1. The instant Second Appeal has been filed by the appellants challenging the judgment and decree, dt.29.08.2002 in AS.No.299 of 2001, on the file of the III Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, whereby the appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the judgment and decree, dt.07.11.2000, in OS.No.1228 of 1993 on the file of the V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, was allowed decreeing the suit of the plaintiff.

2. For brevity and better understanding of the case, the parties will hereinafter be referred as per their array in the original suit.

3. The plaintiffs have filed the underlying suit OS.No.1228 of 1993 on the file of the V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad, seeking ejectment of the defendants and to deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule property and to award future mesne profits @ Rs.1000/- p.m., for use and occupation of the suit schedule property.

4. The brief averments in the plaint are that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and possessor of Plot No.2 in New Survey No.127/1 (Old Survey No.58), admeasuring Ac.1.20 guntas, situated at Bahaloolkhanguda, now known as Erragadda, Hyderabad (popularly known as the “Mental Care Hospital, Erragadda”).

5. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that the suit land was originally leased by his predecessor-in-title to defendant Nos.1 to 3 under an indenture of lease for the purpose of establishing a Government Mental Care Hospital, which was shifted from Jalna, Mahaboobnagar District, to the suit property. The lease was allegedly for the period from 01.04.1972 to 31.03.1983 at a monthly rent of Rs.5/- under an unregistered lease deed. According to the plaintiff, the Government came into occupation of the suit land pursuant to the lease granted by the original owner for establishing and running the Mental Care Hospital at Erragadda and further even after expiry of the lease period, defendant Nos.1 to 3 continued in possession as tenants on the same terms and conditions until the tenancy was terminated by a quit notice.

6. The plaintiff further avers that, the defendant Nos.1 and 2 addressed a letter to the plaintiff to take steps for preventing encroachments and remained silent despite encroachments being made into the suit land, and as the lease period is completed, he thus, issued a notice dt.27.02.1986 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, terminating the tenancy with effect from 31.03.1986 by calling upon the defendant Nos.1 to 3 to deliver vacant possession of the suit property, and also demanded damages at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per month from 01.04.1986 until delivery of possession to him. Thereafter, as the defendants failed to deliver possession of the schedule property, the plaintiff issued a notice under Section 80 CPC on 20.08.1986 and instituted the present suit for ejectment and consequential reliefs.

7. It is further the case of the plaintiff that he purchased the suit schedule property under a registered Sale Deed(Ex.A19) from the legal heirs of late Khan Bahadoor Syed Ali Khasim, consequent upon his death, who are his wife and other legal heirs and pursuant to the execution of the sale deed, possession of the property was delivered to him. Further, by virtue of the said conveyance deed and delivery of possession, the plaintiff claims to have become the absolute owner and possessor of the suit schedule property and he has stepped into the shoes of the original owners and the plaintiff has filed the present suit for the reliefs claimed.

8. The plaintiff further contends that, since the lease in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 3 had been executed by his vendors and as the lease period expired, he validly terminated the tenancy by issuing the requisite statutory notice and sought ejectment, and entitled to recover possession of the property together with mesne profits from defendant Nos.1 to 3.

9. The 3rd defendant filed a written statement, which was subsequently adopted by defendant Nos.1 and 2 through a Memo.

10. The defendant Nos.1 to 3 though jointly dispute the title of the plaintiff over the suit land, contend that the adjacent lands were originally taken by the erstwhile Government from their respective owners for the use of the Government Mental Care Hospital, Hyderabad, after it was shifted from Jalna to Hyderabad in the year 1953, and ever since the said year, the suit land is in possession of the Government for use of the Mental Care Hospital and further, the suit land has also remained in the continuous possession and enjoyment of the Government ever since 1953 and further, the suit land was under a long-term lease and that the plaintiff purchased the same from the original owners with full knowledge of the Government's possession and occupation without there being any letter of Attornment by the original owner, and therefore the defendant Nos.1 to 3 contend that the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit for ejectment with any letter of attornment by the original lesser and also without any written notice of intimation to the defendant Nos.1 to 3.

11. The defendants No.1 to 3 further aver that, during the year 1963, the Government proposed acquisition of the schedule property along with adjacent lands for the use of the Mental Care Hospital vide G.O.Ms.No.2805, Health Department, dt.19.10.1963, and though acquisition proceedings could not be initiated due to certain difficulties, the said Government Order continues to remain in force. It is admitted that rents were paid up to the end of March, 1983,to the original lessor and thereafter to the plaintiff upto certain period and thereafter the plaintiff did not approach the authorities for collection of rent.

12. The defendant Nos.1 to 3 further contend that the Government had taken possession of the entire extent of Acres 85.00 guntas of land along with the disputed extent of Ac.1.20 guntas claimed by the plaintiff, even prior to the plaintiff's purchase of the property. Therefore, according to them, the question of releasing any portion of the land in favour of the plaintiff or ejectment of the defendants No.1 to 3, does not arise. It is also their contention that the plaintiff has no legal or valid claim for damages. The defendants further state that the Government has initiated steps to remove encroachments from portions of the land and has also taken measures for acquisition of the entire extent of Acres 85.00 guntas. On all these grounds, defendant Nos.1 to 3 sought dismissal of the suit.

13. The defendant No.33, the District Collector, who was impleaded subsequent to the institution of the suit, filed a separate written statement setting up an altogether different case and raising several additional pleas.

14. The principal averment made by defendant No.33 is that Bahaloolkhanguda village, where the schedule property is situated and which is presently known as the Hyderabad Mental Care Hospital area, was an Ex-Jagir village forming part of the estate of Raja Dharmakaran Bahadoor. Defendant No.33 specifically contends that an initial survey conducted in the year 1336 Fasli (1926 A.D.) disclosed 122 survey numbers in the village, and Survey No.58, in which the suit property is situated, admeasuring Acres 97.14 guntas, was recorded as Government Kancha land.

15. It is further stated that in the subsequent survey conducted in 1348 Fasli(1938 AD), Survey No.58 was correlated to Survey Nos.42, 43, 63, 64, 65, 173 to 176 and 186, with a total extent of Ac.97.28 guntas, and that the said land was shown as belonging to the Royal Air Force, as reflected in the Wasool Baqui for the year 1950, and after abolition of the Jagirs in 1358 Fasli, corresponding to 1948 A.D., the village merged with the Diwani administration and the estate stood vested in the Government. Consequently, a Sethwar was prepared.

16. It is further averred that after the Royal Air Force vacated the land, possession was taken over by the Public Works Department, and thereafter the Government Mental Care Hospital was shifted from Jalna, Mahabubnagar District and was established in the year 1953 on the said land admeasuring Acres 97.28 guntas consisting of several survey numbers. Further, a Town Survey was conducted under the provisions of the A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923, and the same was notified in the Hyderabad District Gazette Extraordinary, dt.22.04.1976. Further, the defendant No.33 contended that unless the notified survey is modified by a decree of a competent Civil Court within three years from the date of publication, the survey entries and boundaries become final and conclusive proof, and binding on all concerned.

17. The defendant No.33 further contends that after abolition of the Jagirs, all the lands vested in the Government in respect of which no person was paying land revenue to the Jagirdars, and which did not belong to any private individual, were liable to be recorded as Government property. It is also specifically averred that any entries in revenue records by themselves do not confer or create title.

18. According to defendant No.33, the entire extent of land is in the possession and enjoyment of the Institute of Mental Care, popularly known as the Government Mental Care Hospital, Erragadda. Though claims have been advanced through Nawab Rais Yar Jung Bahadur, it is contended that neither he nor persons claiming through him were ever in possession of the land.

19. It is further the case of defendant No.33 that the pahanies clearly disclose possession of the land by the Royal Air Force and, subsequently, by the Mental Care Hospital authorities, and that the present suit has been instituted with an intention to unlawfully claim valuable Government land. It is also contended that even assuming that Nawab Rais Yar Jung Bahadur had been granted a patta by the erstwhile ruler of the State, such grant was neither alienable nor heritable.

20. The defendant No.33 therefore contends that the claims put forward by various persons tracing title through different predecessors are wholly baseless, and that no re-grant was ever made in favour of the plaintiff or his predecessors in respect of the suit land. Since the suit property has at all relevant times remained in the possession and control of the Government and its institutions, defendant No.33 asserts that the plaintiff has no right, title or interest in the suit schedule property and, accordingly, seeks dismissal of the suit with costs.

21. Upon consideration of the rival pleadings, the learned trial Court was pleased to settle the following issues:

               1. Whether the notice of termination is proper?

               2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for eviction of the defendant?

               3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for measne profits and if so, at what rate?

               4. To what relief?

22. Subsequently, an additional issue was also framed, which reads as under:

               Whether the suit property is a Govt. land and therefore the suit is not maintainable?

23. On behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff himself was examined as PW1 and got marked ExsA1 to A22 and on behalf of defendants, Mandal Revenue Officer, Deputy Tahasildar Survey and Land Records, office of the District Collector, were examined as DW1 and DW2, and got marked Exs.B1 to B7.

Findings of the trial Court in OS.No.1228 of 1993:

24. After hearing the arguments advanced by both sides and upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court observed that the suit was one for ejectment of defendant Nos.1 to 3 from the suit schedule property, founded on the plea that the vendors of the plaintiff had leased the property to the defendants No.1 to 3 and as the plaintiff had subsequently acquired title thereto, the plaintiff stepped into the shoes of the original lessor and therefore the suit is filed for ejectment of defendants No.1 to 3.

25. The trial Court observed that the plaintiff's claim was founded upon a registered sale deed under which he allegedly purchased the suit schedule property from one Khan Bahadoor Syed Ali Khasim. However, the Court noticed that Ex.A8, which consisted of correspondence emanating from defendant No.3, referred to one Khan Bahadur Syed Ali Khan as the owner of the property. The learned trial Court seriously doubted this discrepancy as to the identity and description of the person through whom title was claimed by the plaintiff vide Ex.A9.

26. The learned trial Court also took note of the discrepancy in respect of handing over possession of the land of Acres 2.05 guntas to Syed Ali Khasim vide Ex.A9, and the inconsistencies relating to the alleged delivery of possession of the suit schedule property under the documents relied upon by the plaintiff, and treated such discrepancies as circumstances affecting the credibility of the plaintiff's claim.

27. Though the plaintiff relied upon the alleged admission of ownership by defendant Nos.1 to 3, the learned trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence of DWs.1 and 2 and the documents marked on behalf of the defendants as Exs.B1 to B7, came to the conclusion that the material placed by the defendants disclosed a prima facie case of ownership in favour of the Government. The trial Court was of the view that the documentary evidence produced by the defendants was sufficient to raise a serious dispute regarding the plaintiff's title, which would indicate Government ownership over the property, and thus held that the plaintiff had failed to establish even a prima facie title to the suit schedule property. It was also observed that there was no attornment of tenancy by the original lessors or vendors in favour of the plaintiff and also held that in the absence of such attornment, the Court found it difficult to accept the plaintiff's claim that he had stepped into the shoes of the original lessors and had become entitled to seek eviction of the defendants by issuing the suit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881.

28. The trial Court further held that under mistaken facts, though admitted by defendants No.1 to 3, will not create any right to the plaintiff to claim the relief even assuming that certain admissions made by defendant Nos.1 to 3, such admissions, if made under a mistaken understanding of facts, would not by themselves confer any enforceable right upon the plaintiff to obtain the relief of ejectment. The Court was of the opinion that such admissions could not override the substantive evidence relating to title produced by the defendants vide Exs.B1 to B7.

29. The learned trial Court also took into consideration the specific pleadings raised by defendant No.33, together with the documentary evidence produced in support thereof, which, according to the Court, disclosed a distinct claim of title on behalf of the Government over the suit schedule property. The Court found that these pleadings and documents raised substantial questions regarding ownership of the land, which militated the plaintiff's claim.

30. For the aforesaid reasons and other findings recorded in the judgment, the learned trial Court ultimately concluded that even in a suit for ejectment based on the alleged landlord–tenant relationship, the plaintiff was required to establish at least a prima facie title to the property as the defendant No.33 specifically disputed the title of the plaintiff by specific pleadings and held that the plaintiff had failed to establish title over the suit schedule property, and as such, the plaintiff was not entitled to the reliefs sought in the suit and accordingly dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred A.S. No.299 of 2001 before the First Appellate Court.

Findings of the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.299 of 2001:

31. The learned First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, reversed the findings of the trial Court, by holding out that the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff, particularly Exs.A10 to A12, A15, A16, A17 and A18, would clinch the plaintiff's claim and sufficiently demonstrated the recognition of his ownership by the concerned defendants No.1 to 3.

32. The appellate Court placed considerable reliance on Ex.A10, a letter dt.21.10.1970, addressed by the then Executive Engineer, PWD (Roads & Buildings), Hyderabad, to the plaintiff, requesting him to enter into a lease arrangement with the Department and assuring payment of the corresponding arrears of rent in respect of the suit schedule property. The Court also relied upon Ex.A11, dt.30.07.1973, wherein the said Executive Engineer informed the plaintiff about unauthorized encroachments over the schedule property and requested him to take appropriate steps for their removal. The first appellate Court held that such correspondence clearly indicated that the defendants No.1 to 3 and the Government authorities were treating the plaintiff as the person entitled to deal with the property.

33. The learned First Appellate Court further referred to Ex.A18, proceedings, dt.10.01.1984 issued by the Director of Medical Education, Hyderabad, wherein the plaintiff was recognized as the owner of the schedule property and was requested to take necessary measures to safeguard the land from encroachments. Reliance was also placed on Ex.A12, proceedings, dt.03.01.1984 issued by the Superintendent, Government Hospital for Mental Care, Hyderabad, sanctioning payment of an amount of Rs.849.40 towards rent for the period from 01.04.1970 to 31.02.1983 in favour of the plaintiff. The First Appellate Court observed that the said proceedings not only sanctioned rent in favour of the plaintiff but also acknowledged him as the owner of the schedule property.

34. The appellate Court further took note of Ex.A15, a communication, dt.27.02.1970, issued by the Director of Medical and Health Services concerning the plaintiff's request for release of the schedule property, wherein it was stated that the matter was under consideration by the Government. Reliance was also placed on Ex.A17, letter, dt.31.07.1980, issued by the Director of Medical Services, Andhra Pradesh, requesting the plaintiff to approach the Executive Engineer, PWD (R&B), for execution of a lease in respect of the schedule property. The First Appellate Court held that these documents consistently reflected the Government's recognition of the plaintiff's title in relation to the suit schedule property.

35. The learned First Appellate Court also relied upon the admissions made by defendant Nos.1 to 3 and considered the effect of Ex.A14, being the notice issued by the Urban Land Ceiling authorities under Section 6(2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, calling upon the plaintiff to submit a statement in Form-I in respect of the schedule property. The Court was of the view that issuance of such notice by the statutory authorities constituted a further circumstance supporting the plaintiff's claim over the property. The appellate Court also took into account the other documents connected with the Urban Land Ceiling proceedings relied upon by the plaintiff, and on a cumulative consideration of the admissions of defendant Nos.1 to 3 also, the specific assertion of defendant No.33 stating that the Government is proposing to acquire the schedule property along with adjacent lands of the Mental Care Hospital, and held that the aforesaid official correspondence and concluded that the plaintiff had successfully established his case for the reliefs claimed.

36. The learned First Appellate Court further disbelieved the documents relied upon by the defendants, namely Exs.B1 to B7, and declined to accept the defence version founded thereon, and further the First Appellate Court held in view of the documents filed by the plaintiff, that the defendants No.1 to 3 had continued after expiry of the original lease and that the defendants were occupying the property as tenants holding over. Further held that the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff carried greater evidentiary value and outweighed the documents relied upon by the defendants, and thus, the plaintiff was entitled to seek eviction of the defendants. On the said findings, the learned First Appellate Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, and decreed the suit as prayed for.

37. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, the appellants/defendant Nos.1 to 3 preferred the instant Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, raising several contentions and substantial questions of law.

38. The instant Second Appeal was admitted for consideration of the following substantial questions of law:

               1. Whether the plaintiff acquires title to the suit schedule property in question when the so called vendor of the plaintiff himself was not having a valid title?

               2. Whether the alleged vendor of the plaintiff can alienate/dispose of or in any way deal with the suit schedule property after abolition of Jagirs under Jagir Abolition Act, 1358F and after merger of the ex-Jagir village(under the estate of Raja Daram Karan Bahadhur) with Diwani (Government) and the lands vest with the Government?

               3. Whether the revision survey conducted as per the provisions of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act 1317 F and the revenue records prepared pursuant there to in respect of the suit schedule property are binding on the persons concerned and whether the provisions of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, 1357F were enforceable in Kalsa as well as known Kaslsa areas of Hyderabad State?

               4. Whether the town survey land records prepared under the provisions of A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923 and published U/s.13 of the said Act are not binding on the parties concerned in the absence of a decree contrary obtained U/s.14 of the said Act within 3 years of such notification|

               5. Whether the filing of a declaration under the ULC Act would by itself confer a title on the declaration

               6. Whether the Jagir tenures are inalienable?

39. In the light of the substantial questions of law formulated above, it is pertinent to note that the present Second Appeal arises out of a dispute which is closely connected with A.S. No.41 of 2000 pending before this Court. In the said appeal, a different claimant sought substantially similar reliefs, namely, ejectment of the defendants, recovery of possession of the property, and mesne profits, and that the subject matter involved in both proceedings pertains to the very same land forming part of the area occupied by the Hyderabad Mental Care Hospital.

40. Both matters arise out of claims relating to the same survey number and concern lands forming part of the Hyderabad Mental Care Hospital premises, however, as one being a First Appeal preferred under Section 96 read with Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereas the present matter is a Second Appeal filed under Section 100 CPC, although both appeals were heard together, for the sake of convenience and to avoid repetition of facts and arguments, they are being disposed of simultaneously by separate judgments as to their distinct scope and nature of the jurisdiction to be exercised in each proceeding.

41. Heard Sri Pottigari Sridhar Reddy, learned Government Pleader from the Office of the learned Advocate General for the appellants/defendants and Sri S. Malla Rao, learned counsel for respondent/plaintiff. The claim against the defendants No.4 to 32 is given up in the First Appeal as such they are also not arrayed as contesting parties in the present Appeal.

Submissions on behalf of appellants/defendants:

42. The learned Government Pleader from the Office of the learned Advocate General, appearing for the appellants/defendants, contended that the plaintiff has failed to establish the basic foundation of his claim, and that apart, no credible documentary evidence has been produced to establish that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and possessor of the suit schedule property. It is further argued that when the initial burden is not discharged, more so, even prima facie title has not been established by the plaintiff.

43. The learned Government Pleader further contended that a specific plea was taken by the defendants No.1 to 3 that lease amount was withheld pending verification of the plaintiff’s title, but the learned First Appellate Court did not properly considered the said issue. It is also contended that the defendants No.1 to 3 have not handled the matter diligently and admitted the plaintiff as landlord without proper verification of the documents.

44. It is further contended that the First Aplpellate Court failed to appreciate the cardinal principle that suits involving Government property must be dealt cautiously, as the Government officers, who are expected to safeguard public property, may, due to negligence or collusion, admit claims of private parties, thereby putting public property at risk, and any such loss ultimately affects the public at large.

45. The learned Government Pleader relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Hanumaiah and others v. Secretary to Govt. of Karnataka(2010(5) SCC 203) and contended that the plaintiff must establish at least prima facie title, particularly where the suit is based on a lease deed purportedly executed by the 1st defendant on behalf of the Government. It is further argued that the 3rd defendant, being Superintendent of the Government Mental Care Hospital, Hyderabad, acted without due verification and admitted the plaintiff as owner, thereby admitted the jural relationship without any proper lease deed exhibited by the plaintiff and all other documents are mutual correspondences, which are not supported by any evidence.

46. It is further contended that the plaintiff impleaded only the Medical & Health Department officials, whereas the Revenue Department, being the custodian of Government lands, ought to have been impleaded. It is further stated that though the District Collector was not made as party, he was impleaded subsequently. It is further emphasized that the learned First Appellate Court set aside the well-considered findings of the trial Court, which held that the plaintiff has no prima facie title over the  suit schedule property de-horse the admission of the defendants No.1 to 3.

47. It is also contended that the First Appellate Court has not appreciated the evidence and documents filed by plaintiff in proper perspective and even the so called lease deed alleged to have been executed by the vendor of the plaintiff is not produced and all other exhibits are only mere correspondences which are not authentic and therefore the claim of the plaintiff is based on defective and unreliable material, and the learned First Appellate Court had not appreciated the said facts in proper perspective and grossly erred in setting aside the well-considered and well-reasoned judgment and decree of the learned trial Court.

48. The learned Special Government Pleader further contended that the suit property is situated in Bahaloolkhanguda(now prime locality/core area of Hyderabad), which is an ex-Jagir village, and pursuant to the Jagir Abolition Regulation, 1358 Fasli (1948 AD), the entire village vested in the State Government. In support of the said contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Waqf Board & Ors(2022(20) SCC 383), wherein it was held that Jagir lands vested in the State and were administered by the Jagir Administrator under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act; and in that view of the matter, the assertion of the plaintiff that he is the owner of the property is baseless and the plaintiff cannot derive any title in relation to the jagir land.

49. It is further contended that after such vesting, surveys were conducted and original Survey No.58 admeasuring Acres 97.14 guntas was shown as Govt. Kancha land in the initial survey conducted in 1336 Fasli and in the subsequent survey in 1348 Fasli, the said survey No.58 was correlated to survey Nos.42, 43,63, 64, 65, 173 to 176 and 186 and the same was recorded as Royal Air Force as evident from Wasool Baqui of the year 1950, and after abolition of Jagirs, the said village was merged with Diwani and as per the Sethward Record, the old survey No.58 is found correlated to new survey number and merged into survey No.127, which was classified as Sarkari land (Government land) and recorded as Potekharab (uncultivable), and the Sethwar of 1953, marked as Ex.B6, which is the final settlement record, supports such classification, and the learned trial Court ought to have at least scrutinized the material placed by the plaintiff with Exs.B1 to B7. 50. It is also submitted that this Court in G. Satyanarayan v. Govt. of AP.3 considered the evidentiary value of Sethwar and held that presumption of title arises from such entries and since the plaintiff has not produced any document to rebut the same, the First Appellate Court reversed the findings of the learned trial Court.

51. It is further contended that no lease deed has been produced by the plaintiff. The plaintiff relies only upon certain correspondence exchanged between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3, which, by itself, does not constitute a valid or enforceable lease deed in the eyes of law. In the absence of any duly executed lease deed, there is no document creating or evidencing a lawful lease in favour of the plaintiff. The alleged arrangement is therefore unsupported by any legally admissible instrument of lease, and the correspondence relied upon cannot confer any leasehold rights upon the plaintiff nor bind the Government in any manner.

52. It is further contended that the First Appellate Court erred in relying on admissions and ignoring the plea of fraud and misrepresentation, and that the Revenue Department is the proper 3 2014 SCC Online AP 334 custodian of Government lands and the District Collector is the competent authority, who specifically asserted the title of the Government and disputed the title of the plaintiff and though the defendants No.1 to 3 admitted the title of the plaintiff, such admission in the teeth of the pleadings of the defendant No.33 and evidence vide Exs.B1 to B7, could amply prove that the plaintiff has no title over the schedule property.

53. It is further contended that in the backdrop of the factual issue much credence should have been given to the evidence of DW1 and DW2, which clearly establishes that the property belongs to the Government, though the trial Court dismissed the suit, the First Appellate Court without any proper scrutiny of the documents, allowed the appeal.

54. Finally, it is contended that Exs.A1 to A22 do not confer even prima facie title on the plaintiff and on the basis of mere admission on the part of the defendants alone, the plaintiff cannot succeed without any prima facie title and that the learned trial Court has committed no error in dismissing the suit, and that the learned First Appellate Court on erroneous consideration, has decreed the suit setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, and therefore the judgment and decree are liable to be set aside and the appeal deserves to be allowed.

Submissions on behalf of respondent/plaintiff :

55. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff, Sri S. Malla Rao, adopted, in substance, the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel, Sri Sunil B. Ganu, in A.S. No.41 of 2000. As the said submissions have a direct bearing on the issues arising for consideration in the present appeal, they are reproduced for ready reference and consideration asfaras applicable to the instant case, as under:

               “Arguments of plaintiff in AS.No.41 of 2000:

               The learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff, Sri Sunil B. Ganu, while reiterating the pleadings in the plaint as well as the admissions made by the defendants in the suit, contended that the jural relationship between the plaintiff and defendants has been admitted by the defendants by their own specific admission, and once the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted, the question of proving title by the plaintiff does not arise.

               It is further contended that the exhibits filed by the defendants, particularly Ex.A6, clearly indicate that the defendants themselves pleaded that the schedule property along with other lands were proposed to be acquired by the Government by initiating appropriate proceedings, but the said acquisition could not be proceeded with due to certain difficulties.

               It is further contended despite admitting tenancy and the plaintiff as the owner of the property, the defendants examined DW1 and DW2 setting up a new case that the suit schedule property formed part of Jagir lands and that by virtue of the Jagir Abolition Regulation, 1948, the entire land vested in the Government by virtue of Section 5 of the Act. This contention, according to the learned Senior Counsel, is wholly inconsistent with the pleadings and settled principles of law.

               It is further submitted that the admissions made in the written statement, read along with Exs.A1 to A9, clearly establish that the plaintiff is the landlady of the suit schedule property, and therefore the learned trial Court was right in holding that under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, in a suit for ejectment, once the jural relationship is admitted, the tenant is estopped from disputing the title of the landlord, particularly in the absence of a specific plea in the written statement.

               The learned Senior Counsel further contended that Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, sets out the circumstances under which a lease stands forfeited, and in the present case, Exs.A8 and A9 are crucial documents which were issued after receipt of the notice of termination, wherein the defendants had promised to send a detailed reply, but no such reply was ever issued.

               It is further submitted that Ex.A9, dt.13.02.1984, is an important official document issued by the Superintendent of Government Mental Care Hospital referring to G.O.Ms.No.676, dt.21.06.1980, wherein assurance was given for payment of arrears of rent, thereby clearly admitting landlord-tenant relationship.

               Reliance is placed on the judgment in G. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagdish(1987 (4) SCC 424), wherein it was held that under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, a tenant who has been inducted into possession cannot deny the title of the landlord, however defective it may be, so long as possession is not surrendered; and in the light of the said decision, it is contended that as the defendants in the instant case have not filed any counter claim, they are therefore precluded from raising inconsistent claims in appeal.

               The learned Senior Counsel also relied upon State of Andhra Pradesh v. Hyderabad Potteries P. Limited & Another(2010 (5) SCC 382), to contend that TSLR entries have no conclusive evidentiary value to establish title, as affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Further reliance is placed on Ahmed Saheb (Dead) LRs. v. Sayed Ismail(2012 (8) SCC 516), to contend that admitted facts need not be prooved.

               It is further submitted that the decision in R. Hanumaiah and others v. Secretary to Govt. of Karnataka(2010(5) SCC 203) is distinguishable, as that was a suit for declaration of title against the Government, whereas the present suit is one for ejectment and consequential reliefs, and in the present case, there are clear admissions of tenancy by the defendants themselves.

               It is further contended that reliance placed by the learned Special Government Pleader on G.Satyanarayana v. P.Jagdish’s case (supra) is also misplaced, as the Sethwar entries lose significance in the light of the categorical admissions by the Government, and such entries cannot override admitted jural relationships, and that the fact remains that the government made convenient entries once they decided to change their stand.

               Further reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jyothi Sharma v. Vishnu Goel(2025 INSC 1099), wherein it was held that in eviction proceedings, strict proof of ownership is not required as in a title suit, and a tenant who has entered possession under a rent deed cannot subsequently dispute the landlord’s ownership.

               It is therefore contended that the defendants are now attempting to take a completely inconsistent stand by challenging the title of the plaintiff in appeal, contrary to their admissions in the written statement and evidence.

               It is further contended that once the jural relationship is admitted, the defendants are estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiff, and therefore the learned trial Court has rightly decreed the suit. It is finally contended that the appellants have not made out any substantial grounds warranting interference with the well-considered and reasoned judgment and decree of the trial Court, and hence the appeal deserves to be dismissed.”

56. Apart from the above, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, Sri S.Malla Rao, would further contend that the documents relied upon by the defendants under Exs.B1 to B7 do not materially affect the plaintiff's case, particularly in view of the clear assertions and admissions made by defendant Nos.1 to 3 regarding the plaintiff's ownership of the suit schedule property, and that such admissions, coupled with the documents marked as Exs.A8 to A22, unequivocally establish the plaintiff as the absolute owner and possessor of the suit schedule property. According to the learned counsel, once both the tenancy and the plaintiff's title stood admitted by defendant Nos.1 to 3, the plaintiff's entitlement to seek ejectment stood established.

57. He would further contend that the plea raised by defendant No.3 that the disputed land formed part of a Jagir estate and stood vested in the Government upon abolition of Jagirs is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of adjudicating the present suit. It is submitted that in a suit for ejectment, where the relationship of landlord and tenant as well as the plaintiff's title have been admitted by defendant Nos.1 to 3, the assertion by the Government claiming ownership over the property cannot defeat the plaintiff's claim for ejecment of defendants No.1 to 3.

58. The learned counsel would further contend that the learned First Appellate Court has correctly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record and arrived at findings that are fully supported by the material available before it. The learned counsel would contend that no substantial ground, much less no substantial question of law arise for consideration and the defendants have not made out any ground warranting interference with the well-reasoned judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 CPC. Thus, it is contended that the present Second Appeal lacks merit and is accordingly liable to be dismissed.

DETERMINATION BY THIS COURT :

59. Since the present appeal has been admitted for consideration of the substantial questions of law referred to above, before adverting to the other substantial questions of law, it is appropriate to first consider the substantial question of law No.1, which is foundational in nature and has a direct bearing on the other issues.

               Substantial Question of Law No.1:

               “Whether the plaintiff acquires title to the suit schedule property when the alleged vendor of the plaintiff himself was not having a valid title?”

60. The present suit is filed by the plaintiff for ejectment of defendant Nos.1 to 3 and for recovery of possession of the suit schedule property, on the premise that the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff had leased the property in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 3 for establishing and running the Government Mental Care Hospital. The plaintiff purchased the property under Ex.A19/Sale Deed from the legal heirs of the original owner, he stepped into the shoes of the lessor and became entitled to seek eviction.

61. However, defendant No.33, namely the District Collector, who was subsequently impleaded, has set up an entirely different defence and has seriously disputed the very foundation of the plaintiff’s claim. It is specifically contended that the schedule property forms part of the erstwhile Jagir estate of Bahaloolkhanguda village and that after abolition of Jagirs under the Jagir Abolition Regulation, 1358 Fasli, the entire estate stood vested in the Government. It is further contended that the alleged vendor of the plaintiff had no subsisting or transferable right over the schedule property and that the documents relied upon by the defendants, namely Exs.B1 to B7, disclose the property as Government land.

62. In the light of the rival claims, the primary question that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff, who seeks ejectment of the defendants, has established a legally enforceable title over the schedule property and whether the plaintiff has got valid lease deed for claiming the relief.

63. The Hon’ble Supreme Court Ananthula Sudhakar v. Buchireddy (Dead) by LRs.((2008) 4 SCC 594) has held that when the defendant raises a serious cloud over the title of the plaintiff, and sets up a rival claim of ownership, the appropriate remedy is to seek declaration of title and consequential relief, and the plaintiff cannot maintain a suit based merely on an ancillary relief of injunction without establishing title. The principle laid down therein would squarely apply to the present case, as the plaintiff’s claim for ejectment is entirely dependent upon his assertion that he is the owner and landlord of the schedule property.

64. In the present case, though defendant Nos.1 to 3 admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant of the plaintiff, defendant No.33, being the District Collector and custodian of Government lands, has specifically disputed the plaintiff’s title and asserted that the property vested in the Government. Therefore, the question of title cannot be ignored merely because certain admissions were made by departmental officers in the written statement or in correspondence.

65. The plaintiff claims title through Ex.A19/Sale Deed executed by the legal heirs of late Khan Bahadoor Syed Ali Khasim. However, the source of title of the said vendor itself has not been satisfactorily established. The documents relied upon by the plaintiff do not clearly establish that the alleged predecessor-in-title had an absolute and transferable right over the schedule property, more so, Ex.A19 is alleged to be executed by the legal heirs of late Khan Bahadoor Syed Khasim.

66. It is significant to note that even in the correspondence relied upon by the plaintiff, particularly Ex.A8, reference is made to one Khan Bahadur Syed Ali Khan as the owner of the property, whereas the plaintiff traces his title through Khan Bahadoor Syed Ali Khasim. The discrepancy in the identity of the alleged owner creates a serious doubt regarding the root of title. Further, the plaintiff failed to establish the identity of the legal heirs who executed Ex.A19 or their competency to convey valid title.

67. A purchaser cannot acquire a better title than what his vendor possessed. Therefore, unless the plaintiff proves that his vendor had a valid, subsisting and transferable title, the plaintiff cannot claim ownership merely on the strength of the sale deed.

68. On the other hand, defendant No.33 has placed reliance upon official revenue and survey records to demonstrate that the schedule property formed part of Government land. The defence is that Bahaloolkhanguda was an Ex-Jagir village and after abolition of Jagirs, the lands vested in the State Government. The records produced by the defendants, namely Ex.B6/Sethwar, Ex.B7/Town Survey notification and other survey documents, indicate that the land was classified as Government land. Also Ex.B5, the Town Survey record, shows that Survey No.127/1 is classified as Government poramboke land and is shown as being utilized for the Government Mental Care Hospital.

69. Further, DW1, the Mandal Revenue Officer, in his evidence, has specifically stated that the schedule property is Government land. His evidence is supported by the documentary evidence maintained by the Revenue Department in the ordinary course of administration.

70. It is true that revenue entries by themselves do not create title. However, they are relevant pieces of evidence regarding the nature and classification of the land. When such entries/records are supported by survey proceedings, settlement records and official notifications, they cannot be ignored while considering whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie right to seek ejectment.

71. The documents relied upon by the plaintiff, particularly Exs.A10 to A12, A15, A16, A17 and A18, which are communications from Government authorities, were relied upon by the First Appellate Court to conclude that the plaintiff’s ownership was recognized by the Government. However, such correspondence cannot by itself confer title upon the plaintiff when the very authority of the alleged vendor to create title is under dispute. Administrative communications issued by officers cannot substitute proof of title, more so, their authenticity is also not proved by leading evidence. Nonetheless the copy of the lease deed is neither produced nor marked.

72. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Hanumaiah’s case(supra) has cautioned Courts while dealing with claims against Government property and held that mere admissions or actions of Government officials cannot result in private parties acquiring public property, particularly when the possibility of negligence or collusion by officers cannot be ruled out. The relevant principle is that Courts must insist upon strict proof of title when Government property is involved and it is always the gullible officers, who tend to switch sides for various reasons and such supporting version of the claims against the government, would be detrimental to the public property.

73. The said principle applies squarely to the present case. The plaintiff’s claim substantially rests upon the alleged lease and subsequent correspondence, whereas the defendants have produced official records showing the land as Government property. Therefore, the Court is required to examine the title independently and cannot proceed merely on the basis of admissions, coupled with a legally valid lease deed.

74. The learned counsel for the plaintiff placed reliance upon Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act and contended that the defendants, having admitted the landlord-tenant relationship, are estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiff. There is no dispute regarding the settled principle of law that a tenant is estopped from denying the landlord’s title during continuance of tenancy. However, this principle cannot be applied by itself without first making sure that a clear and valid tenancy is actually proved on record, because a tenancy cannot survive in law if the person claiming to be the landlord has no legal right to lease the property at all. Further, admissions alone are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but act as substantive evidence. So also, the estoppel under Section 116 is not automatic in all circumstances and necessarily depends upon the existence of a lawful and proved tenancy relationship. More so, except mere correspondences, no valid lease deed is produced by the plaintiff.

75. However, such principle presupposes the existence of a valid tenancy created by a person having lawful authority to lease the property. Section 116 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked in a mechanical manner when the very foundation of the alleged tenancy, namely the right of the lessor to create such tenancy, is under serious dispute.

76. In the present case, the alleged lease document itself has been questioned by the defendants, and the plaintiff has failed to establish the title of the person who allegedly executed the lease. When the existence of a valid and enforceable lease is itself dependent upon proof of title, estoppel cannot operate as an absolute bar against the defendants.

77. Further, admissions are not conclusive proof of the facts admitted and must be appreciated along with the entire evidence on record. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal(2025 INSC 467) held that a decree on admission can be granted only when the admission is clear, unequivocal and legally binding.

78. Similarly, in Chaturbhuj Panda v.Collector, Raigarh(AIR 1969 SC 255), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed:

               “It is true that the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellants have not been effectively cross-examined. It is also true that the Collector had not adduced any evidence in rebuttal; but that does not mean that the court is bound to accept their evidence. The Judges are not computers. In assessing the value to be attached to oral evidence, they are bound to call into aid their experience of life. As Judges of fact, it was open to the appellate Judges to test the evidence placed before them on the basis of probabilities.”

79. The said principle makes it clear that the Court must assess the entire evidence and surrounding circumstances, and cannot grant relief solely based on admissions when contrary documentary evidence exists.

80. In the present case, the learned Trial Court rightly appreciated that the plaintiff failed to establish even a prima facie title over the suit schedule property. The Trial Court also correctly noticed that the defendants had produced sufficient documentary material showing Government ownership and raising a serious doubt regarding the plaintiff’s claim.

81. The First Appellate Court, however, while reversing the judgment of the Trial Court, placed excessive reliance upon the correspondence and admissions made by defendant Nos.1 to 3, without properly considering the effect of the Government records and the failure of the plaintiff to establish the source and validity of his title along with a valid lease deed.

82. Therefore, when the plaintiff’s own vendor’s title is not established, and when the property is claimed by the Government on the basis of Section 6 of the Jagir abolition Act, 1948, and official survey records, the plaintiff cannot acquire a valid title merely through the alleged sale deed without any proper flow of title from a source having genesis of legal and valid title.

83. Accordingly, the substantial question of law No.1 is answered in favour of the appellants/defendants by holding that the plaintiff cannot derive title to the suit schedule property unless his vendor had a valid and subsisting title capable of being transferred and consequent upon which the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit for ejectment against the defendants and for damages.

84. Insofar as the substantial questions of law i.e., Question Nos.2 to 6 are concerned, the same arise out of the defence set up by the defendants regarding the character of the suit property, the effect of abolition of Jagirs, the evidentiary value and binding nature of the survey and revenue records, and the effect of the Urban Land Ceiling proceedings relied upon by the plaintiff.

               Substantial Question of Law No.2:

               “Whether the alleged vendor of the plaintiff can alienate/dispose of or in any way deal with the suit schedule property after abolition of Jagirs under Jagir Abolition Act, 1358 Fasli (1948 AD) and after merger of the ex-Jagir village with Diwani (Government) and the lands vest with the Government?”

85. The material on record clearly establishes that Bahaloolkhanguda village, now known as Erragadda(core area of Hyderabad), was an erstwhile Jagir village forming part of the estate of Raja Dharmakaran Bahadoor/Raja Khan Bahadoor. The Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli(1948 AD) was enacted with the object of abolishing Jagir tenure and integrating Jagir areas with the Diwani administration. Under the said enactment, Section 6 provides that upon abolition of Jagirs, the entire Jagir area shall stand transferred to the State and shall be managed by the State appointed Jagir Administrator. By virtue of such statutory vesting, the entire Jagir estate stood transferred to the Government and the private rights, if any, stood extinguished except to the extent recognized under the provisions of the Regulation.

86. In the instant case, Exs.B1 to B7 coupled with the evidence of DW1 and DW2 categorically show that the disputed property forming part of the then Bahaloolkhanguda village (now Erragadda) was a Jagir estate of Raja Khan Bahadoor and subsequent to abolition of Jagirs, the said land vested in the Diwani and thereafter in the Government. The said documentary evidence is further supported by the revenue and survey records which consistently describe the land as Government land and as being utilized for the Government Mental Care Hospital.

87. In that view of the matter, the schedule property admittedly falling under the Jagir of Raja Khan Bahadoor, which vested in the Government, the alleged vendor of the plaintiff could not have possessed any independent or transferable right so as to convey valid title in favour of the plaintiff without proper and valid documents. The plaintiff will not acquire any right and title merely on the basis of the sale deed, Ex.A19, relied upon by him. It is settled principle of law that a purchaser cannot acquire a better title than what his vendor possessed.

88. At the cost of repetition, the plaintiff has not proved by any proper and distinct documents to show prima facie title over the schedule property. The root of title of the alleged vendor itself has not been established, and in the absence of proof of the vendor’s competency to alienate the property, Ex.A19 cannot confer any valid title upon the plaintiff.

89. Therefore, the substantial question of law No.2, is answered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff.

               Substantial Question of Law Nos.3 & 4:

               3) Whether the revision survey conducted as per the provisions of Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli and the revenue records prepared pursuant thereto are binding on the parties concerned and whether the provisions of Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, 1357 Fasli were enforceable in Kalsa as well as known Kalsa areas of Hyderabad State?”

               4) Whether the Town Survey Land Records prepared under the provisions of A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923 and published under Section 13 of the said Act are not binding on the parties concerned in the absence of a decree contrary obtained under Section 14 of the said Act within three years of such notification?”

90. Insofar as these substantial questions of law are concerned, relating to the revision survey conducted under the provisions of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli and the revenue records prepared pursuant thereto, coupled with the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, 1357 Fasli and the Town Survey conducted under the A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923, the said enactments provide statutory mechanisms for identification, classification and determination of the nature and boundaries of the lands.

91. Such enactments were validly enacted and were in force, and different procedures were contemplated for survey of lands and preparation of revenue records. The survey and settlement records prepared under such statutory provisions carry evidentiary value regarding the nature and classification of the property, particularly when they remain unchallenged within the prescribed period.

92. The Town Survey proceedings were conducted and the notification under Section 13 of the A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act was published in the Hyderabad District Gazette dated 22.04.1976. The said notification attained finality as no proceedings were initiated under Section 14 of the said Act seeking modification or correction of the survey entries within the prescribed period.

93. Further, Ex.B6 Sethwar, Ex.B7 Gazette notification and other survey records indicate that the land was classified as Government land and was being used for the Hyderabad Mental Care Hospital. These records are not isolated entries but form part of a continuous chain of official records maintained by the Revenue Department.

94. Though revenue entries by themselves may not finally decide title, they are still relevant pieces of evidence to understand the nature of the land. When such entries are supported by statutory survey proceedings, settlement records and official notifications, they cannot be ignored while considering whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie right over the property.

95. The plaintiff has not produced any material to rebut the said statutory records or to establish that the survey proceedings were illegal or without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the substantial question of law Nos.3 and 4 are answered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff.

               Substantial Question of Law No.5:

               “Whether filing of a declaration under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act by itself confers title on the declarant?”

96. The plaintiff relied upon the notice issued under Section 6(2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act and contended that the same recognizes his ownership. However, though a notice was issued to the plaintiff under Section 6(2) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, Ex.A18 would only show issuance of a notice calling upon the plaintiff to submit the required declaration. Such notice does not amount to determination of title nor does it create any right in favour of the declarant.

97. There are no subsequent records filed by the plaintiff evidencing computation of the land, determination under Section 8(2) or proceedings under Section 10 of the Act. Unless the statutory proceedings culminate in a final determination, mere filing of a declaration cannot confer ownership upon the declarant.

98. Therefore, the said notice has no significance for determination of the real controversy involved in the present suit and cannot be relied upon to establish the plaintiff’s title. Accordingly, substantial question of law No.5 is answered against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants.

               Substantial Question of Law No.6:

               “Whether the Jagir tenures are inalienable?”

99. It is trite that Jagir tenures were special tenures governed by the Jagir Abolition Regulation, 1358 Fasli(1948 AD) and by virtue of Sections 6, 13 &18 thereof, jagirs were not ordinary private properties and are not capable of alienation.

100. Upon abolition of Jagirs and vesting of the estate in the Government, the Jagirdar or persons claiming through him could not continue to exercise rights contrary to the statutory vesting. That being so, the alleged vendor of the plaintiff, even assuming, could not have conveyed any better right than what was available after abolition of Jagirs.

101. In the absence of proof of any valid re-grant or recognition of transferable rights, the plaintiff cannot claim title through such alleged vendor. Therefore, substantial question of law No.6 is answered in favour of the defendants.

CONCLUSION:

102. For the above all substantial questions of law answered against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants, the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court is not appreciated to be passed by following due procedure and the learned First Appellate Court has erroneously and without proper appreciation of the documents on record has grossly erred in allowing the appeal by setting aside the well-reasoned and well-considered judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, and the appellants/defendants have made substantial grounds for interference of the judgment and decree in AS.No.299 of 2001, on the file of the III Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.

103. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree, dt.29.08.2002 in AS.No.299 of 2001 on the file of the III Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, is set aside by confirming the judgment and decree, dt.07.11.2000, in OS.No.1228 of 1993 on the file of the V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, and consequently the suit of the plaintiff stands dismissed.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.