C. Hari Shankar, J.
1. The somewhat compendious prayer clause in this writ petition reads as under:
"In view of the foregoing facts, grounds, legal submissions, and judicial precedents, the Petitioner most humbly and respectfully prays that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to:
A. Allow hearing in the matter on day to day basis;
B. Issue a Writ of Certiorari quashing the Impugned Notice dated 16.04.2026, the Impugned Order dated 14.05.2026, and Paragraph 17(vi) of the CAT order dated 11.11.2025 as a jurisdictional nullity;
C. Issue a Writ of Mandamus commanding the Respondents to forthwith implement and declare the Petitioner's "Disability Status" as a 'High Support Need' individual (Sections 2 (l, s-t) and 38 of RPwD Act) with retrospective effect from 17.11.2018;
D. Issue a Writ of Mandamus: directing the Respondents to enforce absolute statutory compliance with the superior Administrative Order dated 04.04.2022 passed by Respondent No. 4 in accordance with Sections 3 and 20(4) of RPwD Act, and permanently clear all financial gridlocks by directing the Respondents to grant:
i) Actual, active financial and promotional benefits to the post of Section Officer w.e.f. 01.01.2025 (extinguishing the hollow, deceptive 'notional' pay fixation order dated 09.10.2025), along with all regular promotional arrears prior to superannuation;
ii) Full restoration and continuous maintenance of all withheld arrears of salary, annual increments, bonuses, HPCA/CA, and Transport Allowance (TA) at double the normal rates under the mandate of the Department of Expenditure, GOI OM dated 15.09.2022 and 29-07-2025, along with 18% penal interest;
iii) Immediate release of the 3rd MACP benefits w.e.f. 23.07.2023 and all withheld annual increments from July 2023 onwards (arrears + 18% penal interest), with full integration into his final Retiral Benefits, Pension, Gratuity, and Leave Encashment;
E. Issue a Writ of Mandamus awarding ₹75,00,000/- as exemplary, punitive, and compensatory damages under the Public Law Remedy framework, to be recovered directly and personal-liability wise from the personal estates and active salaries of Respondent Nos. 4 to 11 for misfeasance in public office.";
F. ISSUE A FURTHER SPECIFIC DIRECTION that the aforementioned compensation amount of ₹ 75,00,000/- be recovered directly, proportionately, and personal- liability-wise from the active monthly salaries and personal estates of Respondent Nos. 4 to 11 in their individual capacities, in accordance with the statutory accountability mandated under Sections 3, 20, 38, 89, and 92 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, to penalize their deliberate, malicious, and malafide acts of personal and oppressive misfeasance in public office, thereby ensuring that the public exchequer is not burdened for their rogue administrative actions;
G. DIRECT the Chief Secretary, GNCTD (Respondent No. 1) to constitute a High-Level Committee to investigate the "Administrative Labyrinth" and "Loss of Records" by filing a status report within two weeks, specifically mentioned throughout this petition, and to fix responsibility on all the officials from Respondent Nos. 4 to 11 who deliberately suppressed the Permanent Disability Certificate dated 21-08-2019 and the Leave Committee Recommendations of 15.12.2020, distorted, manipulated, and misrepresented substantive material documentary facts, and framed his certified permanent disability (Disability Status) as a mere "medical condition" for over seven years;
H. TAKE SUO MOTU COGNIZANCE UNDER ARTICLE 215 of the Constitution of India, read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, against Respondent Nos. 4 to 11 for executing a colourable exercise of power, committing constructive disobedience of the protective declarations passed by this Hon'ble High Court in Paragraph 7 of the Order dated 06.04.2026, and perpetrating a fraud upon statutory bodies;
I. DIRECT the initiation of substantive Contempt proceedings against the Respondents for wilful and deliberate disobedience of the judicial order dated 06.04.2026 passed by this Hon'ble Court, including the distortion, suppression, and concealment of substantive material facts having filed the WP(C) 2997/2026 against the Petitioner as a General Employee of GNCTD without disclosing "Disability Status", to misguide the Court, under Sections 2(b), 2(c), and 10 to 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and Section 92 of the RPwD Act, 2016, against the guilty Respondents for atrocities committed against the High Support Need Permanent Disabled Petitioner over a period of more than 7 years;
J. PASS ANY OTHER ORDER(S) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice, equity, and good conscience."
2. The prayers in the writ petition may be divided into three categories. The first category consists of the prayer, forming part of prayer (B), to set aside para 17(vi) of the order dated 11 November 2025 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal ("the Tribunal" hereinafter). The second set of reliefs are all the other reliefs sought in the writ petition, except prayers (H) and (I). The third category of relief is the prayer for initiation of proceedings for contempt against some of the respondents, contained in prayers (H) and (I).
3. Insofar prayers (H) and (I) are concerned, we are of the opinion that they would have to be separately agitated by the petitioner by filing a contempt petition. Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the prayers, we reserve liberty with the petitioner to move an appropriate contempt petition, if so advised, with respect to prayers (H) and (I) in this writ petition.
4. We proceed to deal with the remaining prayers.
5. Para 17(vi) of the order dated 11 November 2025 passed by the Tribunal merely permits the respondent to, in case they desire to revisit the decision to grant annual increments, bonus, TA and HPCA/PCA, do so with prior notice to the petitioner, with the grounds for revisiting the said emoluments being clearly set out in the notice. For ready reference, we may reproduce para 17 of the order dated 11 November 2025:
17. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, O.A. No. 2183/2024 is allowed with the following directions: -
i. The impugned order/action(s) of the respondents vide which they have stopped the payment of TA, PCA/HPCA, bonus and annual increments are set aside as they are found to be arbitrary and illegal.
ii. The order/action of the respondents in effecting recovery of TA, HPCA/PCA, bonus and annual increments are also found to be illegal and arbitrary.
iii. The respondents are directed to make payment of annual increments, PCA/HPCA, annual bonus and TA keeping in view the earlier approval given the Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare, and implemented by the respondents through various orders referred to above.
iv. If any of the alleged payments has already been recovered by the respondents, the respondents are directed to refund the same to the applicant.
v. The aforesaid directions shall be complied with by the respondents as expeditiously as possible and preferably within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, vi. However, it is provided that in case the respondents find that the orders regarding grant of annual increments bonus, TA and HPCA/PCA are required to be revisited, the respondents shall be at liberty to do the same, however, with prior notice to the applicant and such notice shall also contain the grounds in support of the contemplated action.
6. A reading of the judgment dated 11 November 2025 passed by the Tribunal in OA 2183/2024, which contains para 17(vi), reveals that the stoppage of PA, HPCA/PCA, TA and bonus of the petitioner has been set aside by the Tribunal as having been effected without notice to the petitioner and, therefore, in violation of the principles of natural justice. There is, therefore, no illegality in the Tribunal reserving liberty with the respondent to take a fresh decision in that regard, if they still felt that the emoluments released to the petitioner were required to be revisited, but with advance notice to the petitioner. Mr. Karwal, who appears for the petitioner, has not been able to point out any legal infirmity in such a direction.
7. We, therefore, do not find any error in the direction contained in para 17(vi) of the judgment dated 11 November 2025 of the Tribunal. The prayer for quashing para 17(vi) is, therefore, rejected.
8. In so far as the remaining prayers in the writ petition are concerned, we are of the opinion that this Court is coram non judice in view of paras 93 and 99 of the judgment of the Seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI (1997) 3 SCC 261, which reads as under:
93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.
*****
99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.
9. L. Chandra Kumar acts as an absolute bar to High Courts acting as courts of first instance in any matter which is amenable to adjudication by the Central Administrative Tribunal under Section 14(1) (14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal.--
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court ) in relation to--
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All-India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian;
(b) all service matters concerning--
(i) a member of any All-India Service; or
(ii) a person not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c) appointed to any civil service of the Union or any civil post under the Union; or
(iii) a civilian not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c) appointed to any defence services or a post connected with defence,
and pertaining to the service of such member, person or civilian, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation 3 or society owned or controlled by the Government;
(c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the Union concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) of clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by a State Government or any local or other authority or any corporation 3 or society or other body, at the disposal of the Central Government for such appointment.
Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that references to "Union" in this sub-section shall be construed as including references also to a Union territory.) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 ("AT Act" hereinafter). In fact, the Supreme Court has gone to the extent of holding that challenges, even if they are to statutory provisions dealing with service, must also, in the first instance, be preferred before the Tribunal, unless the provision under challenge is contained in the AT Act itself. This later exception has been carved out in L. Chandra Kumar, only because it is not permissible in any judicial authority to contest the validity of any provision of the very statute to which it owes its existence.
10. A bare reading of prayers in the writ petition, except for the challenge to para 17(vi) of the judgment dated 11 November 2025, in OA 2183/2024, and prayers (H) and (I), are "service matters" within the meaning of Section 14(1)(a) and (b) read with Section 3(q) (3(q) "service matters", in relation to a person, means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government, as respects--
(i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits;
(ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation;
(iii) leave of any kind;
(iv) disciplinary matters; or
v) any other matter whatsoever;) of the AT Act, and are clearly amenable to adjudication by the Tribunal. Section 14(1)(b) extends the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to all service matters concerning a person appointed to any civil service post of the State or any civil post under the Union" and "service matters" as defined in Section 3(q) of the AT Act as meaning "all matters relating to the conditions of service ... any other matters whatsoever".
11. Indeed, Mr. Karwal was also not in a position to satisfy us that the reliefs sought by the petitioner in this writ petition, except for prayers (H) and (I) would not constitute "service matters" within the meaning of the AT Act.
12. We may note that this writ petition had come up for preliminary hearing before the Vacation Bench of this Court on 24 June 2026. The objection to the effect that this writ petition would not lie before this Court and that the petitioner would have to appropriately approach the Tribunal was raised even on that date. It cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioner was taken by surprise.
13. The petitioner filed an application for early hearing, which was listed before us on 2 July 2026. The question of this Court passing any order in this matter, including an order for expedited hearing, would arise only if this Court has jurisdiction to proceed with it. As, to our mind, paras 93 and 99 of the decision in L. Chandra Kumar renders this Court coram non judice with respect to the prayers in this writ petition (except the prayer for setting aside para 17(vi) of the judgment dated 11 November 2025 passed by the Tribunal and prayers (H) & (I) which seeks initiation of contempt proceedings), we were unwilling to proceed with the matter until we were satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction to do so, as any action taken by a court without jurisdiction would be a nullity. However, as Mr. Karwal submitted that the papers of the case were not readily available with him, and sought a day's time to address this Court, we renotified the matter for 3 July 2026.
14. Mr. Karwal has addressed us in detail on above aspect and has also placed on record elaborate point-wise written submissions in an effort to dispel our notion that we have no jurisdiction to proceed in this writ petition.
15. The pleas advanced in the written submissions are, to our mind, completely bereft of merits and suffer from a basic misunderstanding of the law on various aspects. We deal with them, seriatim, as under.
15.1 The very first submission of the petitioner reads thus:
"1. Bypassing the Tribunal via High Court mandate:
This Hon'ble Court in paragraph 1 of its order dated 06.04.2026 passed in WP(C) No. 2997/2026 explicitly reserved the absolute legal right of the petitioner to directly approach this Court if he is aggrieved by any subsequent action or notice issued by the department."
We are sorry to note that, in para 1 of the written submissions, which is reproduced verbatim from the writ petition itself, the petitioner has misquoted the order passed by this Court. This is, to our mind, ex facie objectionable. Para 11 of the order dated 6 April 2026 passed by this Court reads thus:
"11. Needless to say, should the respondent continue to be aggrieved by any decision taken by the respondent in accordance with the order passed by the Tribunal, the right of the respondent in law shall remain reserved."
Clearly, this Court, in its order dated 6 April 2026, has not permitted the petitioner directly to approach this Court, if he continued to remain aggrieved.
15.2 There is a clear misstatement, therefore, in the very first ground advanced by the petitioner. This Court had only permitted the petitioner to seek appropriate remedies in law available to him, if he continued to remain aggrieved with the action of the respondent. That is entirely different from permitting the petitioner to re-approach this Court. Indeed, grant of any such permission would be in the teeth of para 99 of L Chandra Kumar.
15.3 The second ground advanced in the written submissions reads as under:
"2. The Rule of Exception due to Institutional Fraud: It is a pristine principle of constitutional law (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1) that the existence of an alternate remedy is a rule of discretion and not a bar of jurisdiction. Where the impugned executive actions are in gross violation of natural justice, completely lack jurisdictional competence, violate fundamental rights under Article 21, and are built on recorded administrative fraud, the Writ Court's extraordinary intervention is absolute."
This submission, again, misses the wood for the trees. We are not relegating the petitioner to any alternate remedy. The question of alternate remedy arises only where more than one forum has jurisdiction. If this court were to possess jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to deal with the writ petition and felt that another, equally efficacious remedy, was available to the petitioner, and required the petitioner to avail that remedy, it would be of case of relegating the petitioner to an alternate remedy. In the present case, there is no question of any alternate remedy, as there is only one remedy available to the petitioner in view of para 99 of L. Chandra Kumar. This Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It is coram non judice. The only forum which has jurisdiction to deal with the prayers in this writ petition, as a Court of first instance, is the Administrative Tribunal. We repeat, therefore, that we are not relegating the petitioner to any alternate remedy and are only requiring him to approach the only form which can deal with his grievances as a court of first instance.
15.4 The third submission of the petitioner is that the Tribunal has "already shown perversity by abdicating its functions" and that the petitioner is due to superannuate on 31 August 2026. These, needless to say, cannot constitute grounds for us to bypass the mandate contained in paras 93 & 99 of L. Chandra Kumar and exercise jurisdiction as a court of first instance with respect to the prayers contained in this writ petition, with which the Tribunal has never had an occasion to grapple.
15.5 It is also pleaded, in the written submissions, that hyper- technicalities cannot defeat claims to human rights. We are of the opinion that requiring the petitioner to approach the Tribunal cannot be said to be a hyper-technicality. It is the only course of action available to us in view of Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution of India read with the judgment in L. Chandra Kumar. It is obvious that a litigant cannot approach an incompetent forum and insist that his lis be decided, on the ground that it involves "human rights".
15.6 The next ground raised by the petitioner reads thus:
"3. THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ENTERTAIN IS ALREADY EXHAUSTED:
The objection that this Writ Petition is barred by the rule of alternative remedy under L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 is factually and legally incorrect. This Hon'ble Court already admitted the main Writ Petition on 24-06-2026 and formally issued notices to the Respondents. Once a Writ Petition has been entertained and notices have been issued by a coordinate bench, the question of maintainability based on an alternative remedy cannot be re-raised by a regular bench to deny an urgent application for an interim hearing."
15.7 This ground again manifests complete lack of understanding, by the petitioner, of the court procedure. This Bench, in holding that this petition is without jurisdiction, and in relegating the petitioner to the Tribunal, is not acting contrary to the decision of the Coordinate Bench in its order dated 24 June 2026. The Coordinate Bench only issued notice in this writ petition. In fact, the Coordinate Bench also noticed the objection regarding maintainability, but did not express any view thereon. To our mind, proceeding with the writ petition is not possible for us, in view of para 99 of L. Chandra Kumar. There is no principle that, once notice has been issued in the writ petition by a Coordinate Bench, the question of maintainability based on alternate remedy cannot be decided by another Bench. We reiterate, however, that this is not a case of maintainability on the ground of existence of an alternate remedy but a case in which this Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter.
15.8 The next submission of the petitioner is that, as the order dated 14 May 2026, of which the petitioner seeks annulment by the present writ petition, was issued pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court in its order dated 6 April 2026, and was actually not in compliance with the order dated 6 April 2026, as the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to "police, interpret or punish the deliberate violation of a High Court Division Bench mandate" and that this Court under Article 226 is the only proper forum therefor. This submission, again, is completely misconceived in law. Even if the order dated 14 May 2026 purports to have been passed in exercise of the liberty granted by this Court in its order dated 6 April 2026, the grievance of the petitioner with respect to the order dated 14 May 2026 constitutes a new distinct and independent cause of action. This Court cannot, in the teeth of para 99 of L Chandra Kumar, examine the correctness of the order dated 14 May 2026 before the Tribunal has had an occasion to do so. Nor can the petitioner directly approach this Court challenging the order dated 14 May 2026 without approaching the Tribunal in the first instance. Contrary to what the written submissions of the petitioner states, therefore, the Tribunal is the only proper forum which the petitioner can approach, challenging the order dated 14 May 2026.
15.9 It is lastly alleged that the Tribunal stands rendered functus officio, in view of its judgment dated 11 November 2025 in OA 2183/2024. It is specifically asserted, in the written submissions, thus:
"Once a statutory tribunal passes a final judgment, it becomes functus officio and holds no legal power to monitor or interpret subsequent executive orders."
This submission is, once again, thoroughly misconceived in law. There is no want of authority, in the Tribunal, to deal with a challenge to executive orders which are passed pursuant to the liberty granted by the Tribunal in a judicial decision. These executive orders, such as the order dated 14 May 2026, we reiterate, constitute a separate, new and independent cause of action. If the petitioner desires to challenge the said order, he has to do so before the Tribunal and before no other forum.
16. Entertainment of this writ petition by us would be an affront to para 99 of the judgment of the 7 Judge bench of the Supreme Court in L Chandra Kumar. It is illegal and improper for a Court which is conscious that it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter, to do so.
17. We, therefore, regret that it is not possible for us to deal with the prayers in this writ petition, save and except the prayer for setting aside para 17(vi) of the judgment dated 11 November 2025 of the Tribunal in OA 2183/2024, which we have already held to be without merit.
18. We find substance, however, in Mr. Karwal's lament that the petitioner is suffering from 81% percent of disability and that requiring the petitioner to knock again and again on the doors of justice may result in a travesty thereof. At the same time, we cannot exercise jurisdiction on sympathetic and humanitarian grounds, where the Supreme Court has held otherwise.
19. In order to expedite matters, we had suggested to Mr. Karwal that we could transfer the record of this case to the Tribunal so that it could be dealt with expeditiously. Mr. Karwal was, however, not agreeable to the suggestion and required us to pass a judicial order on the aspect of maintainability. We have, therefore, perforce had to pass the present judgment.
20. We, therefore, dispose of this writ petition in the following terms:
(i) The prayer to set aside para 17 (vi) of the judgment dated 11 November 2025 of the Tribunal in OA 2183/2024 is rejected.
(ii) Liberty is reserved with the petitioner to agitate prayers (H) and (I) in this writ petition by way of a separate contempt petition/contempt application, if so advised.
(iii) In so far as the remaining prayers in this writ petition are concerned, liberty is reserved with the petitioner to move the Tribunal in substantive proceedings for the grant thereof. In case the petitioner so desires, he is at liberty to approach the Registry of this Court to transmit the record of this writ petition to the Tribunal, in order to avoid the exercise of refiling the papers in the Tribunal. In that event, the Tribunal would register the present writ petition as a substantive OA/TA and proceed to deal with the matter in accordance with law.
(iv) We also request the Tribunal to take this matter as expeditiously as possible, particularly keeping in mind the physical incapacity from which the petitioner suffers. For this reason, the parties would appear before the Tribunal on 20 July 2026. We request the Tribunal to thereafter to proceed with the matter with all due expedition and attempt to render a final judgment thereon as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of four months from the first date of hearing fixed by us hereinabove.
(v) Neither side would be entitled to take any adjournment on the date when this matter is listed before the Tribunal or on any subsequent date thereafter, save for rare and exceptional reasons.
21. Needless to say, should either side be aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the remedies in law as available thereagainst would stand reserved.
22. This writ petition is accordingly disposed of in the aforesaid terms, with no orders as to costs.
23. The date already fixed i.e., 17 August 2026 stands cancelled.
