1. The petitioner is the sole accused in C.C. No.194 of 2015 on the file of the Court of the Judicial First-Class Magistrate-IV, Kozhikode (“Trial Court”, for short). The case has been registered on the basis of Annexure-A private complaint filed by the second respondent alleging the commission of the offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

2. The petitioner had earlier filed Crl.M.C. No.263 of 2016 before this Court to quash the above complaint. However, by Annexure-B order, this Court dismissed the petition, but permitted the petitioner to raise a preliminary objection before the Trial Court. Though the petitioner filed Annexure-C application, the Trial Court, by Annexure-D order, dismissed the application. Aggrieved by the order the present petition is filed.

3. I have heard Sri. K. Ramkumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Sri.Devadas H.Mallan, the learned Public Prosecutor and Sri.S.Sreekumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the 2nd respondent.

4. Sri. K. Ramkumar submitted that the Trial Court has completely misunderstood the scope of the liberty reserved by this Court in Annexure-B order. He contended that the petitioner had not merely questioned the territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court, but had also specifically raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the complaint. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the 2nd respondent has failed to state the alleged defamatory imputation in the complaint, the particulars of the alleged publication or the persons before whom the 2nd respondent’s reputation had lowered. In the absence of the above rudimentary averments, the complaint is not maintainable in law. The Trial Court has failed to examine the above questions in their proper legal perspective; instead, it has mechanically dismissed the application by a cryptic order.

5. Sri. S. Sreekumar stoutly opposed the petition. He submitted that the present petition is filed solely to protract the proceedings before the Trial Court. Though the complaint was filed on 22.03.2010, it has reached nowhere in the last 16 years. The contentions raised in this petition were raised in the earlier petition. This Court, by Annexure-B order, declined to quash the complaint on finding that the allegations in the complaint attract the offence alleged against the petitioner. As Annexure-B order has attained finality, the petitioner cannot, under the guise of raising a preliminary objection, re-agitate concluded matters. The findings in the Annexure B order is binding on the petitioner. The Trial Court has undertaken only the limited exercise permitted by this Court and has rightly found that the allegations in the complaint do disclose a prima facie case to attract the offence. The questions raised in this petition are matters to be decided after trial. Hence, the petition may be dismissed.

6. The crux of the 2nd respondent’s case in the complaint is that, while he was working as the Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode City, on 03.03.2010, almost all newspapers in the State of Kerala published a news item that the petitioner had filed a complaint before the then Chief Minister of Kerala alleging that the 2nd respondent had misappropriated ₹4.40 lakh received by the petitioner from the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, had forcefully taken away the gold ornaments of the petitioner and her daughter, and had also detained the petitioner’s daughter against her wishes. The petitioner also held a press conference and a television interview to all and sundry, reiterating the above allegations. The petitioner's action seriously impaired the complainant's reputation and lowered his standing in the public eye. Thus, the petitioner has committed the offence.

7. As already stated above, the petitioner had earlier filed Crl.M.C.No.263 of 2016 to quash the complaint on the assertion that the offence of defamation was not made out. This Court, after considering the materials placed on record and the rival submissions, dismissed the petition by Annexure-B order. The relevant observations in the order read thus:

                  “6. In the instant case, copies of publication made in several newspapers were produced besides the copy of the complaint circulated by her on 1.3.2010. A witness list was also submitted along with the complaint. Since petitioner is a senior police officer holding a key position in the police department in the State of Kerala, any imputation made without any basis will have adverse effect on his reputation. Further, it cannot be insisted invariably in all cases that the complaint should disclose the identity of the person before whom he had sustained loss of reputation. If it is pertaining to a celebrity or a public personality or an officer occupying a key position, the imputation, if any made against him would have its own impact among the public. In fact, it is a matter of evidence and there cannot be any insistence to disclose the name and address of the person before whom he had sustained loss of reputation. Regarding the application of Explanation IV and Exception No.9 and 10 attached to Section 499 IPC, it requires adjudication by evidence and as such, the same cannot be taken as a ground of attack under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to maintain a preliminary objection and to take up all defences, the present Crl.M.C. is hereby dismissed.”

        (emphasis given)

8. A reading of the above findings establishes that this Court had examined the foundational challenge of the petitioner that the allegations in the complaint do not attract the offence. It was specifically held that the absence of the names of the persons before whom the complainant allegedly suffered loss of reputation would not, by itself, render the complaint legally defective, particularly when the complainant was occupying a high public office and the imputations were alleged to have been widely circulated through the media. This Court further held that the applicability of Explanation IV and the Exceptions No.9 and 10 to Section 499 of the IPC are matters requiring appreciation of evidence and, therefore, incapable of being adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”).

9. No doubt that this Court reserved liberty in favour of the petitioner to raise a preliminary objection before the Trial Court. Nevertheless, such liberty cannot be construed as a permission to reopen and re-agitate questions that have already been considered and substantially answered by this Court. The liberty was intended only to enable the petitioner to raise such legally permissible objection that may arise before the Trial Court and to urge all available defences during the trial. It can never be construed that this Court intended to permit successive challenges on decided grounds, thereby resulting in endless interlocutory litigation and frustrating the progress of the criminal proceedings.

10. The Trial Court, by the impugned Annexure-D order dismissed the application by holding as follows:

                  “Now the question is whether the ingredients of section 499 of IPC has been constituted. The learned counsel for the complainant relied on the decision rendered by Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Editor, Rashtra Deepika Ltd. and others V/s. Vinaya. N.A (2017 (3) KHC 804). In that case, the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala held that "to prove the publication of a scandalous imputation under the penal law, it is not necessary to prove that it was done out of any ill will or malice or that the complainant had actually suffered from it. It would be sufficient that the accused intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant." That being the position of law, here the newspapers produced by the complaint show that the complainant herein has misappropriated Rs.4.4 lakhs from as well as detained the daughter of the accused. It is pertinent to note that the accused has no case that these allegations are true. These imputations will definitely malign the character of the complainant, who was then Commissioner of Police, Calicut. The very act of publication itself will constitute the offence. That being so the contention of the accused counsel that the imputation does not constitute the offences fails hence it is discard. Viewed this, I find that this court has got jurisdiction as to subject matter of the allegation as well. Accordingly preliminary objection fails to at that score. These points are found against the accused.”

11. The impugned order reveals that the Trial Court has adverted to the contentions raised by the petitioner and has considered the legal principles governing the offence of defamation, after referring to the principles laid down by this Court in Editor, Rashtradeepika Ltd. v. Vinaya N.A. [2017 (3) KHC 804]. It is after applying the above principles that the Trial Court prima facie found that the allegations attributed to the petitioner, if proved, are capable of tarnishing the name and reputation of the second respondent, who was then occupying the responsible office of Commissioner of Police.

12. The principal contention in the present petition is that the Trial Court has not elaborately considered each of the objections raised by the petitioner.

13. In my considered opinion, the said contention is devoid of merit. At the stage when a criminal court is called upon to examine a preliminary objection relating to the maintainability of a complaint, it is not expected to render an exhaustive judgment analysing every conceivable defence available to the accused. The Court is only required to satisfy itself that the complaint discloses the essential ingredients of the alleged offence and that there exists sufficient ground to proceed further, that too after this Court has rendered its findings vide Annexure-B order. The impugned order demonstrates that the Trial Court has undertaken the above exercise and arrived at a prima facie conclusion that the allegations in the complaint warrant a full-fledged trial. Such a finding cannot be characterised as manifestly illegal or erroneous.

14. The petitioner's contention that the complaint does not disclose the particulars of publication or identify the persons before whom the complainant's reputation was allegedly lowered is also liable to be rejected. As already noticed, this Court, in Annexure-B order, had specifically observed that where the complainant is a public functionary occupying a prominent position, and the defamatory imputations are alleged to have been disseminated through print and the visual media, it is not indispensable for the 2nd respondent to identify each individual before whom he suffered the loss of his reputation. When allegations of a serious nature are broadcast through print and visual media with widespread circulation, the question of whether the publication had the tendency to lower the reputation of the 2nd respondent in the estimation of society is essentially one of fact, to be determined by evidence, which cannot be conclusively answered as a preliminary question. The contentions raised in the petition are intrinsically mixed questions of law and fact. Whether the alleged publications were actually made; whether they faithfully reflected the statements attributed to the 2nd respondent; whether they were made in good faith; whether they were protected by any of the statutory Exceptions to Section 499 of the IPC; whether the imputations were true and made for the public good; and whether the complainant's reputation was in fact harmed, are all questions that necessarily depend upon oral and documentary evidence. These questions cannot be adjudicated in isolation based on the pleadings.

15. The inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 CrPC is intended to prevent palpable injustice and not to short-circuit legitimate criminal prosecutions. The inherent power cannot be invoked merely because the accused has raised a plausible defence or because another view on the facts may also be possible. Unless the complaint is demonstrably frivolous, inherently improbable or fails to disclose the ingredients of the alleged offence, this Court should be slow to interdict the prosecution at the threshold. The present case does not fall within any of those exceptional categories warranting the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

16. Another aspect that cannot be lost sight of is the delay in the progress of the proceedings before the Trial Court. The complaint was instituted on 22.03.2010. More than sixteen years have elapsed, yet the trial has not substantially progressed. The chronology of events reveals that the proceedings have remained stalled due to successive interlocutory challenges filed by the petitioner. While every accused is undoubtedly entitled to avail all remedies recognised by law, the procedural safeguards provided by the criminal justice system cannot be permitted to become instruments for postponing the adjudication of a criminal prosecution. Delay in the administration of criminal justice is prejudicial not only to the accused but also to the complainant.

17. Criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to drift endlessly through successive interlocutory challenges when the questions raised are essentially matters for trial. Entertaining repeated challenges at interlocutory stages, particularly on grounds that substantially overlap with those already considered, would not only defeat the object of a speedy trial but would also encourage fragmentary litigation, resulting in avoidable delay and multiplicity of proceedings.

18. Having bestowed my anxious consideration to the materials placed on record, the impugned order and the rival submissions made across the Bar, I am satisfied that the Trial Court has considered the preliminary objections in accordance with law. The impugned order neither suffers from any error, irrationality or impropriety warranting interference by this Court.

The Criminal Miscellaneous Case is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. The Trial Court is directed to dispose of C.C. No.194 of 2015 in accordance with law and as expeditiously as possible and, at any rate, within four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, untrammelled by any observation made in this order.