1. The Petitioners have filed this Writ Petition challenging Ext.P4 Common Order passed by the Labour Court, Kollam, dismissing Claim Petitions Nos.32/1995 and 29/2000 under Section 33- C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ID Act’).

2. The Petitioners are the legal heirs of Sri. P.M. Varghese who was the Workman of the Respondent No.2/Estate of Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. He was dismissed from service w.e.f. 30.07.1988 by the Respondent No.2. The Workman raised I.D. No. 31/1989 and the same was adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal, Kollam, and the Industrial Tribunal, Kollam, passed Ext.P1 Award dated 28.04.1990 directing the Respondent No.2/Management to reinstate the Workman as tapper in the service of the Respondent No.2/Management without back wages and other benefits but with continuity of service. Ext.P1 Award was published on 08.05.1990. The Workman filed C.P. Nos.32/1995 and 29/2000 claiming wages, bonus, leave wages and compensation for losses and hardship and interest totalling Rs.1,25,416/- and Rs.1,60,802/- respectively. C.P.No.32/1995 was for the period from 03.06.1992 to 31.05.1995 and C.P.No.29/2000 was for the period from 01.01.1996 to 31.03.2000. The said Claim Petitions were filed alleging that the Respondent No.2 refused to reinstate the Workman in compliance with Ext.P1 Award. The said Claim Petitions were dismissed by the Labour Court, Kollam, as per Ext.P2 Common Order dated 22.11.2004. This Court set aside Ext.P2 Common Order as per Ext.P3 judgment in W.P.(C) No.8401/2005 filed by the Workman, holding that the Labour Court did not consider the points raised by the Workman. During the pendency of W.P.(C) No.8401/2005, the Workman died on 04.10.2007 and the Petitioners were impleaded as the additional Petitioners in W.P.(C) No.8401/2005. The Petitioners were also impleaded in the aforesaid two Claim Petitions as Addl.Petitioners. The Labour Court by Ext.P4 Common Order dismissed both the Claim Petitions holding that there is no evidence to prove the contention of the Workman that, immediately after his release from jail in May 1991, he approached Respondent No.2 with a request to take him back in service in compliance with the direction in Ext.P1 Award and that the Workman offered his readiness to join the service of the Management through his Union after about three years when only a few months remained for his superannuation. Thereupon, the Petitioners have filed the present Writ Petition challenging the Ext.P4 Common Order.

3. I heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, Sri.P.S.Gireesh, and the learned Counsel for the Respondent No.2/Management, Sri. Jai Mohan. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that Ext.P1 Award was published on 08.05.1990. Admittedly, the Workman was in jail till May 1991. The Workman submitted a Request for reinstatement in compliance with the direction in Ext.P1 Award immediately after his release from jail in May 1991. Even assuming that the Workman had not sent any request to the Management, the Management is under an obligation to issue Communication to the Workman offering the reinstatement. Even though the Management sent a Letter dated 10.01.1991, admittedly, the same was returned unserved on the Workman. At any rate, since the Workman was illegally kept out of service by the Management refusing to comply with the direction in Ext.P1 Award, the Workman is entitled to get the wages and other benefits eligible to the Workman for the period during which the Workman was kept out of service. Such wages and other benefits would come within the meaning of the benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money entitled to the Workman under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. Learned Counsel relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan [AIR 1964 SC 743] to substantiate the point that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the Workman has the right to receive any benefit on the basis of an Award or Settlement under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. Admittedly, the Union sent a Letter dated 10.02.1994 to the Management to reinstate the Workman, and hence, at any rate, the Management is liable to pay the wages and other benefits starting from the said day. The learned Counsel relied on the Division Bench decision of this Court in Annamma Thomas v. T. Joseph [1984 KLT 545] in which it is held that the relief of future wages from the date on which the Workman submitted the claim for reinstatement cannot be denied. The learned Counsel relied on the decision of this Court in Co-operative Sugars Ltd. v. Noorudeen [2002 (2) KLT SN 6 (Case No.6)] to substantiate the point that if the Management denies or delays the reinstatement in spite of request either from the Union or from the Workman, then the Workman is entitled for full wages and other benefits from that stage and that once there is a demand for reinstatement and there is an offer for reinstatement in case a Workman does not turn up for duty for no justifiable reason, he cannot claim any wages, let alone the differential wages. Since the Workman had been in jail until May 1991, the Workman had a justifiable reason for not turning up for duty. The learned Counsel concluded his arguments by praying to set aside Ext.P4 Order and to allow both the Claim Petitions filed by the Workman.

4. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the Respondent No.2/Management contended that the decision relied on by the Petitioners in Annamma Thomas (supra) is clearly distinguishable. In the said decision, there is a clear finding of the Labour Court that the intimation given by the Workman cannot be held to be unreasonably belated for the reason that the employer had challenged the validity of the award before this Court and it cannot be said that it is unreasonable on the part of the Workman to have waited until the award had become final. In the present case, the Ext.P1 Award was published on 08.05.1990. Even though the Workman claimed that he submitted a Request for reinstatement immediately after his release from jail in May 1991, there is no evidence to prove this. On the other hand, Management issued a Letter dated 10.01.1991 to the address of the Workman available with the Management requesting the Workman to join duty on the basis of Ext.P1 Award and the same was left unserved only due to the fault of the Workman. The Request for reinstatement was submitted through the Union only on 10.02.1994. The Request dated 10.02.1994 submitted by the Workman through the Union was not for reinstatement to the post of Tapper from which he was dismissed. The said Request was for reinstating the Workman as a Tapal Peon on the ground that the Workman was not in a position to do tapping work due to his vision problem. Hence, the Request dated 10.02.1994 could not be treated as a request for reinstatement in compliance with Ext.P1 Award. Learned Counsel relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Others [2013 (10) SCC 324] and Central Bank of India and Others v. Dragendra Singh Jadon [(2022) 8 SCC 378] and the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Sudhakar Baburao Bodke v. State of Maharashtra and Others [(1990) 2 LLN 454] to explain the meaning of ‘reinstatement’. Learned Counsel on the strength of the said decisions contended that reinstatement means to place an employee in the same position as before and to restore him to his previous position as if his services had not been terminated. Hence, the Request dated 10.02.1994 submitted by Workman could not be termed as a Request for reinstatement to the post of Tapper in compliance with Ext.P1 Award. Learned Counsel relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Voltas Ltd. v. J.M. Demello and Another [(1971) 2 SCC 479] and State of U.P. and Another v. Brijpal Singh [(2005) 8 SCC 58] to enlighten the scope of jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. Learned Counsel relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others v. Giridhari Sahu and Others [(2019) 10 SCC 695] to explain the scope of judicial review against the Order of the Labour Court. Learned Counsel concluded his arguments praying to dismiss the Writ Petition.

5. I have considered the rival contentions and perused the relevant records.

6. Ext.P1 Award directs reinstatement of the Workman as Tapper in the service of the Management without back wages and other benefits, but with the continuity of service. If the Management had refused to reinstate the Workman in service, definitely the Workman is entitled for the wages and other benefits during the period in which he was illegally kept out of service. Such amounts due to the Workman is a benefit which is entitled to the Workman from the employer which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed is to be decided by the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. In the case on hand, if the Workman had proved that the Management had denied reinstatement in spite of his request for the same, the Workman is entitled for the wages for the period during which he was kept out of service. No reinstatement took place. It is clear from Ext.P4 Order that the date of superannuation of the Workman was within a few months after the Request for reinstatement dated 10.02.1994 was submitted by the Workman to the Management through the Union. Even though the claim of the Workman is that on account of his imprisonment, he was justified in not seeking reinstatement till the date of his release in May 1991, there is no evidence to prove that the Workman had submitted a Request for reinstatement within a reasonable time after his release from jail in May 1991. There is no reference to any such Request in the Letter dated 10.02.1994 submitted by the Union. On the other hand, the Management had issued Letter dated 10.01.1991 requesting the Workman to rejoin duty, at the address of the Workman available with the Management. As per the evidence on record, the Workman submitted a Request for reinstatement only on 10.02.1994 which is more than three years after the date of publication of Ext.P1 Award. There is an unreasonable delay on the part of the Workman to seek reinstatement in service on the basis of Ext.P1 Award. In Annamma Thomas (supra) relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, this Court found that the delay therein is justified since the Management had challenged the validity of the award before this Court and it cannot be said that it is unreasonable on the part of the employee to have waited until the Award has become final. No such justification from the part of the Workman is available in the case on hand. Even assuming that the Workman is entitled to get the wages and the benefits from 10.02.1994, he was entitled to get the benefits only up to the date of his superannuation. The date of superannuation is not borne out of any record. Even though it is found by the Labour Court in Ext.P4 that there are only a few months remaining for the superannuation of the Workman after the submission of the Request dated 10.02.1994, the said finding of the Labour Court is not challenged by the Petitioners in this Writ Petition. In such case, it is to be found that the superannuation date of the Workman was within a couple of months after the submission of the Request for reinstatement on 10.02.1994.

7. The next question is whether the Request dated 10.02.1994 is a request for reinstatement. Admittedly, the Workman had been working in the post of Tapper when he was dismissed. The direction in Ext.P1 Award is to reinstate the Workman as Tapper. The Workman sought for reinstatement as a Tapal Peon in the Request dated 10.02.1994. Hence, the Request dated 10.02.1994 was not for reinstatement in accordance with Ext.P1 Award. It is apposite to extract Paragraph No.21 and the relevant portion of Paragraph No.22 of Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra) hereunder.

                  “21. The word “reinstatement” has not been defined in the Act and the Rules. As per Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 2, 3rd Edn., the word “reinstate” means to reinstall or re-establish (a person or thing in a place, station, condition, etc.); to restore to its proper or original state; to reinstate afresh and the word “reinstatement” means the action of reinstating; re-establishment. As per Law Lexicon, 2nd Edn., the word “reinstate” means to reinstall; to re-establish; to place again in a former state, condition or office; to restore to a state or position from which the object or person had been removed and the word “reinstatement” means establishing in former condition, position or authority (as) reinstatement of a deposed prince. As per Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the word “reinstate” means to place again (as in possession or in a former position), to restore to a previous effective state. As per Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn., “reinstatement” means: “to reinstall, to re-establish, to place again in a former state, condition, or office; to restore to a state or position from which the object or person had been removed.”

22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer……”

8. In Dragendra Singh Jadon (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that reinstatement means to return a person or thing to its previous position or status and that an order of reinstatement puts a person back to the same position. The Hon'ble Supreme Court concurred with the findings of the Single Bench and Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh holding that the legal meaning attributed to word "reinstatement" is beyond any cavil of doubt as by catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and various High Courts, word "reinstatement" has been unequivocally explained to the effect that once the Authority or Court orders for reinstatement of an employee, then the position of that employee is restored back to the date on which he was removed from services.

9. In Sudhakar Baburao Bodke (supra), the Bombay High Court held that reinstatement means putting a particular person in law and in fact to the same position as he had occupied earlier before his services were terminated by the employer because to reinstate a man means to place him in the position from which he was dismissed so as to render the status quo ante the dismissal. In view of the proposition of law laid down in these decisions also, I am fully justified in holding that the Request of the Workman dated 10.02.1994 was not for reinstatement in compliance with Ext.P1 Award.

10. Finally, in the decision in Giridhari Sahu (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Writ of Certiorari is intended to correct jurisdictional excesses and the Writ Court cannot sit as appellate court and re-appreciate evidence; that erroneous decisions which falls within the authority of Tribunal does not entitle writ applicant to seek for a Writ of Certiorari. It is further held that as far as the finding of fact which is one within the jurisdiction of the court, it is ordinarily a matter 'off bounds' for the Writ Court; that this is for the reason that a body which has jurisdiction to decide the matter has the jurisdiction to decide it correctly or wrongly; that it would become a mere error and that too an error of fact; that however, gross it may amount to, it does not amount to an error of law; that an error of law which becomes vulnerable to judicial scrutiny by way of Certiorari must also be one which is apparent on the face of the record; that as to what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, is a matter to be decided by the court on the facts of each case; that a finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence would be perverse and in fact would constitute an error of law enabling the Writ Court to interfere; that it is also to be noticed that if the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support the finding, it would render the decision amendable to certiorari jurisdiction; and that this would be the same as a finding which is wholly unwarranted by the evidence.

11. In view of the above discussion, I find that there is no perversity or error of law in the Ext.P4 Common Order. There is nothing to interfere with Ext.P4 Common Order passed by the Labour Court. Accordingly, this Writ Petition fails and the same is dismissed.