Johnson John, J.

1. This writ petition is filed by the Union of India and its officials on 05.01.2026 challenging the order dated 22.11.2021 of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi in O.A. No. 212 of 2017.

2. Heard Sri. Vishnu, the learned Central Government Counsel for the writ petitioners and Sri. T.R. Jagadeesh, the learned counsel for the respondent.

3. The learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the petitioners argued that the Tribunal rejected the findings of the Release Medical Board and substituted its own conclusions to record a finding that the disability suffered by the respondent is attributable to and aggravated by military service and thereby, the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction

4. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the impugned order of the Tribunal is dated 22.11.2021 and the said order is already implemented and therefore, the present writ petition filed on 05.01.2026 after a lapse of 4 years, 1 month and 13 days is inordinately belated and the same cannot be entertained. It is also argued that the Release Medical Board has not given any reasons in support of the conclusion that the disability is neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service and that the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Rajumon T.M v. Union of India and others [(2025) SCC OnLine SC 1064] would show that when the serviceman is discharged from service and denied the disability pension on the basis of a medical opinion which is devoid of reasons, it would strike at the root of the action taken by the authority and such action cannot be sustained in law.

5. In the writ petition, it is stated that after the order of the Tribunal, steps were taken to challenge the order of the Tribunal before the Honourable Supreme Court and while the same was under process, the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Parashotam Dass reported in MANU/SC/0285/2023 held that there is no restriction on the exercise of power under Article 226 of Constitution of India by the High Court and therefore, it was decided to prefer this writ petition. Apart from the above averments in paragraph 20 of the writ petition, no other reason is highlighted to justify the delay in filing the writ petition.

6. It is true that there is no strict statutory period of limitation for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But, it is well settled that the parties have to approach the court within a reasonable period. Since the exercise of courts’ powers are entirely discretionary, it is for the court to decide, whether, in the peculiar facts and circumstances, it is justifiable to entertain the writ petition irrespective of the delay. In Rajumon T.M (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court held that when there is denial of fundamental right or jurisdictional error or error apparent on the face of record, the High Court can interfere by exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that self-restraint by High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is distinct from putting embargo on High court in exercising such jurisdiction.

7. There is a specific provision in the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (‘Act, 2007' for short) for filing appeal against the order of the Tribunal. Section 30 of the Act, 2007 reads thus:

                  “30. Appeal to Supreme Court.—(1) Subject to the provisions of section 31, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court against the final decision or order of the Tribunal (other than an order passed under section 19):

                  Provided that such appeal is preferred within a period of ninety days of the said decision or order:

                  Provided further that there shall be no appeal against an interlocutory order of the Tribunal.

                  (2) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court as of right from any order or decision of the Tribunal in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt:

                  Provided that an appeal under this sub-section shall be filed in the Supreme Court within sixty days from the date of the order appealed against.

                  (3) Pending any appeal under sub-section (2), the Supreme Court may order that—

                  (a) the execution of the punishment or the order appealed against be suspended; or

                  (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail:

                  Provided that where an appellant satisfies the Tribunal that he intends to prefer an appeal, the Tribunal may also exercise any of the powers conferred under clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be.”

8. Admittedly, in this case, the petitioners have not filed any appeal within ninety days as provided under Section 30 of the Act, 2007 In this case, the writ petition is filed after a lapse of 4 years, 1 month and 13 days from the date of the impugned order of the Tribunal. It is the specific case of the respondent that the order under challenge is already implemented and therefore, the petitioners cannot re-agitate an issue finally decided by a competent forum and attained finality, by filing an inordinately belated writ petition. We have no doubt that entertaining a writ petition challenging an order which has attained finality would be contrary to public policy that it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation.

9. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in filing the present writ petition, the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium would apply and therefore, we are of the opinion that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

In the result, the writ petition is dismissed.