1. With the consent of parties, the matter is heard finally. The present Miscellaneous Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 takes exception to the order dated 31.07.2024 (Annexure P/1) passed by the learned 16th District Judge, Gwalior in M.C.A.No.41/2024, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred to as "CPC"] against the order dated 09.11.2023 (Annexure P/7) passed by the learned Xth Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gwalior in RCS(A) - 443/2023, rejecting the petitioner's application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC seeking temporary injunction, has been dismissed and the order of the trial Court has been affirmed.

2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the petition are as under:

          2.1 It is the case of the petitioner that the land bearing Survey No.353, admeasuring 2.644 hectares (approximately 12 Bigha 13 Biswa), situated at Village Kedarpur, Tehsil and District Gwalior is the self-acquired property of his younger grandfather (Chhote Baba), late Feran Singh, brother of the petitioner's grandfather late Bare Lal and that Feran Singh, being issueless executed a will dated 13.12.1999 in favour of the petitioner in respect of the said land, which was kept in the custody of the petitioner's father, Ramvilas, who continued cultivating the land and maintaining the revenue records in Feran Singh's name. After Ramvilas's death in the year 2015, the petitioner has continued to cultivate the land as its owner/possessor.

          2.2. The petitioner further states that in September 2022, it came to his knowledge that respondent No. 1 fraudulently got his name mutated in the revenue records on the basis of a judgment dated 07.01.1984 and a decree dated 10.01.1984 passed in Civil Suit No. 9A/1984 captioned as Mahesh Singh Kushwaha v. Feran Singh [hereinafter referred to as the "1984 suit"] before the learned IInd Civil Judge Class-II, Gwalior. The petitioner states that the said decree was obtained by the respondent through fraud and by setting up an imposter in place of Feran Singh, since Feran Singh never appeared before, or compromised the matter in, the said Court. On the basis whereof, the petitioner instituted the suit bearing No.RCS(A)-443/2023 seeking declaration that the judgment dated 07.01.1984 and the decree dated 10.01.1984 passed in 1984 suit be declared null and void; along with a prayer for permanent injunction restraining the respondent No.1 from interfering with the petitioner's possession. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC seeking temporary injunction restraining the respondent No.1 from interfering with the petitioner's possession or creating any third party rights pending disposal of the suit.

          2.3 The learned trial Court, vide order dated 09.11.2023, finding the petitioner not to be in possession and no prima facie case in his favour, rejected the application for temporary injunction. In the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC, the order passed by the learned trial Court has been affirmed vide order dated 31.07.2024 passed by the learned 16th District Judge, Gwalior. It is this order which is under challenge in the present petition.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the learned Courts below have erred in rejecting the will dated 13.12.1999 executed in favour of the petitioner, and have placed undue reliance on the revenue entries obtained by the respondent on the strength of a disputed decree. He submits that the petitioner and his predecessors have been in continuous cultivating possession of the suit land, and that mere mutation does not by itself confer title, specifically when the decree itself is under challenge as fraudulent. He further submits that the respondent's own affidavit stating that he has been cultivating the land for the "last 10 years" is contradictory to his claim of possession since 1984/1995-96, and that this inconsistency is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not in actual possession.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submits that the balance of convenience and irreparable injury both lie in favour of the petitioner, since if the respondent is permitted to deal with or alienate the disputed land during the pendency of the suit, the petitioner would be rendered remediless. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following judgments - Nagar Palika Parishad v. Hindustan Copper Limited, 2009 (2) MPLJ 222; Ashok Kumar Sable v. Sevak Prasad Singh, 1997 (1) MPWN 123 ; Marble City Hospital and Research Centre Pvt. Ltd. v. City Hospital and Research Centre Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., 2009 (21) RCR (Civil) 652; Sushma Soni v. Pramod Gupta and Ors., Misc. Appeal No. 1557 of 2009 decided on 28.01.2010 ; Padam Chand and Ors. v. Ashok and Ors., Misc. Appeal No. 1363/2008; Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Ltd. v. KS Infraspace LLP Ltd. and Anr., 2020 (5) SCC 410 ; Bhagchand v. Administrator, Municipal Corporation and Ors., AIR 2005 MP 159 ; M.P. Housing Board v. Anil Kumar Khiwani, AIR 2005 SC 1863 ; Rame Gowda (D) by LRs v. M. Varadappa Naidu (D) by LRs and Anr., 2004 (1) SCC 769 . Accordingly, he contends that the impugned order dated 31.07.2024 passed by the lower appellate court as well the order dated 09.11.2023 passed by the trial Court deserve to be set aside and that temporary injunction be granted in his favour.

5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 submits that both the Courts below upon appreciation of the judgment dated 07.01.1984 and a decree dated 10.01.1984 passed in 1984 suit as well as the revenue records including Khasra entries from 1995-96 to 2023-24 have given a finding that prima facie, respondent No.1's name has continuously been recorded as Bhumiswami, and that the petitioner has failed to place any document evidencing his own possession apart from the will dated 13.12.1999, which itself is disputed.

6. He further submits that the above findings recorded by the trial Court and the first appellate Court are not open to re-appreciation by this Court in the exercise of its limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents places reliance upon Gyankunwar v. State of M.P., 2018 (I) MPWN 27 , Mohd. Mohd Mehtab Khan & Ors v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan 2013 (9) SCC 221 and Guddi v. Banwari Rameshwar and Others, 1999 (1) MPLJ 64. Accordingly, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 prays for dismissal of the present petition.

7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

8. From the material available on record, it is clear that the learned Trial Court as well as the learned lower appellate Court, while deciding the application for temporary injunction filed by the petitioner, have recorded a finding that the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case as well as his possession over the suit land. In arriving at the said finding, both the Courts have considered the judgment dated 07.01.1984 and the decree dated 10.01.1984 passed in the 1984 suit, the Khasra entries and revenue records for the years 1995-96, 2017-18 and 2023-24, all of which prima facie disclose respondent No.1 as the Bhumiswami of the suit land. Both the Courts have further considered the evidence adduced by the petitioner, namely, the will dated 13.12.1999 as well as the panchnama prepared by the Ward Councilor in favour of the petitioner. Upon consideration of the same, both the Courts have opined that the said evidence adduced by the petitioner does not establish a prima facie case in his favour, as the evidence placed on record by respondent No.1/defendant prima facie appears to be more reliable.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the judgment dated 07.01.1984 and the decree dated 10.01.1984 passed in the 1984 suit were fraudulently obtained and are disputed, and therefore, could not have formed the basis for the learned Trial Court to arrive at a finding that the petitioner has no prima facie case for grant of injunction in his favour. Be that as it may.

10. The fact remains that the petitioner herein claims temporary injunction over the suit land on the basis of the will dated 13.12.1999. Apart from the averment that the Will is in his favour, it has also been pleaded by the petitioner that a panchnama was prepared by the Ward Councilor in his favour in the year 2024. However, the record reveals that, even if taken at its face value, no steps whatsoever were taken by the petitioner/plaintiff to get the will dated 13.12.1999 executed in his favour after the death of his father, Ramvilas in 2015, that is, when he allegedly came to the knowledge of will being in his favour. Moreover, even the panchnama prepared by the Ward Councilor in his favour does not disclose the date on which it was prepared. In the given facts and circumstances, a mere plea that the petitioner has a will in his favour, without any corresponding document to establish the factum of ownership or possession, is prima facie not sufficient for grant of injunction. The said aspect has also been considered by the learned lower appellate Court in the impugned order dated 31.07.2024 as well as the learned trial court in its order dated 09.11.2023.

11. At this stage, this Court has also gone through the judgments supplied by the learned counsel for the petitioner and after having gone through them, is of the considered opinion that the judgments as relied may not be applicable in the facts of the present case. This is because, the case of the petitioner is very specific inasmuch as the petitioner claims to be the owner and in possession of the suit land on the strength of the will dated 13.12.1999, whereas the material available on record, including the revenue records and khasra entries as well as the judgment dated 07.01.1984 and the decree dated 10.01.1984, prima facie indicates respondent No.1 to be the owner and in possession thereof. None of the judgments relied on by the petitioner deal with this aspect.

12. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the order dated 12.12.2025 passed by the Additional Tehsildar in proceedings bearing No.67/2025-26/A-12, filed along with IA No.9383/2026, to contend that respondent No.1 had filed an application for demarcation of the suit property under Section 129 of the M.P. Land and Revenue Code, 1959 [hereinafter referred to as "MPLRC"]. However, the said application was rejected by the Additional Tehsildar on the ground that the ownership of the land in question was disputed and that the matter was pending before the trial Court. Accordingly, it is the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent No.1 is not in possession of the suit property and, as such, the plea for temporary injunction cannot be denied to the petitioner, as he is in possession of the suit property, which is reflected from the order passed by the Tehsildar.

13. Upon consideration, this Court finds that the said argument is bereft of merit. Firstly, the petitioner relies upon a document which was neither filed before the lower appellate Court nor before the learned trial Court. Therefore, placing reliance upon such document before this Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is, in essence, an attempt to further develop the petitioner's case and raise a ground upon which no finding was recorded by either of the Courts below and the same cannot be permitted. Secondly, even on merits, the said document does not support the case of the petitioner, for the reason that rejection of respondent No.1's application for demarcation under Section 129 of the MPLRC does not, by itself, prima facie establish ownership or possession in favour of the petitioner so as to warrant grant of temporary injunction in his favour. Thus, the aforesaid argument raised by the petitioner stands rejected.

14. Moreover, it is apposite to refer to the case of Wander Ltd. and another vs. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 (Supp.) SCC 727, wherein the Apex Court had considered the scope of interference in an appeal arising out of rejection of temporary injunction by the Trial Court. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein:

          "The Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretion. (Para-14)"

          [Emphasis Supplied]

15. A perusal of the learned trial Court's order dated 09.11.2023 (Annexure P/7) indicates that by appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court concluded that the petitioner has failed to prove his prima facie ownership and possession over the suit property and therefore, there is no balance of convenience in his favour and neither any irreparable loss is being caused to him. Thus, the learned trial Court declined issuance of temporary injunction to the petitioner. The aforesaid findings of fact recorded by the learned trial Court have been affirmed by the lower appellate Court. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court have exercised their jurisdiction to deal with the prayer for injunction on sound principles of law. As such, this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot interfere with the concurrent finding of fact leading to the non-grant of injunction, unless the findings arrived at are perverse in nature (See Skyline Education Institute (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.L. Vaswani, 2010 (2 ) SCC 142 ). The findings recorded by the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court by no stretch of imagination can be said to be perverse.

16. In view of the above consideration, no case for interference is made out in order dated 31.07.2024 (Annexure P/1) passed by the learned 16th District Judge, Gwalior in M.C.A.No.41/2024 and the order dated 09.11.2023 (Annexure P/7) passed by the learned Xth Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gwalior in RCS(A) - 443/2023, impugned in the present petition. Accordingly, the petition stands dismissed.

17. Pending application (s), if any, shall stand closed.