1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With consent of both the parties, matter is taken up for final disposal at the stage of admission.

2. The present Petition is arising out of the order dated 17/2/2020 passed by the Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur in Tenancy Revision No. Misc/TNC/AMR-14/2018, whereby the application for condonation of delay in filing the revision is rejected.

3. In the present matter, it would be relevant to refer certain facts of the Petition as under :

                   One Suryabhan Shravan Raut was a tenant of Respondent/Trust and cultivating the suit field bearing Survey No. 251, admeasuring 11.88 HR situated at Mouza Bhatkuli, District Amravati. The said Suryabhan Raut expired on 7/8/1973 and the present Petitioners are his legal heirs, who claimed to be in cultivation of the suit field as a tenant and are in possession of the same. The Respondent/Trust, in the month of April-2016 initiated the proceeding under Section 120(c) of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1958’ for the sake of brevity) bearing No. Tenancy/ 59(13)/ Bhatkuli-1/ Kholapur/ 09/2015-16. The Petitioners received the notice of the said proceeding, which is registered with the Sub Divisional Officer, Tiosa-Bhatkuli in the month of May-2016.

4. After receipt of the notice, the Petitioners appeared before the Sub Divisional Officer and requested to supply the copy of Application filed by the Respondent/Trust in the matter. Accordingly, same was supplied to the Petitioners. After filing the reply by the Petitioners, the proceeding was posted for evidence. At that time on 6/10/2017 the Respondent/Trust has moved the application, thereby seeking permission to verify the xerox documents from the original. So also filed the list of 15 documents before the learned Sub Divisional Officer, Bhatkuli. In the said list of documents, Respondent has filed the Exemption Certificate dated 22/4/1963 issued under Section 129(b) of the Act of 1958 by the Sub Divisional Officer, Amravati. According to the Petitioners, when this Certificate came on record, for the first time, they got knowledge that the Respondent/Trust is possessing the Certificate under Section 129(b) of the Act of 1958. Therefore, they immediately decided to challenge the same before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur.

5. The Petitioners, thereafter on 5/3/2018, filed the Revision Petition under Section 111 of the Act of 1958 before the Tribunal along with the application for condonation of delay. It is the submission of the Petitioners before the Tribunal that considering the date of knowledge of Certificate obtained by the Trust, the delay is required to be counted from the date of knowledge and not from the date of issuance of Certificate by the Authority in favour of the Respondent/Trust. So also states that to decide the Revision on its own merits, delay be condoned. The Petitioners along with the Revision and application for condonation of delay also moved the application for grant of stay to the proceeding under Section 120 (c) of the Act of 1958 pending before the Tahsildar.

6. The Respondent/Trust appeared before the Tribunal and filed their reply to the application for grant of stay. In the reply, Respondent/Trust has submitted that late Suryabhan Shravan Raut was well aware about the Exemption Certificate, which was obtained by the Trust. It is pointed out that late Suryabhan Raut, during his life time, has filed the proceeding for transfer of land in his favour by fixing reasonable price vide application bearing No.1649/59(13)/Bhatkuli/64-65 before the Tahsildar, Amravati in the year 1964. The said proceedings were contested by the Respondent/Trust. In the said proceeding late Suryabhan has admitted that the Trust is having the Exemption Certificate, and therefore, order came to be passed by the Tahsildar in the said matter on 3/4/1968, thereby rejecting the prayer of Suryabhan for transfer of land in his favour. In support of this submission, copy of the said proceeding was placed on record by the Respondent/Trust before the Tribunal.

7. The present Petitioners have strongly objected the proceedings which are referred and relied by the Respondent/Trust, by alleging that proceedings do not seem to be authentic, so also the signature of Suryabhan recorded therein is doubtful, and therefore, moved application (Exhibit-23) before the Tribunal for grant of permission to refer the documents for opinion of Handwriting Expert. According to the Petitioners, Kabulat Patta, which was filed on record by the Respondent/Trust bears the real signature of Suryabhan, and therefore, the Petitioners made a request that signature on the proceeding can be compared with the signature on Kabulayat Patta and refer to the Handwriting Expert. The Respondent/Trust has contested the said application by filing their reply. According to the Respondent/Trust, there is a gap of almost 13 to 15 years in between two documents, and therefore, reference of the said document to the Handwriting Expert will not be justified in the matter.

8. The learned Tribunal, without deciding the application for permission to refer the documents to Handwriting Expert, independently proceeded to decide the application for condonation of delay. The learned Tribunal by the impugned Judgment, by holding that the documents which are placed on record by the Respondent/Trust are not required to be referred to the Handwriting Expert, and the delay of 54 years and 256 days is being an inordinate delay, the Tribunal has rejected the application.

9. The Petitioners, who approached before this Court, raised a ground that the Exemption Certificate, which the Respondent/Trust has relied upon, no where shows that same bears any case number under which it was issued. It is further their submission that while issuing the said Certificate notice was not issued to the Petitioners or their forefathers and lastly it is their submission that the copies of proceedings, which are alleged to be filed by Suryabhan, are forged and fabricated documents, and therefore, thorough enquiry ought to have been conducted by the Tribunal by providing the opportunity to the Petitioners to refer the same to the Expert or at least to record the evidence to justify their contention.

10. The Respondent/Trust has opposed this Petition by filing their written submission before this Court. According to the Respondent/Trust, the first ground, which is raised by the Petitioners that the proceedings do not bear the case number, the Respondent has pointed out from the record and proceedings which were filed by the Respondent/Trust to obtain the Exemption Certificate under Section 129 (b) of the Act of 1958. From the said record, it is pointed out that the proceedings which were filed for getting Exemption Certificate bears the case number as 38/59(20)/Kholapur/59-60. Therefore, it is the contention of the Respondent/Trust that the first ground raised by the Petitioners does not survive.

11. Second ground, which is raised by the Petitioners, is that they were not issued notice of the proceedings filed by the Respondent/Trust while issuing the Exemption Certificate. In that regard, it is the specific submission of the Respondent that at the relevant time law, which was in existence, as laid down in the case of Shrimant Jagdeorao Anandrao Pawar V/s Kisan Namdeo Pawar and others, 1979 Mh. L. J. 687 was that while issuing the Exemption Certificate to the Trust, notice to the tenant is not required, as they have no independent right to challenge the said order. It would be relevant to refer paragraph No.3 of the Judgment in the case of Shrimant Jagdeorao Anandrao Pawar (cited supra), which reads thus :

                   “3. As far as the statutory character and the scheme of the provisions of section 88-B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 are concerned, there is the Division Bench authority of this Court in the case of Manekji Edulji Mistry v. Maneksha Aradeshir Irani', where the Court observed that the lands belonging to a trust falling under sub-section (1) (b) of section 88-B would be exempt from the operation of some of the provisions of the Act, provided such trust is or is deemed to be registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and the entire income of such lands is appropriated for the purposes of such trust. In a proceeding where a claim is set up to exemption by the trust, what is necessary is to satisfy these two requirements. Sub-section (2) of section 88-B of the Act indicates and embodies a rule of evidence, in that the certificate granted by the Collector after holding an inquiry is conclusive evidence with regard to the satisfaction of the two requirements. In an appeal from Manekji Edulji Mistry's case taken to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment, the Supreme Court Maneksha Ardeshir Irani v. Manekji Edulji Mistry has observed thus:-

                   "A contention was advanced on behalf of the appellant that the appellant was entitled to a notice when the Collector held an inquiry under section 88-B (2) of the Act for the purpose of granting a certificate to the respondent. The Collector under section 88-B (2) of the Act grants a certificate after holding an inquiry that the conditions in the proviso to section 88-B (1) are satisfied by any trust. The trust has to satisfy two conditions. First, the Trust is registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. Second, the entire income of the lands which are the property of the Trust is appropriated for the purposes of such Trust. The certificate granted by the Collector shall be conclusive evidence. The appellant raised this contention in the High Court that the appellant was entitled to a notice. The High Court did not accept the contention. The High Court held that the appellant at no stage denied the fact that the lands are the property of a Trust. The inquiry is between the Collector and the Trust. The conclusive evidence clause in the section means that it is a rule of evidence which would not render it necessary for it to prove again the compliance with the requirements."

                   (Italics supplied.)

                   The ratio of these observations on the submission that was made before the Supreme Court clearly indicates that in an inquiry under sub-section (2) of section 88-B notice is not a must and the issue arises between the Trust and the Collector. Certification proceeding, therefore, results in issue of a certificate which has been given the status of the conclusive proof under the statutory rule of evidence enacted by sub-section (2) and nothing more.”

12. The Respondent/Trust pointed out that first time this legal position was over ruled by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Keraba Dattu Borachate and others V/s Shri Sheshashai and Vishnu Trust, 1990 Mh.L.J. 1183. Hence, according to the Respondent/Trust, merely because the change in law, the Petitioners are not entitled to raise a ground that notices ought to have been issued to them while issuing the Exemption Certificate by the Collector under Section 129(b) of the Act of 1958.

13. In this regard, the Petitioners have relied upon the Judgment of Gauhati High Court in the case of M/s Topcem India V/s Union of India & Ors in Case No. WP(C)/2918/2020 along with connected Petitions, wherein the Gauhati High Court, in paragraph No.57, recorded the finding as under :

                   “57. From the Judgment of the Apex Court discussed above, it is evident that a “Judgment” decides the rights between the parties to a lis. Once a Court renders a judgment on the issues viz-a-viz the rights of the parties, such a judgment can only be re-visited by the established judicial norms, namely, a review or an appeal or revision in some cases. Unless, the findings of a Court arrived at by way of legal proceeding is sought to be reopened in the manner discussed above, the operative portions in the judgment viz-a-viz parties will attain finality. A subsequent change in law arrived at by a Court by way of the separate judicial proceeding, wherein the earlier law laid down has been held to be not a good law or that the earlier law will cease to have precedential value, will not ipso facto reverse the position of the party viz-a-viz their rights which were declared and concluded by way of an earlier judicial proceedings.”

                   In view of this legal position, it is the submission of the Petitioners that second ground of the Petitioners that notice ought to have been issued to the tenants or his legal heirs does not survive in the matter.

14. Now what is remained in the third issue, which is highly contested by both the parties before this Court is that, the Petitioners have raised serious objection about existence of the proceedings which are referred as Case No. 1649/59(13)/Bhatkuli/64-65 before the Tahsildar, Amravati. The Petitioners have pointed out the following discrepancies, which according to them, are apparent on the face of record :

                   (a) According to the Petitioners, the Respondent/Trust has stated in his reply before the Tribunal that late Suryakant has filed the proceeding under Section 48 of the Act and same was registered as Case No. 1649/59(30)/64-65/Bhatkuli. However, the perusal of this proceeding which Respondent has placed on record before the Tribunal shows that same were initiated suo mottu under Section 48 of the Act of 1958.

                   (b) According to the Petitioners, if the proceedings are initiated suo mottu, it was necessary to issue notice to both the parties in the matter. But the roznama of the proceeding shows that on 21/10/1967 it is only stated that notice be issued to Suryabhan Shravan Raut and matter was posted for 25/11/1967. On perusal of roznama dated 25/11/1967 it appears that the said roznama was recorded under the presumption that, “there is a confusion that Suryabhan Shravan Raut is owner of the suit field and since Suryabhan Shravan Raut is absent, then either the Trust is registered or Suryabhan is not having possession over the suit field”. It means that the Trust is registered Trust and Suryabhan is not having possession over the agricultural field, and therefore, the proceeding was closed. But, immediately within four days thereafter i.e. on 29/11/1967 the case was reopened and recorded in the roznama that Suryabhan is present and according to him, he is cultivating the field, and therefore, the intimation be given to the Panch of the Trust namely, Gulam Mustafa Mohammad, Kholapur. The Petitioners further pointed out that at one hand it is recorded that notice be issued to Gulam Mustafa Mohammad but his signature is appeared on the roznama of same date.

                   (c) It is alleged that the signatures, which are shown as the signatures of Suryabhan on roznama, are seriously disputed because the same are not appearing to be identical from the naked eyes, and therefore, validity of this proceeding requires to be examined in the matter.

                   (d) It is further pointed out that after the intimation was issued to the Panch of the Trust, the matter was adjourned for 26/12/1968, 30/1/1968, 5/3/1968 and 3/4/1968. On all these dates none appeared on behalf of the Respondent/Trust, but surprisingly on 3/4/1968 the Panch of the Trust namely, Gulam Mustafa Mohammad remained present and on the same day the proceedings are held to be closed on the ground that the Trust is possessing Exemption Certificate under Section 129(b) of the Act of 1958.

15. In the background of this submission of the Petitioners, I have perused the impugned Judgment passed by the learned Tribunal in the matter. It is admitted fact that the Tribunal did not pass any independent order on the specific application moved by the Petitioners vide Exhibit-23 to refer the documents for opinion of Handwriting Expert. So also the parties are not permitted to lead their evidence in support of their respective submission so that the Tribunal can reach to the logical conclusion. The Petitioners, through roznama of this proceeding, has pointed out to this Court that after filing of the proceeding, the matter was time and again adjourned and lastly it was heard on 10/2/2020 and the same was decided by order dated 17/2/2020.

16. The perusal of the Judgment further shows that there is no consideration of the abovesaid serious objections, which are raised by the Petitioners before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by holding that late Suryabhan Raut has attended the proceedings so also his son Bisen has put the signature on the proceeding, meaning thereby that, they are aware about the proceedings which were suo mottu initiated by the Tahsildar, and therefore, rejected the application for condonation of delay.

17. In the background of this factual position, it would be relevant to consider the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee V/s Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, by this Judgment, has summarised the principles laid down in various Judgments as to how the application for condonation of delay should be deal with and decided by the Authorities. It would be relevant to refer paragraph 21 of the Judgment which reads as under :

                   “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

                   21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

                   21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

                   21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

                   21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

                   21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

                   21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

                   21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

                   21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

                   21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

                   21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

                   21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

                   21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

                   21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.”

In the light of the facts and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, it is not in dispute that the Law of Limitation is founded on public policy. The same is a substantive law and has consequences on the right and obligation of a party, therefore, the principles, which are laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, needs to be adhered and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of the given case. It is also necessary that while dealing with such application, justice must be done to both the parties equally, so that end of justice can be achieved.

18. In the present matter, in my opinion, the learned Tribunal ought to have considered the serious objection, which was raised by the Petitioners on the proceeding which are decided by the Tahsildar by order dated 3/4/1968. The same is available on record from page 84 to 87. Page 84 shows that the said proceedings were initiated by Suryabhan Shravan Raut. However, page 85 shows that the proceedings are initiated suo mottu by the Tahsildar, Amravati. It is further revealed that on 25/11/1967, the proceedings were closed by the Authority by holding that as Suryabhan is not attending the proceeding and presumed that he is not having possession over the suit field. But surprisingly on 29/11/1967 the proceedings were reopened. It is further pertinent to note that on 25/11/1967 Suryabhan was not served, but within a span of four days on 29/11/1967 he was shown to be served and appeared before the Authority. It is further pertinent to note that the Authority has issued notice to the Panch namely, Gulam Mustafa Mohammad on 29/11/1967. Thereafter the matter was adjourned time and again and on all these dates notice was not served upon him, but surprisingly on 3/4/1968 the said Mustafa appeared and on the same day proceedings are disposed of.

19. As such, prima facie, this proceedings, which were initiated under the statutory provisions, creates a doubt. The learned Tribunal, therefore, ought to have verified the validity and legality of this proceeding before reaching to the conclusion in the matter. This is the vital document in the entire proceeding to demonstrate whether the Petitioner were aware of the proceeding or the record is manipulated by the concerned Authority. Hence, issue goes to the root of the case and needs reconsideration in the matter.

20. In the present case, the Petitioners are in possession of the agricultural land before the date of registration of the Trust. In my opinion, in a judicial proceeding, if serious objections are raised about manipulation of record and prima facie it is reflected on record, then thorough enquiry is necessary. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the impugned order dated 17/2/2020 passed by the learned Member of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur is liable to be quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal to decide the same afresh. Resultantly, following order is passed.

                   ORDER

                   1. Writ Petition is allowed.

                   2. The Judgment and Order dated 17/2/2020 passed by the Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur in Tenancy Revision No. Misc/TNC/AMR-14/2018 is hereby quashed and set aside.

                   3. The proceeding bearing Tenancy Revision No. Misc/TNC/AMR-14/2018 is hereby restored to the file of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur to decide afresh in accordance with the provisions of law.

21. Rule is made absolute in above terms. No order as to costs.

22. Since the Writ Petition is disposed of, pending Civil Application (CAW) No. 1350/2022 does not survive. The same stands disposed of accordingly.