Cav Judgment:

1. Heard Mr. Parmanand Pd.Nr.Sahi along with Mr.Girish Pd.Gupta, learned counsels appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. Ajay Mishra, learned APP for the State.

2. These two criminal appeals, Criminal Appeal No.636 of 2010 and Criminal Appeal No.682 of 2010, are arises out of the common judgment of conviction dated 18.06.2010 and the order of sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-IV, Lakhisarai in Sessions Trial No.415 of 2007 arising out of Surajgarha (Kajra) P.S. Case No.326 of 2006 (G.R. No.1029 of 2006). By the said judgment, the learned Trial court convicted the appellants, namely Brajesh Kumar, Ajit Kumar, Ranjeet Kumar (son of Baikunth Mahto) and Ranjeet Kumar (son of Jageshwar Mahto), for the offence punishable under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959 and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year along with a fine of Rs.3,000/-. In default of payment of fine, each of the appellants was further directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. However, the appellants were acquitted of the charges under Sections 26, 35 and other allied provisions of the Arms Act. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellants have preferred the present appeals before this Court which are heard together.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 11.12.2006 at about 6:00 P.M. that while the informant posted as Sub-Inspector of Police at Kajra Police Station, he had received a secret information regarding indiscriminate firing in Village Arma arising out of a land dispute between the groups of Baikunth Mahto and Jageshwar Mahto. After making a station diary entry, he, along with the police force, proceeded to the village and conducted searches at the houses of both factions in the presence of independent witnesses. During the search of the house of Baikunth Mahto, accused Brajesh Kumar, Ajit Kumar and Ranjeet Kumar (son of Baikunth Mahto) were apprehended, from whose possession one country-made loaded pistol with live and empty cartridges, another country-made pistol with two live cartridges and a magazine, and two live point 315 bore cartridges, were allegedly recovered. Thereafter, the police searched the house of Jageshwar Mahto and apprehended Ranjeet Kumar (son of Jageshwar Mahto), from whose possession one country-made loaded pistol along with one live cartridge and one empty cartridge were recovered. As none of the accused could produce any valid licence, the arms and ammunition were seized and the seizure lists were prepared at the spot in presence of two witnesses.

4. On the basis of the written report of the informant, Surajgarha (Kajra) P.S. Case No.326 of 2006 was instituted under Sections 25(1-B)(a), 26(1) and 35 of the Arms Act. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons, cognizance was taken, and after commitment, charges were framed to which the accused pleaded not guilty and upon conclusion of the trial the appellants were convicted leading to the filing of the present appeal.

ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence suffer from serious legal and factual infirmities and are liable to be set aside. The defence case is that the prosecution has failed to establish the alleged recovery of firearms and ammunition beyond reasonable doubt belong the appellant. The entire prosecution case rests solely on the testimonies of police officials, whereas the two independent seizure witnesses, P.W.11 and P.W.12, have not supported the prosecution case and have categorically deposed that no search or seizure was conducted in their presence and that their signatures were obtained on blank papers. It was further submitted that, despite the alleged raid having been conducted in a densely populated village, no independent local resident was examined to corroborate the prosecution version. Learned counsel further argued that the evidence of the police witnesses suffers from material contradictions with regard to the manner of search, seizure and preparation of the seizure lists, and in the absence of reliable independent corroboration, such interested testimony cannot safely form the basis of conviction.

6. Learned counsel further submitted that the prosecution case itself discloses that the alleged incident arose out of a long-standing land dispute between the families of Baikunth Mahto and Jageshwar Mahto, which leads to strong motive of false implication. It was contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the conscious and exclusive possession of the alleged firearms and ammunition by the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt and that the mandatory safeguards governing search and seizure under the Arms Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure were not strictly complied with. It was argued that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material contradictions, the hostile attitude of the independent seizure witnesses and the deficiencies in the prosecution evidence, and erroneously recorded the conviction solely on the basis of official witnesses. Accordingly, it was prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside and the appellants be acquitted of all the charges.

ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE STATE

7. Per contra, learned APP appearing on behalf of the State supported the impugned judgment of conviction and submitted that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence on record. It was contended that the prosecution has successfully proved that, acting on secret information, the police party conducted searches at the houses of the rival factions in the presence of witnesses and recovered unlicensed firearms and live cartridges from the conscious possession of the appellants. The evidence of the informant, the Investigating Officer and the other members of the raiding party is consistent and cogent with regard to the manner of search, seizure and recovery, and there is no material contradiction affecting the core of the prosecution case.

8. Learned APP further submitted that the prosecution has also proved the ballistic examination report through P.W.15, which establishes that the seized firearms were in working condition and the live cartridges were capable of being fired. The sanction for prosecution under Section 39 of the Arms Act was duly proved through P.W.14, thereby establishing compliance with the statutory requirements. It was, therefore, argued that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the conscious possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunition by the appellants, and the learned Trial Court has rightly convicted them under the relevant provisions of the Arms Act. Accordingly, it was prayed that the appeals be dismissed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence be affirmed.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

9. Heard the parties.

10. I have perused the lower court records and proceedings and also taken note of the arguments canvassed by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

11. The learned trial court, on the basis of materials as collected during the course of investigation, passed the Judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated dated 18.06.2010 for the offences under Section 25(1B)A of the Arms Act.

12. During the trial, the prosecution has examined altogether fifteen witnesses, namely:

                  P.W.1 – Ram Pratap Rai – Member of the SAP (Special Armed Police) raiding party.

                  P.W.2 – Nand Bihari Singh – Member of the SAP raiding party.

                  P.W.3 – Sheo Badan Singh (also referred to as Shiv Bachan Singh in parts of the record) – Member of the SAP raiding party.

                  P.W.4 – Anil Kumar – Member of the SAP raiding party.

                  P.W.5 – Ram Binay Singh – Member of the SAP raiding party.

                  P.W.6 – Shivakant Tiwari – Member of the SAP raiding party.

                  P.W.7 – Gayasuddin Ansari – Member of the SAP raiding party.

                  P.W.8 – Gagan Kumar Sudhakar – Informant and the then Sub-Inspector of Police, Kajra Police Station; leader of the raiding party who conducted the search and seizure.

                  P.W.9 – Subhash Prasad Yadav – Member of the SAP raiding party.

                  P.W.10 – Dhirendra Kumar Ram – Member of the SAP raiding party.

                  P.W.11 – Harkhu Mahto – Seizure list witness (declared hostile).

                  P.W.12 – Pramod Kumar – Seizure list witness (declared hostile).

                  P.W.13 – Manoj Kumar Singh – Investigating Officer.

                  P.W.14 – Gopal Krishna – Reader/Peshkar in the office of the District Magistrate, Lakhisarai; proved the sanction order under Section 39 of the Arms Act.

                  P.W.15 – Rajendra Thakur – Sergeant Major (Ballistic Expert), who examined the seized firearms and ammunition and proved the ballistic examination report.

13. The prosecution has also relied upon following document exhibited during the course of trial:-

                  Exhibit-1 – Seizure list relating to the recovery from the house of Baikunth Mahto.

                  Exhibit-1/1 – Seizure list relating to the recovery from the house of Jageshwar Mahto.

                  Exhibit-2 – Written report submitted by the informant.

                  Exhibit-3 – Charge-sheet.

                  Exhibit-4 – Sanction order under Section 39 of the Arms Act.

                  Exhibit-5 – Ballistic/Sergeant Major's examination report.

                  Material Exhibit-I, I/1 and I/2 – Three seized country-made firearms.

                  Material Exhibit-II – Seven live cartridges.

                  Material Exhibit-III – Two empty cartridges.

                  Material Exhibit-IV – One magazine/charger.

14. It would be apposite to discuss the oral/documentary evidences. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses (PWs) can be summarized as follows:

                  P.W.1 – Ram Pratap Rai: A member of the SAP force, who participated in the raid. He supported the prosecution case regarding the raid conducted at the house of Baikunth Mahto. In his cross-examination, he stated that the seizure list was not prepared in his presence as the same was prepared inside the house.

                  P.W.2 – Nand Bihari Singh: Another SAP jawan who accompanied the raiding party. He corroborated the prosecution case regarding the raid and arrest of the accused persons. He also admitted in cross-examination that the seizure list was prepared inside the house and not before him.

                  P.W.3 – Sheo Badan Singh: He was also a member of the raiding party. He supported the prosecution version regarding the search and arrest but stated that he did not witness the actual preparation of the seizure list.

                  P.W.4 – Anil Kumar: An SAP jawan who deposed regarding the raid conducted by the police. His testimony substantially supports the prosecution case regarding the recovery of arms from the accused persons.

P.W.5 – Ram Binay Singh: He also participated in the raid and supported the prosecution version. Like the other police personnel, he admitted that the seizure list had been prepared inside the house.

                  P.W.6 – Shivakant Tiwari: He corroborated the prosecution case regarding the raid, search and arrest of the accused persons. Nothing substantial could be elicited in his cross-examination to discredit his testimony.

                  P.W.7 – Gayasuddin Ansari: Another member of the SAP force. He supported the prosecution case and stated that the accused persons were apprehended during the raid.

                  P.W.8 – Gagan Kumar Sudhakar (Informant):

He was the then Sub-Inspector of Kajra Police Station and the informant of the case. He deposed that on receiving secret information regarding firing arising out of a land dispute between Baikunth Mahto and Jageshwar Mahto, he entered the information in the station diary and proceeded to Village Arma with the SAP force. He stated that after observing all legal formalities relating to search, the house of Baikunth Mahto was searched, where Brajesh Kumar, Ajit Kumar and Ranjeet Kumar (son of Baikunth Mahto) were apprehended and country-made firearms and live cartridges were recovered from their possession. Thereafter, the house of Jageshwar Mahto was searched, where another Ranjeet Kumar (son of Jageshwar Mahto) was apprehended and one loaded country-made pistol along with live cartridges and an empty cartridge were recovered from his possession. He proved both seizure lists as Exhibit-1 and Exhibit-1/1 and also proved the written report as Exhibit-2.

                  P.W.9 – Subash Prasad Yadav: A member of the SAP force who participated in the raid and supported the prosecution version regarding search and recovery.

                  P.W.10 – Dhirendra Kumar Ram: Another SAP jawan who also supported the prosecution case regarding the raid and seizure.

                  P.W.11 – Harkhu Mahto (Seizure Witness): He identified his signature on the seizure list but did not support the prosecution case regarding recovery. He stated that no seizure was effected in his presence and that the police had obtained his signature on a blank paper. He was declared hostile.

                  P.W.12 – Pramod Kumar (Seizure Witness): He also identified his signature on the seizure list but did not support the prosecution version regarding the seizure and stated that his signature had been taken on a blank paper. He too was declared hostile.

                  P.W.13 – Manoj Kumar Singh (Investigating Officer): He conducted the investigation and proved the charge-sheet as Exhibit-3. He also produced before the Court the seized firearms, seven live cartridges, two empty cartridges and one magazine, which were marked as Material Exhibits I, I/1, I/2, II, III and IV respectively.

                  P.W.14 – Gopal Krishna: He was the Peshkar in the office of the District Magistrate, Lakhisarai. He identified the signature of the then District Magistrate on the sanction order under Section 39 of the Arms Act, which was marked as Exhibit-4. The District Magistrate himself was not examined during trial.

                  P.W.15 – Rajendra Thakur (Sergeant Major): He examined the seized firearms and ammunition and proved his ballistic examination report as Exhibit-5. He deposed that two of the country-made pistols were in working condition and the third firearm could also be made functional by replacing the trigger spring. He further stated that the seized live cartridges were capable of being fired and were dangerous to human life.

15. On the basis of materials surfaced during the trial, the appellant/accused was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.PC by putting incriminating circumstances/evidences surfaced against him, which he denied and shows his complete innocence.

16. It would be apposite to discuss the oral/documentary evidences as available on record to re-appreciate the evidences for just and proper disposal of the present appeal.

17. The provision of Section 25(1-B)A of Arms Act provides that :-

                  “Whoever-(a)acquires, has in his possession or carries any firearm or ammunition in contravention of section 3; or….”

I. ON THE POINT OF SANCTION UPON

SATISFACTION OF AUTHORITY

18. In the present case, the prosecution has proved the sanction order through the evidence of P.W.-14 Gopal Krishna, the Reader in the office of the District Magistrate, Lakhisarai, who identified the signature of the then District Magistrate, Shri Narsingh Upadhyay, on the sanction order, which has been marked as Ext. 4. The prosecution has thus brought on record the sanction granted under Section 39 of the Arms Act by the competent authority before institution of the prosecution. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination of P.W.-14 to cast any doubt upon the genuineness or validity of the sanction order, nor has any material been placed on record to suggest that the sanction was accorded mechanically or without due application of mind. In the absence of any such challenge, Ext. 4 constitutes sufficient prima facie proof of a valid sanction under Section 39 of the Arms Act. It is also to be presumed that, while granting such sanction, the competent authority had applied its mind to the materials placed before it and formed the requisite “reason to believe” for according approval. A principle which finds support in the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala, reported in (2004) 11 SCC 576, wherein of “reason to believe” has been construed which is as under:

                  “9. Under IPC, guilt in respect of almost all the offences is fastened either on the ground of “intention” or “knowledge” or “reason to believe”. We are now concerned with the expressions “knowledge” and “reason to believe”. “Knowledge” is an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. “Reason to believe” is another facet of the state of mind. “Reason to believe” is not the same thing as “suspicion” or “doubt” and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing. “Reason to believe” is a higher level of state of mind. Likewise “knowledge” will be slightly on a higher plane than “reason to believe”. A person can be supposed to know where there is a direct appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to have a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause to believe the same. Section 26 IPC explains the meaning of the words “reason to believe” thus:

                  “26. ‘Reason to believe’.—A person is said to have ‘reason to believe’ a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise.”

                  10. In substance, what it means is that a person must have reason to believe if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man would, by probable reasoning, conclude or infer regarding the nature of the thing concerned. Such circumstances need not necessarily be capable of absolute conviction or inference; but it is sufficient if the circumstances are such as creating a cause to believe by chain of probable reasoning leading to the conclusion or inference about the nature of the thing. These two requirements i.e. “knowledge” and “reason to believe” have to be deduced from various circumstances in the case.”

II. ON THE POINT OF POSSESSION OF THE ARMS

19. It is settled that the word 'possession' as mentioned in Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 would simply mean physical/constructive possession or 'conscious possession' has already been the subject matter of many judicial decisions and the law on the subject is no longer res integra. This court deems it profitable to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gunwantlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (1972) 2 SCC 194, wherein, while reading into the word 'possession', the Constitution Bench has held there has to be an element of intention, consciousness or knowledge. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinunder:-

                  “5. What is meant by possession in the context of this section? Is it that the person charged should be shown to be in physical possession or is it sufficient for the purposes of that provision that he has constructive possession of any firearm or ammunition in contravention of Section 3 which prohibits him to be in such possession without a licence. It may be mentioned that under Section 19 of the Arms Act, 1878, an offence corresponding to Section 25(1)(a) is committed if a person had in his or under his control any arms or ammunition in contravention of Sections 14 and 15 of that Act. The word “control” under Section 25(1)(a) has been omitted. Does this deletion amount to the Legislature confining the offence only to the case of a person who has physical possession or does it mean that a person will be considered to be in possession of a firearm over which he has constructive possession or over which he exercises the power to obtain possession thereof when he so intends? If the meaning to be given to the word “possession” is that it should be a physical possession only, then certainly the charge as framed on the facts of the prosecution case will not be sustainable but if the meaning to be given to the word “possession” is wider than that of actual or physical possession then it is possible, if the evidence produced by the prosecution is such as would sustain a finding, that he had constructive possession on September 17, 1966, when he handed it over to Miroo and Miroo handed it over to Chhaganlal because if it was not seized from Chhaganlal, the appellant could have at any time got back the physical possession of the revolver through Miroo. The possession of a firearm under the Arms Act in our view must have, firstly the element of consciousness or knowledge of that possession in the person charged with such offence and secondly where he has not the actual physical possession, he has nonetheless a power or control over that weapon so that his possession thereon continues despite physical possession being in someone else. If this were not so, then an owner of a house who leaves an unlicensed gun in that house but is not present when it was recovered by the police can plead that he was not in possession of it even though he had himself consciously kept it there when he went out. Similary, if he goes out of the house during the day and in the meantime some one conceals a pistol in his house and during his absence, the police arrives and discovers the pistol, he cannot be charged with the offence unless it can be shown that he had knowledge of the weapon being placed in his house. And yet again if a gun or firearm is given to his servant in the house to clean it, though the physical possession is with him nonetheless possession of it will be that of the owner. The concept of possession is not easy to comprehend as writers of Jurisprudence have had occasions to point out. In some cases under Section 19(1)(f) of the Arms Act, 1878 it has been held that the word “possession” means exclusive possession and the word “control” means effective control but this does not solve the problem. As we said earlier, the first precondition for an offence under Section 25(1)(a) is the element of intention, consciousness or knowledge with which a person possessed the firearm before it can be said to constitute an offence and secondly that possession need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the gun, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power and control. In any disputed question of possession, specific facts admitted or proved will alone establish the existence of the de facto relation of control or the dominion of the person over it necessary to determine whether that person was or was not in possession of the thing in question. In this view it is difficult at this stage to postulate as to what the evidence will be and we do not therefore venture to speculate thereon. In the view we have taken, if the possession of the appellant includes the constructive possession of the firearm in question then even though he had parted with physical possession on the date when it was recovered, he will nonetheless be deemed to be in possession of that firearm. If so, the charge that he was in possession of the revolver on September 17, 1966, does not suffer from any defect particularly when he is definitely informed in that charge that he had control over that revolver. It is also apparent that the words “on or before” were intended to bring home to the accused that he was not only in constructive possession of it on September 17, 1966, but that he was in actual physical possession of it prior to that date when he gave it to Miroo. It is submitted, however, that the word “on or before” might cause embarrassment and prejudice to the defence of the accused because he will not be in a position to know what the prosecution actually intends to allege. From a reference of Form XXVIII of Schedule 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the mode of charging a person is that he “on or about”… did the act complained of. In view of the forms of the charge given in the Schedule to the Code, we think that it would be fair to the appellant if the charge is amended to read ‘on or about’ instead of ‘on or before’ which we accordingly order.”

20. Subsequently, in case of Sanjay Dutt v. State Through CBI, Bombay (II) reported in (1994) 5 SCC 410, a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court elucidated the meaning of possession to be conscious possession and not mere custody, lacking any knowledge or intention to use. It was observed, as hereunder:-

                  “19. The meaning of the first ingredient of „possession‟ of any such arms etc. is not disputed. Even though the word 'possession' is not preceded by any adjective like 'knowingly', yet it is common ground that in the context the word 'possession' must mean possession with the requisite mental element, that is, conscious possession and not mere custody without the awareness of the nature of such possession. There is a mental element in the concept of possession. Accordingly, the ingredient of 'possession' in Section 5 of the TADA Act means conscious possession.

                  This is how the ingredient of possession in similar context of a statutory offence importing strict liability on account of mere possession of an unauthorised substance has been understood. (See Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, (1969) 2 A.C. 256 and Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya, (1950) AC 458.”

III. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS

ESTABLISHED THEIR CASE BEYOND ALL

REASONABLE DOUBT?

21. Upon an independent re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charge under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act against all the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of P.Ws.1 to 10, who were members of the raiding party, including the informant (P.W.8), consistently establishes that, acting upon credible secret information regarding indiscriminate firing arising out of a land dispute, the police party proceeded to Village Arma, conducted searches at the houses of the rival factions after observing the requisite formalities, and recovered unlicensed firearms and live cartridges from the conscious possession of the respective appellants. Their testimonies are consistent on the material particulars relating to the search, seizure, recovery and arrest, and nothing substantial has been elicited in their cross-examination to discredit their evidence or to establish any motive for false implication.

22. The mere fact that P.W.11 Harkhu Mahto and P.W.12 Pramod Kumar, the seizure list witnesses, did not support the prosecution case and were declared hostile does not, by itself, render the prosecution case doubtful. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the evidence of official witnesses cannot be discarded merely because they belong to the police force, if their testimony is otherwise found to be reliable, cogent and trustworthy. In the present case, the evidence of the police witnesses stands duly corroborated by the Investigating Officer (P.W.13), who produced and proved the seized firearms, cartridges and magazine before the Court as material exhibits. The ballistic expert (P.W.15) has categorically opined that two of the seized country-made pistols were in working condition and the third firearm could also be rendered functional by replacing the trigger spring, while the live cartridges were capable of being fired and were dangerous to human life. The prosecution has further proved the sanction for prosecution through P.W.14 by exhibiting the sanction order (Ext.4), thereby, satisfying the mandatory requirement under Section 39 of the Arms Act. No material has been brought on record to suggest that the sanction suffered from any legal infirmity.

23. The defence plea of false implication on account of a land dispute also does not inspire confidence. Except making a bald allegation, the appellants have not produced any cogent evidence to probabilise their defence. The defence witness has not witnessed the alleged search and seizure, and their testimony is insufficient to discredit the otherwise reliable prosecution evidence. Likewise, the hostility of the seizure witnesses cannot outweigh the consistent and convincing testimony of the official witnesses, particularly when there is no suggestion of previous enmity between the members of the raiding party and the appellants. This Court, therefore, concurs with the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court that the prosecution has proved conscious and unauthorised possession of firearms and ammunition by the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt.

24. Accordingly, I find no reason to interfere with the judgment of conviction dated 18.06.2010 and the order of sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-IV, Lakhisarai in Sessions Trial No. 415 of 2007 (arising out of Surajgarha (Kajra) P.S. Case No. 326 of 2006/G.R. No. 1029 of 2006), whereby the appellants have been convicted under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act. The conviction of all the appellants under the aforesaid provision is, accordingly, affirmed.

25. However, so far as, the sentence is concerned, this Court takes into consideration that the occurrence is of the year 2006, the appellants have faced the agony of criminal prosecution for nearly two decades. The appellants have also remained in custody for a substantial period during investigation and trial. Considering the aforesaid mitigating circumstances, while maintaining the conviction, the substantive sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year awarded to the appellants is modified and reduced to the period already undergone by them. The sentence of fine of Rs.3,000/- each, along with the default sentence, shall remain unaltered. While maintaining their conviction under section 25(1-B)A of the Arms Act, 1959 this Court grants the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, to the present appellants upon their executing bonds to maintain peace and good behaviour for a period of one year. I find that the appellants have already been released by this Court vide order dated 08.07.2010 in Cr. App. (SJ) 636 of 2010 and 08.09.2010 in Cr. App.(SJ) 682 of 2010 and no adverse report against the appellants is placed before this Court, they are accordingly directed to be released.

26. Accordingly, both the appeals, namely Criminal Appeal No. 636 of 2010 and Criminal Appeal No. 682 of 2010, stand partly allowed to the extent indicated above.

27. Office is directed to send back the lower court records along with a copy of this judgment to the learned District Court forthwith.