Mehta vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.), in paragraph nos. 4 to 8 held as follows:
“4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the materials on record. Apparently, there is a delay of about 07 years in filing the present writ petition, even if the appellate order dated 15.12.2012 is taken into account, for which no plausible explanation whatsoever has been furnished, hence the writ petition is fit to be dismissed on the ground of principles of delay and laches, alone.
5. It is a well settled principle of law that stale claims should not be adjudicated by the writ courts. In this connection, reference be had to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, reported in (2015) 15 SCC 602 (State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri & Others), paragraph nos. 26 to 28 whereof are reproduced herein below:-
“26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ court.
27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim “deo gratias” - ‘thanks to God’.
28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless non-interference would cause grave injustice. The present case, needless to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It deserved to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present.”
6. In a judgment reported in 1986(4) SCC 566 (State of M.P. & Ors. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors.), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:-
“That the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner, the Court may decline to intervene and grant relief inasmuch as entertaining such a belated claim would have not only the effect of inflicting hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties and creation of third party rights during the interregnum period, is a matter to be considered while exercising discretionary writ jurisdiction.”
7. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Ors. Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, it has been ruled thus:
“Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis”. Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. Through its Chairman & Managing Director & Anr Vs. K. Thangappan and Anr would be apposite:-“Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party”. It was, therefore, contended that the appellant itself had agreed with respondent 2 to pay bonus for 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1956 according to the terms of the bonus agreement. It was also pointed out that the appellant had not pressed its objection with regard to jurisdiction before the labour court or the industrial court. But it appears that the decision of this Court in Prakash Cotton Mills case 1962 (1) LLJ 108] (vide supra) was given on February 16, 1961 after the decision of K. K. Desai, J., on July 1, 1960 and before the decision of the Letters Patent Bench on February 6, 1962. In the circumstances of this case, we do not consider that there is such acquiescence on the part of the appellant as to disentitle it to a grant of writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the issue of a writ certiorari is largely a matter of sound discretion. It is also true that the writ will not be granted if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstance, cause prejudice to the adverse party. The principle is to a great extent, though not identical with, similar to the exercise of discretion in the Court of Chancery. The principle has been clearly stated by Sri Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell and John Kemp [Law Reports 5 P.C., 221 at 239] as follows:”
Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties as also taking into account the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases referred to hereinabove, regarding the principles of delay and laches, this Court finds that as far as the present case is concerned, no plausible explanation has been furnished by the petitioner so as to convincingly explain the delay in question of about 07 years in approaching this Court, hence the present writ petition is fit to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.”
16. Considering the settled proposition that stale claims are generally not adjudicated by courts, unless there is a clear and valid reason for long delay. In the present case, the petitioner did not raise any grievance for almost nine years, thereafter, approached this Hon’ble Court in 2016 and subsequently filed her appeal before the State Appellate Authority, which was dismissed in 2019. She again slept over her rights and woke up from her slumber in 2022 i.e. after delay of three years and filed the present writ petition. The petitioner cannot be permitted to unsettle a settled thing, which has already attained finality in 2015.
17. Accordingly, this Court does not find any merit in the writ petition filed by the petitioner and the same is dismissed.
18. Pending applications, if any shall also stand dismissed.
