Johnson John, J.

1. The order dated 30.05.2017 of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi in O.A. No. 217 of 2016 is under challenge in this writ petition filed on 09.04.2026.

2. Heard Sri. Sathyanathan V.K., the learned counsel for the writ petitioner and Sri. P. Sreekumar, the learned Additional Solicitor General for the respondents.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Tribunal, while partly allowing the application, restricted the monetary benefit of arrears of disability element of pension as also rounding off to a period of three years prior to the filing of the Original Application and that the same is against the settled position of law and that once the right to receive the disability pension is recognised and found due, the benefit of the same has to be given from the date it became due and the same cannot be curtailed by restricting the benefit to a period of three years preceding the filing of the Original Application.

4. Per contra, the learned Additional Solicitor General argued that the impugned order of the Tribunal is dated 30.05.2017 and the said order is already implemented and therefore, the present writ petition filed on 09.04.2026 after a lapse of 8 years, 10 months and 10 days is inordinately belated and the same cannot be entertained.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner produced copy of the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ -A Nos. 4594 of 2026 and 2718 of 2026 to point out that on the basis of the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India through its Secretary & Ors. v. SGT Girish Kumar and Ors. [C.A.Nos.6820-6824 of 2018 = 2026 SCC OnLine SC 194, the High Court of Allahabad allowed the writ petitions, despite the long delay in filing the writ petitions. But, the learned Additional Solicitor General cited the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Kanishk Singha and another v. State of West Bengal and another [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 259 and Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal [2024 KHC 6318] to point out that a subsequent change of law will not be attracted, unless a case is pending before a competent court awaiting its final adjudication and if a case has already been decided, it cannot be reopened and redecided solely on the basis of a new interpretation based on a subsequent change of law.

6. It is not in dispute that the Tribunal passed the order on 30.05.2017 and the only reason highlighted to justify the delay in filing the writ petition is that only recently the petitioner came to know about the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Girish Kumar (supra), wherein it was held that the right to receive disability pension is a valuable right and once found due, the benefit of the same has to be given from the date it became due. But, in the recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Balakrishnan Mullikote [2026 SCC OnLine SC 464 = 2026 INSC 286), the Honourable Supreme Court, after considering the decision in Girish Kumar’s case (supra) and Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. Tarsem Singh [(2008) 8 SCC 648], has left open the question of law regarding the issue of limitation in claiming the pensionary entitlements.

7. Though there is no prescribed period of limitation for filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India, it is well settled that the parties have to approach the court within a reasonable period. Unlike a statutory appeal, there is no strict statutory period of limitation for filing a writ petition. But, the exercise of courts’ powers are entirely discretionary and therefore, it will be for the High Court to decide, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, whether it should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. In Union of India and others v. Parashotam Dass [(2025) 5 SCC 786], the Honourable Supreme Court held that where there is denial of fundamental right or jurisdictional error or error apparent on the face of record, the High Court can interfere by exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that self-restraint by High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is distinct from putting embargo on High court in exercising such jurisdiction.

8. There is a specific provision in the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (‘Act, 2007' for short) for filing appeal against the order of the Tribunal. Section 30 of the Act, 2007 reads thus:

                  “30. Appeal to Supreme Court.—(1) Subject to the provisions of section 31, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court against the final decision or order of the Tribunal (other than an order passed under section 19):

                  Provided that such appeal is preferred within a period of ninety days of the said decision or order:

                  Provided further that there shall be no appeal against an interlocutory order of the Tribunal.

                  (2) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court as of right from any order or decision of the Tribunal in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt:

                  Provided that an appeal under this sub-section shall be filed in the Supreme Court within sixty days from the date of the order appealed against.

                  (3) Pending any appeal under sub-section (2), the Supreme Court may order that—

                  (a) the execution of the punishment or the order appealed against be suspended; or

                  (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail:

                  Provided that where an appellant satisfies the Tribunal that he intends to prefer an appeal, the Tribunal may also exercise any of the powers conferred under clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be.”

9. The period prescribed for preferring an appeal is ninety days from the date of the decision or order and admittedly, in this case, the petitioner has not preferred any appeal as provided under Section 30 of the Act. In this case, the writ petition is filed after a lapse of 8 years, 10 months and 10 days from the date of the impugned order of the Tribunal. It is the specific case of the respondent that the order under challenge is already implemented and therefore, the petitioner cannot re-agitate an issue finally decided by a competent forum and attained finality, by filing an inordinately belated writ petition. We have no doubt that entertaining such a belated writ petition would be contrary to public policy that it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation.

10. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in filing the present writ petition, the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium would apply and therefore, we are of the opinion that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

In the result, the writ petition is dismissed.