1. Heard Mr. MU Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. K Konwar, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam and Mr. AK Ghosh, learned counsel for the Panchayat and Rural Development Department.

2. The petitioner before this Court was serving as an Assistant Engineer in the Panchayat & Rural Development Department, Binnakandi Development Block, Doboka, Hojai. During his service period, the petitioner was arrested on 11-11-2025 in connection with ACB Police Station Case No.58/2025 registered under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on the charges of demanding and accepting illegal gratification from the complainant. The petitioner was thereafter immediately arrested, although subsequently released on bail. Since the petitioner was detained in custody for more than 48 hours, the petitioner was suspended under Rule 6 (1) and 6(2) of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 by the respondent no.2 vide the impugned suspension order dated 05.12.2025 with effect from the date of his arrest i.e. 11.11.2025. Subsequent to the grant of bail to the petitioner on 12.12.2025, the petitioner approached the competent authority seeking reinstatement in service and release of the subsistence allowance. The representation was filed on 02- 01-2026. Thereafter, the petitioner filed another 2 (two) representations being the representation dated 06-03-2026 and 27-03-2026, requesting the concerned authority for reinstatement in service and payment of subsistence allowance. However, the respondents did not pass any orders on these prayers made in the representations. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has approached to this Court by filing the present writ petition.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner's prolonged suspension is dilutive of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhury vs. the Union of India & Anr. reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291, and also in Rakibuddin Ahmed vs. State of Assam & Ors. reported in 2019 (5) GLT 600.

4. It is submitted that the petitioner has been suspended by the suspension order dated 05.12.2025 with effect from the date of his arrest i.e. 11.11.2025. No proceedings were initiated, nor was his suspension reviewed as required under the Rules. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner's prolonged suspension is illegal and contrary to the applicable Rules. It is prayed that the suspension order dated 05.12.2025 be set aside and the petitioner be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits, including full back wages and continuity of service. It is further prayed that the respondents be directed to release the subsistence allowance due to the petitioner during the period of suspension, which has not been paid, along with all other admissible service benefits.

5. In spite of notices being issued by this Court on 06-05-2026, the respondents have not filed their affidavit.

6. Mr. K Konwar, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam submits on instructions that the show-cause notice and other memorandum of charges have been issued by the Department on 06-06-2026 and the petitioner has been called upon to respond. He further submits that the suspension order was also reviewed by the orders dated 06-06-2026 and 08-06-2026, whereby the respondents reviewed the suspension of the petitioner and extended it from 11- 02-2026 to 10-05-2026 by the order dated 06-06-2026 and for another period of 3 (three) months with effect from 11.05.2026 to 10-08-2026 by the order dated 08-06-2026.

7. It is submitted that, in the judgment rendered in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court ultimately did not interfere with the order of suspension passed against the appellant/petitioner therein, as a show-cause notice had already been issued to the appellant/petitioner. He therefore submits that since the show-cause notices have been issued to the petitioner, the prayer for revoking the suspension may be rejected.

8. Since the judgement of the Apex Court rendered in Ajay Kumar Choudhury (supra) did not interfere with the suspension order of the appellant/petitioner therein and the findings of the Division Bench passed in Rakibuddin Ahmed (supra) did not take note of the findings by the Apex Court and therefore, the findings rendered by the Apex Court will be prevailed.

9. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and the pleadings available before the Court are carefully perused.

10. The writ petitioner was suspended vide order dated 05.12.2025 with effect from his arrest i.e. 11.11.2025. The Coordinate Bench of this Court had ordered that in respect of an employee who was suspended in pursuance to Rule 6(2) of the Rules under 1964, the period of 90 (ninety) days in such cases of deemed suspension will be counted from the day when the said employee informs the authority upon being released on bail or released from custody. The petitioner was released on bail on 15-12-2025 and he intimidated the authorities on 02-01-2026. Therefore, the period of 90 (ninety) days would be counted from 02-01-2026. In Rakibuddin Ahmed (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, while referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), considered a similar issue in a reference made on account of conflicting decisions rendered by Coordinate Benches in Biswajit Dey v. State of Assam [W.P.(C) No. 240/2019] and Atful Rahman v. State of Assam [W.P.(C) No. 6842/2018]. The Division Bench examined the issue in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), read in conjunction with the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964.

11. In the facts pertaining to Rakibuddin Ahmed (supra), at Para-7 of the said judgment, it is seen that a show cause notice containing the charges against the writ petitioner/ appellant therein was issued on 16-06-2019. However, no order was passed reviewing the requirement of continuing under suspension and the said position exists till date. Thereafter, examined extensively and the judgement passed in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) was referred to and ultimately the Court held that the principle laid down in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) would also be applicable in the case of deemed suspension under Section 6(2) of the Rules of 1964. The Division Bench answered the reference by holding that the periodic review in the case of deemed suspension is mandatory.

12. Coming to the facts of this case it is seen that the petitioner was suspended with effect from 11.11.2025 and no review as mandated under the Rules was carried out within a period of 3 (three) months from the date of suspension of the petitioner. Although the respondents have submitted on the instructions that the memo of charges was issued on 16-06-2026 and the petitioner has been called upon to submit a reply and the suspension order has also been reviewed on 16-06-2026, 06-06-2026 and 08-06-2026, the fact remains that the review of suspension within the 90 (ninety) days as held to be mandatory by the Division Bench of this Court has not been carried out. In this context, it is also relevant to refer to another Division Bench judgement of this Court rendered in State of Assam & Ors. vs. Ajit Sonowal & Ors. reported in 2023 (6) GLT 115, wherein by referring to various Supreme Court judgments, including the judgment of Rakibuddin Ahmed (supra), the Division Bench categorically held that unless the review is held within 90 (ninety) days, an order of suspension, including the one issued for a detention of an employee in custody for more than 48 hours, would not survive, and nor can such order be granted fresh lease of life by carrying out a review after the expiry of 90 (ninety) days. The relevant paragraphs in the judgement of Rakibuddin Ahmed (supra) reads as follows:

                   “15. We have consciously applied our mind to the query raised by the learned Single Judge. Though the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhury (Supra) is a case where suspension order was issued pending drawal of Disciplinary Proceeding and not a case of deemed suspension, the observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph-20 whereby, the analogy of Section 162(2) Cr.P.C., 1976 has been brought in, we are persuaded to hold that the principles laid down in the said case cannot be restricted to an order of suspension issued only on contemplation of drawal of Disciplinary Proceeding and not for deemed suspension.

                   In our view, the issue should be seen from the perspective of the consequence and effect of suspension which is the same in both the cases. We also feel that no prejudice, whatsoever, would be caused to the Department by such interpretation inasmuch as no blanket order of revocation of suspension is passed and it is left to the Department to make periodic review within a period of 3(three) months and decide as to whether such suspension is required to be extended or not by assigning reasons. Whether such reasons are justified and germane can be the subject matter of a separate challenge.

                   In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the reference by holding that the principles laid down in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhury(Supra) would also be applicable in case of deemed suspension under Section 6(2) of the 1964 Rules.

                   16. Further, in the instant case, it is seen that the order of suspension is also on account of pending drawal of Disciplinary Proceeding in which case, periodic review within 3(three) months is otherwise held to be mandatory.

                   17. Since we have already answered the reference holding that periodic review in the case of deemed suspension is mandatory, the requirement of remanding the matter to the learned Single Judge would be a meaningless exercise and as agreed to by the parties, while answering the reference, as above, we are of the opinion that a case for interference of the impugned order dated 16.02.2019 is made out.

                   Accordingly, the order of suspension dated 16.02.2019 issued by the Divisional Forest Officer, Guwahati Wildlife Division is hereby set aside and quashed. We, however, hasten to add that the Department would be at liberty to post the petitioner in any nonsensitive post.

13. The judgement of Ajit Sonowal (supra) , are extracted below.

                   13. From careful analysis of the above decisions of the Supreme Court what follows is that unless review is held within 90 days, an order of suspension including one issued due to the detention of an employee in custody for 48 hours, would not survive nor can such an order be granted fresh lease of life by carrying out a review after expiry of the period of 90 days. In view of the law laid down in the case of Dipak Mali (supra) and Ajay Kumar Choudhary (Supra) it is axiomatic that the order of suspension dated 07/12/2019 had lapsed after the expiry of 90 days due to want of review of the same by the Disciplinary Authority. We, therefore, find ourselves in agreement with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned Judgment and order dated 22/04/2021.

                   14. In the case of Rajiv Kumar (Supra), relied upon by the writ appellant, the High Court of Judicature at Delhi had quashed the order of suspension by holding that after the release of the petitioner on bail, an order of suspension could have been passed only under Rule 10(1) and not under Rule 10(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules 1965. Rule 10(1) of the Rules of 1965 provides that the Appointing Authority or any other authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the President, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension :-

                   (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or

                   (aa)Where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or

                   (b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial:

                   Answering the question raised by the appellant, the Supreme Court had made the following observations :-

                   “26. The inevitable conclusion therefore is that the order in terms of Rule 10(2) is not restricted in its point of duration or efficacy to the period of actual detention only. It continues to be operative unless modified or revoked under Sub-Rule 5(c), as provided under Sub-rule 5(a). 27. Rule 10(5)(b) deals with a situation where a government servant is suspended or is deemed to have suspended and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during continuance of that suspension irrespective of the fact whether the earlier suspension was in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise. Rule 10(5)(b) can be pressed into service only when any other disciplinary proceeding is also commenced than the one for and during which suspension or deemed suspension was already in force, to meet the situation until the termination of all such proceedings. In contradiction, Rule 10(5)(a) has application in relation to an order of suspension already made or deemed to have been made. Rule 10(5)(b) has no application to the facts of the present case and no inspiration or support could be drawn for the stand taken for the respondents or the decision arrived at by the High Court. It is Rule 10(5)(a) alone which has application and the deemed suspension would continue to be in force till anything has been done under Rule 10(5)(c). Similarly, Rules 10(3) and 10(4) operate in different fields and merely because a specific provision is made for its continuance, until further orders in them itself due to certain further developments taking place and interposition of orders made by Court or appellate and reviewing authority to meet and get over such specific eventualities, in given circumstances and that does not in any way affect the order of suspension deemed to have been made under Rule 10(2).”

                   15. In that case also the respondent Rajiv Kumar was arrested on 26/03/1998 for accepting bribe and was released on bail on 02/04/1998. The order issued under Rule 10(2) of the Rules of 1965 to formally place him under suspension was passed on 15/05/1998, which order was assailed before the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short “CAT”) at the Delhi Bench on the ground that that there was no reason for his continued suspension. On 09/11/2000, an order was passed by the authorities continuing his suspension. The CAT directed the authorities to dispose of the matter by a reasoned order. The application for review of the said order was also rejected. In terms of the CAT’s direction, an order was passed on 21/05/2001 which was the subject matter of challenge in writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court.

                   16. The decision in the case of Rajiv Kumar (Supra), does not lay down the proposition in law that an order of suspension would not call for periodic review. Therefore, the decision in Rajiv Kumar (Supra), in our opinion, must be understood to have been rendered in the facts and circumstances of that case. On the other hand, the decision in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (Supra) is of wider import and hence, would have applicability on every order of suspension. Moreover, in view of the categorical findings recorded by a co-ordinate bench in the case of Rekibuddin Ahmed (Supra), holding that the ratio of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (Supra) would be applicable to an order of suspension issued under Rule 6(2), it would not be permissible for this Court to take a different view in the matter. The appellant’s counsel has also failed to persuade us to take a view that the decision in the case of Rekibuddin Ahmed (Supra) calls for reconsideration by a larger Bench.

                   17. For the reasons stated herein above, we hold that there is no merit in this appeal. However, since Rule 6(1)(a) of the Rules of 1964 permits the authorities to place an employee under suspension when a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending and considering the fact that disciplinary proceeding has, in the meantime, been initiated against respondent No 1 by serving a memorandum of charges upon him, we make it clear that this order would not come in the way of the Disciplinary Authority from exercising jurisdiction under Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 1964 and issue a fresh order of suspension, if so advised.

14. Considering the above position in law, rendered by the Apex Court and also by this Court and the facts and circumstances in the present proceedings, this Court is of the view that the impugned suspension order dated 05.12.2025 which was effect from his arrest i.e. 11.11.2025, cannot be withstand in the eye of law in view of the fact that the continuance of the suspension order by way of a review was not carried out as is mandatorily required within a period of 90 (ninety) days. The impugned suspension order dated 05.12.2025 therefore stands set aside. The petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service with full service benefits. The release of any subsistence allowance that may have been pending during the suspension period is also directed to be released. The Department will proceed in terms of the show-cause notice, if any issued, as per the provisions of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. Since an investigation in connection with ACB Police Station Case No.58/2025 registered under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, where allegation of illegal gratification was levelled against the petitioner, was carried out and the petitioner was granted bail on 12.12.2025 by the Court of Special Judge, Guwahati, Assam, the authorities are at liberty to reinstate the petitioner and post him at any non-sensitive post as they deem fit and proper.

15. In terms of the above, the writ petition stands disposed of.