1. This Writ Petition is filed by the petitioner seeking the following relief:
“…Issue a writ order or direction particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the order dated 14 09 2016 in File No 887/SERP/HRII/2011 passed by the 2nd respondent whereby dismissing the appeal filed against the order dt 14 9 2016 on the File No 887/SERP/HRII/2011 passed by the 3rd respondent in terminating the service of the petitioner as a Assistant Project Manager APM Hasanparthy Mandal Warangal District as illegal arbitrary and violative of principles of Natural Justice and consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service as Assistant Project Manager APM Hasanparthy Warangal District with all attendant benefits and pass and pass…”
02. Heard Mr. Nayakwadi Ramesh, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Panchayat Raj for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 and Sri Rupendra Mahendra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1. Perused the record.
03(a). Aggrieved by the action of the 2nd respondent in dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order, passed by the 3rd respondent in the month of June, 2014, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
03(b). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner completed B.Tech. in the year 2002 and initially joined as a Community Coordinator under the Velugu Project on 15.12.2002. Subsequently, he was appointed as HRMS under SERP with effect from 01.01.2008, re-designated as Community Coordinator Grade–0/1/2/3, and later promoted as Assistant Project Manager, Hasanparthy Mandal, Warangal District. His service conditions were governed by the Job Chart and Performance Indicators issued by the respondents.
03(c). Learned counsel submits that while the petitioner was working as Assistant Project Manager, he was placed under suspension vide proceedings dated 01.12.2010 on the allegation that he had failed to get the books of accounts updated and audited despite directions issued by the superior officers. Thereafter, a charge memo dated 04.05.2013 containing six charges was issued. The petitioner submitted detailed explanations to the charge memo as well as to the articles of charge. However, the Inquiry Officer conducted no oral enquiry and submitted his report without affording the petitioner an effective opportunity to defend himself.
03(d). Learned counsel further submits that the Inquiry Officer specifically found that the petitioner was not directly involved in any misappropriation. The principal allegation against the petitioner related to non-maintenance of records and failure to produce original bills amounting to Rs.20,420/- towards refreshments, meals, Xerox and stationery charges. According to the petitioner, he had produced vouchers and bills supporting the said expenditure, and neither the Inquiry Officer nor the disciplinary authority recorded any finding that the documents produced were fabricated or not genuine. It is contended that no effort was made to verify the genuineness of the bills from the concerned hotel or Xerox centre and, therefore, fastening liability upon the petitioner without such verification is arbitrary and unsustainable.
03(e). Learned counsel submits that the main charge regarding non-auditing of books of accounts of Mandal Samakhya did not fall within the duties and responsibilities of the petitioner. Under the service conditions, the functions relating to finance and accounts were entrusted to the Assistant Project Manager (Finance) and DPMU/TPMU authorities. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held responsible for the alleged failure to audit the accounts.
03(f). Learned counsel further contends that the delay in updating and auditing the accounts pertained to the period from 2003 onwards and was attributable to the inaction of the concerned officials. No action was initiated against those responsible. It is also submitted that another Assistant Project Manager, against whom similar allegations were made, was let off without any punishment, whereas the petitioner alone was subjected to the extreme penalty of termination, thereby violating the principle of equality.
03(g). Learned counsel submits that the petitioner was issued a memo dated 26.11.2010 requiring completion of the audit by 30.11.2010. However, the said memo was dispatched only on 02.12.2010 and served on the petitioner on 03.12.2010, whereas the suspension order had already been passed on 01.12.2010. Thus, the suspension order itself was arbitrary and illegal.
03(h). Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner preferred an appeal on 23.07.2014 against the order of termination and submitted several reminders. As the appellate authority failed to dispose of the appeal, the petitioner approached this Court in W.P. No.12038 of 2016. Pursuant to the directions issued therein, the appellate authority afforded a hearing and received the petitioner’s statement of defence. However, by order dated 14.09.2016, the appeal was dismissed without assigning any reasons and without considering either the grounds raised in the appeal or the defence statement submitted by the petitioner.
03(i). Learned counsel further contends that both the order of termination passed by the 3rd respondent and the appellate order dated 14.09.2016 passed by the 2nd respondent are arbitrary, non-speaking, violative of the principles of natural justice and liable to be set aside. It is submitted that the petitioner had rendered nearly twelve years of service and that the impugned action has caused severe hardship to him and his family. Therefore, he prays that this Court may set aside the impugned orders and direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service as Assistant Project Manager with all consequential benefits.
03(j). In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision in State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayat Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh(2025 LawSuit(SC) 591) wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.58 and 60 that:
“58. It is clear, on a bare reading of Rule 9, that the procedure contemplated therein corresponds to the procedure that was ordinarily followed in conducting disciplinary proceedings prior to amendment of Article 311 by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. As held in paragraph 27 of B. Karunakar (supra), where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer’s report and the delinquent employee’s reply to it with regard to his alleged guilt. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions reached at the first stage. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee’s right to receive the report is, thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the enquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings.
60. We, thus, hold while answering the third issue that there has been blatant disregard by the appellant of not only principles of natural justice and the judicial command in B. Karunakar (supra) by not furnishing the enquiry report but also by not following the applicable statutory rule. The enquiry, therefore, stands wholly vitiated.”
03(k). Further, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Raj Pal Singh((2010) 5 Supreme Court Cases 783) wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.4 and 5 that:
“4. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that once the charges have been held to be established, it was not appropriate for the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment and judged from this standpoint, the order of the High Court cannot be sustained. In support of the said contention, reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44] and Secy. to Govt., Home Deptt. v. Srivaikundathan [(1998) 9 SCC 553 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1249] .
5. Though, on principle the ratio in aforesaid cases would ordinarily apply, but in the case in hand, the High Court appears to have considered the nature of charges levelled against the five employees who stood charged on account of the incident that happened on the same day and then the High Court came to the conclusion that since the gravity of charges was the same, it was not open for the disciplinary authority to impose different punishments for different delinquents. The reasoning given by the High Court cannot be faulted with since the State is not able to indicate as to any difference in the delinquency of these employees.”
03(l). Further, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Man Singh v. State of Haryana and others3 wherein it was held at Paragraph No.21 that:
“21. We have, therefore, examined the case of the appellant in the light of the established doctrine of equality and fair play. The principle is the same, namely, that there should be no discrimination between the appellant and HC Vijay Pal as regards the criteria of punishment of similar nature in departmental proceedings. The appellant and HC Vijay Pal were both similarly situated, in fact, HC Vijay Pal was the real culprit who, besides departmental proceedings, was an accused in the excise case filed against him by the excise staff of Andhra Pradesh for violating the excise prohibition orders operating in the State. The appellate authority exonerated HC Vijay Pal mainly on the ground of his acquittal by the criminal court in the excise case and after exoneration, he has been promoted to the higher post, whereas the appeal and the revision filed by the appellant against the order of punishment have been rejected on technical ground that he has not exercised proper and effective control over HC Vijay Pal at the time of commission of the excise offence by him in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The order of the disciplinary authority would reveal that for the last about three decades the appellant has served in the Police Department of Haryana in different capacities with unblemished record of service.”
04(a). Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the order passed by the 2nd respondent confirming the order of removal passed by the 3rd respondent is legal, valid and in accordance with the applicable rules and principles governing 3 (2008) 12 Supreme Court Cases 331 disciplinary proceedings. While working as Assistant Project Manager (APM), Hasanparthy Mandal, the petitioner failed to get the books of accounts updated and audited for the financial year 2009-2010 and also failed to comply with various directions issued by the Chief Executive Officer, SERP. During the Finance Meeting held on 14.09.2010, several financial irregularities were noticed. In view of such irregularities and non-maintenance of accounts, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner.
04(b). Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner had been repeatedly warned on several occasions through memos dated 18.12.2006, 05.05.2007, 11.12.2007, 23.01.2008, 25.05.2009 and 02.03.2010 regarding his negligent attitude and failure to follow instructions relating to implementation of schemes and maintenance of accounts. Despite issuance of further memos dated 19.08.2010 and 06.10.2010 calling upon him to explain why disciplinary action should not be initiated, the petitioner failed to rectify the deficiencies or furnish a satisfactory explanation.
04(c). Learned counsel submits that even after repeated reminders and clear directions issued by the CEO, SERP, the petitioner failed to update and get the books of accounts audited. Consequently, he was placed under suspension on 01.12.2010. Owing to the petitioner’s failure to follow instructions and circulars governing financial administration, financial irregularities occurred in the Mandal Samakhya.
04(d). Learned counsel further submits that an audit conducted by a Chartered Accountant revealed several irregularities and instances of misappropriation. Accordingly, an enquiry was ordered and a charge memo dated 06.05.2013 was issued to the petitioner. After receipt of his explanation, a detailed enquiry was conducted in accordance with Rule 8.5(v)(b) of the SERP Employees Rules. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 29.04.2014.
04(e). Learned counsel submits that the Enquiry Officer categorically held Charges 1 to 3 relating to non-maintenance of accounts as proved. It was also found that the petitioner failed to produce original bills relating to expenditure incurred towards refreshments, meals, Xerox charges and stationery amounting to approximately Rs.20,420/-. Based on the enquiry report and the material available on record, the disciplinary authority imposed the major penalty of removal from service by proceedings dated 01.06.2014 under Rule 8.3(ii)(c) of the SERP Employees Rules.
04(f). Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Executive Council and the appellate authority considered the matter and passed orders on 14.09.2016 confirming the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority.
04(g). Learned counsel contends that the petitioner was responsible, in his capacity as APM (MS Coordinator), for maintaining the books of accounts and furnishing the same for internal audit. Though the functions of APM (Finance) and DPM (Finance) include monitoring financial matters, the responsibility of maintaining accounts at the Mandal Samakhya level rested upon the petitioner. His failure to discharge such duties amounted to dereliction of duty.
04(h). Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner failed to maintain proper accounts and failed to establish that the amounts released for community activities were utilized for the purposes for which they were sanctioned. The inability of the petitioner to produce original supporting bills during the enquiry further substantiated the charges against him.
04(i). Learned counsel submits that with regard to the plea of discrimination, the action has also been initiated against Smt. P. Neelaveni. It is contended that the charges against the petitioner pertain to the period during which he was functioning as APM (MS Coordinator) and was directly responsible for maintenance of accounts of the concerned Mandal Samakhya.
04(j). Learned counsel therefore submits that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted after affording adequate opportunity to the petitioner, the findings of the Enquiry Officer are supported by the material on record, and both the disciplinary and appellate authorities have passed valid orders in accordance with law. Hence, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.
04(k). In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon a decision State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma(1996 (3) SCC 364) wherein it was held at Paragraph No.34 that:
“34. Now, in which of the above principles does the violation of sub-clause (iii) concerned herein fall? In our opinion, it falls under Principles Nos. 3 and 4(a) mentioned above. Though the copies of the statements of two witnesses (Kaur Singh, Patwari and Balwant Singh) were not furnished, the respondent was permitted to peruse them and take notes therefrom more than three days prior to their examination. Of the two witnesses, Balwant Singh was not examined and only Kaur Singh was examined. The respondent did not raise any objection during the enquiry that the non-furnishing of the copies of the statements is disabling him or has disabled him, as the case may be, from effectively cross-examining the witnesses or to defend himself. The trial court has not found that any prejudice has resulted from the said violation. The appellate court has no doubt said that it has prejudiced the respondent's case but except merely mentioning the same, it has not specified in what manner and in what sense was the respondent prejudiced in his defence. The High Court, of course, has not referred to the aspect of prejudice at all.”
05. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and upon perusal of the material available on record, it is not in dispute that the petitioner was initially appointed as Community Coordinator under the Velugu Project on 15.12.2002 and, after serving in different capacities, was promoted as Assistant Project Manager (APM), Hasanparthy Mandal, Warangal District. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner was placed under suspension on 01.12.2010, a charge memo containing six articles of charge was issued on 04.05.2013, an enquiry was conducted, and ultimately the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of removal from service by proceedings dated 01.06.2014, which came to be affirmed by the appellate authority on 14.09.2016.
06. The principal contention of the petitioner is that the enquiry was conducted in complete violation of the principles of natural justice, that no effective oral enquiry was held, that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer do not establish any act of misappropriation against the petitioner, and that the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority mechanically imposed and confirmed the punishment without independently considering the material on record.
07. A careful examination of the enquiry report placed before this Court discloses that the Enquiry Officer has nowhere recorded any finding that the petitioner had misappropriated any amount or had derived any personal gain. On the contrary, the findings primarily relate to non-maintenance of accounts, delay in updating the books of accounts and non-production of certain original vouchers relating to expenditure of approximately Rs.20,420/- towards refreshments, meals, stationery and Xerox charges.
08. On careful perusal of the record, the petitioner has consistently taken the stand that vouchers and supporting bills had been produced before the Enquiry Officer. Significantly, neither the Enquiry Officer nor the disciplinary authority has recorded any finding that the vouchers produced by the petitioner were fabricated, forged or otherwise not genuine. Equally, no attempt was made by the disciplinary authority to verify the authenticity of those vouchers from the concerned establishments from whom the expenditure was allegedly incurred. In the absence of any such verification, the conclusion that the petitioner failed to account for the expenditure rests merely on assumptions and cannot constitute a legally sustainable basis for imposing the extreme penalty of removal from service.
09. Further, the record reveals that one of the principal allegations against the petitioner relates to non-auditing of the books of accounts of the Mandal Samakhya. However, the petitioner has specifically pleaded that auditing of accounts and financial supervision fall within the domain of APM (Finance), DPM (Finance) and other financial authorities under SERP. Except making a general assertion that the petitioner was responsible for maintenance of accounts, the respondents have not placed any material demonstrating that the exclusive responsibility for auditing and completion of financial accounts rested solely upon the petitioner. The disciplinary authority has also failed to examine this specific defence raised by the petitioner before fastening the entire liability upon him.
10. Another aspect which assumes considerable significance is the petitioner's specific contention that the delay in updating and auditing the accounts pertaining to several previous years, commencing from the year 2003 onwards, cannot be attributed solely to him. According to the petitioner, the alleged lapses relate to a period during which several officials were entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining and updating the accounts, and therefore, the entire blame could not have been fastened exclusively upon him. However, the respondents have failed to demonstrate that disciplinary action was initiated uniformly against all the officials who were responsible for the alleged lapses during the relevant period. On the contrary, the petitioner has specifically pleaded that he has been subjected to discriminatory treatment by pointing out that another Assistant Project Manager, who was allegedly similarly situated and faced comparable allegations, was not imposed with the punishment of removal from service. Although the respondents have contended that disciplinary proceedings were also initiated against another employee, no material whatsoever has been placed before this Court to establish that all similarly situated employees were treated alike or that the nature and gravity of the misconduct attributed to such employee were materially distinguishable from those alleged against the petitioner. It is specifically the case of the petitioner that the period to which the alleged lapses pertain was under the charge of one Smt. Neelaveni. During the course of hearing, however, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the charges levelled against Smt. Neelaveni were ultimately dropped and that she was thereafter granted permission to proceed abroad on leave. The respondents have not placed any convincing material before this Court explaining the basis on which the charges against Smt. Neelaveni were dropped while the petitioner alone was inflicted with the extreme penalty of removal from service.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in several cases has categorically held that where the gravity and nature of the charges against similarly situated employees are identical, the imposition of disparate punishments, without any rational or justifiable basis, would be violative of the constitutional guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation from the respondents justifying the differential treatment meted out to the petitioner vis-à-vis other similarly situated employees, particularly Smt. Neelaveni, the impugned action cannot be sustained as being consistent with the constitutional mandate of equality and fairness.
12. This Court also finds considerable force in the contention regarding the suspension proceedings. The petitioner has specifically pleaded that the memo directing completion of audit by 30.11.2010 was dispatched only on 02.12.2010 and was served on him on 03.12.2010, whereas the order placing him under suspension had already been passed on 01.12.2010. The respondents have not produced any convincing material to dislodge this factual assertion. This circumstance lends support to the petitioner's contention that the disciplinary proceedings had substantially been predetermined even before affording him an opportunity to comply with the alleged directions.
13. More importantly, the appellate order dated 14.09.2016, which is under challenge, is wholly unsustainable. The petitioner had preferred a statutory appeal raising several factual and legal grounds. Earlier, this Court, in W.P.No.12038 of 2016, directed the appellate authority to consider the appeal after granting an opportunity of hearing. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted his written defence. However, a reading of the appellate order shows that it merely confirms the findings of the disciplinary authority without discussing any of the grounds urged by the petitioner. There is no independent appreciation of the evidence, no consideration of the defence raised by the petitioner and no discussion as to why the penalty of removal alone was warranted. The appellate authority has thus failed to discharge the statutory obligation cast upon it. The object of a disciplinary enquiry is not merely to record findings against an employee but to ensure fairness in the decision-making process. An appellate authority is equally expected to independently examine the correctness of the disciplinary action. The impugned appellate order falls far short of this settled legal requirement. However, the present case is not one involving a mere technical procedural lapse. The prejudice caused to the petitioner is evident from the record itself. The disciplinary authority failed to verify the documentary evidence relied upon by the petitioner, ignored his specific defence regarding the allocation of duties, failed to examine the plea of discrimination, and the appellate authority disposed of the statutory appeal without assigning any proper and cogent reasons. These are not curable procedural irregularities but go to the root of the fairness of the decision-making process.
14. It is well settled that although judicial review does not ordinarily extend to re-appreciation of evidence in disciplinary matters, the Constitutional Court would undoubtedly interfere where the findings are based on no evidence, where relevant material has been ignored, where the conclusions are perverse, where the punishment is imposed without proper application of mind or where the decision-making process is vitiated by arbitrariness or violation of the principles of natural justice. In the present case, this Court finds that the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority have failed to consider the petitioner's defence in its proper perspective; failed to record any finding regarding misappropriation; failed to establish that the petitioner alone was exclusively responsible for the alleged lapses; failed to verify the genuineness of the vouchers relied upon by the petitioner; and failed to assign cogent reasons while imposing and confirming the extreme punishment of removal from service. Consequently, the impugned orders suffer from arbitrariness, non-application of mind and violation of the principles of natural justice and are liable to be set aside.
15. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned proceedings passed in the month of June, 2014 by the respondent No.3 removing the petitioner from service and the appellate order dated 14.09.2016 passed by the respondents-authorities confirming the said punishment are hereby set aside. Consequently, the respondents-authorities are directed to reinstate the petitioner into service with continuity of service and all consequential benefits. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
