Soumen Sen, C.J.

1. This writ petition is filed by the mother of the detenu, Shameer @ Kannappan, aged 26 years, challenging Ext.P1 detention order dated 12th February, 2026, issued by the Government under Section 3(1) read with Section 13(2)(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (for short, "KAA(P)A"), and Ext.P2 Government Order dated 31st March, 2026, whereby the Government directed that the detenu be detained for a period of one year.

2. The process leading to the issuance of the Detention Order commenced with the submission of the proposals dated 18th January, 2026 and 4th February, 2026 by the District Police Chief, Thiruvananthapuram Rural, the sponsoring authority herein, to the detaining authority, narrating the anti-social activities, committed by the detenu, after the expiry of the early detention order, passed against him under Section 3(1) of the Act.

3. Three cases were relied upon by the detaining authority while passing the order of detention. The first is Crime No.865 of 2025 of Kadakkavoor Police Station, registered on 5th July, 2025 for the offences punishable under Sections 305(a), 331(4), 334 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS for short). The second is Crime No. 922 of 2025 of Kuravilangad Police Station, registered on 10th July, 2025 for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act for short). The third is Crime No. 1369 of 2025 of Mangalapuram Police Station, registered on 18th December, 2025 for offences punishable under Sections 22(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act. These three cases formed the basis for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, leading to the issuance of the detention order.

4. The records herein reveal that the detenu has a long history of criminal antecedents and had earlier undergone preventive detention for a period of six months pursuant to the detention order dated 30th October, 2023 passed by the District Collector, Thiruvananthapuram. However, even after his release from detention, he allegedly continued to involve himself in various criminal activities involving rioting and violent conduct, assault, use of obscene language, criminal intimidation, criminal trespass causing damage to property and causing bodily injury, kidnapping, theft, use of explosive substances, robbery, attempt to commit culpable homicide, attempt to commit murder and other offences under the NDPS Act and the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act (PDPP Act for short).

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has filed an argument note on 30th June, 2026 highlighting the repugnancy between the KAA(P)A and PITNDPS Act.

6. The main argument raised by the petitioner is that the KAA(P)A, insofar as it authorises the preventive detention of "drug offenders", occupies the same legislative field as the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (PITNDPS Act for short), a Parliamentary enactment specifically governing preventive detention of persons engaged in illicit drug trafficking. Consequently, KAAPA is liable to be tested on the touchstone of Article 254 of the Constitution for repugnancy. In the absence of Presidential assent under Article 254(2) with respect to this occupied field, the Parliamentary legislation would prevail to the extent of any inconsistency.

7. The constitutional validity of KAA(P)A on this specific ground has not been examined by the Kerala High Court, as the judgment in Vilasini Ramachandran v. Union of India (Judgment dated 19 July 2021 in W.P. (Crl.) No. 9 of 2021) , considered its validity only vis-à-vis the National Security Act, 1980, and not in relation to the legislative field occupied by the PITNDPS Act. Accordingly, the issue remains open for authoritative judicial determination.

8. He further pointed out that, both KAA(P)A and PITNDPS Act authorise preventive detention of persons involved in drug-related activities, they substantially operate in the same legislative field. PITNDPS Act, being a specialised Parliamentary enactment exclusively governing preventive detention in relation to narcotic offences, occupies that field. Consequently, the provisions of KAA(P)A relating to preventive detention of "drug offenders" are liable to be tested for repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution. To the extent the two enactments are inconsistent and in the absence of Presidential assent under Article 254(2), the Parliamentary law would prevail and the State legislation would be inoperative to that extent.

9. He then relies on the doctrine of pith and substance to show the similar legislative nature of the two enactments. He states that the PITNDPS Act is a special Parliamentary law whose dominant purpose is the preventive detention of persons engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Whereas, KAA(P)A, although generally enacted to deal with various categories of anti-social activities, contains specific provisions relating to "drug offenders."

10. Thus, in pith and substance, the provisions of KAA(P)A relating to "drug offenders" occupy the same legislative field as the PITNDPS Act, namely the preventive detention of persons engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

11. The petitioner further contends that the principle of Harmonious Construction is inapplicable in the present case as there are two parallel regimes for the same category of offenders, different detaining authorities with different hierarchical safeguards, different maximum detention period, different procedural timelines and different safeguards.

12. Another contention was that since the two enactments prescribe parallel but inconsistent preventive detention regimes, Article 254(1) is attracted. In the absence of Presidential assent under Article 254(2), the PITNDPS Act prevails, and KAA(P)A is inoperative to the extent that it authorises preventive detention for NDPS-related offences.

13. The Petitioner also challenges the constitutional validity of Section 2(i) of the KAA(P)A, insofar as it includes drug offences within its ambit, contending that the said provision is unconstitutional, arbitrary and repugnant to the provisions of the PITNDPS Act.

14. Further, he contended that Exhibit P3 representation was not considered by the detaining authority thereby violating Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. To substantiate this ground he placed reliance upon the following paragraphs in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaseela Shaji v. Union of India and Ors. ( (2024) 9 SCC 53)

                  “36. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment would reveal that for emphasising the importance of personal liberty and individual freedom, this Court has reproduced Joy Adamson's memorable classic Born Free. This Court observed that though the concept of personal liberty and individual freedom can be curtailed by preventive detention laws, the courts have to ensure that the right to personal liberty and individual freedom is not arbitrarily taken away even temporarily without following the procedure prescribed by law. It has been held that when a detention order is passed all the material relied upon by the detaining authority in making such an order must be supplied to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation. This Court held that this is required in order to comply with the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, irrespective of whether the detenu had knowledge of such material or not.

                  * * *

                  54. This Court in Tara Chand [Tara Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (1981) 1 SCC 416 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 165] in unequivocal terms held that the delay of one month and five days in communicating the representation of the detenu from the jail to the detaining authority demonstrates the gross negligence and extreme callousness with which the representation made by the detenu was dealt with by the respondents or their agents. It has been further held that Article 22(5) of the Constitution enjoins that the obligation of the appropriate Government or of the detaining authority to afford the detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation and to consider that representation speedily is distinct from the Government's obligation to constitute a Board and to communicate the representation, amongst other materials, to the Board to enable it to form its opinion and to obtain such opinion.

                  * * *

                  55. It is thus clear that merely because the Advisory Board opined that the order of detention was sustainable, it does not absolve the agents of the detaining authority/the Central Government to immediately forward the representation to the competent authority and the detaining authority or the Central Government to consider and decide such a representation speedily.

                  * * *

                  60. It could thus be seen that this Court in unequivocal terms held that the intermediary authorities who are communicating authorities are also required to move with an amount of promptitude so that the statutory guarantee of affording earliest opportunity of making the representation and the same reaching the Government is translated into action. This Court expressed the need of the State Government to gear up its own machinery to see that in these cases the representation reaches the Government as quickly as possible and it is considered by the authorities with equal promptitude. It has been held that any slackness in this behalf not properly explained would be denial of the protection conferred by the statute and would result in invalidation of the order.”

15. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that there were no compelling circumstances warranting the detention of the detenu while he was already in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. If the detenu is already in custody the mandatory parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India ((1991) 1 SCC 128) for passing an order of preventive detention against a person already in custody, has to be followed, namely, (i) awareness of the fact that the detenu was in custody, (ii) the existence of reliable material giving rise to a real possibility of his release on bail, and (iii) the necessity to prevent him from indulging in prejudicial activities upon such release.

16. It was further argued that the allegations in the last case pertain to an offence involving commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act and, therefore, the rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would squarely apply. According to the petitioner, having regard to the stringent conditions prescribed under Section 37 and the antecedents of the detenu, who is involved in several NDPS cases, there was no real or imminent possibility of his being released on bail on the date of passing Ext. P1 detention order.

17. Finally, it was contended that while determining the period of detention, the Detaining Authority was required to take into account the fact that the detenu had already been in judicial custody for nearly two months prior to the issuance of the detention order. To substantiate the said argument he relied on a Division Bench Judgment of this Hon’ble Court in the case of Rema Vijayalal v. State of Kerala ( Judgment dated 19 February 2024 in W.P (Crl.) No. 712 of 2023) , wherein it was held that:

                  “6. There are two parts in a detention order. One is related to the reasons justifying the detention order. The second part of the detention order is related to the period of detention. If the reasons for passing detention order can be legally sustained, the Court should not set aside the detention order mainly for the reason that there was non-application of mind in regard to imposing maximum period of detention order. The question is whether the court should interfere when there is non-application of mind as to the maximum period of detention order. This court finds that there was non-application of mind in regard to imposing maximum period of detention order. This is a fit case that ought to have been remitted for reconsideration by the authorities concerned. However, taking note of the fact that the detenu is already in judicial custody since 16.02.2023 onwards, this Court is refraining from remitting it back.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

18. We also refer to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Asmabi Basheer K.P v. State of Kerala and Ors. (Judgment dated 11 March 2026 W.P (Crl.) No. 339 of 2026.) , wherein it was observed as follows:

                  “8. Although the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody at the time of passing the detention order is adverted to in the impugned order, it is nowhere stated that there was a possibility of the detenu being released on bail in the case in which he was under judicial custody, or that, if released on bail, there was a likelihood of his repeating criminal activities. It is undisputed that there is no legal impediment to passing a detention order against a person who is under judicial custody. However, when a person is already in judicial custody, there would ordinarily be no basis for apprehending that he would repeat criminal activities. In such circumstances, a detention order under the preventive detention laws would not ordinarily be warranted. Nevertheless, if there exists a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail in the case in connection with which he is under judicial custody, and if, upon such release, there is a likelihood of his engaging in further criminal activities, a detention order under the preventive detention laws may validly be passed. However, in the present case, the impugned order does not disclose that the jurisdictional authority considered either the possibility of the detenu being released on bail or the likelihood of his repeating criminal activities in the event of such release. Therefore, the detention order is liable to be set aside on this ground.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

19. According to the petitioner, Ext. P2 discloses no application of mind to this relevant circumstance, and the period of detention has been fixed mechanically without considering the period already undergone in custody. It is, therefore, contended that Ext. P2 is vitiated by non-application of mind and is liable to be set aside.

20. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the detenu is a habitual offender with extensive criminal antecedents involving 47 criminal cases, including offences under the NDPS Act, offences against the human body, offences against property and other serious crimes. Despite earlier preventive detention, prosecution under the ordinary criminal law and execution of a peace bond, the detenu continued to indulge in serious criminal activities, thereby posing a threat to public order.

21. It was further submitted that the detention order was passed only after due scrutiny of the proposal and the Detaining Authority had arrived at the requisite subjective satisfaction based on the materials placed before it. The time taken in processing the proposal was part of the decision-making process and did not amount to any unexplained or inordinate delay.

22. The learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that all the mandatory procedural safeguards under the Act were strictly complied with. The detention order, grounds of detention and all relied upon documents were served on the detenu in a language known to him, acknowledgements were obtained, and he was informed of his right to make representations before the Government and the Advisory Board.

23. It was further submitted that the Government approved the detention order within the statutory period, the Advisory Board found sufficient cause for detention, the representation submitted on behalf of the detenu was duly considered before confirmation, and the detention was confirmed strictly in accordance with law. It was therefore contended that the writ petition is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed.

24. With regard to the submission that there exists repugnancy between the KAA(P)A and PITNDPS, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the legislative intent behind the above two statutes is entirely different. The PITNDPS Act is aimed at preventing illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances while KAA(P)A is aimed at maintaining public order by incapacitating habitual offenders including drug offenders. Though there may be instances of overlapping between the two enactments, there is no inconsistency between the two and there is no situation where compliance with one results in violation of the other. The detaining authority chooses either of the statutes depending on whether the conditions for initiation are met. No confrontation or collision arises on account of both the enactments operating simultaneously and both laws can operate in harmony. It is submitted that Parliament has not occupied the entire field by enacting the PITNDPS Act and has never expressed an intention that PITNDPS Act shall be the exclusive preventive detention law for all drug related activities. In the absence of an expressed provision barring application of State Preventive Detention Law to drug offenders it can be assumed that Parliament did not intend to occupy the entire field. Since the co-existence of the two statutes is possible and they operate in harmony, there is only overlap and no repugnancy.

25. The petitioner initially challenges the detention order principally on the ground that the mandatory procedural safeguards contemplated under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the KAA(P)A were not complied with, inasmuch as there is nothing on record to show that the detention order was read over and explained to the detenu, that copies of the relevant documents were furnished to him, or that he was informed in writing of his right to make representations before the Government and the Advisory Board.

26. Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the KAA(P)A reads as follows: -

                  “7. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed - (1) When a person is arrested in pursuance of a detention order, the officer arresting him shall read out the detention order to him and give him a copy of such order.

                  (2) The grounds of detention, specifying the instances of offences, with copies of relevant documents, as far as practicable, on the basis of which he is considered as a "known goonda" or "known rowdy" and giving such materials relating to his activities on the basis of which his detention has been found necessary, shall be furnished to him as soon as possible nevertheless, in any case, within five days of detention and he shall also be informed in writing, under acknowledgement, of his

right to represent to the Government and before the Advisory Board against his detention: Provided that nothing in this section shall require any authority to disclose to the detained person any fact, the disclosure of which will reveal the identity of any confidential source or the disclosure of which will be against the interests of internal security or national security.”

27. The safeguards incorporated in Sections 7(1) and 7(2) are not empty formalities. They are intended to ensure that the detenu is effectively apprised of the grounds of detention and is afforded a meaningful opportunity to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of representation. Being provisions enacted in furtherance of the constitutional guarantee under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, strict compliance with the same is imperative.

28. We would like to reinforce our position on the aforesaid exposition of law by placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarfaraz Alam v. Union of India ((2024) 3 SCC 347) , wherein it was held that:

                  “14.1. Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India [Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 427 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 463] : (SCC p. 436, para 20)

                  “20. … “Communicate” is a strong word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the “grounds” should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the “ground” to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the “grounds” are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) is infringed. If any authority is needed on this point, which is so obvious from Article 22(5), reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra [Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117 : 1962 Supp (2) SCR 918 : AIR 1962 SC 911] and Hadibandhu Das v. DM, Cuttack [Hadibandhu Das v. DM, Cuttack, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 136 : (1969) 1 SCR 227 : AIR 1969 SC 43] .”

                  (emphasis supplied)

29. In the State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya (AIR 1951 SC 157) it was held as follows:

                  “23. The question has to be approached from another point of view also. As mentioned above, the object of furnishing grounds for the order of detention is to enable the detenu to make a representation i.e. to give him an opportunity to put forth his objections against the order of detention. Moreover, “the earliest opportunity” has to be given to him to do that. While the grounds of detention are thus the main factors on which the subjective decision of the Government is based, other materials on which the conclusions in the grounds are founded could and should equally be conveyed to the detained person to enable him to make out his objections against the order. To put it in other words, the detaining authority has made its decision and passed its order. The detained person is then given an opportunity to urge his objections which in cases of preventive detention comes always at a later stage. The grounds may have been considered sufficient by the Government to pass its judgment. But to enable the detained person to make his representation against the order, further details may be furnished to him. In our opinion, this appears to be the true measure of the procedural rights of the detained person under Article 22(5).

                  ***

                  27. The conferment of the right to make a representation necessarily carries with it the obligation on the part of the detaining authority to furnish the grounds i.e. materials on which the detention order was made. In our opinion, it is therefore clear that while there is a connection between the obligation on the part of the detaining authority to furnish grounds and the right given to the detained person to have an earliest opportunity to make the representation, the test to be applied in respect of the contents of the grounds for the two purposes is quite different. As already pointed out, for the first, the test is whether it is sufficient to satisfy the authority. For the second, the test is, whether it is sufficient to enable the detained person to make the representation at the earliest opportunity.

                  28. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondent mixes up the two rights given under Article 22(5) and converts it into one indivisible right. We are unable to read Article 22(5) in that way. As pointed out above, the two rights are connected by the word “and”. Furthermore, the use of the words “as soon as may be” with the obligation to furnish the grounds of the order of detention, and the fixing of another time-limit viz. the earliest opportunity, for making the representation, makes the two rights distinct. The second right, as it is a right of objection, has to depend first on the service of the grounds on which the conclusion i.e. satisfaction of the Government about the necessity of making the order, is based. To that extent, and that extent alone, the two are connected. But when grounds which have a rational connection with the ends mentioned in Section 3 of the Act are supplied, the first condition is satisfied. If the grounds are not sufficient to enable the detenu to make a representation, the detenu can rely on his second right and if he likes may ask for particulars which will enable him to make the representation. On an infringement of either of these two rights the detained person has a right to approach the Court and complain that there has been an infringement of his fundamental right and even if the infringement of the second part of the right under Article 22(5) is established he is bound to be released by the Court. To treat the two rights mentioned in Article 22(5) as one is neither proper according to the language used, nor according to the purpose for which the rights are given

                  ***

                  31. This detailed examination shows that preventive detention is not by itself considered an infringement of any of the fundamental rights mentioned in Part III of the Constitution. This is, of course, subject to the limitations prescribed in clause (5) of Article 22. That clause, as noticed above, requires two things to be done for the person against whom the order is made. By reason of the fact that clause (5) forms part of Part III of the Constitution, its provisions have the same force and sanctity as any other provision relating to fundamental rights. As the clause prescribes two requirements, the time factor in each case is necessarily left fluid. While there is the duty on the part of the detaining authority to furnish grounds and the duty to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation, which obligations, as shown above, are correlated, there exists no express provision contemplating a second communication from the detaining authority to the person detained. This is because in several cases a second communication may not be necessary at all. The only thing which emerges from the discussion is that while the authorities must discharge the duty in furnishing grounds for the order of detention “as soon as may be” and also provide “the earliest opportunity to the detained person to make the representation”, the number of communications from the detaining authority to the detenu may be one or more and they may be made at intervals, provided the two parts of the aforesaid duty are discharged in accordance with the wording of clause (5). So long as the later communications do not make out a new ground, their contents are no infringement of the two procedural rights of the detenu mentioned in the clause. They may consist of a narration of facts or particulars relating to the grounds already supplied. But in doing so the time factor in respect of the second duty viz. to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation, cannot be overlooked. That appears to us to be the result of clause (5) of Article 22.

                  (emphasis supplied)

30. On a perusal of the records made available before us, we are satisfied that the mandatory requirements under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the Act have been duly complied with. The records clearly reveal that the grounds of detention and all the documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority were served on the detenu at the time of execution of the detention order. The acknowledgment bearing the signature of the detenu evidence receipt of the said documents. The report of the Advisory Board also records that all the relevant records had been furnished to the detenu. Thus, we find no inconsistency and the contention raised by the petitioner in that regard is devoid of merit.

31. The petitioner further contends that two of the three crimes relied upon by the detaining authority relate to offences under the NDPS Act and the field is occupied by a separate Parliamentary enactment, namely the PITNDPS Act. Therefore, the act of the detaining authority in invoking the provisions of the KAA(P)A was not justified in view of the availability of the aforesaid special legislation in respect of persons allegedly involved in drug-related offences.

32. Coming to the factual aspects, it is seen that the detaining authority has relied upon three criminal cases for ordering the preventive detention of the detenu. Out of these, two cases relate to offences registered under the NDPS Act, while the remaining one relates to an offence under the BNS.

33. Section 2 (j) of the KAA(P)A defines the term ''goonda'' to mean a person who indulges in any anti-social activity or promotes or abets any illegal activity which are harmful for the maintenance of the public order directly or indirectly and includes a bootlegger, a counterfeiter, a depredator of environment, a digital data and copyright pirate, a drug offender, a hawala racketeer, a hired ruffian, rowdy, an immoral traffic offender, a loan shark or a property grabber.

34. It is beyond doubt that Section 2(j) of “KAA(P)A” provides an inclusive definition to the word “goonda”; and as it is well known and established, such a definition only expands the meaning of the term beyond its ordinary definition, to include specific, additional, or related concepts. This broadens the definition, to cover terms which may otherwise not be covered; but does not limit the term to only what is listed; or in other words, is not exhaustive. There can be no contest, when one reads Section 2(j) of the “KAA(P)A” carefully, that it is a classic case of employing an inclusive definition, by first providing the activities as are intended to be covered; and then stipulated to include specific types of offenders within its fold.

35. At this juncture, it pertinent to refer to the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Aaliya Ashraf v. State of Kerala & Ors (2026 SCC OnLine Ker 4053) ., wherein it was held that the view taken in Suhana v. State of Kerala (2024 (7) KHC 212) that only possession of drugs linked with commercial intent would bring a person within the ambit of the KAA(P)A, does not lay down the correct law. It was held that “anti-social activity” under Section 2(a) of the Act is of wide import and includes repeated possession of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, even in small quantities, as such conduct has a direct nexus with public order and societal security. Accordingly, persons repeatedly involved in offences under the NDPS Act may fall within the definition of a “goonda” under the Act, and the contrary view restricting its application only to commercial quantity cases was disapproved.

36. Sections 2(j) and 2(o) of the “KAA(P)A” defines the words ‘goonda’ and ‘known goonda’ in the following manner:

                  “2(j) ''goonda'' means a person who indulges in any anti-social activity or promotes or abets any illegal activity which are harmful for the maintenance of the public order directly or indirectly and includes a bootlegger, a counterfeiter, a depredator of environment, a digital data and copyright pirate, a drug offender, a hawala racketeer, a hired ruffian, rowdy, an immoral traffic offender, a loan shark or a property grabber. 2(o) '' known goonda '' means a goonda who had been, for acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under this Act,--

                  (i) found guilty, by a competent court or authority at least once for an offence within the meaning of the term 'goonda' as defined in clause (j) of section 2; or

                  (ii) found in any investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer, or other authority or competent court on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in two separate instances not forming part of the same transaction, to have committed any act within the meaning of the term 'goonda' as defined in clause (j) of section 2.

                  Provided that an offence in respect of which a report was filed by a police officer before a lawful authority consequent to the seizure, in the presence of witnesses, of alcohol, spirit, counterfeit notes, sand, forest produce, articles violating copyright, narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, or currency involved in hawala racketeering may be included for consideration though the report had resulted from an action initiated by a police officer.

                  Explanation:- An instance of an offence involving a person, which satisfies the conditions specified in the definition of known rowdy referred to in clause (p) of section 2 can also be taken into consideration as an instance, along with other cases, for deciding whether the person is a known goonda or not.”

37. The phrase ‘anti-social activity’ is then defined under Section 2(a) of the “KAA(P)A” as under:

                  “2(a) ''anti-social activity'' means acting in such manner as to cause or is likely to cause, directly or indirectly, any feeling of insecurity, danger or fear among the general public or any section thereof, or any danger to the safety of individuals, safety of public, public health or the ecological system or any loss or damage to public exchequer or to any public or private property or indulges in any activities referred in clauses (c), (e), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m),(n),(q) and (s) of this section.”

38. Further, a ‘drug offender’ in the “KAA(P)A”, is defined in Section 2(i) thereof in the manner below:

                  “2(i) ''drug-offender'' means a person who illegally cultivates, manufactures, stocks, transports, sells or distributes any drug in contravention of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (Central Act 61 of 1985) or in contravention of any other law for the time being in force, or who knowingly does anything abetting or facilitating any such activity.”

39. Turning to the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), Section 8 thereof reads as under:

                  “8. Prohibition of certain operations.—No person shall—

                  (a) cultivate any coca plant or gather any portion of coca plant; or

                  (b) cultivate the opium poppy or any cannabis plant; or

                  (c) produce, manufacture, possess, sell, purchase, transport, warehouse, use, consume, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or tranship any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, except for medical or scientific purposes and in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder and in a case where any such provision, imposes any requirement by way of licence, permit or authorisation also in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence, permit or authorisation:

                  Provided that, and subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the prohibition against the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of ganja or the production, possession, use, consumption, purchase, sale, transport, warehousing, import inter-State and export inter-State of ganja for any purpose other than medical and scientific purpose shall take effect only from the date which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf:

                  [Provided further that nothing in this section shall apply to the export of poppy straw for decorative purposes.]”

40. Thus, we are of the view that Section 2(j) of the KAA(P)A defines the expression “goonda” in an inclusive manner, taking within its sweep not only persons indulging in anti-social activities but also specifically enumerated categories, including a “drug offender”. The definition of “drug offender” under Section 2(i) of the Act clearly brings within its ambit persons who illegally cultivate, manufacture, stock, transport, sell or distribute narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances in contravention of the NDPS Act, 1985 or any other law for the time being in force. Likewise, the definition of “anti-social activity” under Section 2(a) is of wide amplitude and is intended to address conduct which causes or is likely to cause insecurity, danger or fear among the general public or any section thereof.

41. We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the fixing of 1-year period of detention vide Ext. P2 is illegal as he is not continuously falling under "Known Rowdy". A combined reading of the statutory framework reveals that the inclusion of offences under the NDPS Act via Section 2(i) of the KAA(P)A automatically elevates the detenu into the definition of a "Drug Offender". A "Drug Offender" explicitly falls within the omnibus definition of a "Goonda" under Section 2(j) of the KAA(P)A. Since the detenu engaged in fresh, repetitive anti-social prejudicial activities following his release from his first detention, the detaining authority was perfectly justified in classifying him as a "Known Goonda" under KAA(P)A and confirming the subsequent statutory detention for the maximum permissible period of one year as per Section 12 of the KAA(P)A.

42. Section 8 of the NDPS Act, 1985 imposes a general prohibition against cultivation, possession, sale, purchase, transport and other dealings in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, except as permitted under the Act. Therefore, involvement in offences under the NDPS Act, depending upon the nature and repetition of such activities, squarely falls within the statutory concept of a “drug offender” under the KAA(P)A.

43. The legal position has been clarified by the Full Bench of this Court in Aaliya Ashraf (Supra), wherein it has been held that the view taken in Suhana (Supra) restricting the application of KAA(P)A only to cases involving commercial quantity of drugs does not lay down the correct law. It has been categorically held that repeated involvement in offences under the NDPS Act, even in respect of small quantities, may constitute “anti-social activity” having a direct nexus with public order, thereby justifying action under the KAA(P)A.

44. The petitioner further contends that the detention order is liable to be set aside on account of the unexplained delay in its execution. According to the petitioner, although the detention order was passed on 12th February, 2026, the same was executed only after a delay of five days, notwithstanding the fact that the detenu was already in judicial custody. He further points out that the live and proximate link existing between the last prejudicial activity and order of detention gets snapped and the delay occurred in passing the above order was not duly explained by the detaining authority.

45. In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu ((1979) 1 SCC 465) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the phrase “live and proximate link” in the following words:

                  “6. It is further true that there must be a “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention namely the prevention of smuggling activities. We may in appropriate cases assume that the link is “snapped” if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case, we may strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the “link” not snapped but strengthened.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

46. While dealing with the question of delay it is also relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Licil Antony v. State of Kerala((2014) 11 SCC 326) wherein it was observed as follows:

                  “ 9. While dealing with the question of delay in making an order of detention, the court is required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. No hard-and-fast formula is possible to be laid or has been laid in this regard. However, one thing is clear that in case of delay, that has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the purpose of preventive detention is to take immediate steps for preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activity. If there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activity and making of the order of detention and the delay has not been explained, the order of detention becomes vulnerable. Delay in issuing the order of detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is a ground to quash the order of detention. No rule with precision has been formulated in this regard. The test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of undue and long delay the court has to investigate whether the link has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

47. Similarly in Adishwar Jain v. Union of India, ((2006) 11 SCC 339) it was held that:

                  “15. Delay, as is well known, at both stages has to be explained. The court is required to consider the question having regard to the overall picture. We may notice that in Sk. Serajul v. State of W.B. [(1975) 2 SCC 78 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 425] this Court opined: (SCC p. 80, para 2)

                  “There was thus delay at both stages and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Burdwan recited in the order of detention. It would be reasonable to assume that if the District Magistrate of Burdwan was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude both in making the order of detention as also in securing the arrest of the petitioner, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

48. It is well settled that the prejudicial activities relied upon must bear a live and proximate nexus with the order of detention. If there is undue and unexplained delay in passing the order, such delay may, in a given case, have the effect of snapping the nexus between the prejudicial activities and the purpose sought to be achieved by the detention. On the other hand, where the delay is satisfactorily explained by the time consumed in investigation, collection of materials, administrative processing, scrutiny by the sponsoring and screening authorities, and consideration by the Government, the detention order cannot be invalidated merely on the ground of lapse of time.

49. From the materials it is prima facie evident that the delay in passing the detention order was attributable to the time taken by the Detaining Authority in arriving at its subjective satisfaction on the necessity of invoking the provisions of the Act. The records disclose that the proposal underwent scrutiny at various administrative levels before the Detaining Authority, upon due consideration of the materials placed before it reached its subjective satisfaction and passed the order of detention.

50. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that there were no compelling circumstances warranting the preventive detention of the detenu when he was already in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. On perusing the materials placed before us, we are of the view that the first mandatory condition that the detaining authority shall be aware of the fact that the detenu is in custody, is very well taken note of by the detaining authority. As regards the second and third requirements, though no bail application had been filed by the detenu in the case in which he was in custody, the detaining authority has recorded cogent reasons for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that there existed a real possibility of his securing release on bail. The detention order specifically notes that, having regard to the detenu's past conduct and criminal antecedents, there was every likelihood of his obtaining bail on technical or other legal grounds. The authority has further taken into account the consistent pattern exhibited by the detenu, namely, that immediately after securing liberty in earlier cases, he resumed his involvement in prejudicial activities without any sign of reformation. On the contrary, the materials disclose that each successive crime reflected an increased degree of audacity and aggression, indicating that the detenu had remained undeterred by previous prosecutions or periods of incarceration. The apprehension entertained by the detaining authority that, upon his release, the detenu would again indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order is, therefore, founded on objective materials and his antecedent conduct and cannot be said to be either speculative or without basis. We are, therefore, satisfied that the parameters prescribed in Kamarunnissa (Supra) stand duly complied with in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

51. As regards the contention of the petitioner that, in view of the rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, there could not have been any real or imminent possibility of the detenu being enlarged on bail at the time of passing the detention order, it is pertinent to refer to the decision of the Division Bench of this court in Sheeja P v. State of Kerala (2025 SCC OnLine Ker 13890) in which it was held as follows:

                  “14. In the present case, the contraband involved being of commercial quantity, the above rigour of Section 37 squarely applies. The twin conditions under Section 37 are conjunctive, not disjunctive. Therefore, in order to secure bail in a case involving commercial quantity, an accused must satisfy the Court that there are reasonable grounds to believe not only that he is not guilty of the offence, but also that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. However, we are not oblivious to the fact that the rigour of Section 37 is not an absolute bar, and hence it cannot be said in absolute terms that a preventive detention order is impermissible merely because the accused faces allegations of possessing or selling commercial quantity of contraband. Therefore, it cannot be said, in abstract terms, that recourse to preventive detention laws is impermissible solely because the accused faces allegations of possessing or selling commercial quantity of contraband. There can be myriad circumstances where a court can enlarge an accused on bail despite the rigorous provision of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, taking note of the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

52. The petitioner also has a specific case that the representation submitted on behalf of the detenu was not considered by the Government before the confirmation of the detention order and, therefore, the continued detention stands vitiated.

53. We are unable to accept the said contention. The materials placed on record clearly disclose that the representation dated 24th March, 2026, submitted by the mother of the detenu on his behalf, was duly received and considered by the Government before the order confirming the detention was passed. The confirmation order dated 31st March, 2026 itself reflects that the representation was examined and taken into consideration while confirming the detention. In such circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that the representation was not considered prior to the confirmation of the detention order is factually incorrect and liable to be rejected.

54. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in KM Abdullah Kunji & BL Abdul Khader v. Union of India (AIR 1991 SC 574) , wherein it was held as follows:

                  “12. The representation relates to the liberty of the individual, the highly cherished right enshrined in Article 21 of our Constitution. Clause (5) of Article 22 therefore, casts a legal obligation on the government to consider the representation as early as possible. It is a constitutional mandate commanding the concerned authority to whom the detenu submits his representation to consider the representation and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. The words “as soon as may be” occurring in clause (5) of Article 22 reflects the concern of the Framers that the representation should be expeditiously considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency without an avoidable delay. However, there can be no hard and fast rule in this regard. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no period prescribed either under the Constitution or under the concerned detention law, within which the representation should be dealt with. The requirement however, is that there should not be supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of representation would be a breach of the constitutional imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal. This has been emphasised and re-emphasised by a series of decisions of this Court.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

55. In light of the foregoing discussion, particularly having regard to the previous criminal antecedents of the detenu, his persistent involvement in prejudicial activities, and his repeated violation of bail conditions and other preventive measures imposed under the ordinary criminal law, we are satisfied that the Detaining Authority had arrived at the requisite subjective satisfaction, on the basis of relevant materials, that the preventive detention of the detenu was necessary to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

56. Before we part with, we deem it appropriate to reiterate the conceptual framework governing preventive detention, as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal and Others ((1975) 2 SCC 81) , wherein it was observed that “the power of detention is clearly a preventive measure. It does not partake in any manner in the nature of punishment. It is taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the community. Since every preventive measure is based on the principle that a person should be prevented from doing something which, if left free and unfettered, it is reasonably probable he would do, it must necessarily proceed in all cases, to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof.”

57. Hence, we dismiss this writ petition. No order as to costs.

58. The report in the sealed cover shall be returned to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor forthwith.