Ramesh Sinha, CJ.

1. Heard Ku. Neha Hindwani, appellant in person as well as Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondents.

2. By way of present writ appeal under Section 2 of Sub-Section (1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench Act, 2006, the writ petitioner / appellant (in person) has challenged the order dated 04.05.2026 passed by learned Single Judge in WPS No.831 of 2016 (Ku. Neha Hindwani Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), by which the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner/ appellant herein has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge.

3. Brief facts, necessary for disposal of this appeal, are that the father of the appellant was working as Assistant Grade-II in the establishment section of Tahsil Pandariya, District Kabirdham, and died in harness on 19.05.2010. The mother of the appellant had made her application for compassionate appointment on 02.11.2012, which was forwarded by the Collector, Kabirdham to Tahsildar, Pandariya for further action. The Tahsildar, Pandariya, recommended that since the mother of the appellant Smt. Asha Hindwani had already divorced by the deceased employee vide judgment dated 21.06.2006 passed in Civil Suit No. 6-A/2006, she can not be given compassionate appointment. Based on the recommendation, the application of the mother of the appellant Smt. Asha Hindwani was rejected on 30.01.2013. Thereafter the mother of the appellant moved another application on 23.04.2013 for grant of compassionate appointment to the appellant, who was minor on that day and 17 years of age. Due to her minority, she was not recommended for compassionate appointment as per the memo dated 26.06.2013, sent by the Tahsildar Pandariya, to the Collector Pandariya. The appellant, after attaining majority, claiming that she being sole legal heir of the deceased employee, submitted an application on 13.08.2014 seeking compassionate appointment; however, the same has been rejected by the Collector, District Kabirdham vide impugned order dated 15.06.2015 on the ground that Compassionate Appointment Policy dated 10.06.2003 would be applicable in the case of the appellant and there was no provision in the policy dated 10.06.2003 for providing compassionate appointment to the minor member of the family after attaining age of majority. Being aggrieved by the said rejection, the appellant has approached this Court by filing writ petition, being WPS No. 831 of 2016. The said writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 04.05.2026 firstly on the ground that there is mention of minor clause in the Compassionate Appointment Policy dated 10.06.2003, secondly, on the ground of delay as the appellant has applied after more than four years from the date of death of the deceased employee and thirdly, on the ground that applications submitted by the mother of the appellant seeking compassionate appointment for herself had already been rejected by the competent authorities. Being aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant has preferred the instant appeal.

4. Ku. Neha Hindwani, the appellant, appearing in person, vehemently submitted that the learned Single Judge has committed a manifest error in dismissing the writ petition by upholding the rejection of her claim for compassionate appointment on the basis of the Compassionate Appointment Policy dated 10.06.2003. It is contended that the authorities as well as the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that although the appellant's father died in harness in the year 2010, the appellant was a minor on the date of his death and attained the age of majority only in the year 2014. It is submitted that the appellant became legally competent to seek compassionate appointment only upon attaining majority and, therefore, her claim ought to have been considered in accordance with the Compassionate Appointment Policy dated 14.06.2013, which was in force on the date she became eligible and submitted her application. The appellant argued that the application of the 2003 Policy, instead of the prevailing 2013 Policy, is contrary to settled principles of law governing compassionate appointment in the case of minor dependents and defeats the very object of the welfare scheme. It is further contended that the rejection of her claim on the ground of delay is wholly unjustified, as the delay, if any, was occasioned solely on account of her legal disability as a minor, a circumstance beyond her control. The appellant submitted that she applied immediately after attaining majority in the year 2014 and well within the period contemplated under the 2013 Policy, and therefore her claim could not have been rejected on the ground of delay and laches.

5. The appellant further submitted that both the respondent authorities and the learned Single Judge adopted a hyper- technical approach while completely overlooking the humanitarian object underlying the scheme of compassionate appointment. It is urged that after the death of the sole breadwinner, the appellant's mother, who was a divorcee, had applied for compassionate appointment but her application was rejected on technical grounds relating to her marital status, despite the fact that she was the only surviving guardian responsible for maintaining the minor appellant. It is contended that the authorities failed to consider the acute financial distress suffered by the family and ignored the mandatory factors prescribed under Clause 12(3) of the applicable policy, namely, the financial condition of the family, the number of dependents, the income available to the family and other special circumstances before rejecting the claim. The appellant further submitted that the respondents have erroneously interpreted the requirement of "immediate financial crisis" by ignoring that, in the case of a minor dependent, such immediacy has necessarily to be assessed from the date the dependent attains majority and becomes legally eligible for appointment. According to the appellant, her prompt application upon attaining majority satisfied the very object of the compassionate appointment scheme, and the respondents' insistence on a rigid and literal interpretation has frustrated the beneficial purpose of the policy.

6. The appellant lastly submitted that the authorities as well as the learned Single Judge failed to consider the subsequent circumstances demonstrating the continuing financial hardship faced by the family. It is submitted that the family pension came to an end in the year 2021, resulting in a fresh financial crisis. The appellant further submitted that she is presently a divorced single mother having the sole responsibility of maintaining her minor child as well as her aged and ailing mother, without any independent source of income or ancestral property. It was also pointed out that during childbirth in the year 2022, she suffered serious cardiac complications requiring implantation of a permanent pacemaker, thereby aggravating her financial and medical difficulties. It is further contended that the respondents have committed a serious error in treating the rejection of her mother's earlier application as a final bar to her independent claim. According to the appellant, every eligible dependent has an independent right to seek compassionate appointment, and the rejection of the mother's application on technical grounds cannot operate as a bar against the appellant, who was a minor at the relevant time and had no legal capacity to assert her rights. It is thus submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from errors of law and fact, is contrary to the object of the compassionate appointment scheme and the guarantees of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and therefore deserves to be set aside.

7. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition as the appellant's claim for compassionate appointment was not maintainable under the applicable policy. It was contended that compassionate appointment is not a matter of vested right but an exception to the normal rule of public employment and is intended only to provide immediate financial relief to the family of the deceased employee. Since the appellant's mother had already applied for compassionate appointment and her claim stood rejected, and the appellant herself submitted her application after a considerable lapse of time from the date of death of the deceased employee, the respondents were justified in rejecting her claim. It was further submitted that no illegality or arbitrariness has been committed by the authorities or by the learned Single Judge warranting interference in the present appeal, and therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

8. We have heard the appellant, who appeared in person, learned State counsel, and have carefully perused the record of the case, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, and the documents placed on record.

9. The principal submission of the appellant is that since she was a minor on the date of death of the deceased employee and attained majority only in the year 2014, her claim for compassionate appointment ought to have been considered under the Compassionate Appointment Policy dated 14.06.2013 and not under the earlier policy. We are unable to accept the said submission. The law governing compassionate appointment is no longer res integra. Compassionate appointment is not a source of recruitment nor a vested or hereditary right. It is only an exception to the constitutional mandate of equality in public employment under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, carved out solely to provide immediate financial assistance to the family of a deceased employee who dies in harness leaving the family in penury. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that such appointments can only be made strictly in accordance with the policy prevailing at the relevant time and that no person can claim compassionate appointment dehors the scheme framed by the employer.

10. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shashi Kumar, (2019) 3 SCC 653, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that compassionate appointment is not a vested right and that the claim has to be considered strictly in accordance with the governing scheme. Similarly, in N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 7 SCC 617, the Supreme Court held that compassionate appointment is governed entirely by the applicable policy and no appointment can be directed contrary to the terms of the scheme. The Court further held that no dependent can claim compassionate appointment as a matter of right merely because the employee died in harness.

11. The appellant has also sought to justify the delay by contending that she was a minor on the date of death of her father and, therefore, the period during which she remained a minor deserves to be excluded. This submission also cannot be accepted. The settled legal position is that the object of compassionate appointment is to meet the immediate financial crisis arising on account of the sudden death of the sole breadwinner and not to provide employment after several years when the crisis has substantially abated. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138, the Hon'ble Supreme Court categorically held that compassionate appointment cannot be granted after the lapse of a reasonable period since the very object of the scheme is to relieve the family of the immediate hardship caused by the death of the employee. The Court observed that compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any point of time in future.

12. Again, in Local Administration Department v. M. Selvanayagam, (2011) 13 SCC 42, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the dependent was a minor at the time of death of the employee, the claim cannot be kept alive till the dependent attains majority, as such an interpretation would defeat the very object of compassionate appointment. Similar principles have been reiterated in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Sajad Ahmed Mir, (2006) 5 SCC 766, wherein the Supreme Court held that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed after a long lapse of time as the immediate need for financial assistance ceases to exist.

13. In the present case, the deceased employee died in the year 2010. Admittedly, the appellant's mother had already submitted an application seeking compassionate appointment, which was duly considered and rejected by the competent authority. The appellant submitted her own application only after attaining majority. By then, several years had elapsed from the date of death of the deceased employee. The very object of compassionate appointment, namely, providing immediate succour to the bereaved family, stood substantially diluted by passage of time. Merely because the appellant attained majority subsequently cannot create a fresh cause of action or revive a claim which otherwise does not survive under the scheme.

14. We also find no substance in the contention that the respondents were bound to consider the appellant's application independently merely because her mother's application had been rejected. Although every eligible dependent may submit an application if permissible under the governing scheme, such application must still satisfy the conditions prescribed therein. The rejection of the appellant's claim is not solely founded upon the rejection of her mother's application but also upon the fact that the appellant's claim did not satisfy the requirements of the applicable compassionate appointment policy. Therefore, no legal infirmity can be found in the action of the respondents.

15. Equally untenable is the submission that the appellant's present financial hardship, cessation of family pension, divorce, responsibility of maintaining her minor child and ailing mother, or her medical condition requiring implantation of a permanent pacemaker constitute grounds for directing compassionate appointment. Though these circumstances undoubtedly evoke sympathy, the law is equally well settled that compassionate appointment cannot be directed solely on humanitarian considerations dehors the governing policy. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar, (1994) 2 SCC 718, the Supreme Court held that however sympathetic the facts may appear, courts cannot direct compassionate appointment contrary to the statutory rules or policy. Likewise, in Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar, (2015) 7 SCC 412, it was reiterated that compassionate appointment must strictly conform to the scheme framed by the employer and cannot be granted merely on equitable considerations.

16. The scope of judicial review in matters concerning compassionate appointment is also limited. Unless the decision of the employer is shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory or contrary to the governing policy, the Court would not substitute its own view. In the present case, we find that the respondents have considered the appellant's claim in accordance with the applicable policy and the learned Single Judge has rightly declined to interfere. No perversity, arbitrariness or violation of any statutory provision has been demonstrated by the appellant.

17. In view of the foregoing discussion and in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in aforementioned judicial precedents, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant has failed to make out any ground warranting interference with the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. The impugned order neither suffers from any error of law nor from any perversity calling for interference in intra-court appellate jurisdiction.

18. Consequently, the writ appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.