Soumen Sen, C.J.

1. This Writ Petition is filed by the brother of the detenu, challenging Exhibit P1 Detention Order dated 31st March, 2026 passed by the 2nd respondent, invoking the power conferred under Section 3(1) of Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (PIT NDPS, for short).

2. In the detention order, the detaining authority had relied on three criminal cases in which the detenu was allegedly involved. The first case is Crime No.1867/2025 of North Paravur Police Station registered under Section 22(b) of the NDPS Act, wherein it is alleged that on 24th October, 2025, the detenu was found in possession of 3.49 grams of MDMA from a lodge room at North Paravur. The second case is Crime No.217/2025 of Vadakkekara Police Station registered for offences under Section 22(b) of the NDPS Act, wherein the allegation is that on 7th March 2025 the detenu was found in possession of 2.49 grams of MDMA and 0.03 grams of LSD stamps. The third case is Crime No.864/2023 of Vadakkekara Police Station registered under Section 20(b)(ii)A of the NDPS Act, wherein 10 grams of ganja was allegedly recovered from the possession of the detenu on 12th November, 2023.

3. The proposal for preventive detention was initiated by the Sponsoring Authority on 21st January, 2026 and the same was recommended and forwarded to the Government by the State Police Chief by a letter dated 27th February, 2026. The Government then examined the proposal and placed the same before the Screening Committee constituted in this regard under the chairmanship of Law Secretary on 5th March, 2026. The Screening Committee examined the same in detail and opined that this is subjectively and objectively a fit case for issuing order of detention under Section 3(1) of the PIT NDPS Act, 1988. Later, the report of the Screening Committee was sent to the Screening Committee members and Sponsoring authority concerned for getting their authentication and the same was received back to the Government on 19th March, 2026 and finally the order of detention was passed on 31st March, 2026.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the instant case the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the order of detention has been snapped. According to him, the last prejudicial activity relied upon against the detenu is Crime No.1867/2025 of North Paravur Police Station, Ernakulam, which was registered on 25th October, 2025 in which the detenu was arrested on the very same day. However, the detention order was passed much later, only on 31st March, 2026, nearly five months after the said prejudicial activity.

5. It is further contended that the Sponsoring Authority did not produce the order granting bail to the detenue in the last prejudicial activity before the detaining authority for its consideration. Moreover, proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS had already been initiated against the detenu. Neither the proposal nor the detention order, discloses any specific reason as to why the existing preventive measures were considered inadequate.

6. The learned counsel has further contended that though the detention order was issued on 31st March, 2026, it was executed only on 7th April, 2026 thereby, resulting in a delay of seven days in executing the detention order. In order to substantiate his contention, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura and others (AIR 2022 SC 4715) , to show that the unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention and actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of proposal and passing of the order of detention renders the detention order bad and invalid as the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention gets snapped.

7. Lastly, it is contended that the existing bail conditions imposed upon the detenu by the competent court have not been properly considered by the detaining authority. It is pointed out that the detenu was released on bail on 31st December, 2025 and that no crime or prejudicial activity has been reported against him thereafter till the issuance of the detention order on 31st March, 2026. In the absence of any subsequent criminal involvement after his release on bail, there was no basis for the detaining authority to conclude that the bail conditions had proved ineffective or that the detenu was likely to violate the same.

8. The learned Senior Government Pleader has filed a statement of facts on behalf of the first and second respondents. In the said statement, it is stated that the order of detention was passed after considering the proposals submitted to the Government of Kerala by the Sponsoring Authority i.e., the District Police Chief, Ernakulam Rural, as per letter dated 21st January, 2026, 4th March, 2026 and 9th March, 2026, respectively through the State Police Chief as per the letter dated 27th February, 2026, 7th March, 2026 and 19th March, 2026. It is further stated that the Government examined the proposal and placed the same before the Screening Committee constituted in this regard under the Chairmanship of Law Secretary on 5th March, 2026. The Screening Committee examined the proposal in detail and opined that this is subjectively and objectively a fit case for issuing order of detention under Section 3(1) of the PIT NDPS Act. Later, the report of the Screening Committee was sent to the Screening Committee members and the Sponsoring Authority concerned for getting their authentication and the same was received back to the Government on 19th March, 2026. The Government examined the proposal in detail along with the opinion of the Screening Committee and the order of detention was issued on 31st March, 2026. The detention order was timely communicated to the Ministry of Finance as per letter dated 1st April, 2026, as mandated under Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act. The detenu was arrested on 7th April, 2026 and detained at the Central Prison and Correctional Home, Thiruvananthapuram on 8th April, 2026. Subsequently, as required under Section 9(b) of the PITNDPS Act of 1988, the case of the detenu was referred to the PITNDPS Advisory Board as per letter dated 24th April, 2026. The Advisory Board heard the detenu and the Sponsoring Authority i.e. the District Police Chief, Ernakulam Rural on 14th May, 2026 through hybrid mode. After hearing and perusing the relevant records, the Advisory Board in its report dated 19th May, 2026 opined that there are sufficient reasons for the continued detention of detenu. After examining the report together with the opinion of the Advisory Board with full application of mind, the Government confirmed the order of detention issued against Sri. Frijo, S/o Micheal, under clause (f) of Section 9 of the PITNDPS Act of 1988, and ordered that the said detention will be continued for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention, u/s. 11 of the Act, vide G.O. (Rt)No.1797/2026/Home, dated 22nd May, 2026. All procedural formalities as laid down in the PITNDPS Act were complied with in issuing the detention order and in its confirmation and no constitutional safeguards were denied to the detenu.

9. The statement has also disclosed the details of the crime cases reckoned for the purpose of detention as per Section 2(e) of the PITNDPS Act, 1988 which are as follows:

               

10. It appears that in respect of Crime No.1867/2025 and Crime No.217/2025, the chemical analysis report revealed that the seized contraband contains narcotic substance and LSD. In respect of Crime No.864/2023, the detenu was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act, 1985 by the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, North Paravur, on 5th December, 2023. The Sponsoring Authority also initiated the following normal preventive measures against the detenu:

                

11. The statement also disclosed the following events in respect of the detention order which are reproduced below:

                 

12. The learned Senior Government Pleader, relying upon the aforesaid sequence of events, submitted that the detenu had repeatedly engaged in narcotic offences despite being released on bail and notwithstanding the preventive measures already initiated against him. It was further submitted that the detenu had violated the bail conditions imposed in the past and that even his conviction in one of the NDPS cases failed to dissuade him from indulging in further narcotic offences. It was also submitted that the existing preventive measures had proved ineffective in curbing his activities, thereby necessitating the order of preventive detention to prevent him from engaging in further illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances while on bail. It was, therefore, submitted that the detention order is justified in the interest of maintaining peace, tranquillity and public order.

13. We shall first deal with the contention regarding the alleged delay in passing the order of detention. According to the petitioner, there was nearly five months of delay between the last prejudicial activity attributed to the detenu and the issuance of the detention order. It is contended that such delay has the effect of snapping the live and proximate link between the prejudicial activities relied upon and the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority.

14. The PITNDPS Act does not prescribe any specific period within which an order of detention is required to be passed from the date of the prejudicial activity. What is required is that the detaining authority must arrive at its subjective satisfaction on the basis of relevant materials that preventive detention is necessary with a view to preventing the person concerned from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Nevertheless, it is well settled that the prejudicial activities relied upon must bear a live and proximate nexus with the order of detention. If there is undue and unexplained delay in passing the order, such delay may, in a given case, have the effect of snapping the nexus between the prejudicial activities and the purpose sought to be achieved by the detention. On the other hand, where the delay is satisfactorily explained by the time consumed in investigation, collection of materials, administrative processing, scrutiny by the sponsoring and screening authorities, and consideration by the Government, the detention order cannot be invalidated merely on the ground of lapse of time.

15. In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu ((1979) 1 SCC 465) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the phrase “live and proximate link” in the following words:

                  “It is further true that there must be a “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention namely the prevention of smuggling activities. We may in appropriate cases assume that the link is “snapped” if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case, we may strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the “link” not snapped but strengthened.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

16. While dealing with the question of delay it is also relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Licil Antony v. State of Kerala wherein it was observed as follows:

                  “ 9. While dealing with the question of delay in making an order of detention, the court is required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. No hard-and-fast formula is possible to be laid or has been laid in this regard. However, one thing is clear that in case of delay, that has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the purpose of preventive detention is to take immediate steps for preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activity. If there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activity and making of the order of detention and the delay has not been explained, the order of detention becomes vulnerable. Delay in issuing the order of detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is a ground to quash the order of detention. No rule with precision has been formulated in this regard. The test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of undue and long delay the court has to investigate whether the link has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

17. Similarly in Adishwar Jain v. Union of India,4 it was held as follows:

                   “15. Delay, as is well known, at both stages has to be explained. The court is required to consider the question having regard to the overall picture. We may notice that in Sk. Serajul v. State of W.B. [(1975) 2 SCC 78 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 425] this Court opined: (SCC p. 80, para 2)

                  “There was thus delay at both stages and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Burdwan recited in the order of detention. It would be reasonable to assume that if the District Magistrate of Burdwan was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude both in making the order of detention as also in securing the arrest of the petitioner, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

18. The learned Senior Government Pleader has produced the original file. We have perused the materials placed before the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board has taken note of the fact that the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.1867/2025, which is on 24th October, 2025. Detenu was arrested on the same day and bail was granted on 31st December, 2025. Thereafter, a proposal was made by District Police Chief, Ernakulam Rural, the sponsoring authority on 21st January, 2026. An additional report was filed on 4th March, 2026, which is for informing about the filing of the final report in the last crime. Another additional report was submitted on 9th March, 2026 for filing a bail order. The State Police Chief filed the report on 27th February, 2026. Corresponding to the additional reports filed by the sponsoring authority, additional reports were filed on 17th March, 2026 and 19th March, 2026. The Government placed the matter before the Screening Committee on 5th March, 2026. The Screening Committee recommended detention. Report was received back on 19th March, 2026 and finally the detention order was passed on 31st March, 2026.

19. Therefore, the above facts will go to show that there is no delay and the live link is not snapped. The time taken is for getting necessary reports and the report of the Screening Committee.

20. Now with regard to the submission that the Sponsoring Authority has not produced the order granting bail to the detenue in the last prejudicial activity, is incorrect.

21. The records disclosed would show that all relevant documents relied upon by the detaining authority were furnished to the detenu at the time of execution of the detention order and acknowledgment thereof was obtained from him. The Advisory Board has specifically recorded a finding that the grounds of detention were definite, proximate and free from ambiguity and that the detenu was informed with sufficient clarity of the materials which weighed with the detaining authority while arriving at its subjective satisfaction. Similarly, no materials were produced by the Petitioner herein to establish that any relied upon document, including the bail order, was not served on the detenu or that such non-service had caused prejudice to his constitutional right to make an effective representation. Therefore, the said challenge raised by the petitioner cannot be sustained.

22. It is also evident from a perusal of the detention order that the bail conditions imposed in the last prejudicial activity upon the detenu were specifically taken note of and duly considered by the detaining authority. In fact, the relevant bail conditions have been expressly reproduced in the detention order itself, demonstrating that the detaining authority was fully conscious of the nature and extent of the restrictions imposed upon the detenu while granting bail.

23. Now, moving on to the next contention that the proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS had already been initiated against the detenu and that neither the proposal nor the detention order discloses any reason as to why such measures were considered inadequate, we take note of the findings of the Advisory Board that, since the detenu had been involved in similar offences earlier, a rowdy history sheet was opened against him on 17th March, 2025, and proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS were also initiated before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Fort Kochi. The pendency of such proceedings before the Magistrate cannot operate as a bar to invoke the detention proceedings under Section 3(1) of the PIT NDPS Act.

24. Recently a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Sindhu K v. State of Kerala( Judgment dated 5th February, 2025 in WP(CRL.) NO. 1372 OF 2024,) considered similar issue and held as follows:

                  “9. While considering the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS would have been sufficient to restrain the detenu from repeating the criminal activities, first of all, it is to be noted that proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS, and action under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act operates in different spheres. Under Section 126 of the BNSS, a person is only called to furnish security for his good behaviour. On the other hand, under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act a person, who is having history of criminal activities is detained so as to prevent him from repeating criminal activities. Therefore, action under the KAA(P) Act is more effective. It is for the detaining authority to decide whether action under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act is necessary against a person against whom already proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS, have been initiated. Proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS will in no way preclude the jurisdictional authority from initiating proceedings under KAA(P) Act. However, when a person against whom Section 126 of the BNSS proceedings is pending, the authority passing the detention order shall be satisfied that the said proceedings are not sufficient to prevent the detenu from repeating criminal activities. In the case in hand in the impugned order, it is specifically mentioned that there is every prospectus of occurring delay in the completion of proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS and there is every chance of detenu getting involved in criminal activities during the pendency of the said proceedings. Of course the said explanation in the impugned order justifies the present detention order passed during the pendency of proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

25. The said principle has been reiterated in Fathima v. State of Kerala and Ors. ( [2025/KER/11288 : MANU/KE/0468/2025 : 2025 KHC OnLine 10764])

26. From the above discussion, it is evident that the pendency or initiation of proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS does not operate as a legal bar to the exercise of powers of preventive detention under the PITNDPS Act or the KAA(P)A. The measures contemplated in the said statutes operate in distinct fields and serve different purposes, one being to secure good behaviour under the ordinary criminal law and the other being preventive detention aimed at curbing illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances of a person having criminal antecedents of similar offence. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the existence of proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS renders the detention order unsustainable is devoid of merit and liable to be rejected.

27. We have also taken note of the fact that the detenue had violated the stringent bail conditions imposed by the competent court in Crime No. 217 of 2025, namely the condition that the Petitioner shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected. However, the detenue had given scant respect to the same and blatantly violated the condition and got involved in subsequent crimes. From his past criminal activities, as rightly taken note of by the detaining authority, it is evident that even if he is released on bail with conditions, he is likely to violate those conditions and there is high propensity that the respondent will indulge in drug peddling activities in future.

28. Before we conclude, it is pertinent to refer to Section 6 of the PITNDPS Act which reads thus,

                  “6. Grounds of detention severable - Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly-

                  (a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are-

                  (i) vague,

                  (ii) non-existent,

                  (iii) not relevant,

                  (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or

                  (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever,

                  and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section (I) of section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention;

                  (b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub-section (I) after being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds.”

29. The said provision expressly deals with the principle that the grounds of detention are severable and that an order of detention resting on more than one ground is to be treated as having been made separately on each such ground. Thus, even if one of the grounds is assumed to be defective for any reason whatsoever, the detention order would not automatically fail, provided the remaining grounds are capable of independently sustaining the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.

30. On an overall consideration of the materials placed before us, we find that the prejudicial activities relied upon by the detaining authority have been duly established; the delay in processing the proposal and passing the detention order has been satisfactorily explained; all relevant materials were furnished to the detenu; the pendency of proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS does not operate as a bar to preventive detention under the PITNDPS Act; the bail conditions imposed upon the detenu were specifically considered; and no unreasonable delay has been established either in passing or in executing the detention order. The subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is based on relevant materials and does not suffer from any illegality, arbitrariness or procedural infirmity warranting interference in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

31. Accordingly, we find no reason to interfere with the order of detention and the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. The report in the sealed cover shall be returned to the learned Public Prosecutor forthwith.