V.M. Syam Kumar, J.

1. This W.P.(Crl.) is filed by the mother of Mr.Sabarinath, who is detained in the Central Prison and Correctional Home, Thiruvananthapuram, and continues to be under detention pursuant to the order passed under Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (for short ‘PIT NDPS Act’). Petitioner challenges the detention of her son as illegal and seeks to issue a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of certiorari quashing the orders leading to his detention.

2. Copies of the detention order bearing No.SSC1/189/2025-Home dated 22.01.2026 issued by the 1st respondent and the Confirmation Order bearing No.GO (Rt) No.1289/2026/Home dated 06.04.2026 are produced along with the W.P.(Crl.) as Exhibits P1 and P2 respectively. Petitioner inter alia seeks to quash Exhibit P1.

3. A memo has also been filed by the learned Public Prosecutor on 25.06.2026 producing therewith the statement of facts furnished by the 4th respondent District Police Chief, Thiruvananthapuram (Rural).

4. Since it was deemed necessary to have a closer scrutiny of the records and procedures undertaken by the authorities leading to Exhibits P1 and P2 orders, we had on 09.06.2026 directed the learned Public Prosecutor to produce the original records in a sealed envelope. Pursuant to the said direction, a sealed cover has been produced containing the report, opinion dated 31.03.2026 and the proceedings of the Advisory Board concerning the detenu along with connected documents.

5. We heard Mr.M.J.Santhosh, Advocate appeared for the petitioner and Mr.Biju Meenattoor, learned Senior Public Prosecutor for the respondents.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Exhibit P1 order issued invoking Section 3(1) of the PIT NDPS Act and its confirmation, vide Exhibit P2 order are illegal, arbitrary and vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record. It is submitted that there had been no application of mind to the relevant materials before issuing the detention order and that the same had been issued without following the procedures prescribed by the law. The learned counsel further contended that there was a delay of 4 months from the date of last prejudicial activity attributed to the detenu and the detention order. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose sought to be achieved by the order of preventive detention had snapped. It is also submitted that there was a delay of 2 months from the report of the sponsoring authority to the date of detention and no reasonable explanation has been offered for the said delay which according to the learned counsel is inordinate. The learned counsel further contends that though the report of the screening committee to the Government was issued on 24.12.2025, the detention order was issued only on 22.01.2026 i.e. after a delay of 1 month. It is submitted that the detenu had not been involved in any NDPS cases after 11.09.2025 and reliance is placed on the dictum laid down in Anjana Das P. v. State of Kerala [2026: KER:16817 (W.P.(Crl) No.308 of 2026 dated 25.02.2026)] wherein a delay of 32 days for issuing detention order after the report of the screening committee was held to be inordinate. Reliance is also placed on the judgments of this Court in Ramla A. v. State of Kerala [2025:KER:73770 (W.P. (Crl) No.1268 of 2025 dated 07.10.2025)] and Asmabi Basheer K.P. v. State of Kerala [2026:KER:21937 (W.P.(Crl) No.339 of 2026 dated 11.03.2026)] wherein the delay of 28 days and 45 days respectively in issuing the detention order after the decision of the screening committee were held to be sufficient to vitiate the detention order. The learned counsel also points to the judgment of the court in Suneera v. State of Kerala [2024 (5) KHC 584] to contend that failure of Police Department to leverage the available technology to expedite the process and instead offer weak excuses for the delay undermines the principles of personal liberty that are to be scrupulously adhered to before venturing to preventively detain a citizen, and that such explanations are not only unsatisfactory, but also incompatible with the duty to protect an individual's right to timely and just legal process. It is thus submitted by the learned counsel that the delay occasioned is inordinate rendering the detention order illegal and unsustainable. The confirmation of the same was without taking into consideration the non-compliance of statutory procedure leading to its issuance. Thus the confirmation too bad and unsustainable in law. The learned counsel thus prays that Exhibits P1 and P2 orders may be quashed and the W.P.(Crl) may be allowed as prayed for.

7. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor based on the statement filed, submitted that all statutory requirements had been complied with while issuing Exhibits P1 and P2 orders. It is submitted that the detenu against whom the detention order under Exhibit P1 has been issued is a habitual offender in drug trafficking and is operational in the Districts of Thiruvananthapuram and Kollam within the State. It is submitted that he along with associates have been indulging in transporting drugs from other States and has been involved in 6 NDPS cases for transporting, processing and supplying of medium and large quantity of narcotic substances ganja and methamphetamine for sale at Varkala, Attingal and Neyyattinkara police subdivision limits, Thiruvananthapuram Rural and in Kollam District. Preventive measures initiated against him under Section 129 BNSS and the stringent bail conditions imposed upon him earlier by the courts were proven inadequate to prevent him from committing drug peddling activities and it has after being objectively and subjectively satisfied that for the further maintenance of public tranquility in Thiruvananthapuram and other Districts, the initiation of Section 3(1) of PIT NDPS Act is inevitable and necessary.

8. The learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the contention put forth regarding snapping of live link due to alleged delay is incorrect and unsustainable. The proposal against the detenu was submitted on 24.11.2025 within 2 months and 13 days from the last prejudicial activity. The last crime registered against the detenu was on 11.09.2025. i.e. at Varkala Police Station in Crime No.1361 of 2025 under Section 22 (c) and 29 of the NDPS Act. In the said case, the detenu had been granted bail by the Additional Sessions Court-1, Thiruvananthapuram 11.11.2025. Based on the proposal submitted on 24.11.2025, the screening committee of PIT NDPS Act heard the sponsoring authority on 24.12.2025 for scrutinising the proposal. After due compliance with mandatory procedure, the detaining authority ordered the detention of the detenu under Section 3(1) of the PIT NDPS Act vide Exhibit P1 order dated 22.01.2025. As required under Section 9(b) of the PIT NDPS Act, the detaining authority referred the case of the detenu to the advisory body, and the Advisory Board after hearing perusing the relevant records, concluded that there are sufficient reasons for continued detention of the detenu. The Advisory Board had on 06.04.2026, confirmed the detention of the detenu for undergoing preventive detention for a period of one year. There is thus no snapping of live link and reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Radhika v. State of Kerala [2025 (1) KLT 426], wherein it has been held that if the detenu is likely to be released from custody and if in the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu there is likelihood that after his release from judicial custody he would still indulge in prejudicial activities, then it is necessary and imperative to detain him for the purpose of preventing him from engaging in such activities.

9. It is submitted by the learned Senior public prosecutor that the date of commission of the last prejudicial activity is 11.09.2025 of Varkala Police Station under Crime No.1361 of 2025 and the detenu was arrested on 11.09.2025. Thereafter he was released on 11.11.2025 pursuant to the bail granted by the Additional Sessions Court-1, Thiruvananthapuram. The contraband that had been seized from him was 50.47 grams of methamphetamine, which is of commercial quantity. The date of report of the sponsoring authority is 24.11.2025 and the State Police Chief had forwarded the proposal with connected records on 20.12.2025. Six number of NDPS cases had been reckoned for issuing the detention order and the order of detention is dated 22.01.2026. The date of execution of the order of detention is 26.02.2026, which though is beyond a period of one month the same has valid reasons and explanation. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor submits that the detenu was absconding and a team had to be constituted to find him out and to execute the detention order. After conducting several enquiries, reliable information had been obtained that the detainee was in Bangalore. A special team had been sent to Bangalore after obtaining the due permissions. On investigation, the detenu was located at a place called Dharappalli on 24.02.2026. After he was apprehended and while the police party was bringing him back by train to Kerala, when the train reached Aluva Railway Station, the detenu escaped through the toilet window glass and he was later found at Aluva Carmel Hospital. A crime has been registered against the detenu as Railway Police Crime No.139 of 2026 under Section 265 of the BNSS. It is submitted that he was brought to Chirayankeezhu Police Station on 25.02.2026 at 11.10 P.M. and the detention order was executed by the ISHO Chirayankeezhu Police Station on 26.02.2026 at 01.00 P.M. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor submits that the delay in executing the detention order occurred on the above account and that all mandatory provisions of the PIT NDPS Act were complied with within a reasonable and well explained time limit. There is thus no cause or reason to interfere with Exhibits P1 and P2 orders, it is submitted.

10. We have heard both sides in detail and have considered the respective contentions put forth. We have also perused the report of the Advisory Board along with the ‘Reasons for its opinion’, and the ‘Proceedings of the Advisory Board’ produced by the learned Senior Public Prosecutor in a sealed envelope. We note that the Advisory Board had heard the detenu, on 26.03.2026. Thereafter, the Advisory Board had provided its opinion.

11. The first contention put forth by the petitioner is concerning delay. It is the case of the petitioner that there had been inordinate and unexplained delay on more than one count. First, it is contended that there has been a delay of 4 months between the Last Prejudicial Activity on 11.09.2025 and the issuance of the detention on 22.01.2026. The next major delay alleged by the petitioner is that of two months between the report of the sponsoring authority on 24.12.2025 and the issuance of the detention order on 22.01.2026. A delay of 30 days is also alleged in issuing the detention order on 22.01.2026 from the date of report of the screening committee on 24.12.2025. The law regarding delay in preventive detention matters and as to when it could be termed as snapping the live link between the offence and the order of detention is no longer res integra.

12. The question concerning delay in preventive detention matters and the impact thereof on the detention has been subject matter of authoritative precedents. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Licil Antony v. State of Kerala and another [(2014) 11 SCC 326], has held that delays in issuing or executing a preventive detention order do not automatically invalidate the detention as long as the state provides a reasonable, tenable explanation showing that the "live link" between the individual's illegal activity and the need for detention was not broken. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the same question in Rajinder Arora v. Union of India and others [(2006) 4 SCC 796] in which it has been held as follows:

                  "20. Furthermore no explanation whatsoever has been offered by the respondent as to why the order of detention has been issued after such a long time. The said question has also not been examined by the Authorities before issuing the order of detention.

                  21. The question as regards delay in issuing the order of detention has been held to be a valid ground for quashing an order of detention by this Court in T.A.Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala: 1989) 4 SCC 741 stating: (SCC pp. 748-49, paras 10-11)

                  '10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.

                  11. Similarly when there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay between the date of order of detention and the date of securing the arrest of the detenu, such a delay would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner.' (Emphasis Supplied)

                  It would also be relevant to take note of the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.A.Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and others [(1989) 4 SCC 741] had referred to the observations in Golam Hussain alias Gama v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and others [(1974) 4 SCC 530] as follows:-

                  “10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.” (emphasis supplied)

                  In the light of the above dictum which is now trite and settled, it can be concluded that mere delay in initiating or passing a detention order is not by itself fatal. If the delay is properly explained and the explanation is found to be satisfactory, such delay cannot be regarded as inordinate so as to vitiate the order of detention. Therefore, there exists no inflexible rule requiring a detention order to be issued within a specific time frame following the last prejudicial act. It is in the light of the above legal position that the contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding delay leading to snapping of live link has to be considered.

13. As regards the case at hand, the last crime i.e., Crime No.1361 of 2025 of Varkala Police Station was registered against the detenu on 11.09.2025 and he was arrested on that day itself. He was subsequently enlarged on bail on 11.11.2025 because of the anomalies noted in the grounds of arrest. The detaining authority had valid and well founded apprehension that the detenu will continue his illegal activities in the future. The proposal was submitted on 24.11.2025 is within 13 days of his release on bail and an additional report was also submitted on 15.01.2026 by the sponsoring authority. The State Police Chief, after scrutinising the proposal and report, submitted the proposal and report on 20.12.2025 and 19.01.2026. On receipt of the proposal, the matter was placed before the screening committee on 24.12.2025 and after receiving the opinion of the screening committee, the detaining authority passed the detention order on 22.01.2026 which could be executed only on 26.02.2026 because the detenu was absconding.

14. It is thus revealed from records that the matter was processed continuously through the various statutory and administrative stages, without any unexplained interruption or lack of diligence on the part of the authorities. We are, therefore, satisfied that the time taken to complete the process has been sufficiently accounted for. In the absence of any material indicating lethargy, inaction, or unexplained delay on the part of the authorities, we are unable to accept the contention that the live and proximate nexus between the prejudicial activities and the detention order had been severed.

15. The next point to be considered is the contention that the detenu was on bail pending trial in the cases in which he had been arraigned as accused and there was no reason to invoke the preventive detention law in the meanwhile. It is trite that preventive detention and criminal prosecution serve different legal purposes. While criminal prosecution may aim to impose punishment for offences that have already been committed, preventive detention on the other hand intends to prevent an individual from engaging in similar activities that may be harmful or prejudicial in the future. It has been held in the case of the State of Tamil Nadu v. Nabila and another [(2015) 12 SCC 127], referring to a Constitution Bench decision in Haradhan Saha [(1975) 3 SCC 198], in which it was held as follows:

                  “32. The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution.

                  33. Article 14 is inapplicable because preventive detention and prosecution are not synonymous. The purposes are different. The authorities are different. The nature of proceedings is different. In a prosecution an accused is sought to be punished for a past act. In preventive detention, the past act is merely the material for inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part of the detenu.

                  34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject are many. The decisions in Borjahan Gorey v. State of W.B. [Borjahan Gorey v. State of W.B., (1972) 2 SCC 550 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 888 : (1973) 1 SCR 751] , Ashim Kumar Ray v. State of W.B. [Ashim Kumar Ray v. State of W.B., (1973) 4 SCC 76 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 723] , Abdul Aziz v. District Magistrate, Burdwan [Abdul Aziz v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, (1973) 1 SCC 301 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 321 : AIR 1973 SC 770] and Debu Mahato v. State of W.B. [Debu Mahato v. State of W.B., (1974) 4 SCC 135 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 274] correctly lay down the principles to be followed as to whether a detention order is valid or not. The decision in Biram Chand v. State of U.P. [Biram Chand v. State of U.P., (1974) 4 SCC 573 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 609] , which is a Division Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. The principles which can be broadly stated are these. First, merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” (emphasis supplied)

                  In addition to the fact that the law is thus very clear and precise that pendency of criminal proceedings is not a bar against initiation of preventive detention action, we note that the sufficiency of bail conditions imposed on the detenu in the bail orders and whether it would deter the detenu from future offences had also engaged the attention of the authorities.

16. We note that the authorities have considered and concluded that the bail conditions imposed on the detenu at the time he was granted bail in the respective criminal cases were not sufficient to prevent the detenu from further involvement in criminal activities taking note of his antecedents and prior violation of bail conditions. The detenu had been granted bail by the Additional Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram, in Crl.M.P.No.1996 of 2021 in Crime No.1863 of 2021 of Chirayinkeezhu Police Station for offences punishable under Section 20(b) (ii) B, 2B and 29 of the NDPS Act as well as in Crl.M.P.No.1853 of 2021 of Chirayinkeezhu Police Station in Crime No.1782 of 2021 under Section 20(b) (ii) B, 2B and 29 of the NDPS Act. The detenu had, in violation of the bail conditions, again committed the crime registered in Varkala Police Station as Crime No.1361 of 2025. It has also been noted that the bail condition, which read that “the petitioner shall not get involved in any offence while on bail,” subject to which the bail had been granted had been breached by the petitioner by again getting involved in the Crime No.1361 of 2025 of the Varkala Police Station. A bail cancellation report had been submitted by the ISHO's Chirayinkeezhu Police Station before the Additional Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram and the said report had been under the consideration of the court. There were thus valid material and cogent reasons for the authorities to invoke Section 3(1) of the PIT NDPS Act against the detenu apprehending commission of further narcotic offences by him.

17. Considering the entirety of the fact and the conduct of the detenu and applying the law laid down in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another [(1991) 1 SCC 128], we are of the view that the triple test laid down therein has been squarely applicable in the instant case. The three test contemplated under the said decision are: Firstly, it is to be ascertained that the detenu is in custody. Secondly, it is to be satisfied that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is real possibility of the detenu being released on bail, and that on being released she would in all probability engage in more crimes and thirdly, if it is felt essential to detain him/her to prevent from so doing. As regards the case at hand, the record speaks for itself.

18. We also note that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the authorities as to whether preventive detention is essential is also well resonated, valid and legally subsisting. The involvement of the detenu in earlier offences/ antisocial activities and his association with others in trafficking huge quantities of methamphetamine from other states and Districts, and clandestinely operating and controlling the said activities, had been borne out from records. The fact that the initiation of normal preventive measures under Section 129 BNSS and opening of Rowdy History Sheet, proved to be insufficient to prevent him from indulging in further narcotic activities are valid considerations taken due note of by the authorities while issuing Exhibit P1 detention order. We note that the authorities had also taken into consideration the fact that the detainee had been involved in other 12 different crimes mostly in Chirayinkeezhu and Mangalapuram Police Stations. The said offences alleged against the detainee include those punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 302, 294B, 114, 307, 354D, 506(ii), 507, 509 IPC, Section 27 of the Arms Act and Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act. We hence find no illegality in Exhibits P1 and P2 orders in the count of lack of subjective or objective satisfaction. The report in the sealed cover shall be returned to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor forthwith.

W.P.(Crl.) is dismissed.