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CDJ 2026 Ker HC 996 My Notes print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Kerala
Case No : Op(Kat) No. 146 of 2026
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S. MURALEE KRISHNA
Parties : State Of Kerala Represented By The Secretary To Government, Health & Family Welfare Department, Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala & Others Versus Dr. Rosin Aboobacker
Appearing Advocates : For the Appearing Parties: Ann Mariya Francis, Government Pleader, Saju John, V. Varghese, Jelson J.Edampadam, Advocates.
Date of Judgment : 03-07-2026
Head Note :-
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 19 -

Comparative Citation:
2026 KER 48832,
Judgment :-

Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The respondents in O.A.(EKM)No.1038 of 2025 before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Additional Bench at Ernakulam (the ‘Tribunal’ for short), filed this original petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P1 order dated 12.12.2025 passed by the Tribunal in that original application.

2. Going by the averments in the original application, the respondent, an Assistant Surgeon in the Health Services Department, is aggrieved by Annexure-A1 order dated 07.07.2025 issued by the 2nd petitioner, transferring her from PHC, Vilayur in Palakkad district to CHC, Bedadka in Kasaragod district. It is stated therein that the transfer is ordered on the basis of a complaint regarding her behaviour towards the general public and an enquiry allegedly conducted by the 3rd petitioner. It is understood that the enquiry was in fact conducted by the Deputy DMO without any prior intimation to the respondent while she was on leave, and though the report was stated to be in her favour, it was later modified adversely by the DMO. A plain reading of Annexure A1 order reveals that it is clearly punitive in nature, containing adverse findings and proposing disciplinary action. However, the order has been issued without putting the respondent on notice or affording her an opportunity of hearing. The allegations are vague and unspecific, and the complainant remains unidentified. The respondent has thus been condemned unheard, in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. Annexure-A1 order is punitive, stigmatic, and vitiated by malafides. With these pleadings, the respondent- applicant approached the Tribunal by filing the original application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs;

                  “(i) set aside Annexure-A1 order.

                  (ii). call for the records pertaining to letter No. A6-8303/2024/DMO dated 31.01.2025. referred to in Annexure-A1 and set aside the same.

                  (iii). direct the respondents to retain the applicant in PHC, Vilayur, as if Annexure-A1 were never issued”.

3. In the original application, on 10.07.2025, the Tribunal passed Ext.P3 interim order directing the petitioners to keep in abeyance Annexure A1 order, till the next posting date of the original application.

4. The 2nd petitioner filed Ext.P4 reply statement dated 18.08.2025 in the original application, opposing the reliefs sought for and producing therewith Annexures R2(a) to R2(e) documents. To that reply statement, the respondent filed Ext.P5 rejoinder dated 26.10.2025.

5. After hearing both sides, the Tribunal, by the impugned Ext.P1 order, disposed of the original application. Paragraphs 8 to 10 and the last paragraph of that order read thus;

                  “8. The order of transfer Annexure A1 was a result of the enquiries/inspection reports. Annexure R2(b) and (c) actually resulted from a complaint filed Annexure R2 (a). A complaint was received by the DMO, from one Baby Girija, President of the Grama Panchayath. General complaints were raised regarding the administration of the hospital. It was stated that the entire functioning of the Primary Health Centre had come to a standstill due to lack of proper administration. Allegations were raised against the applicant as well as other officers. It was further stated that the doctor had attended the Outpatient Department only on three days, as she was engaged in other meetings and immunisation programmes. Serious allegations were also raised against the Staff Nurse. Based on the above complaint, inspections were conducted. Pursuant to the inspection conducted by the District Medical Officer, a report was submitted highlighting the lack of proper maintenance in the office. The report noted that the office premises, as well as the cash records and reports, were not properly maintained. It was further observed that the hospital was in an unhygienic condition, the entire area was overgrown with grass and bushes. The main allegations were with regard to maintenance of office records.

9. In the report of Deputy DME Annexure R2(b), no serious allegations were raised against the applicant. It was reported that as she is the only Doctor working in the PHC, she had to attend immunizations and training programs and she has got very short time for attending to the hospital administration. The details of the leave taken by the doctor were also recorded and it was found that alternate arrangements were made to hand over whenever the doctor was on leave. At the same time, it was noted that apart from her official duties as a Doctor, there was dereliction on her part in the administration side and she was not maintaining good relationship with the Panchayath Officers and representatives of people. It could be seen from Annexure R2 (b) that the members of the Panchayth Committee had expressed their dissatisfaction with the misconduct of the Medical Officer. It was based on the complaint of the Parichayath Officers that all these enquiries have started. It was in the above background that a decision was taken to transfer the Staff Nurse, the Junior Health Inspector, and also the Doctor to another institution, The intention was only to remove her from the superintendence of the Hospital and accommodate her in another Hospital. In Annexure R2(e) the Director had ordered to transfer the applicant to another institution where Supervisory Officer is available. The main reason for the recommendation was the behaviour of the applicant towards the patients and other members of the public. It is the case of the applicant that recommendation of the 2nd respondent in Annexure R2(e) was only to transfer the applicant to another place where there is a Supervisory Officer and it was based on the allegation that she misbehaved to the members of the public and patients. There was absolutely no suggestion in the order to transfer the applicant to a station which is 300 km away from the present station. It remains a fact that the applicant has continued all alone at the same station due to the interim order issued by this Tribunal.

10. There is merit in the contention of the applicant that no opportunity was given to her for presenting her version though three enquiries including a surprise inspection was conducted in order to arrive at the facts. Had there been an opportunity, the applicant could have explained her version to the concerned officers but instead of that the applicant was transferred to a place which is 300 km away from her present station, which itself shows the order of transfer was punitive and it was not guided by administrative reasons. In the order of transfer it is mentioned that it is on administrative reasons that order of transfer is issued. But after considering the entire facts and situation we find that the above argument cannot be accepted because the transfer was necessitated on the complaint filed by the Panchayat Committee members and also the enquiry reports. Accordingly, we find that the order is highly stigmatic and punitive and it was issued behind the back of the applicant without giving her an opportunity to present her case. Accordingly Annexure A1 order of transfer is set aside. The learned Government Pleader has referred to the Judgments of the Hon’ble High Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court in Nixy James v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation [2023(4) KHC 35], Dinamony v. Dt. Superintendent of Police, Kollam in [1994 (1) KLT 326] and the judgment in Sunil Kumar M. v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation [2025 KHC Online 1217]. The learned Government Pleader has vehemently argued that the transfer is a prerogative of the employer and that, the cases where the presence of an employee is conducive to proper administration, it is open to the employer to transfer her out of that station and there are so many judgments of the Hon’ble High Court and Supreme Court which have placed restrictions on the power of judicial review in matters relating to transfer. We give due consideration to the above arguments and it is made clear that it is open to the respondents to transfer the applicant out of the present station keeping in mind the observation made herein above. But, if at all such a transfer is effected that shall not be effected in the midst of the academic year. With the above observation, the Original Application is disposed of.”

6. The petitioners, being aggrieved by Ext.P1 impugned order of the Tribunal, approached this Court with the present original petition.

7. On 29.05.2026 when this original petition came up for admission, the same was admitted onto file. Urgent notice by speed post was ordered to the respondent, returnable within two weeks.

8. Heard the learned Government Pleader for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent.

9. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

10. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd [(2001) 8 SCC 97], the Apex Court held thus;

                  "The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to."

11. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

12. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

13. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

14. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

15. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

16. We have gone through the materials on record and the impugned Ext.P1 order of the Tribunal. While passing the impugned order, the Tribunal took note of the contentions of the respondent that no opportunity was given to her for presenting her version, though three enquiries, including a surprise inspection, were conducted in order to arrive at the facts. The Tribunal has also noted that though in the order of transfer it is mentioned that it is on administrative reasons that the order of transfer is issued, the entire facts and situation would show that the transfer was necessitated on the complaint filed by the Panchayat committee members and also based on the enquiry reports. The Tribunal has also taken into consideration that the respondent was transferred to a place which is 300 kilometres away from her present station. However, noting that transfer is a prerogative of the employer, the Tribunal made it clear that it is open to the petitioners herein to transfer the respondent out of the present station, keeping in mind the observations made in that order. In effect, the Tribunal has permitted the petitioners to transfer the respondent from the present station, if administrative reasons warrant the same. However, the said order of transfer shall not be arbitrary or punitive in nature.

17. Having considered the entire facts and circumstances and the reasoning given by the Tribunal in the impugned order, we find no ground to hold that the aforesaid observations and directions given by the Tribunal in the impugned order are suffering from any patent illegality or perversity. But, at the same time, we notice that in the impugned order, the Tribunal has further directed that if at all the petitioners wanted to effect transfer of the respondent, that shall not be effected in the midst of the academic year. For issuing such a direction, no reasons are stated in the impugned order. When an employee in a key post is to be transferred to another station due to administrative reasons, a direction as that of the present one given by the Tribunal would tie the hands of the employer, especially when there are no sufficient materials to support such a direction. Moreover, we notice that in the present case, the impugned order of the Tribunal was on 12.12.2025 and the academic period of that year has already over. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the direction in the impugned order of the Tribunal, to the extent it restrains the petitioners from transferring the respondent in the midst of the academic year, is liable to be set aside.

In the result, the original petition is disposed of by interfering with the impugned Ext.P1 order dated 12.12.2025 in O.A. (EKM)No.1038 of 2025, passed by the Tribunal, only to the extent of setting aside the direction in that order restraining the petitioners from effecting transfer of the respondent in the midst of the academic year.

 
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