S. Muralee Krishna , J.

1. The applicant in O.A.(EKM)No.875 of 2018 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Additional Bench at Ernakulam (the ‘Tribunal’, for short), filed this original petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P4 order dated 01.08.2025 passed by the Tribunal in that original application.

2. Going by the averments in the original application, the petitioner was granted Leave Without Allowance (‘LWA’ for short) for a period of 5 years as per Annexure A1 order dated 26.09.1997 for employment abroad. Before expiry of the period of 5 years, the petitioner applied for extension of leave through proper channel by submitting Annexure A2 application dated 05.08.2002. By Annexure A3 letter dated 20.09.2002, the application was forwarded by the Panchayat Deputy Director. It is stated in Annexure A3 that the service records of the petitioner were with the vigilance department as a vigilance case was pending against him. Though the application for extension of leave was submitted, there was no response. The petitioner was not intimated about rejoining duty, and hence the petitioner was under the bona fide belief that his application for extension of leave was favourably considered and sanctioned. By Annexure A4 letter dated 31.05.2012, the vigilance case against the petitioner was dropped. Meanwhile, the petitioner returned from abroad and made a request for rejoining duty. By Annexure A6 letter dated 10.12.2012, the Panchayat Director had called for explanation from the petitioner for unauthorised absence from duty without leave. By Annexure A7 order dated 31.05.2013 of the Panchayat Director, the petitioner was posted as Assistant Secretary in the Puthur Grama Panchayath and the petitioner joined service. By Annexure A8 show cause notice dated 31.03.2014 issued by the Panchayat Director, the increment of the petitioner was suspended for one year. Since the petitioner was to retire on 31.03.2016, the petitioner accepted Annexure A8. Despite the penal action, the Local Self Government Department, by Annexure A9 order dated 16.03.2015, set aside Annexure A8 and has again started disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. By Annexure A10 show-cause notice dated 14.03.2017, the Local Self Government Department has reduced the pension of the petitioner by Rs.500/-as an interim measure. To Annexure A10 show cause notice, the petitioner submitted Annexure A11 reply dated 05.05.2017. Due to the disciplinary proceedings initiated pursuant to Annexure A9, the petitioner is denied gratuity, ex-gratia pension and other benefits on retirement. With these pleadings, the petitioner filed O.A.(EKM)No.875 of 2018, invoking the provisions under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs;

                  “(i) Call for the records and to set aside Annexure A9 and A10.

                  (ii) To direct the respondent to grant gratuity, ex-gratia pension and other service benefits to the applicant”.

3. In the original application on behalf of the respondent, Ext.P2 reply statement dated 15.10.2019 was filed opposing the reliefs sought for. To that reply statement, the petitioner filed Ext.P3 rejoinder dated 02.01.2020, producing therewith Annexure A12 document. Subsequently, by the impugned Ext.P4 order dated 01.08.2025, the Tribunal dismissed the original application. Paragraphs 6 and the last paragraph of that read thus;

                  “6. The impugned action in Annexure A9 cancelling the disciplinary action initiated by the Director of panchayaths is stated to be under Rule 34 of KCS (CC&A) Rules. A perusal of Rule 34 would show that it is within the competence of the respondent to call for the records leading to the order passed by the Director of Panchayats and pass fresh orders in accordance with law. Annexure A10 is only a show cause notice issued to the applicant, after the respondent issued a fresh memo of charge, for which also the respondent is competent. Applicant could have submitted his reply to the show cause notice if at all he had any contentions to raise against the proposal. Now that the respondent has found that applicant is not eligible for either service pension or ex-gratia pension. At any rate it cannot be said that the action of the respondent covered by Annexure A9 and A10 are vitiated. Therefore we do not find any reason to interfere with Annexure A9 and A10. The Original Application is dismissed accordingly.”

4. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the original application, the petitioner is now before this Court with this original petition.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that before the expiry of the LWA granted to the petitioner by virtue of Annexure A1 order dated 26.09.1997, the petitioner submitted Annexure A2 application dated 05.08.2002 for extension of leave for a further period of five years through proper channel. Subsequently, he filed another application for extension of leave for a further period of five years. He was under the bona fide belief that his applications for extension of leave had been allowed, since no order was communicated to him. On coming back to India, the petitioner submitted Annexure A5 application dated 14.09.2012 requesting to rejoin duty. But he was permitted to rejoin duty as per Annexure A7 order dated 31.05.2013. He retired from service on 31.03.2016. The Tribunal failed to consider the reliefs sought in the original application in their proper perspective. The respondent ought to have regularised the period of leave or at least should have granted the benefit of the waiting period between Annexure A5 application and Annexure A7 order of rejoining duty, in which event, the service period of the petitioner would have qualified him for pension. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Additional Chief Secretary, Tvm v. P.R Jayasree [2022 (1) KHC 434] in respect of the contention of the petitioner regarding the waiting period, the petitioner had to spend from the date of Annexure A5 application and Annexure A7 order.

7. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader argued that the applications for extension of LWA submitted by the petitioner were not allowed due to the pendency of a vigilance case. From Annexure A3 letter dated 20.09.2002 of the Panchayath Deputy Director produced by the petitioner himself in the original application, it can be seen that the No Objection for extension of LWA was not issued by the Panchayath Deputy Director, due to the pendency of the vigilance case. Therefore, the petitioner was aware of the non-sanctioning of the LWA extension applications submitted by him. Even then, the petitioner did not rejoin duty, and he was on unauthorised absence from 2002 to 2012. The petitioner came back from abroad and submitted Annexure A5 request only after the closure of the Vigilance case. For unauthorised absence, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him by Annexure A9 order dated 16.03.2015 and Annexure A10 show-cause notice dated 14.03.2017 of the Local Self Government Department. Since the petitioner was on unauthorised absence, he cannot claim the benefit of waiting period.

8. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

9. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd [(2001) 8 SCC 97], the Apex Court held thus;

                  "The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to."

10. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

11. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

12. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

13. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

14. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

15. The perusal of the pleadings and materials on record would show that the petitioner was granted LWA for a period of five years by virtue of Annexure A1 order dated 26.09.1997 and he availed that leave with effect from 05.10.1997. Before the expiry of the aforesaid period of five years on 04.10.2002, the petitioner submitted Annexure A2 application for extension of LWA for another five years on 05.08.2002. However, no orders have been passed in that leave extension application. From Annexure A3 letter dated 20.09.2002 of the Panchayath Deputy Director addressed to the Panchayat Director, it can be seen that Annexure A2 LWA extension application was not accompanied with the No Objection of the Panchayath Deputy Director since a vigilance case was pending against the petitioner at that time. The subsequent LWA extension application submitted by the petitioner was also not allowed by the Government. The petitioner submitted Annexure A5 application to rejoin duty only on 14.09.2012.

16. When an employee submits an application for leave extension, it was his duty to ascertain the status of the said application before continuing on leave. The petitioner, being aware of the non-issuance of NOC due to the pendency of the vigilance case, as evident from Annexure A3, cannot take a stand that he was under the impression that his applications for extension of LWA were allowed. Admittedly, the petitioner did not make any attempt to rejoin duty till the filing of Annexure A5 request dated 14.09.2012. From Annexure A8 show cause notice dated 31.03.2014, it can be gathered that a memo of charges dated 12.08.2013 was issued to the petitioner for unauthorised absence and a penalty of barring one annual increment with cumulative effect was proposed in that show cause notice. However, by Annexure A9 order, Annexure A8 show cause notice was set aside, and the Local Self Government Department decided to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The department also issued Annexure A10 subsequent order as an interim measure by reducing Rs.500/- from the pension of the petitioner. From the pleadings and materials placed on record, it is evident that the petitioner was on unauthorised leave from 05.10.2002 onwards. Therefore, he cannot claim the benefit of waiting period from the date of Annexure A5 application dated 14.09.2012 till Annexure A7 order dated 31.05.2013 by which the petitioner was allowed to rejoin duty. For the said reason, the judgment in P.R. Jayasree [2022 (1) KHC 434] is not applicable to the facts of the present case.

17. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find no patent illegality or perversity in the impugned Ext.P4 order of the Tribunal which warrants interference by exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

In the result, the original petition stands dismissed.