1. The instant petition under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has been filed seeking to grant anticipatory bail to the Petitioner/Accused No.3, in connection with Crime No.21 of 2024 of CID Police Station, Mangalagiri, registered for the offences 409, 420, and 120-B read with Sections 34, 37 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (For short “IPC‟) and Sections 7, 7(a), 8, 13(1)(b) & 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (For short “PC Act‟).
2. The present crime arises out of allegations concerning large-scale irregularities in the implementation of the excise policy and functioning of the Andhra Pradesh State Beverages Corporation Limited (APSBCL) during 2019 to 2024. The matter came to light upon a representation made to the Principal Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, on 26.08.2024 by one Venkateswara Rao Srinivas, alleging irregularities in the excise policy from 2019 to 2024. The report highlighted issues such as unfair discrimination in the allocation of Orders for Supply (OFS) of liquor, leading to the suppression of established brands and preferential treatment for new brands, in violation of existing norms. It also raised concerns about the shift from an automated to a manual OFS system, which could allow for manipulations. After an enquiry, Principal Secretary referred the complaint to CID Police, Mangalagiri, which registered a case in Crime No.21 of 2024 against unknown persons on 23.09.2024, alleging offences under Sections 409, 420, and 120-B of IPC. On 05.02.2025, the Government constituted a Special Investigation Team (SIT), vide G.O.Rt.No.262 to investigate the alleged irregularities in the excise policy and related crimes.
3. Heard Sri K.Parameshwar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri P.Jitendra, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Sri M.Lakshmi Narayana, learned Public Prosecutor for State.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner / Accused No.3 would submit that the Petitioner, who was appointed as Special Officer in the Revenue Excise Department in November 2019, acted under the directions and pressure of his superiors. Upon realizing the gravity of the matter, he voluntarily cooperated with the investigation and expressed his intention to turn approver by making a full and true disclosure.
Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the Petitioner was examined on multiple occasions and his statements were recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of the BNSS, including a voluntary confessional statement before the Magistrate on 25.02.2025. In these statements, he not only admitted his own role but also disclosed the involvement of other principal conspirators, thereby significantly aiding the investigation. It is further contended that his self-incriminatory disclosures demonstrate his bona fide intention to assist the prosecution, and he is willing to provide further information as required.
It is further argued that the learned Special Judge misread Section 306 Cr.P.C (Section 343 of BNSS) by holding that grant of anticipatory bail would weaken judicial dignity. The Special Court dealt with such an application as if the Court was deciding the application of tender of pardon. It is argued that the issue of approvership is primarily between the State and the Accused, and the Court‟s role is limited to examining compliance with statutory requirements. The Petitioner‟s cooperation, duly acknowledged by the prosecution, warranted consideration for grant of anticipatory bail.
It is further submitted that the findings naming the Petitioner as a “prime accused” and expressing apprehensions about non-compliance with bail conditions are premature and speculative. The observation that grant of bail would collapse the prosecution case is unsustainable. It is contended that the Petitioner, is aged 52 years, and is a permanent resident with no criminal antecedents, poses no flight risk, and undertakes to abide by any conditions. His continued liberty is essential to fulfil his role as an approver, and arrest at this stage would defeat the purpose of his cooperation. Hence, prayed to grant anticipatory bail to the Petitioner. In support of their contentions, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Md.Asfak Alam vs. State of Jharkhand and another ((2023) 8 SCC 632), Pradip N.Sharma vs. State of Gujarat and another (2025 SCC OnLine SC 457), Jasbir Singh vs. Vipin Kumar Jaggi ((2001) 8 SCC 289), Lt.Commander Pascal Fernandes vs. State (1967 SCC OnLine SC 37), D.Siva Sankar Reddy vs. CBI and others (SLP (Crl.) D.No.29297 of 2022, dated 10.10.2022), High Court of A.P in Gajjala Uma Sankar Reddy vs. CBI (2022 SCC OnLine AP 346), Konajeti Rajababu vs. State of A.P (2002 SCC OnLine AP 3), High Court Delhi in Bangaru Laxman vs. State through CBI & Another (ILR (2012) II Delhi 102), Prem Chand vs. State (1984 SCC OnLine Del 311), Jayalakshmi Jaitly vs. CBI (2012 SCC OnLine Del 3152), High Court of Jharkhand in Lalan Singh vs. Union of India (2011 SCC OnLine Jhar 425), Sudhanshu Ranjan vs. Union of India (2022 SCC OnLine Jhar 290), High Court of Madras in Munisamy vs. Superintendent, Central Prison (1987 SCC OnLine Mad 425), Subramanian vs. State (2013 SCC OnLine Mad 3760), High Court of Chhattisgarh in Rajkumar Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2020 SCC OnLine Chh 109), High Court Jammu & Kashmir in Tariq Ahmed Dar vs. National Investigation Agency (2023 SCC OnLine J & K 236) and High Court of Rajasthan in Noor Taki @ Mammu vs. The State of Rajasthan (1986 SCC OnLine Raj 11).
5. Learned Public Prosecutor would submit that the Petitioner has been cooperated with the investigating agency, appeared before the Investigating Officer, furnished required information, clarified several issues and his statements were also recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of BNSS, 2023. Learned Public Prosecutor would submit that the Court may pass appropriate orders. The Prosecution placed on record the written instructions received from the investigating agency as well as the police report filed against Accused Nos.1, 6 to 17, 25, 26 and 30 in the present crime.
6. Having heard the submissions on both sides, the point that would emerge for determination is:
Whether the Petitioner / Accused No.3 is entitled to anticipatory bail?.
POINT:
7. According to the prosecution, the Petitioner, along with the other accused, participated in the formation of a syndicate with the objective of exercising complete control over the procurement, supply, and sale of liquor in the State, thereby generating unlawful pecuniary gains in the form of commissions, kickbacks, and inflated pricing. It is not the case that no accusations found against Petitioner / Accused No.3 during the course of investigation. The name of the Petitioner / Accused No.3 is very much available from the inception of the registration of the crime. He is a public servant and the investigating agency did not choose to arrest him. Be that as it may, the police report placed on record would show the material against the Petitioner / Accused No.3 and his role in implementation of the excise policy under conspiracy.
8. The allegations leveled against the Petitioner / Accused No.3 in the police report filed against Accused Nos.1, 6 to 17, 25, 26 and 30 are as follows:
(a) The Petitioner was strategically positioned within the administrative framework of APSBCL to facilitate the implementation of the conspiracy relating to liquor procurement and distribution in the State.
(b) On 08.10.2019, the Petitioner met Accused No.4 at Tirupati and requested him to accompany Accused No.2 to the residence of Accused No.5 at Hyderabad with APSBCL's annual sales data of previous years.
(c) On 13.10.2019, the Petitioner, along with Accused Nos.1 to 5 and 7, attended a meeting at the residence of Accused No.5, where the liquor sales data was analysed and it was estimated that the proposed scheme would generate approximately Rs.50 to Rs.60 crores per month by way of kickbacks from distilleries and suppliers.
(d) During the said meeting, it was proposed that the Petitioner would oversee supplies to APSBCL depots and sales through Government Retail Outlets by bypassing the automatic Order for Supply (OFS) mechanism, thereby enabling the syndicate to manipulate procurement decisions.
(e) The Petitioner was promised appointment to an IAS post by the year 2023 in consideration of his role in furthering the conspiracy.
(f) Pursuant to the conspiracy, the Petitioner was appointed as Special Officer, APSBCL, on 15.11.2019.
(g) In December, 2019, the Petitioner, along with Accused No.2, met Accused No.1 at his office in Hyderabad on the instructions of Accused No.4, where directions were issued to promote the sale of liquor supplied by those distilleries and suppliers who had agreed to pay the demanded kickbacks.
(h) At a meeting held after the Sankranthi festival in January, 2020, attended by Accused Nos.1, 2, 3 and 6, the authority to issue Orders for Supply (OFSs) was delegated to the Petitioner in February, 2020, thereby conferring upon him substantial control over the procurement process.
(i) The Petitioner, being an Assistant Commissioner in the Excise Department, possessed detailed knowledge of the liquor procurement and distribution system and of the modus operandi through which illegal kickbacks could be generated.
(j) By virtue of his official position, the Petitioner implemented the decisions of the syndicate by manipulating the supply process.
(k) The Petitioner conducted daily conference calls with APSBCL Depot Managers through WhatsApp using his personal mobile number, during which directions were issued regarding the placement of indents.
(l) The Petitioner ensured preferential placement of indents in favour of liquor brands supplied by manufacturers and suppliers who had agreed to pay kickbacks, while simultaneously reducing or suppressing indents for popular brands whose manufacturers declined to make such illegal payments.
(m) The Petitioner acted upon draft indent plans prepared by Accused Nos.1, 7 and 8, who determined the allocation of indents based on the quantum of kickbacks received from various suppliers.
(n) By exercising control over the issuance of OFSs and the distribution of liquor to APSBCL depots and Government Retail Outlets, the Petitioner implemented such indent plans and facilitated the objectives of the syndicate.
(o) The Petitioner played a pivotal operational role in the alleged conspiracy by manipulating the procurement and supply process, extending preferential treatment to favoured suppliers, and using his official position to facilitate the generation of unlawful pecuniary gains in the form of commissions and kickbacks.
9. It is represented that the Petitioner has voluntarily submitted an application before the Special Court seeking tender of pardon and the same was returned with some defects. At that juncture, the Petitioner had moved an application for anticipatory bail before the Special Court and the Special Court rejected the said application mainly on the ground that he had voluntarily filed an application seeking tender of pardon to become an approver and, therefore, in view of Section 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. (Section 343(4)(b) of the BNSS), the Petitioner shall be in the custody till the completion of the trial.
10. In the above factual background, apprehending arrest the Petitioner has approached this Court seeking anticipatory bail. The principal contention of the Petitioner is that, in spite of the allegations levelled against him, he has voluntarily cooperated with the investigation, gave statements under Sections 180 and 183 of the BNSS, made full disclosures regarding the alleged conspiracy, voluntarily moved an application seeking tender of pardon before the Special Court, he is ready to furnish sureties to the satisfaction of the Court and he is always ready and willing to cooperate with the investigation in this matter.
11. It is well settled that, to invoke the jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail for a non-bailable offence, there should be a reasonable apprehension of arrest. The existence of such apprehension has to be examined independently by the Court and cannot be negatived merely because the prosecution has not expressly opposed the application or has stated that it has no objection if appropriate protection is granted. Equally, the seriousness of the allegations or the specific role attributed to the Accused does not, by itself, answer the question whether the Accused has a reasonable apprehension of arrest. Those aspects may be relevant while considering the merits of the application, but the threshold requirement for invoking the jurisdiction under the relevant provision remains the existence of a bona fide apprehension of arrest.
12. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the very object of the provision relating to anticipatory bail is to protect an individual who has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence. The Court observed that the expression "reason to believe" postulates the existence of reasonable grounds for apprehending arrest and that such apprehension cannot be dismissed on mere assumptions or conjectures. Similarly, in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and others ((2011) 1 SCC 694), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the provision for anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual's liberty against unnecessary arrest and that the Court must examine whether the apprehension of arrest is genuine and reasonable in the facts of the case.
13. Prosecution has not filed counter opposing the application. The written instructions received from the investigating agency are placed on record. For ready reference, the said written instructions are extracted hereunder:
In this regard, it is submitted that the individuals who have filed the anticipatory bail are the previous employees of APSBCL and they are in a position to bring all the facts of the crime to light during the course of investigation. It is to further bring to your notice that, Sri D. V. Satya prasad (A-3) was issued notice u/s. 179 BNSS/160 CrPC and he attended before the 10 and given his statement on 21-2-2025. To strengthen the investigation, He has also given his statement before the Hon'ble court u/s. 183 BNSS on 25-2-2025. Again, he has appeared before the I.O for informing the additional facts of the crime and the same was recorded in his further examination statements on 16-7-2025. He also appeared before the investigating officer and clarified many of the issues so as to move ahead in the investigation and the same was recorded as mediators report on 10-8-2025.
The accused A-3's statements and cooperation with the investigation have helped the investigation agency to understand the crime, conspiracy involved, magnitude of the criminal proceeds and also to find out the accused persons who perpetuated the crime and who all are benefitted from the crime, complete conspiracy and modus operandi of the persons in crime. In light of these facts, it is submitted that the petitions may be argued in the interest of further investigation.
Therefore, in the Anticipatory bail petitions filed by D.V.Satya Prasad vide CRL.P.No. 12048 of 2025, in view of the cooperation and crucial information provided by him which led to finding the conspiracy, discovery of several material evidence, establishment of role of all the persons involved, Modus operandi of the crime Etc. So, the investigation agency has no objection in case this Hon'ble court is willing to grant anticipatory bail to A-3. These facts may kindly be brought to the notice of the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh during the hearing and appropriate orders may be sought in the interest of further investigation and justice.
14. In the light of the serious allegations made against Petitioner / Accused No.3 in the report filed before the Court, apprehension of arrest of the Petitioner / Accused No.3 cannot be ruled out simply because the investigating agency has no objection if the Court considers his application for anticipatory bail for the present.
15. The High Court of Delhi in Bangaru Laxman’s case referred to supra, while referring to the judgment of the said Court in Prem Chand vs. State (1995 Crl.L.J. 1534) and while examining the scope of Section 306(4)(b) Cr.P.C., reiterated that an approver who accepts a tender of pardon is ordinarily required to remain in custody till the termination of trial unless he was already on bail at the time of grant of pardon. The object of such detention is not to punish the approver but is intended to protect him and ensure his adherence to the conditions of pardon. In the said case, one of the Accused namely T. Satyamurthy, was granted anticipatory bail and subsequently, CBI moved an application seeking his pardon so as to make him a witness and said application was allowed by the Special Court. Aggrieved by the grant of pardon to T.Satyamurthy, the co-accused in the said crime moved an application before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court consequently dismissed the said application having regard to the fundamental right to life and liberty of the approver in the said case when his statement had already been record, no purpose would be served to send him in custody.
16. The High Court of Chhattisgarh in Rajkumar Sahu’s case referred to supra, while granting bail to an approver, categorically held that it is quite pellucid that the provision contained in Section 306(4)(b) of the Code requiring the approver to be detained in custody till the termination of trial if he is not already on bail, is meant not to punish the person in whose favour the pardon has been tendered but to protect him from possible indignation, rage and resentment of his associates in a crime to whom he has chosen to expose.
17. A Coordinate Bench of this Court, in Gajjala Uma Sankar Reddy’s case referred to supra, held that merely because an accused who intends to become an approver is granted anticipatory bail, or because the investigating agency does not oppose such bail, it cannot be presumed that there was any illegal bargain or understanding between the accused and the investigating agency. Such an inference can be drawn only if there is independent material showing that the statutory procedure for granting pardon was misused or that there was an improper agreement between them.
18. In D.Siva Shankar Reddy’s case referred to supra, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition without expressing anything on the merits of the pardon granted to Accused No.4.
19. In Jayalakshmi Jaitly’s case referred to supra of the High Court of Delhi, one of the Accused moved an application seeking anticipatory bail before the Special Judge for CBI, the same was not opposed by the CBI and anticipatory bail was also granted. Thereafter, on an application filed by the said Accused, his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C was also recorded. Subsequently, CBI filed an application seeking pardon of the said Accused and the same was also allowed. After long delay, one of the co-accused challenged the impugned order of pardon. The High Court of Delhi had categorically observed that the pardon proceeding is neither an enquiry nor a trial in which an opportunity must be given to the other Accused to show to the Court that the statement of the Accused seeking pardon is not true. Only during the course of trial, the opportunity will be given to the Accused to show to the Court that the approver‟s evidence at the trial is untrustworthy in view of the contradictions or improvements made by him by allowing the accused to cross-examine. It was further held that an Accused can be granted pardon on the condition of his making a full and true disclosure of whole of the circumstance within his knowledge relative to the offence. Holding so, the High Court dismissed the petition.
20. The Composite High Court of A.P., in Konajeti Rajababu’s case referred to supra, while dismissing the revision petition which was filed by a co-accused challenging the pardon granted to Accused No.3, clearly observed that, ordinarily, it is for the prosecution to ask that a particular accused out of several may be tendered pardon. It is because the State may not desire that any accused be tendered pardon as it does not need approver's testimony, or it may not also like the tendering of pardon to a particular accused because he may be the brain behind the crime or the worst offender. After all, the Court shall not be oblivious of the fact that the power which it exercises is not on its own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency. Therefore, the power shall be exercised only when the prosecution joins in the request. This does not, however, preclude the accused from directly applying the Court. When the accused directly applies to the Court, the Court must first refer the request of the accused to the prosecuting agency and ask for a statement from the prosecution on the request of the accused. If the prosecution thinks that the tender of pardon will be in the interests of successful prosecution of the other offenders whose conviction is not easy without the approver's testimony, it would indubitably agree to the tender of pardon. The Court should, therefore, embark upon such a procedure in the interests of justice.
21. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Fernandes‟ case referred to supra, which is reiterated in Jasbir Singh’s case referred to supra, is that, although the power to tender pardon is vested in the Court, the decision as to whether the evidence of an accomplice is necessary for securing the conviction of the remaining accused lies exclusively within the domain of the prosecution. The Court must not assume the role of a prosecuting agency or independently determine the propriety of granting pardon. Ordinarily, the initiative for tendering pardon must come from the prosecution, and even where an accused directly seeks pardon, the Court should first obtain the views of the prosecution. The Court's role is confined to satisfying itself that the statutory requirements are fulfilled and that the request for pardon is made in the interest of an effective prosecution. These cases support the proposition that the prosecution has the primary role in deciding whether an Accused should be tendered pardon, those decisions are not precedents for granting anticipatory bail. Consequently, they cannot be treated as authorities conferring a right to anticipatory bail merely because the accused claims to be a prospective approver. The entitlement of the Petitioner to anticipatory bail must, therefore, be determined on the independent merits of the present case.
22. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in Pradip N.Sharma’s case referred to supra, while granting anticipatory bail to the Accused, categorically held that, considering the nature of the allegations and the fact that the matter is to be investigated primarily based on documentary evidence, the Court is inclined to grant the relief of anticipatory bail to the appellant. The prosecution had not demonstrated any necessity for the custodial Interrogation of the Appellant / Accused beyond scrutiny of official records, which can be done without placing him in detention. Additionally, the Appellant had expressed his willingness to cooperate with the investigation, and no material has been placed before the Court to suggest that he has evaded or obstructed the investigation in any manner. Furthermore, it is well-settled that anticipatory bail can be granted where custodial interrogation is not essential, particularly in cases where the allegations hinge on official records and the presence of the accused can be secured without pre-trial detention. The Court also takes note of the fact that the FIR in question is part of a series of similar allegations against the appellant, and in the absence of any concrete material indicating a likelihood of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses, the grant of anticipatory bail is justified. Accordingly, while the appellant shall cooperate with the investigation as and when required, he shall not be taken into custody, subject to conditions imposed hereinafter to ensure his participation in the inquiry process.
23. In Lalan Singh’s case (supra), the petitioner challenged the order of the Special Judge, CBI, Dhanbad rejecting his application under Section 306 Cr.P.C seeking grant of pardon as an approver. The Jharkhand High Court found that the trial court had not exercised its discretion in a proper and judicious manner despite the prosecution agency itself not opposing and rather supporting the plea, and held that the request for pardon required a conscious and fair consideration in terms of Section 306 CrPC and Section 306(5) CrPC. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the impugned order and allowed the revision, granting pardon to the petitioner on the condition of full and truthful disclosure of facts relating to the offence. This judgment pertains to the grant of pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. and does not lay down any principle governing the grant of anticipatory bail.
24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Md. Asfak Alam’s case referred to supra, held that while considering bail or anticipatory bail, the Court must balance personal liberty with the interests of justice, keeping in view the nature and gravity of the offence, the possibility of the accused tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses, the likelihood of absconding, and the need for custodial interrogation. The Court further held that where the accused has cooperated with the investigation and the charge-sheet has been filed, bail should ordinarily be granted unless there are compelling reasons to deny such relief, and a mechanical rejection of bail or insistence on surrender is impermissible.
25. In Noor Taki’s case referred to supra, the High Court of Rajasthan had categorically held that, although Section 306(4)(b) Cr.P.C. mandates that an approver who is not already on bail shall remain in custody until the conclusion of the trial, the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not curtailed by that provision. In exceptional cases, where the continued detention of an approver becomes unreasonable, oppressive, or violative of the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly due to prolonged delay in trial, the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to enlarge the approver on bail or declare such detention illegal. The Court held that this extraordinary power must be exercised sparingly, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, to prevent abuse of the process of Court or to secure the ends of justice.
26. The High Court of Madras in Munisamy’s case referred to supra, while granting bail to an approver, categorically held that, no doubt, under Section 306(4)(b) of Cr.P.C (Section 343 of BNSS) the approver shall be detained in custody until termination of the trial, unless he is already on bail. But, that does not mean that he can be kept in detention without any limit on the ground that some of the accused are absconding and the trial could not go on. That would amount to grave injustice to a citizen and deprivation of life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and thereby granted bail to an approver. In the similar circumstances, the same view was expressed by the High Court of Madras in Subramanian’s case (supra), while granting bail to an Accused, who was treated as an approver.
27. The High Court of Jharkhand in Sudhanshu Ranjan’s case referred to supra, while granting bail to the Accused, who was in jail custody for more than three years and who had been tendered pardon, has categorically observed that, a person who has been made approver cannot be allowed to be remained in jail custody indefinitely. Moreover, section 306(4)(b) Cr.P.C seems to be directory and not mandatory. To keep the approver indefinitely in jail is not the intention of the legislature.
28. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Tariq Ahmed Dar’s case (supra), had categorically held that, the law is no longer res integra that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C in appropriate case can release an approver on bail. In the present case, since the Petitioner has not yet been granted pardon and has not acquired the status of an approver, the principles laid down therein do not directly govern the Petitioner's claim for anticipatory bail and are of limited assistance.
29. It is well settled that the proceedings relating to grant of anticipatory bail and the proceedings relating to tender of pardon operate in distinct statutory fields governed by separate considerations. Anticipatory bail is granted on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution, primarily to protect an individual from unnecessary arrest, subject to the satisfaction of the Court that custodial interrogation is not required and that the accused is not likely to abscond or tamper with evidence. On the other hand, the power to tender pardon is exercised under Section 306 of Cr.P.C. (Section 343 of BNSS) to secure the evidence of an accomplice in aid of a fair trial, by obtaining a full and true disclosure of the circumstances relating to the offence.
30. The grant of anticipatory bail does not, in any manner, preclude the competent Court from considering an application seeking tender of pardon. Even where anticipatory bail has been granted, it remains open to the trial Court to examine whether the statutory requirements under Section 306 of the Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 343 of the BNSS) are satisfied and whether tender of pardon ought to be granted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the grant of anticipatory bail cannot be construed as an impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court in dealing with an application for pardon, in accordance with law.
31. Conversely, the mere grant of tender of pardon does not have the effect of extinguishing or curtailing the constitutional right of an Accused to seek liberty by filing an application for bail. The right to apply for bail is an integral facet of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution and continues to subsist unless curtailed by a valid procedure established by law.
32. Thus, both the grant of anticipatory bail and the grant of tender of pardon are independent judicial determinations serving different purposes. One does not operate as a bar to the other. The judicial discretion exercised in one proceeding cannot be treated as foreclosing the statutory jurisdiction of the Court in the other. The issue relating to tender of pardon falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent Court depending on the stage of the case and it is for the competent Court to independently consider whether the statutory requirements for granting pardon are satisfied, based on the facts, role of the accused, and overall interests of a fair trial. In the present case, the Petitioner has filed an application seeking tender of pardon and no final decision has been taken thereon. Therefore, this Court, while dealing with the application for anticipatory bail, is not called upon to adjudicate upon the merits or maintainability of the said application for pardon, as it is not the subject matter of the present proceedings. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the question relating to grant of tender of pardon is wholly beyond the scope of the present adjudication and shall be decided independently by the trial Court in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observations made herein.
33. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this Court finds that the Petitioner has been arrayed as Accused No.3 in a serious economic offence and specific allegations have been levelled against him in the police report.
34. The Court cannot take the place of investigating agency. It is not the duty of the Court to ensure the arrest of an individual in a petition filed for anticipatory bail. It is not the decision of the Accused to become an approver and ultimately it is the strategy of the investigating agency to choose a person for the purpose of pardon. Taking the view expressed in Jayalakshmi Jaitly’s case (supra) and Konajeti Rajababu’s case (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the mere pendency of proceedings for tender of pardon cannot be a ground to deny the relief of anticipatory bail. Further, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and in the absence of any material indicating that the Petitioner is likely to abscond or evade the process of law, this Court finds that there is no flight risk involved. In such circumstances, this Court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the Petitioner / Accused No.3.
35. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner / Accused No.3, on the following conditions:
(i) In the event of his arrest, the Petitioner/Accused No.3 shall be enlarged on bail on execution of a personal bond for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-(Rupees One Lakh only), with two sureties for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the arresting police officials;
(ii) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall surrender his passport, if any, before the trial Court and shall not leave India without prior permission of the said Court.
(iii) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall appear before the Investigating Officer as and when required and shall cooperate with further investigation, if any.
(iv) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall not directly or indirectly tamper with evidence nor influence, intimidate, or induce any prosecution witness.
(v) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall not contact any of the prosecution witnesses or co-accused, except during legal proceedings.
(vi) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall file his affidavit before the trial Court disclosing all his movable and immovable properties, bank accounts, demat accounts, business interests, and financial holdings, whether held individually or jointly within a period of two weeks from the date of his release.
(vii) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall not make or publish or disseminate any information, statement, or post whether in print, electronic or social media concerning the present crime till conclusion of the trial.
(viii) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall not alienate, encumber, or create third-party interests in any property disclosed by him or identified by the prosecution, without prior permission of the trial Court.
(ix) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall not operate or manage any company, firm, or bank account alleged to have been used in connection with the offence, except with prior intimation to the Investigating Agency.
(x) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall furnish his active mobile number to the Investigating Officer and shall be available at all times and any change shall be intimated forthwith.
In the event of violation of any of the above conditions, the prosecution shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of bail.
The trial Court is at liberty to decide the Petitioner‟s application for tender of pardon independently on its own merits, in accordance with law, without being influenced by any findings or observations made herein.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.
