Common Order:

1. Heard Ms. Srilekha Pujari, learned counsel for the petitioner in C.R.P.No.11 of 2026 and the respondents in C.R.P.Nos.4709, 4728 and 4731 of 2025 and Sri P. Lakshma Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent in C.R.P.No.11 of 2026 and the petitioners in C.R.P.Nos.4709, 4728 and 4731 of 2025. Perused the entire record.

2. The C.R.P.No.11 of 2026 is preferred by the plaintiff/petitioner and C.R.P.No.4728 of 2025 is preferred by the defendant/petitioner aggrieved by the order dated 14.11.2025 passed in I.A.No.181 of 2025 in O.S.No.4 of 2025 on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Jogulamba Gadwal District (‘trial Court’), whereby the petition filed by the defendant under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) of the CPC, seeking leave of the Court to defend the summary suit, was allowed subject to the condition that the defendant shall furnish security for an amount of Rs.50,00,000/- within two months from the date of the order. The plaintiff has filed C.R.P.No.11 of 2026 challenging the grant of leave to the defendant to defend the suit, whereas the defendant has filed C.R.P.No.4728 of 2025 challenging the condition imposed upon him to furnish security of Rs.50,00,000/- as a condition for granting leave to defend the suit.

3. The C.R.P.Nos.4709 and 4731 of 2025 are preferred by the defendants/petitioners, aggrieved by the orders dated 14.11.2025 passed in I.A.No.182 of 2025 in O.S.No.5 of 2025 and I.A.No.183 of 2025 in O.S.No.6 of 2025 on the file of the trial Court, whereby the petitions filed by the defendants under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) of the CPC, seeking leave of the Court to defend the summary suits, were allowed subject to the condition that the defendants shall furnish security for an amount of Rs.50,00,000/- in each suit within two months from the date of the orders. The defendants have preferred these revisions challenging the condition imposed upon them to furnish security of Rs.50,00,000/- in each suit as a condition for granting leave to defend the suits.

4. The petitioner in C.R.P.No.11 of 2026 is the plaintiff in all the suits i.e., O.S.Nos.4 to 6 of 2025 and the respondent in C.R.P.Nos.4709, 4728 and 4731 of 2025. The respondent in C.R.P.No.11 of 2026 is the petitioner in C.R.P.No.4728 of 2025 and the defendant in O.S.No.4 of 2025. The petitioners in C.R.P.Nos.4709 and 4731 of 2025 are the defendants in O.S.Nos.5 and 6 of 2025, respectively.

5. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their array in the suits, i.e., the plaintiff and the defendants. As the subject matter and the plaintiff in the suits are common, all the revisions are being disposed of by this common order.

Background of facts:

6. The brief facts of the cases are that there were loan transactions between the plaintiff and defendants i.e., the lender and borrowers respectively. The plaintiff filed suits in O.S.Nos.4 to 6 of 2025 on the file of the learned trial Court alleging that at the oral request of the defendants an amount of Rs.50,00,000/- was forwarded in each suit transaction and the defendants have executed promissory notes dated 08.09.2022 in each suit. The defendants promised to repay the borrowed amount with interest at 2% per annum, but failed to do so. After paying interest for a period of six months upto February, 2023, on account of default of payment of interest amount, the plaintiff filed three summary suits for recovery of principal amount of Rs.50,00,000/- in each suit together with interest at Rs.31,00,000/- in each suit totaling to Rs.81,00,000/- in each suit. In the said suits, summons were served on the defendants. As per the record, the defendants did not appear before the Court within 10 days, but appeared after lapse of one month time period and then filed I.As. under revision i.e., I.A.Nos.181 to 183 of 2025 in O.S.Nos.4 to 6 of 2025 respectively seeking leave to defend the suits.

7. Both the parties have submitted their respective pleadings and upon enquiry, the learned trial Court passed the impugned orders granting leave to defend to the defendants in all the suits subject to condition of furnishing security for an amount of Rs.50,00,000/- in each suit, which is the principal amount borrowed under the promissory notes in each suit. Aggrieved by the same, the present revisions are preferred by the respective parties.

Contentions of the plaintiff:

8. The grounds on which the plaintiff is opposing the impugned orders is that there is failure on the part of the defendants to make an appearance within 10 days of service of summons and failure to serve notice on the plaintiff or his counsel about making appearance in the suits. On account of the said failures, according to the plaintiff, there is no need for the plaintiff to serve the judgment summons under Order XXXVII Rule 3 (4) of the CPC. On account of failure on the part of the defendants to follow the procedure contemplated under Order XXXVII Rules 1 to 3 of the CPC, the plaintiff contends that the trial Court ought to have decreed the suits forthwith and ought not to have granted leave to defend.

9. Alternatively, learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that even in case leave to defend is granted there is no fault in imposing the condition to furnish security for the principal amount of Rs.50,00,000/- in each suit. The plaintiff’s case is that either the impugned orders be set aside and to decree the suits or alternatively the condition imposed on the defendants to furnish security of Rs.50,00,000/- in each suit to be continued.

10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff relied upon the judgments in the cases of Tarun Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar(CS SCJ/1507/2024, dated 10.02.2025, Saket Courts.), Darshan Mekani v. Aman Khemka(G.A.No.174 of 2016 with CS No.294 of 2015, dated 22.08.2017, CHC.), Alphonsa Mathew v. Benson Benjamin(RFA No.578 of 2016, dated 11.07.2025, HCK.), Kashmir Ayurvedic Works v. The Director Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy(CR No.5455 of 2016, dated 18.07.2017, P&H HC.), S.T.Kasinathan v. A. Tamilarasan(CRP (PD) No.2837 of 2019 and C.M.P.No.18576 of 2019, dated 30.08.2019, MHC.), Tahira Rehman v. M/s. Manipal Sowbhagya Nidhi Limited(RFA No.392 of 2011, dated 26.07.2017, HCK), Rajni Kumar v. Suresh Kumar Malhotra(Appeal (Civil) No.2538 of 2003, dated 28.03.2003, SC.), Niravbhai Mahendrabhai Trivedi v. Nico Scientific and Medical Devices Pvt. Ltd.( R/Special Civil Application No.9129 of 2024, dated 25.06.2024, HCG.) and The Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar(Civil Appeal No.5200 of 2025, dated 16.04.2025, SC (2025 INSC 490).).

Contentions of the defendants:

11. Learned counsel for the defendants challenged the imposition of the condition to grant leave to defend subject to furnishing security of Rs.50,00,000/- in each suit. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendants is that the defendants have successfully demonstrated viable defence through which the defendants can successfully defend the suits and therefore, leave to defend ought to have been granted unconditionally.

12. In support of the his case, the learned counsel for the defendants relied upon the cases in B.L.Kashyap and Sons Limited v. JMS Steels and Power Corporation((2022) 3 SCC 294), Nipro Medical India Pvt. Ltd. v. BRS Health and Research Institute Pvt. Ltd.( 2023 (3) ALD 301 (TS) (DB)), IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited v. Hubtown Limited((2017) 1 SCC 568) and Sudin Dilip Talaulikar v. Polycap Wires Private Limited((2019) 7 SCC 577). More particularly, reliance is placed upon the case in IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited (supra), wherein guidelines are chalked out for granting leave to defend either unconditionally or by imposing conditions relevant portion at paragraph No.17 of the judgment is extracted and produced below:

               “17. Accordingly, the principles stated in paragraph 8 of Mechelec’s case will now stand superseded, given the amendment of O.XXXVII R.3, and the binding decision of four judges in Milkhiram’s case, as follows:

               17.1.If the defendant satisfies the Court that he has a substantial defence, that is, a defence that is likely to succeed, the plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgment, and the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend the suit;

               17.2. If the defendant raises triable issues indicating that he has a fair or reasonable defence, although not a positively good defence, the plaintiff is not entitled to sign judgment, and the defendant is ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend;

               17.3. Even if the defendant raises triable issues, if a doubt is left with the trial judge about the defendant’s good faith, or the genuineness of the triable issues, the trial judge may impose conditions both as to time or mode of trial, as well as payment into court or furnishing security. Care must be taken to see that the object of the provisions to assist expeditious disposal of commercial causes is not defeated. Care must also be taken to see that such triable issues are not shut out by unduly severe orders as to deposit or security;

               17.4. If the Defendant raises a defence which is plausible but improbable, the trial Judge may impose conditions as to time or mode of trial, as well as payment into court, or furnishing security. As such a defence does not raise triable issues, conditions as to deposit or security or both can extend to the entire principal sum together with such interest as the court feels the justice of the case requires.

               17.5. If the Defendant has no substantial defence and/or raises no genuine triable issues, and the court finds such defence to be frivolous or vexatious, then leave to defend the suit shall be refused, and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment forthwith;

               17.6. If any part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, leave to defend the suit, (even if triable issues or a substantial defence is raised), shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by the defendant in court.”

13. The aforementioned guidelines have been followed in the other cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendants. On the basis of the guidelines chalked out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited (supra), the learned counsel for the defendants contends that the defendants have challenged the very execution of the promissory notes. In addition, it is contended that any transaction involving more than Rs.2,00,000/- has to be reported to the Local Income Tax Officer, which has not been complied with. These two circumstances, according to the learned counsel for the defendants constitutes substantial defence as described at paragraph No.17.1 of the judgment in IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited (supra) and therefore, argued that the trial Court ought to have granted leave to defend without imposing any condition. Further, reference is made to paragraph No.17.2 of the same case, wherein it is held that when there is a fair or reasonable defence available, where there are triable issues, the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend.

Reply by the learned counsel for the plaintiff:

14. In response, learned counsel for the plaintiff referred to the IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited (supra) at paragraph No.17.5, wherein it is held that in case there is no substantial defence or no genuine triable issues, if the Court finds that the defence is frivolous, then the leave to defend shall be refused. Further, at paragraph No.17.6, it is held that in case any part of the amount claimed is admitted by the defendant, leave to defend the suit shall not be admitted. It is submitted that the signatures on the promissory notes are not denied, therefore, execution of promissory notes is admitted. Hence, the plaintiff is entitled to decree in the summary suits to the exclusion of defendants’ plea for grant of leave to defend.

Findings of the Court:

15. The learned counsel for plaintiff referred to judgment of Saketh Courts at New Delhi in the case of Tarun Kumar (supra), wherein, a summary suit was decreed for recovery of Rs.1,50,000/- with interest at 18% per annum. On account of failure of the defendant to enter an appearance within 10 days of service of summons as required under Order XXXVII Rule 3 (1) of CPC, subsequent to due service of notice. Since no appearance was made by the defendant, the plaintiff was held to have become entitled to a decree. This fact pattern according to the learned counsel for plaintiff is similar to the facts of the present case. This Court is not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for plaintiff. In the said case, there is failure to make appearance within 10 days. However, there are no details as to whether the defendant remained absent until a decree was passed. In the instant cases, the defendants though not have made appearance within 10 days, proceeded to explain the same to the effect that the summons were served on them in the month of May, 2025, at which point of time the Courts were in vacation and therefore after engaging a counsel they made appearance on 20.06.2025 when the suit was listed for hearing. By the time the defendants made appearance, the plaintiff did not take steps for passing of a decree. Rather, after the defendants entered their appearance, after one month, then the plaintiff herein filed an affidavit for passing of decree. Since the defendants already made appearance, since the defendants have filed leave to defend within 10 days of serving of affidavit to pass the decree, the trial Court proceeded to conduct enquiry in the I.As. filed by the defendants seeking leave to defend and passed the impugned orders. This fact situation is not applicable to the case of Tarun kumar (supra).

16. Further, reference is made to the case of Darshan Mekani (supra), wherein the High Court of Calcutta, in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, has decreed the summary suit as the defendants did not enter appearance in the 10 days following serving of notice and did not file an application for seeking leave to defend, as such the plaintiff was held entitled to a decree as claimed in terms of the summons. The said case was based on a dishonored cheque which was issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. Summons in the prescribed form was served on the defendant on 10.12.2015, but the defendant did not enter appearance on or before 20.12.2015. Instead, he filed an application for leave to defend after expiry of statutory period. Said application was not pursued and was ultimately dismissed for default. This fact pattern is not applicable to the present cases as the plaintiff herein did not file any application for passing a decree immediately after 10 days of serving of notice on the defendants, when there was failure on their part to enter appearance. Instead, the plaintiff waited for almost period of two months i.e., one month after the defendants’ made appearance and then chose to file an affidavit for passing the decree. Further, in the case of Darshan Mekani (supra), the defendants, though filed application seeking leave to defend, did not pursue the same and said application was dismissed for default. In the instant case, the defendants not only filed an application seeking leave to defend, but pursued the same leading to passing of the impugned I.As. Therefore, the facts in the case of Darshan Mekani (supra) are not applicable to the facts in the present case.

17. Learned counsel for plaintiff referred to the judgment of Alphonsa Mathew (supra) and said case is about recovery of money on the basis of a promissory note, but a regular original suit, not a summary suit. Evidence was lead by both the parties and upon considering merits of both the parties, judgment has been passed and therefore, not applicable to the present cases which are summary suits.

18. Learned counsel for the plaintiff referred to the case in Kashmir Ayurvedic Works (supra), wherein the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that under Order XXXVII Rule 2 of CPC, the summons shall be served in Form No.4 in Appendix B, and the defendant shall not be granted leave to defend under Sub-Rule (1) unless he enters an appearance and the consequence of failure to enter an appearance is that the allegations in the plaint are deemed to be admitted and consequently, decree shall be passed. Further, it is held that when summons are served under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of CPC, the defendant under Rule 2 of Order XXXVII of CPC may enter an appearance either in person or through a pleader within 10 days and also shall file in the Court an address of service of notice on him. Then, the plaintiff has to serve on the defendant a summon for judgment in Form No.4A in Appendix B or such other form prescribed from time to time returnable not less than 10 days from the date of service supported by an affidavit, verifying the cause of action, amount claimed and stating that in his belief there is no defence to the suit. Further, it is held that the failure of defendant in entering appearance within 10 days would have enabled the trial Court to pass a decree. In the absence of compliance under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of CPC, there would be no obligation on the part of plaintiff at that stage, whereas it is held that the plaintiff can only be obligated if there was a compliance under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of CPC by the defendants at the first instance. Since there was no compliance by the defendants, therefore the impugned order to that extent is not legally sustainable and it was the defendants who were at fault in not complying the mandatory requirement under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of CPC. As such, it was held that the suit ought not to have been treated to be ordinary suit.

19. At the cost of repetition, the facts in Kashmir Ayurvedic Works (supra) are not completely similar to the fact pattern of the present case. In said case, there was failure on the part of the defendant to make appearance within 10 days. However, the plaintiff therein has followed the procedure contemplated under Order XXXVII of CPC and therefore, was entitled to a decree.

20. In the instant case, the plaintiff, in spite of failure on the part of defendants to enter an appearance within 10 days of serving of summons under Order XXXVII Rule 2 of CPC failed to take further steps for passing of the decree. The plaintiff remained silent for almost a period of one month for the defendants to make appearance and remained silent for another period of one month to file the affidavit in support of summons for judgment in Form No.4A i.e. 2 months time period elapsed before the plaintiff filed the summon for judgment in Form No.4A in Appendix B rather 1 month after appearance of the defendants. The plaintiff having failed to serve the summons for judgment immediately within 10 days of defendants appearance, now intends to take advantage of failure of defendants to make appearance within 10 days of serving of summons. The defendants as per procedure laid down in Order XXXVII of CPC, in spite of lapse in entering an appearance, within 10 days of serving of affidavit in support of judgment, summon for judgment, have filed leave to defend. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot rely upon Kashmir Ayurvedic Works (supra) when there are lapses on the part of plaintiff in strictly adhering to the procedure under Order XXXVII of CPC.

21. Learned counsel for plaintiff relied upon the case of S.T. Kasinathan (supra), wherein a suit for recovery was filed on the basis of promissory note, summons were issued in Form No.4A under Order XXXVII Rule 3 CPC. The defendants entered appearance and issued notice of appearance to the plaintiff on 18.06.2019. On 24.06.2019, the plaintiff filed summons for judgment. The defendants did not file petition to leave to defend, instead, filed a memo seeking to convert the summary suit into regular suit for non-compliance of procedure laid down under Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC. However, the trial Court proceeded to follow the procedure laid down under Order XXXVII of CPC. In that context, the counsel for plaintiff referred to the observation made by the High Court of Madras in the said case about failure of defendant to enter appearance within 10 days of such service and obligation to file an address for service of summons and to give notice of appearance to the plaintiff or his counsel. After the defendant makes appearance under Order XXXVII Rule 2 CPC, summons for judgment in Form No.4A Appendix B has to be served on the defendant within 10 days from the date of service supported by an affidavit, verifying the cause of action, amount claimed, and that the defendant has no defence.

22. The said fact pattern or this observation is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The plaintiff in the present case did not take any steps for passing of decree within 10 days of failure on the part of the defendants to enter appearance. In fact in the same case, the High Court of Madras held that Order XXXVII Rule 3(7) empowers the Court to excuse the delay in entering an appearance or in applying for leave to defend the suit by the defendant for a sufficient cause shown. That being the case, in the instant case the trial Court permitting the defendants to enter appearance after lapse of 10 days or permitting the defendants to file the leave to defend petitions within 10 days of serving of affidavit for passing judgment cannot be found fault with.

23. Learned counsel for plaintiff referred to the case of Tahira Rehman (supra), which is a regular suit for recovery of money, not a summary suit under Order XXXVII of CPC and therefore, not relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the present revisions.

24. Reference is made to the case of Rajni Kumar (supra), wherein a summary suit filed under Order XXXVII of CPC has been decreed and thereafter, application filed under Rule 4 of Order XXXVII CPC to set aside this ex parte decree has been dismissed holding that no special circumstances were stated in the petition with regard to the illegality in deeming service of judgment on the petitioner, as well as facts sufficient to entitle him to defend the suit. This fact situation is not applicable to the present case, as no decree was passed, and before a decree was passed in the summary suits, the defendants herein have filed applications seeking leave to defend and said applications have been allowed imposing condition to furnish security. Hence, this case is not helpful for the case of the plaintiff herein, who has failed to take diligent steps in getting a decree passed immediately after failure of the defendants to enter appearance within 10 days of serving of summons in the suit.

25. Reference is made to the case of Niravbhai Mahendrabhai Trivedi (supra) with respect to a commercial suit filed as a summary suit under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of CPC, wherein summons were served on 06.12.2019, appearance was made on 02.12.2019. He filed an application to engage the lawyer and said application was allowed. On 01.01.2020, Vakalathnama was filed and a petition to condone delay in filing the written statement was filed on 17.06.2021. Since the appearance was made after 56 days of serving of summons, which is beyond the period prescribed in Order XXXVII Rule 3 of CPC, it is held that the suit cannot be dismissed and the procedure of defendants' plea to condone delay in filing the written statement has been held to be misconceived. Since the petition was filed with a delay of almost 1 year in filing the written statement, the application was rejected. The application of limitation period of COVID-19 was held to have been started from the March, 2020 and not on the date of the counsel filing Vakalathnama in the suit. In that context, it was held that there are no grounds to condone delay. This fact situation is not similar as the plaintiff as well as the defendants have committed lapses in following the procedure laid down under Order XXXVII of CPC with respect to entering appearance in 10 days by the defendants and summons for judgment within 10 days of failure of defendants to enter appearance.

26. Lastly, reference is made to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution (supra), which is about rejection of plaint and not the procedure to be followed in a summary suit, hence not relevant.

27. With respect to the reporting of any transaction involving more than Rs.2,00,000/- to the local income tax officer and exemptions, it is argued that the plaintiff has raised money through agricultural income and therefore, there is an exemption from reporting of agricultural income to the local income tax officer. This contention and its validity can be decided by the trial Court as applicability of said exemption can be decided only after the plaintiff produces evidence to prove that the amount forwarded in the subject suits was derived from agricultural operations.

28. A discussion of the citations relied upon by the learned counsel for plaintiff shows that the fact situation in said cases is not squarely applicable to the fact situation of the present suits. It is a point to be noted that that there is failure on the part of the defendants to enter appearance within 10 days of serving of summons. Likewise, it is a point to be noted that there is failure on the part of plaintiff in approaching the Court to pass a decree immediately after 10 days of serving of summons to urge the Court to pass a decree. The plaintiff have waited for almost 1 month and thereafter, the defendants entered appearance on 20.06.2025. Even thereafter, the plaintiff did not take steps for serving summons to pass judgment, instead filed affidavit. Immediately within 10 days of filing of affidavit to pass decree, the defendants filed application seeking leave to defend.

29. As per the judgment in case of Rajni Kumar and S.T. Kashinathan (both supra) Order XXXVII Rule 3(7) of CPC empowers the Court to excuse delay in entering an appearance or delay in applying for leave to defend for a sufficient cause shown. Thus, the contention of plaintiff that the very factum of failure of defendants to make appearance within 10 days of serving of summons extinguishes their right to defend is not true. There is scope for excusing the delay for sufficient cause shown.

30. In the instant case, the learned trial Court held that there is lapse on the part of plaintiff in filing the affidavit for judgment within the time frame contemplated under Order XXXVII of CPC and also deemed that the defence taken by the defendants contains triable issues such as facts related to income source of the plaintiff and whether the promissory notes were executed by the defendants, as such granted leave. Since the trial Court deemed that sufficient cause was shown, leave was granted to defend. Therefore, this Court does not see any reason to set aside the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court in I.A.No.181 of 2025 in O.S.No.4 of 2025, as such C.R.P.No.11 of 2026 is liable to be dismissed.

31. Now coming to the case of defendants, it is pleaded that though summons were served, it was month of May, 2025, when there was summer vacation to the Courts and therefore, the counsel was engaged on 20.06.2025 to represent them and the counsel perused the record and informed that the defendants ought to have entered appearance within 10 days from the date of service of summons. On 20.06.2025, the plaintiff filed affidavit for judgment under Order XXXVII Rule 3(6) (a) and therefore, the defendants have filed applications seeking leave to defend the suit. The defendants took objection to failure on the part of plaintiff in serving the summons for judgment under Order XXXVII Rule 3(4) in Form 4A, Appendix B, either on the defendants or on their counsel.

32. The defendants admitted that the plaintiff claims to have advanced huge amount of Rs.1,50,00,000/- in cash on the same day to the defendants in three suits who are all family members. The specific case of defendants is that the plaintiff does not have financial capacity to lend such huge amount as loans, as he himself borrowed small amounts such as Rs.5,00,000/- from family members to meet his financial needs and he also availed loans from financial institutions. In that context, the defendants offered to produce documentary evidence along with the written statement.

33. Further, it is pleaded that the defendants received Rs.46,18,151/- as compensation with respect to land acquired by the State Government and therefore, with an intention to extort said amount the suits are filed. Further, it is pleaded that the respondents are entitled to receive Rs.2,45,082,743/- as compensation for the land acquired from the Government, the plaintiff has knowledge of the same, and to extort said money, false and vexatious suits are filed. The defendants pleaded that they have sufficient money to meet both the family and business needs and they do not have any cause to borrow money from the plaintiff.

34. Further, it is pleaded that whenever a transaction involving greater than Rs.2,00,000/- takes place the same has to be informed to the local income tax officer and failing to do so would be violation of provisions of Income Tax Act. It is pleaded that there are substantial triable issues and therefore, leave to defend or to be granted.

35. When the aforementioned pleadings are considered vis-à-vis the guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Milkhiram (India) (P) Ltd. v. Chamanlal Bros.( AIR 1965 SC 1698), which is referred in IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited (supra), it is seen that questioning the financial capacity of the plaintiff to lend huge amount of money when he himself is indebted to the family members and financial institutions constitutes a substantial defence, wherein leave can be granted unconditionally.

36. Alternatively, under paragraph No.17.1 of judgment in IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited (supra), the defences raised with respect to financial capacity of the plaintiff, with respect to his indebtedness to the family members and financial institutions, coupled with the defendants being entitled to payment of Rs.2,50,00,000/- from the Government and above shows that there is good defence and that the plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment automatically and therefore, unconditional leave can be granted.

37. This Court is not subscribing to the view expressed by the learned counsel for plaintiff about improbability of the defence, or lack of substantial defence or admission by the defendants as per the situations described in paragraphs 17.4, 17.5 and 17.6 of IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited (supra), to decline the defendants’ case for grant of leave unconditionally. The grounds raised by the defendants do fall under substantial defence or positively good defence and therefore they are entitled to grant of leave to defend unconditionally. As such, the impugned orders passed by the learned trial Court to the extent of imposing condition on the defendants to furnish security amount of Rs.50,00,000/- in each of the suits for granting leave to defend are liable to be set aside.

38. In view of the foregoing discussion, the C.R.P.Nos.4709, 4728 and 4731 of 2025 filed by the defendants are to be allowed by setting aside the condition of furnishing security.

39. In the result, the C.R.P.No.11 of 2026 is dismissed and C.R.P.Nos.4709, 4728 and 4731 of 2025 are allowed setting aside the impugned orders dated 14.11.2025 in I.A.No.182 of 2025 in O.S.No.5 of 2025, I.A.No.181 of 2025 in O.S.No.4 of 2025 and I.A.No.183 of 2025 in O.S.No.6 of 2025 respectively on the file of the Principal District Judge, Jogulamba Gadwal District, to the extent of imposing condition to furnish security for a sum of Rs.50,00,000/- in each case and consequently, leave to defend the suits to the defendants is granted unconditionally. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending shall stand closed.