(Prayer: Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying that in the circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein, the High Court may be pleased to set aside the Order, Dt. 14.08.2025 passed in I.A. No. 165 of 2025 in O.S. No. 65 of 2023 on the file of the Court of Learned Junior Civil Judge, Narasannapeta, and pass such
IA NO: 1 OF 2026
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to order notice in the present CRP No. 3457 of 2025 and miscellaneous petition therein to be served by way of substitute service on respondents 3 to 5 by way of paper publication in Eenadu Daily Newspaper of Medak District, Telangana State, in the interests of justice and to pass)
1. The 1st defendant in the suit filed the above revision against the order dated 14.08.2025 in I.A.No.165 of 2025 in O.S.No.65 of 2023 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Narasannapeta.
2. The respondents 1 and 2, being the plaintiffs, filed the suit O.S.No.65 of 2023 seeking partition of the plaint schedule properties.
3. It was pleaded in the plaint that the defendants 1 & 2, mother of defendants 3 & 4 by name Pathivada Lakshmi, are the children of Polaki Haranadha Rao. The said P.Haranadha Rao had one sister by name Dola Saraswathama. After the divorce, she came down to the house of Haranadha Rao and started living there. The plaint schedule properties belonged to said Dola Saraswathama, who died intestate on 07.06.2006. The plaintiffs, defendants 1 & 2, and the mother of defendants 3 & 4 come under Serial No.IV (3) of the Class-II legal heirs of Dola Saraswathama. The 1st defendant is looking after the plaint schedule properties and giving share to others. The plaintiffs came to know that the 1st defendant, with the instigation of other defendants, created some fake documents and thereafter filed the suit.
4. The defendants 1 and 2 were set ex parte on 19.09.2023. The defendants 3 and 4 were set ex parte on 16.02.2024. The trial Court decreed the suit ex parte and passed a preliminary decree on 27.02.2024. Thereafter, the 1st defendant in the suit filed I.A.No.165 of 2025 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 340 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree.
5. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, it was pleaded that the deponent used to take care of the welfare of Dola Saraswathama during her old age. She died testate by executing an unregistered Will dated 27.05.2006 in respect of her properties. The plaintiffs 1 and 2 filed the suit for partition by adding the elder sister as 2nd defendant and the children of the deceased sister as defendants 3 and 4, along with the deponent as D1. The other defendants received the summons and filed vakalat, and later, they did not file a written statement and remained ex parte. The suit summons was not served on the deponent, since she was not staying at the address shown in the plaint. The plaintiffs are aware of the whereabouts of the deponent, as there are comings and goings on occasions of hardships and pleasures from both sides. The deponent made a complaint in Spandana in September, 2022, to remove the property from the list of prohibited properties, under Section 22-A. The District Collector directed the Tahsildar to conduct an enquiry, and in the meantime, the plaintiffs and other defendants colluded together and filed the suit. The plaintiffs managed the process. By virtue of an ex parte preliminary decree, the plaintiffs filed a petition to the Tahsildar to keep the properties in the dispute register. The deponent came to know the same through the Tahsildar, Polaki, by endorsement dated 02.01.2025 and immediately filed the present application.
6. The plaintiffs filed a counter and opposed the application. It was pleaded that the 1st defendant received summons personally; however, she failed to appear before the Court, and hence, she was set ex parte, and eventually, an ex parte preliminary decree was passed on 27.02.2025.
7. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced on either side.
8. The trial Court, by order dated 14.08.2025, dismissed the application holding that the 1st defendant failed to show sufficient reasons to condone the delay.
9. The revision petition was listed on 05.12.2025 and adjourned at the request of learned counsel for the petitioner tenable him to place on record the contemporary signatures of the petitioner available on some public documents and also a copy of the Court summons, on which the present petitioner was allegedly signed. The petitioner filed a memo vide CRPUSR No.150435 of 2025 dated 19.12.2025. A coordinate Bench of this Court, having verified the signatures, prima facie opined that the signature on the summons seems to have been a forged one and eventually suspended the preliminary decree by order dated 23.12.2025.
10. Heard Sri P.Rishyendra Sai, learned counsel representing Srinivas Ambati, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri P.Rajkumar, learned counsel for the respondents 1 & 2.
11. Now, the point for consideration is:
Whether the petitioner has shown sufficient cause to condone the delay of 340 days in filing the petition to set aside exparte decree?
12. As seen from the material available on record, according to the plaintiffs and preliminary decree, the 1st defendant (revision petitioner) received summons; however, she failed to enter appearance, and hence, she was set ex parte on 19.09.2023. The revision petitioner, in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, specifically pleaded that summons was not served on her. However, the trial Court disbelieved the same since no evidence was led in. In the revision, the petitioner filed a memo vide CRPUSR No.150435 of 2025 dated 19.12.2025. Along with the said memo, a copy of the summons said to have been served on the petitioner in the suit as well as in the I.A. was filed. The signatures of the petitioner in the suit summons and I.A. summons and other signatures of the contemporary period i.e. signatures on the pattadar pass book, title deed and Aadhaar application, are not the same, even for the naked eye. Of course, this court is not giving an emphatic finding, since it requires a further probe. Apart from that, the revision petitioner has been contending that she has not been residing at the address shown in the plaint, since the house there is in dilapidated condition. The revision petitioner ought to have led evidence to substantiate the said contention. However, no evidence was led in.
13. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The object is to put an end to every legal remedy and to have a fixed period of life for every litigation, as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. The courts have always treated the statutes of limitation and prescription as statutes of peace and calm. The courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal/application even after the expiry of the prescribed period, provided the proposed appellant can establish “sufficient cause” for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon a host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence, etc. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase “sufficient cause” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice.
14. Of course, it is not necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the appeal/application. Sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter. It is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations, and if the delay is not deliberate. However, existence of “sufficient cause”, is sine qua non to condone the delay. It is pertinent to mention here that the phrases “liberal approach”, “justice-oriented approach” and cause for the advancement of “substantial justice” cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation to allow stale claim or, as a matter of fact, dead matters to be revived and reopened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. One must not be oblivious of the fact that while construing “sufficient cause” in deciding an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal/ application, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. Condonation of delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon facts and circumstances of each case.
15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy ((2013) 12 SCC 649), considered several old precedents on this aspect and summed up the following guidelines regarding condonation of delay:
i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challan manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.
16. In the case at hand, no doubt the trial Court exercised the jurisdiction vested in it. Had the petitioner filed the material before the trial Court, which was filed before this Court, the result would have been otherwise. The length of delay is immaterial, showing sufficient reasons matters. As observed supra, when technical and substantial justice are pitted against each other, the Court must lean towards substantial justice. By giving an opportunity to the petitioner, the rights, if any, accrued to the plaintiff, shall not be taken away, since the suit was filed for partition.
17. Given the discussion supra, the order under revision brooks interference, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the order dated 14.08.2025 in I.A.No.165 of 2025 in O.S.No.65 of 2023 on the file of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Narasannapeta is set aside. I.A.No.165 of 2025 is restored. The matter is remanded to the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Narasannapeta. It is open to the revision petitioner as well as the respondents to lead evidence and advance arguments in I.A.No.165 of 2025. The learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Narasannapeta, after hearing, shall pass appropriate orders, uninfluenced by the observations made by this Court.
18. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is Allowed. No costs.
As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications shall stand closed.
