1. Heard on I.A.No. 4655/2026, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.

2. The application is supported by the affidavit.

3. For the reasons mentioned in the application, I.A.No. 4655/2026 is allowed and the delay in filing the present petition is hereby condoned.

4. This review petition has been filed seeking review of the order dated 15.10.2025 passed in W.P. No. 5523/2020.

5. Learned counsel for the review-petitioners submitted that this Court, vide the order under review, directed the respondents to grant the benefit of the minimum of the revised pay scale under the 7th Pay Commission to the writ petitioner with effect from 01.01.2016. It is submitted that while passing the said order, this Court did not consider the circular issued by the Public Health Engineering (P.H.E.) Department dated 08.08.2022. It is further submitted that, in view of the said circular, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the minimum of the revised pay scale under the 7th Pay Commission only with effect from 15.12.2016.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in W.P. No. 17832/2020 (Virendra Kumar Shivhare Vs. State of M.P. and others), which related to a similarly situated employee of the P.H.E. Department, the learned Government Advocate could not dispute the fact that the benefit under the recommendations of 7th Pay Commission is extended to the employees of all the department w.e.f. 01.01.2016. It is further submitted that, in the case of similarly situated employees of the P.W.D. Department, the Coordinate Bench vide order dated 31.10.2025 passed in W.P. No. 17873/2021 (Nathuram Kushwaha & Ors. Vs. The State of M.P. and Ors.) has also granted the benefit with effect from 01.01.2016. It is submitted that the said order has also been upheld in writ appeal vide order dated 10.07.2026 passed in W.A. No. 1402/2026 (The State of M.P. and Ors.Vs. Nathuram Kushwaha & Ors.), wherein the learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the State admitted that on merits, there is no error in the impugned order.

7. It is submitted that the respondent cannot be discriminated against merely because he is an employee of the P.H.E. Department. Both the P.H.E. Department and the P.W.D. Department are departments of the State of Madhya Pradesh, and therefore, no discrimination can be made between similarly situated employees on that ground.

8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

9. Upon consideration of the material available on record, it is evident that in W.P. No. 17832/2020 (Virendra Kumar Shivhare vs. State of M.P. and Others), which pertained to a similarly situated employee of the P.H.E. Department, the State did not dispute that the benefit of the recommendations of the 7th Pay Commission had been extended to employees of all departments of the State with effect from 01.01.2016. The relevant part of order reads as under;

          "4. Counsel for the State though opposed the prayer by submitting that necessary benefits have already been extended to the petitioner, however, could not dispute the fact that the benefit under the recommendations of 7th Pay Commission is extended to employees of all the departments w.e.f. 1/1/2016."

10. The record further reveals that in the case of similarly situated employees of the P.W.D., the Coordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 31.10.2025 passed in W.P. No. 17873/2021 (Nathuram Kushwaha and Others vs. State of M.P. and Others), directed grant of the benefit of the 7th Pay Commission with effect from 01.01.2016. The said judgment has subsequently been affirmed by the Division Bench in W.A. No. 1402/2026 (State of M.P. and Others vs. Nathuram Kushwaha and Others), decided on 10.07.2026. It is also borne out from the record that, in the said writ appeal, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State fairly conceded that the judgment of the learned Single Judge did not suffer from any error on merits.

11. The relevant part of order passed in W.P. No.17873/2021 reads as under;

          "7. In view of the aforesaid, the petition is disposed of directing the respondents to extend the benefit of minimum of the revised pay scale under 7th pay commission recommendation to the petitioner within a period of 90 days from the date of submission of certified copy of this order."

12. Furthermore, the relevant part of order passed by the Division Bench in W.A. No.1402/2026 reads as under;

          "6. A bare perusal of the application for condonaton of delay reflects that except mentioning the dates of movement of file from one table to another, no reason much less sufficient reason has been assigned for condonation of delay, coupled with the fact that even according to appellants themselves, there is no merit in the case, accordingly, I.A. No. 6009/2026 is dismissed, and appeal is dismissed as barred by time."

13. In view of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, it is apparent that the benefit of the 7th Pay Commission has already been recognized in favour of similarly situated employees. The respondent, being an employee of the P.H.E. Department, cannot be subjected to differential treatment merely on account of the department in which he is serving. Both the P.H.E. Department and the P.W.D. are departments of the State Government, and employees similarly situated cannot be discriminated against without any rational basis.

14. Furthermore, scope of review is well defined. In the case of Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati and Others, (2013) 8 SCC 320 , principles relating to review jurisdiction have been laid down. The principles relating to review jurisdiction may be summarized as follows:

          "When the review will be maintainable:

          (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

          (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

          (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram Vs. Neki, (1921- 22) 49 IA 144 and approved by this Court in the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos Vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule".

          When the review will not be maintainable:

          "(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

          (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

          (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

          (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

          (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

          (vi) The meres possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

          (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

          (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate Court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

          (ix) Reviews is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."

15. It is also held by the Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Kamal Sengupta & Anr., (2008) 8 SCC 612 that mistake or error apparent on the face of the record means that mistake or error which is prima facie visible and does not require any detailed examination. Erroneous view of law is not a ground for review and review cannot partake the category of the appeal.

16. Apart from the above, Section 114 of the CPC, which is the substantive provision and deals with the scope of review is required to be quoted and analyzed :-

          "Section 114- Review:- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved:-

          (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred;

          (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code; or

          (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order, and the court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit."

17. The grounds available for filing a review application against a judgment as set out in Order XLVII of the CPC is also required to be discussed:

          "1. Application for review of judgment -

          (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved -

          (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

          (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

          (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

          (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or Order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.

          [Explanation-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.]"

18. A glance at the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that a review application would be maintainable on (i) discovery of new and important matters or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, were not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him when the decree was passed or the order made; (ii) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason.

19. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others reported in 1980 Supp SCC 562, the Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made are as under:

          "12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante and Another v. Sheikh Habib reported in (1975) 1 SCC 674, this Court observed :

          'A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."

20. In Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715, stating that an error that is not self evident and the one that has to be detected by the process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise the powers of review, the Apex Court held as under:

          "7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. reported in 1964 SCR (5) 174, this Court opined: '

          11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an 'error apparent on the face of the record'. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an 'error apparent on the face of the record', for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by 'error apparent'. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.

          8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury reported in (1995) 1 SCC 170, while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389, this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

          9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of this jurisdiction under Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise".

          [emphasis added]

21. Considering the above, it appears that no apparent error exists on the face of the record warranting interference.

22. Resultantly, this review petition stands dismissed.