1. Judgment dated 17.07.2025 in S.C.No.590/2014 on the files of the Additional Sessions Court-III, Alappuzha, is under challenge in this appeal. The appellant is the sole accused in the above case.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor in detail. Perused the verdict impugned and the records available.

3. In this matter the prosecution case is that, at 5 a.m on 10.02.2011 the accused herein with intention to commit murder of PW1, because of the previous enmity towards her, arose out of refusal of his offer to marry her, driven car bearing Registration No.KL-31B/2222 through Thamarakkulam road deliberately and hit down PW1. Though PW1 survived, she sustained fatal injuries including fracture. On this premise, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 326, 308 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (`IPC’ for short) by the appellant/accused.

4. The trial court ventured the matter. PW1 to PW12 were examined and Exts.P1 to P12 were marked on the side of the prosecution. Exts.D1 to D3 were the contradictions extracted during cross examination of the prosecution witnesses on the side of the defence. The learned Sessions Judge addressed the evidence available and finally found that the appellant/accused committed the offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 326 and 307 of IPC and accordingly he was sentenced as under:

                  “In the result, the accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months for the offence punishable u/s.323 of IPC, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable u/s.324 of IPC, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of ₹25,000/- and in default of payment of fine amount, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for the offence punishable u/s.326 of IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs.25,000/- and in default of payment of fine amount, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for the offence punishable u/s.307 of IPC. The substantive sentences shall run concurrently. The accused will be entitled for set off from 21.02.2011 to 14.03.2011. The interim custody of vehicle bearing Registration No. KL-31B/2222 made absolute. Having considered the mental trauma suffered by PW1 on account of the accident it is hereby recommended to the District Legal Services Authority, Alappuzha to take steps for awarding adequate compensation to PW1 under Kerala Victim Compensation Scheme, 2017.”

5. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused would submit that the FIR was registered after 10 days of the occurrence and the delay was not properly explained. Further, PW1 was not admitted in a nearby hospital since she was taken to VSM Hospital, Thattarambalam, on the premise that her relative had been working there. According to him, initially the occurrence was reported as `road traffic accident’ (RTA) and it was thereafter offences under Sections 323, 324, 326 and 308 of IPC were incorporated, by the Investigating Officer. While framing charge, the learned Special Judge altered the offence under Section 308 IPC to 307 of IPC. It is pointed out that PW4, who was examined to prove entrustment of the vehicle by the accused for repair, soon after the occurrence turned hostile to the prosecution. It is submitted that despite hostility of PW4 the owner of the vehicle failed to be examined, though he was cited as a prosecution witness. According to the learned counsel of the appellant, the evidence tendered by PW1 the injured, PW2 grandmother and PW3 an independent witness are contrary and there are material omissions in the evidence of PW1 to make her evidence untrustworthy of credit. According to the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, the prosecution has failed to explain how the accused came to know about the presence of PW1 at the place of occurrence at the relevant time, especially when she had been pursuing her nursing studies at Azeezia Medical College during the relevant period. Therefore, this is a vital aspect that casts serious doubt in the prosecution evidence. In view of the matter, the learned counsel for the appellant pressed for interference in the impugned verdict by giving benefit of doubt to the accused.

6. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor supported the verdict and submitted that the evidence of PW1, in fact, alone is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused and to justify the finding of the Sessions Court that the accused had committed the above said offences. However, in the instant case, her version was corroborated by PW2, her grandmother, and PW3, an independent chance witness, who had occasion to witness the occurrence. Apart from that, PW6, Dr.Satheeshkumar proved Ext.P9 wound certificate and Ext.P10 discharge summary, which would suggest fatal injuries and would attract offence referred to in Section 320 of IPC, thereby attracting the offence punishable under Section 326 of the IPC. According to her, the appellant/accused attacked the defacto complainant with the deliberate intention of causing her death. The evidence adduced by the witness cannot be discarded merely on account of certain omissions, as they are not material. Therefore, the conviction and sentence are liable to be confirmed.

7. The points arise for consideration are:

                  (i) Whether the Sessions Court is right in holding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC?

                  (ii) Whether the Sessions Court is justified in finding that the appellant/accused committed the offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC?

                  (iii) Whether the Sessions Court went wrong in finding that the appellant/accused committed the offence punishable under Section 326 of IPC?

                  (iv) Whether the Sessions Court is right in finding that the appellant/accused committed the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC?

                  (v) Is it necessary to interfere with the impugned judgment in any manner?

                  (vi) The order to be passed?

Point Nos.(i) to (vi)

8. In this case the crucial witness is PW1. PW1 deposed that during 2001 she had resided in Thamarakkulam, with her grandmother, grandmother's sister, grandfather and great-grandmother. According to her, the occurrence was at 5 a.m on 10.02.2011 in front of her house in Kollam-Theni Highway. During the relevant time, she was studying in Azeezia Medical College for Nursing. She waited at the bus stop at 5.30 a.m to board a bus to the college along with her grandmother Rajamma Pilla (PW2) and Pankajakshi Pilla, the great-grandmother, on the side of the road. The accused had driven a maroon-coloured Chevrolet Spark car bearing Registration No. KL-31-B-2222 and hit on her and she fell down; and an iron rod pierced her stomach and she sustained injuries including fracture on both legs and second and third toes of right leg. Further she lost biceps and triceps of her left hand and sustained injury to her left eye. There was swelling on her ribs. She also deposed about the other injuries sustained by her and stated that the accused was the driver, who had driven the car at the time of occurrence and no others were present inside the car at the time of occurrence. She deposed further that there were streetlights on both sides of the road in front of her house. She witnessed the occurrence and identified the accused from the light available there. She became unconscious after the occurrence and she was taken to VSM hospital, where her mother was working as the Principal of the Nursing College attached to the hospital. Since there was bleeding from her abdomen, she was taken to Pushpagiri Hospial for scanning and thereafter referred back to VSM Hospital. According to her, the accused was the batch mate of her sister in the school and there was a cordial relationship between herself and the accused and he wanted to make an affair with her and she negatived the same as she had no interest for the same. Later the accused contacted her through phone and threatened and uttered that she would be killed and ashamed and she would not be allowed to continue her studies. According to her, the accused is one among the persons, who involved in the murder of one Ashraf. Her further version was that she survived because she evaded the car on seeing it. Regarding her presence at the place of occurrence, she stated that she had reached the house to offer Ponkala at Nediyaanikkal Temple, and when she was about to return on 10.02.2011, she was hit down by the accused. She admitted her signature in Ext.P1 FIS. She deposed that she was treated for 7 days in VSM Hospital, after the occurrence and later she was affected by stroke and she had used steroids to cure the same; and she had showed habit of vomiting blood.

9. PW1 was subjected to cross examination, during which some omissions in her previous statement with regard to involvement of the accused in the murder of Ashraf, her omission to state that she was studying in the first year of the Nursing course and also her omission regarding use of the word `finish it off' etc. were put to her. In fact, nothing was extracted in the cross examination to disbelieve the version of PW1 as regards to the occurrence and previous animosity between PW1 and the accused and threat of the accused that she would be killed and ashamed and she would not be allowed to continue her course, were not at all shaken. The grandmother of PW1 examined as PW2, an aged lady of 73 years at the time of examination, also supported the occurrence without specifying the date and time of occurrence, though she stated that there was no hit against PW1 on the eastern side of the road as she could not remember the same.

10. PW3 examined in this case is one Anilkumar.P. PW3 generally supported the occurrence as a chance witness and his evidence is that he happened to be at the place of occurrence as part of his tapioca business, viz. Stocking of tapioca from various houses in and around the place of occurrence. In fact, he had no familiarity with the accused though he identified the accused at the dock.

11. Coming to the medical evidence, Ext.P9 is the wound certificate and Ext.P10 is the discharge certificate and PW6, the doctor, who prepared Ext.P10 discharge certificate and is familiar with the author of Ext.P9, supported the prosecution case, including the injuries narrated in Ext.P10 as under:

                  “i). Soft tissue injuries on the neck with brachial plexus injuries;

                  ii). IDK on the right knee;

                  iii). Fracture of proximal phalanx of second toe of right foot;

                  iv). Pain and swelling on the right foot;

                  v). Lower abdominal pain;

                  vi). Severe tenderness on the neck region

                  vii) Tenderness and swelling left orbital region with small 2x1 cm laceration lateral to right eye,

                  viii) Swelling and tenderness over the right foot

                  viii) Tenderness over the left lumbar and liac fossa

                  It was through PW6, Ext.P11, the scan report also tendered in evidence.

12. Though PW4, a car Mechanic, was examined to prove the entrustment of vehicle, bearing Registration No.KL-31B/2222, after the occurrence, by the accused to him, he denied the same. He had turned hostile to the prosecution and his previous statement supporting the prosecution case was marked on the side of the prosecution.

13. In this case, one of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused is that 10 days delay in lodging the FIS is not at all explained. In fact, in the occurrence, PW1, who lodged Ext.P1 FIS, sustained very serious injuries including fracture and she was admitted in a hospital and her statement was recorded therefrom. As per Ext.P1 itself, PW1 stated that she was under the impression that the hospital authorities would have informed the same to the police. In the instant case, after the occurrence, PW1 was hospitalised consequent to the injuries sustained by her.  If anybody, who is aware of the occurrence or the hospital authorities failed to inform this occurrence to the police, for want of time or for any other valid reasons, the same would not have much significance in this case where the crime was registered on the basis of the FIS given by the seriously injured person at the hospital. Therefore, the delay of 10 days in lodging the FIS, as explained in Ext.P1, is to be acted upon as sufficient and therefore this challenge is found to be not acceptable.

14. In order to find out the ingredients to attract offence under Section 307 of IPC, it is necessary to extract the said provision as under:

                  “307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is herein before mentioned.”

                  Thus the ingredients are;

                  (i) That the accused did an act;

                  (ii) That the act was done with intention or knowledge and under such circumstances to cause a bodily injury as the accused knew to be likely to cause death or that such bodily injury was in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause such death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury a is likely to cause death; and

                  (iii) That the accused had no excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury.

                  In other words, the ingredients are;

                  (i) that the death of a human being was attempted;

                  (ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of the accused; and

                  (iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as:

                  (a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or

                  (b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury (see decision in Chimanbhai Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 2009 SC 3223 : (2009) 11 SCC 273).

15. The first part makes any act committed with the intention or knowledge that it would amount to murder if the act caused death punishable with imprisonment up to ten years. The second part makes such an act punishable with imprisonment for life if hurt is caused thereby. Thus even if the act does not cause any injury it is punishable with imprisonment up to 10 years. If it does cause an injury and therefore hurt, it is punishable with imprisonment for life (see decision in Pasupuleti Siva Ramakrishna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 2014 (2) Scale 417 : (2014) 5 SCC 369).

16. In the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh V. Saleem, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Apex Court held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such, non-conviction under Section 307 IPC on the premise only that simple injury was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course. In the said judgment, it was pointed out that the court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. The position that because a fatal injury was not sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been reiterated in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha, (2019)3 SCC 605. Yet, in Jage Ram (supra) and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or life threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, the intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.

17. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, initially when PW1 was admitted in the hospital, the reason for the occurrence was stated as `RTA' as it involved a motor car. Later offences under Sections 323, 324, 326 and 308 of IPC were found to be committed by the accused and accordingly reporting so to the Magistrate Court concerned, the investigation continued, which resulted in filing of final report alleging commission of the said offences. However, the learned Sessions Judge altered the offence punishable under Section 308 to 307 of IPC based on the prosecution records and tried the matter. In this case, it is relevant to note that as per the evidence of PW1, the accused made an attempt to have a love affair with PW1 and she had informed the accused that she was not interested. At this juncture, the accused telephoned her and threatened that he would humiliate her and he would not allow her to pursue her studies and she would be killed. This evidence would show that the accused had reached the place of occurrence with intention to kill her as threatened, after ensuring the presence of PW1 at her house and anticipating her return to the college at the early morning at 5 a.m. Thus the accused, who is not a native of the place of occurrence or a very nearby place, hit down PW1 by using the car driven by him with intention to commit her murder and thereby he caused grievous and fatal injuries to her, though PW1 survived on treatment.

18. According to the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, the presence of the accused at the place and time of occurrence is not properly explained by the prosecution.  In fact, the prosecution case itself is that the accused reached the place of occurrence with intention to commit murder of PW1 and in prosecution of the said intention, he had hit down her and caused serious injuries to ensure her death, though she survived. As far as the knowledge regarding the accused as to availability of PW1 at the relevant time at the place of occurrence is concerned, evidence of PW1 would depict that the accused had connection with a nearby shop and also he was aware of the fact that there was Ponkala in Nediyaanikkal Temple and she should reach her house for performing the Ponkala. Therefore, this argument cannot be countenanced.

19. Thus on re-appreciation of the evidence, it could be found that the appellant/accused deliberately hit down PW1 on the date of occurrence by using a car possessed and driven by him with intention to commit murder of PW1 due to animosity arose out of negation of his request to have an affair and romantic relationship with PW1. If so, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused to upset the finding of the Sessions Court that the accused did commit the offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 326 and 307 of the IPC would not sustain in the eye of law. In view of the above, conviction for the said offences is liable to be confirmed.

20. Coming to the sentence, the same is found to be so moderate in the facts and circumstances of the case and therefore, the sentence also doesn't require interference.

21. In the result, this Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Court are confirmed. As a sequel thereof, the order suspending sentence and granting bail to the accused stands cancelled and the bail bond also stands cancelled.

22. The accused is directed to surrender before the Additional Sessions Court-III, Alappuzha to undergo the sentence forthwith, failing which the Additional Sessions Court-III, Alappuzha shall execute the sentence forthwith.

Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Special Court for compliance and further steps.