1. By this petition, the petitioners-tenants seek review of the order dated 7th August, 2025 passed by this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 596 of 2017, thereby dismissing the revision application against a judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Mumbai, in Appeal No. 474 of 2008, whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by Respondent No. 1 - landlord against the judgment and decree in R.A.E. & R. Suit No. 395/811 of 1994, dated 2nd May, 2008 came to be allowed and a decree of eviction was passed against the defendants – tenants.

2. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the parties are hereinafter referred to in the capacity in which they were arrayed before the Trial Court.

3. Defendant No. 1 firm is the tenant of the premises comprising one big room; facing the road, and five rooms situated at the rear side of the second floor of the building known as Guzdar House, situated at 529-A, Jagannath Shankar Seth Marg, Mumbai ("the suit premises"). Plaintiff No. 1 had instituted a suit for eviction against Defendant No. 1 and the co-defendants on multiple statutory grounds, under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (“the Bombay Rent Act”).

4. The trial Judge dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes at Mumbai was persuaded to reverse the findings of the trial Judge. The Appellate Bench held that, Defendant No. 1 has unlawfully sublet the suit premises initially to Defendant No. 3 and, later on, to Defendants Nos. 5 and 6 and a host of persons or entities. Consequently, Defendant No. 1 firm had not been using the suit premises for the purpose for which it was let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the institution of the suit, without a reasonable cause. The Appellate Bench also found that the defendants committed acts contrary to the provisions of Clause (o) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

5. Being aggrieved, Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 had preferred Civil Revision Application No. 596 of 2017. By an order dated 7th August, 2025, this Court found no reason to interfere with the decree passed by the Appellate Bench. This Court observed, inter alia, as under:

                   “6. The endeavour of Mr. Godbole to persuade the Court to hold that the reversing judgment of the Appellate Bench requires consideration, does not merit acceptance. The facts are both incontrovertible and hard. Indisputably, the suit premises was let to defendant No.1 – firm. The Appellate Court found that there was not an iota of material to show that defendant No.1 – firm was carrying on any business whatsoever in the suit premises, during the relevant period. Secondly, defendant No.3, who claimed to be the daughter of one of the deceased partners of defendant No.1, was incontestibly in the occupation of the suit premises from the year 1984 to 1991/1992. Defendant No.3 had also tendered the rent. Thirdly, it is not the case that after the demise of the father of defendant No.3, who was a partner of defendant No.1 – firm, the firm was reconstituted and defendant No.3 was inducted as a partner in the firm. Fourthly, the defendants claim, defendant Nos.5 and 6 were using the suit premises for residence, as the employees of defendant No.1. However, it eventually transpired that the legal heirs of defendant Nos.5 and 6 were in the occupation of the suit premises. Moreover, the business which defendant Nos.5 and 6 were conducting was not shown to be for and on behalf of defendant No.1 – firm. Fifthly, apart from defendant Nos.3, 5 and 6, a number of other entities and persons were found to be in the occupation of the portions of the suit premises at varying points of time.

                   7. In the face of such evidence, which stares in the face, the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes was fully justified in reversing the decree passed by the Trial Court, which had not properly appreciated the onus of proof that lay on the parties, once it was shown that defendant No.1 was not carrying on the business from the suit premises and other persons were using the suit premises not only for residence but also for commercial purposes. Therefore, both the grounds of unlawful subletting and the consequent non-user by defendant No.1 of the suit premises for the purpose for which it was let were proved beyond the pale of controversy. The Appellate Bench of Court of Small Causes, thus, committed no error in passing the impugned decree.”

6. The defendants-applicants in the Civil Revision Application have preferred the instant petition seeking review of the aforesaid order on the ground that, after the passing of the aforesaid order, the defendants came to know from Mr. Daswani, another tenant of Gazdar House, that the plaintiffs had suppressed material documents which show that, prior to the filing of the eviction suit, Plaintiff No. 1 firm was not the owner or the landlord of the suit premises and, therefore, the very suit for eviction at the instance of Plaintiff No. 1 was not maintainable.

7. The defendants claim that, upon inspection of the papers and proceedings in Criminal Writ Petition (Stamp) No. 8263 of 2023, filed by the said Mr. Daswani, it transpired that there were Indenture of Assignment dated 18th January, 1990, 14th July, 1993 and 21st June, 1995, which clearly indicate that Plaintiff No. 1 was not and could not have claimed to be the landlord of the suit premises and, thus, the Court of Small Causes lacked inherent jurisdiction. By the year 1993, Plaintiff No. 1 had lost whatever rights it had to receive rent and/or otherwise deal with the suit premises. Thus, the order dated 7th August, 2025 in Civil Revision Application No. 596 of 2017 deserves to be reviewed and recalled and the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes in Appeal No. 474 of 2008 deserves to be quashed and set aside. In the alternative, the appeal be remanded back to the Appellate Bench for a fresh decision upon consideration of the new documents.

8. An affidavit-in-reply has been filed on behalf of Respondent No. 1-Plaintiff No. 1. The substance of the resistance put-forth on behalf of Plaintiff No. 1 is that, under the Articles of Agreement dated 18th April, 1946, the original lessees had granted a sublease in favour of Kishinchand Chellaram for a term of five years commencing from 1st August, 1945. The said Mr. Kishinchand Chellaram formed the partnership firm M/s. Kishinchand Chellaram and the original lessees executed another Articles of Agreement dated 14th July, 1951 and thereby granted sublease in favour of M/s. Kishinchand Chellaram, Plaintiff No. 1, for a term of five years commencing from 1st August, 1950. Under another Articles of Agreement dated 5th October, 1955, the original lessees executed in favour of the partners of M/s. Kishinchand Chellaram a sublease for a term of five years commencing from 1st August, 1955.

9. Thus, upon the expiry of the term of the sublease under the Articles of Agreement dated 5th October 1955, the sub-lessee became the monthly tenant of the premises. Neither the original lessees nor their successors-in-interest have terminated the leasehold rights of Plaintiff No. 1 firm and, thus, Plaintiff No. 1 firm continues to be the sub-lessee in respect of the upper four floors and the rear portion of the ground floor of Gazdar House. Under the indentures referred to by the defendants, the transferees therein have stepped into the shoes of the original lessees. However, M/s. Kishinchand Chellaram, Plaintiff No. 1, continued to remain the sub-lessee and retain its rights as a sub-lessee over the rear portion of the ground floor and the four upper floors of the suit properties.

10. It was further contended that, for more than 75 years, the suit property has been managed, rent collected, receipts issued, surrender of tenancies accepted, and new tenancies created by Plaintiff No. 1 firm, who is covered by the definition of the term "landlord" under the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, as well as the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. Thus, no case for review of the order dated 7th August, 2025 in Civil Revision Application No. 596 of 2017 is made out.

11. I have heard Mr. Girish Godbole, the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners-defendants, and Mr. Aniruddha Sapre, the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1-Plaintiff No. 1.

12. Mr. Godbole submitted that the discovery of the new material demolishes the very foundation of Plaintiff No. 1's claim of being the landlord of the suit premises. Thus, the admission of jural relationship between Plaintiff No. 1 and Defendant No. 1 unbeknowest of these documents is of no significance. Taking the Court through the Indenture of Assignment dated 18th January, 1990, whereunder the trustees of the estate of the original lessees had assigned their leasehold interest in Gazdar House to Kamal Chellaram and Pishu Chellaram, and the Indenture of Assignment dated 14th July, 1993, executed between Kamal Chellaram, as the assignor, Pishu Chellaram, as the confirming party, and Lokumal Kishanchand Exports Private Limited, the assignee, whereunder Kamal Chellaram assigned the rights in ½ ground floor, the whole second floor, which included the suit premises, and the whole third floor to Lokumal Kishanchand Exports Private Limited, the assignee, together with right to receive rent, compensation from the tenants/occupants of the aforesaid premises, including the suit premises, Mr. Godbole submitted that, with effect from 14th July, 1993, Plaintiff No. 1 lost whatever rights it had in regard to the suit premises.

13. Mr. Godbole would further submit that, the Indenture of Assignment dated 21st June, 1995 makes the position crystal clear. Under the said Indenture of Assignment dated 21st June, 1995, Pishu Chellaram, the assignor, assigned the rights in the remaining ½ ground floor, first floor and fourth floor to Chelco Trading Private Limited, the assignee, with an explicit recital that the said assignment was subject to the monthly tenancy in favour of M/s. Kishinchand Chellaram, Plaintiff No. 1, for the first and fourth floor and the ground floor. Mr. Godbole would urge the Indenture of Assignment dated 21st June, 1995, thus, makes it abundantly clear that Respondent No. 1 only had rights in respect of ½ ground floor, first floor and fourth floor of Gazdar House and it did not have any right in respect of the suit premises with effect from 14th July, 1993. Yet, by brazenly suppressing the aforesaid documents, Plaintiff No. 1 instituted the suit in the capacity of the landlord of the suit premises. Thus, according to Mr. Godbole, the order dated 7th August, 2025 is required to be reviewed.

14. To lend support to the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Godbole placed reliance on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Chandrashekhar Narayan Tambe vs. Dhondusa Sitaram Pawar(2003(1) Mh.L.J. 689.), wherein it was enunciated that, if it emerges from the record that the respondent was neither the owner of the premises nor entitled to receive rent or had authority to receive rent in respect of the demised premises at the time when the action was instituted, he could be labeled as "landlord" even within the wide meaning of Section 5(3) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, and, consequently, the suit instituted by the respondent could not have been proceeded with by the Rent Court under Section 28 of the Act, which has jurisdiction only to adjudicate matters between the landlord and tenant.

15. Mr. Sapre, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1, countered the submissions on behalf of the petitioners. At the outset, it was submitted that, having obtained the time to vacate the suit premises by volunteering to file an undertaking before the Court, the defendants petition for review of the said order cannot be said to be bona fide.

16. On the merits of the matter, Mr. Sapre submitted that, the review petition is based on incomplete and half-baked facts. Since Defendant No. 1 had not disputed the landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, Plaintiff No. 1 was never called upon to place documents on record to substantiate its claim that it was the landlord in respect of the suit premises. And, therefore, the contention that there was suppression of facts is wholly untenable.

17. In any event, Mr. Sapre would urge, the three Articles of Agreement dated 18th April, 1946, 14th July, 1951 and 5th October, 1955 clearly establish that, Plaintiff No. 1 firm became the sub-lessee of the rear portion of the ground floor and the upper four floors of Gazdar House and the said sublease continued despite the assignment of the leasehold rights of the original lessee. The endeavour on the part of the defendants to selectively read the subsequent Indentures of Assignment in a desperate attempt to avoid eviction, therefore, cannot furnish a sustainable ground to review the order dated 7th August, 2025.

18. To begin with the scope of the power of the Court to review its decision. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, empowers the Court to review its judgment or order upon a petition by a person who considers himself to be aggrieved by such judgment or order. It reads as under:

                   “114. Review – Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved-

                   (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

                   (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or

                   (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

                   may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.”

19. Order XLVII of the Code, 1908 prescribes the grounds on which a review of the judgment or order can be sought. Rule 1 of Order XLVII reads as under :

                   “1. Application for review of judgment. - (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved, -

                   (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

                   (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

                   (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

                   and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.”

20. A conjoint reading of the provisions contained in section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1, would indicate that the power to review the judgment or order can be exercised if the conditions prescribed as to the locus of the person seeking review and the stage and mode of invocation are satisfied, on any of the following grounds :

                   (i) discovery of new matter or evidence;

                   (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

                   (iii) any other sufficient reason.

21. The legal position has crystalized to the effect that the existence of the power to review is one thing and justifiability of its exercise is an altogether different matter. Review cannot be sought merely for the purpose of re-hearing and a fresh decision of the case. Judgment or order pronounced by the Court is final. Its legality and correctness can of course be assailed in an appropriate appeal or revisional proceeding, wherever permissible in law. Though the Code empowers the Court to review its judgment and order, it is beyond cavil that a review proceeding cannot be placed on the same pedestal as the original proceeding, and the finality of the judgment cannot be reconsidered, except in cases where the review is warranted on the grounds enumerated in Order XLVII Rule 1.

22. Broadly stated, the scope of review is extremely limited. The review is not an appeal in disguise. Review would be justified where it could be demonstrated that there was a glaring omission, patent mistake or grave error resulting in miscarriage of justice.

23. A useful reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh(1963 SCC Online SC 94) wherein it was enunciated that there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by “error apparent”. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise where an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. If one could point out to the error without an elaborate arguments and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out.

24. In the case of Kamlesh Verma V/s. Mayawati and Ors.(), the Supreme Court further enunciated that an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior Court to correct all errors committed by the Court below. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

25. In the case of Shanti Conductors Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Assam State Electricity Board and Ors.( (2020) 2 SCC 677), a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court again exposited the scope of review in the following words :

                   “25. …… The scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions, which have already been addressed and decided. The scope of review has been reiterated by this court from time to time. It is sufficient to refer to the judgment of this Court in Parison Devi V/s. Sumitri Devi((1997) 8 SCC 715), wherein in para 9 of the following has been laid down : (SCCp. 719)

                   “9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.” A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.

26. In the case at hand, the fulcrum of the Petitioners case for review is that the Indentures of Assignment dated 18 January 1990, 14 July 1993 and 21 June 1995; which were discovered subsequent to the passing of the order dated 7 August 2025 in CRA No.596 of 2017, cumulatively reveal that, prior to the institution of the suit for eviction i.e. RAE & R Suit No.395/811 of 1994, Plaintiff No.1 was not the owner or landlord of the suit premises; Plaintiff No.1 had suppressed the said fact and, thus, the very institution of the suit for eviction before the Court of Small Causes, Mumbai, and the consequent decree for eviction passed by the Appellate Bench were non-est in the eye of law.

27. Evidently, the Defendants seek review of the order dated 7 August 2025 on the ground of discovery of new matter and evidence, which according to the Defendants, renders the order dated 7 August 2025 and the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Bench in Appeal No.474 of 2008 legally unsustainable.

28. Where a party seeks review on the ground of discovery of new matter and evidence, it is incumbent upon such a party to demonstrate that :

                   (1) the said matter or evidence was actually available on the date the court passed the order sought to be reviewed;

                   (2) that such party, despite reasonable care and due diligence, could not bring such matter or evidence before the Court at the time the said order was passed;

                   (3) the matter or evidence so discovered is relevant and bears upon the decision of the case; and

                   (4) that the absence of such material / evidence has resulted in mis-carriage of justice, in as much as, had such material and evidence been produced and considered by the Court, the Court would not have passed the order sought to be reviewed and the outcome would have been different.

29. On the aforesaid touchstone, reverting to the facts of the case, the first condition of the existence as such of the Indentures of Assignments dated 18 January 1990, 14 July 1993 and 21 June 1995, on the date this Court passed an order dated 7 August 2025, cannot be controverted. Plaintiff No.1 did not dispute the existence, or for that matter, the contents of the aforesaid Indentures of Assignment. The bold case of Plaintiff No.1 was that, notwithstanding the Indentures of Assignment, on account of the antecedent instruments under which sub-lease came to be created in favour of Plaintiff No.1, interest of Plaintiff No.1 as a sub-lessee subsisted and the Indentures of Assignments under which the original lessee transferred the leasehold rights did not impinge upon the said interest of Plaintiff No.1.

30. On the aspect of the inability of the Defendants to produce Indentures of Assignments on the record of the Court before passing of the order dated 7 August 2025 in CRA No.596 of 2017, despite reasonable care and due diligence, the only explanation sought to be offered on behalf of the Defenants was that the Defendants came to know about the existence of the said documents upon making enquiries with Mr. Daswani, another tenant, who had filed Writ Petition (ST) No.8263 of 2023. In substance, the Defendants claim that they were unaware of the existence of those Indentures of Assignments.

31. Whether this explanation deserves acceptance unreservedly ? First and foremost, it is necessary to note that the Defendants never disputed the jural relationship between the parties. From the perusal of the pleadings, it becomes explicitly clear that when the tenancy in favour of Defendants No.1 first commenced, the Plaintiff No.1 was the landlord. At no point the Defendants disputed the fact that the Plaintiff No.1 was the landlord of the suit premises. Secondly, the court cannot lose sight of the fact that, not only the above referred Indentures of Assignment, but even the instruments dated 18 April 1946, 14 July 1951 and 5 October 1955, under which Plaintiff No.1 was purportedly granted sub-lease by the original lessees, were all registered instruments.

32. In that view of the matter, the aspect of constructive notice to the Defendants in the wake of the registration of the instruments comes to the fore. In view of the provisions contained in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for willful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. The Explanation to section 3 provides that, where any transaction relating to immovable property is required to be evidenced by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of it, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration if the conditions stipulated in the proviso to the Explanation 1 are satisfied.

33. Thus, by a deeming fiction, notice is imputed to a party if he willfully abstains from enquiring or causing search which a person would otherwise make, or is guilty of gross negligence. In the case of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad V/s. Haji Abdulgafur Haji Hussenbhai(1971(1) SCC 757), the Supreme Court enunciated that the presumption of notice is commonly known as constructive notice. Though originating in equity this presumption of notice is now a part of our statute and we have to interpret it as such. Wilful abstention suggests conscious or deliberate abstention and gross negligence is indicative of a higher degree of neglect.

34. In the case of Beena Murlidhar Hemdev and Ors. V/s. Kanhaiyalal Lokram Hemdev and Ors.( (1999) 5 SCC 222), the Supreme Court enunciated that, when the deed is registered it is deemed to be a notice to the concerned party (the builder) in view of Section 3 of the TP Act, 1888. Once notice is there, actual as well as constructive, the plea of bona fide purchaser without notice of rights of affected party, cannot be countenanced.

35. In the cases of Dahiben V/s. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (gajra) dead and Ors.( (2020) 7 SCC 366) and Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. V/s. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Anr.( 2024 SCC Online SC 3844) also the notice was imputed on the basis of the registered instruments.

36. Thus, the claim of the Petitioners that they learnt about the instruments in question only after the dismissal of the Civil Revision Application No.596 of 2017 and were unaware of those instruments, cannot be readily acceded to. Nonetheless, the Court considers it appropriate to delve into the merits of the claim for review.

37. As noted above, the thrust of the submission of Mr. Godbole was that, the recitals in the Indenture of Assignment dated 14 July 1993 make it explicitly clear that Kamal Chellaram had assigned his rights in ½ ground floor, whole of 2nd floor (which included the suit premises) and whole of 3rd floor of Guzdar Building to Lokumal Kishinchand Exports Pvt. Ltd., along with a right to receive rent, compensation from the tenants / occupants of the aforesaid premises. In contrast, in the Indenture of Assignment dated 21 June 1995, whereunder Pishu Tahilram Chellaram, the assignor, professed to assign his interest in balance ½ ground floor, first floor and 4th floor to Chelco Trading Pvt. Ltd., the monthly tenancy in favour of M/s. Kishinchand Chellaram (R1) for first and 4th floors and the ground floor, was saved. Thus, with the Indenture of Assignment dated 14 July 1993, whatever rights Respondent No.1 purportedly claimed in the suit premises ceased to exist.

38. To appreciate the aforesaid submission in a correct perspective, it may be apposite to extract the relevant part of the demise under the Indenture of Assignment dated 21 June 1995 in favour of Chelco Trading Pvt. Ltd. Clauses (d) and (e), inter alia, read as under :

                   “(d) Under the said Deed of Assignment dated 14th July, 1993, the Assignor herein and the Second Confirming Party further agreed and recorded that the remaining premises viz. the remaining half ground floor, including three shops and some portion on the ground floor let out to

:

                   (i) Dr. D.S.Alerge (Shop No.1);

                   (ii) Starfreeze Industries (Shop No.2);

                   (iii) New Ahmedabad Sports (Shop No.3);

                   (iv) M/s. Kishinchand Chellaram

                   (v) Mr. Kishin (No.(v) being sub tenant of M/s. Kishinchand Chellaram).

                   And That the whole of the 1st and 4th floors shall be of the ownership of the Assignee Together with the rights, benefits and advantages of the covenants, conditions and stipulations contained in the said hereinabove recited Indenture of Lease dated 29th August 1941.

                   (e) In the premises aforesaid and by virtue of the hereinabove recited Deed of Assignment dated 18 January 1990, the Assignor herein is seized and possessed of or otherwise well and sufficiently entitled to one half share in the said leasehold property and more particularly described in the schedule hereunder written and the Second Confirming Party is entitled to remaining one half share in the said leasehold property, subject to the said monthly tenancy in favour of M/s. Kishinchand Chellaram for 1st and 4th floor and the said ground floor, on aggregate monthly rent of Rs.3,785.45.”

39. The aforesaid demise makes it explicitly clear that, there was monthly tenancy in favour of the Plaintiff No.1 for first and fourth floors and the ground floor, and that was saved. It is true, in the Indenture of Assignment dated 14 July 1993, in favour of M/s. Lokumal Kishinchand Exports Pvt. Ltd. (the Assignee), there is no reference to the tenancy rights in favour of Plaintiff No.1, and the whole of second floor, which comprises the suit property, was assigned thereunder. However, the matter cannot be determined solely on the basis of the absence of the saving of the tenancy rights of the Plaintiff No.1 in the Indenture of Assignment dated 14 July 1993.

40. The rights of Plaintiff No.1 have prior provenance. The registered Articles of Assignments dated dated 18 April 1946, 14 July 1951 and 5 October 1955 explicitly record that the original lessees granted the sub-lease in favour of the then partners of Plaintiff No.1 – firm in respect of the entire four upper floors and a portion of a ground floor of Guzdar building. Clause 7 of the said Article of Agreement dated 5 October 1955 provided for further assignment of the demised premises or any part thereof, with the written consent of the original lessees.

41. The reference to the tenancy rights of Plaintiff No.1 in the Indenture of Assignment dated 21 June 1995 is, thus, required to be seen through the aforesaid prism of antecedent rights derived from the original lessees. In the absence of any material to show that the rights of Plaintiff No.1 as a sub-lessee were terminated in a lawful manner, after the expiry of the term of the sub-lease granted by the Articles of Agreement dated 5 October 1955, the case of Plaintiff No.1 cannot be jettisoned away on the basis of the recitals in the Indenture of Assignment dated 14 July 1993, to which Plaintiff No.1 was not a party.

42. The contention of the Defendants that the Plaintiff No.1 was not the landlord at the date of the institution of the suit is required to be appreciated in the light of the fact that the very creation of the tenancy in favour of Defendants No.1 by Plaintiff No.1 was not put in contest. Nor could it be controverted that the Defendant No.1 continued to pay rent to the Plaintiff No.1 for several decades.

43. In the backdrop of these facts, it is necessary to extract the the definition of the term “landlord” under Section 5(3) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947. It reads as under :

                   (3) “landlord” means any person who is for the time being, receiving, or entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guarding, or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant, and includes any person not being a tenant who from time to time derives title under a landlord and further includes in respect of his sub-tenant, a tenant who has sublet any premises: and also includes in respect of a licensee deemed to be a tenant by section 15A, the licensor who has given such licence, and in respect of the State Government, or as the case may be, the Government allottee referred to in sub-clauses (b) of clause (1A), deemed to be a tenant by section 15B, the person who was entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant immediately before the coming into force of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control, Bombay Land Requisition and Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1996).

44. Evidently, the definition of the landlord is wide and expansive. It is not restricted to the owner, free holder or head landlord. The definition, in a sense, encompasses as many as 12 categories of persons who may satisfy the description of the landlord. The juridical concepts of “landlord” and “ownership” are materially distinct, and where it could be shown that a person is inducted as a tenant by another, to whom the first person has been paying rent for the long period, the second person would be landlord within the meaning of the expansive definition, irrespective of the fact whether he is the owner of the demised premises or has derived title from the owner.

45. A useful reference in this context can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of K.D.Dewan V/s. Harbhajan S. Parihar(2002 Bom. C.R.187), wherein in the context of the definition of the landlord under Section 2(c) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, although is not as wide as the definition of landlord under Section 5(3) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, the Supreme Court enunciated that :

                   “To be a landlord within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 2 a person need not necessarily be the owner; in a vast majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in many cases a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes of the Act the legislature has made a distinction between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act.”

46. In the facts of the said case, the Supreme Court ruled that, since the Appellant therein had been paying monthly rent of the premises to the Respondent from 1976, the Respondent was, thus, the landlord of the premises under the Act, and was entitled to seek relief under Section 13(3) (a) of the Act.

47. The aforesaid pronouncement was followed with approval in the case of R.S.Grewal and Ors. V/s. Chander Prakash Soni and Anr.( (2019) 6 SCC 216), wherein it was enunciated that :

                   “18. A landlord within the meaning of Section 2(c) is not necessarily the owner of the property. The definition of the expression “landlord” is relatable to an entitlement to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land. The inclusive definition of “landlord” under Section 2(c) would take in its sweep Shiv Dev Kaur who held a life interest in the property. This position in law has been explained in a decision of a two-judge Bench of this court in K.D.Dewan V/s. Harbhajan S. Parihar (supra).”

48. The matter can be looked at from another perspective. Having been inducted by the Plaintiff No.1 in the demised premises, and having paid rent to the Plaintiff No.1 and never disputed the status of Plaintiff No.1 as a landlord of the suit premises, it may not be open for the Defendant No.1 to now question the status of Plaintiff No.1. The Tenant’s estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, may preclude the Defendant No.1 from denying the title of the landlord at the beginning of the tenancy.

49. In the case of S. Thangappan V/s. P. Padmavathy((1999) 7 SCC 474), with reference to the definition of the landlord under Section 2(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the Supreme Court enunciated that, the definition of landlord is very wide to include any person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent. The Explanation includes even a tenant to be the landlord under the said Act. In regard to the operation of the estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court enunciated the legal position as under :

                   “14. This section puts an embargo on a tenant of an immovable property, during the continuance of his tenancy to deny the title of his landlord at the beginning of his tenancy. The significant words under it are at the beginning of the tenancy. This is indicative of the sphere of the operation of this section. So a tenant once inducted as a tenant by a landlord, later he cannot deny his landlord title. Thus, this principle of estoppel debars a tenant from denying the title of his landlord from the beginning of his tenancy. Howsoever defective title of such landlord could be, such tenant cannot deny his title. But subsequent to his induction as tenant if the landlord looses his title under any law or agreement and there is threat to such tenant of his eviction by subsequently acquired paramount title holder then any denial of title by such tenant to the landlord who inducted him into the tenancy will not be covered by this principle of estoppel under this Section…….”

50. On the anvil of the aforesaid legal position, if the submissions of the Petitioners are tested, I find it rather difficult to agree with the submission of Mr. Godbole that the rights of Plaintiff No.1 came to an end with effect from the Indenture of Assignment dated 14 July 1993 for the mere reason that there is no saving of the rights of the Plaintiff No.1, unlike Indenture of assignment dated 21 June 1995. The sub-lease evidenced by the registered instruments in favour of Plaintiff No.1 cannot be extinguished by the mere absence of reference to such tenancy in the instrument to which Plaintiff No.1 was not a party. Therefore, the Defendant No.1 cannot be heard to urge that the Plaintiff No.1 allegedly lost his title subsequently.

51. The conspectus of aforesaid consideration is that the Defendants have failed to make out a case for review of the order dated 7 August 2025 in CRA No.596 of 2017 on account of the purported discovery of new matter or evidence. Resultantly, the Review Petition deserves to be dismissed.

52. Hence, the following order:

: O R D E R :

(i) The review petition stands dismissed.

(ii) No costs.