Common Order:
1. The Writ Petition No.17948 of 2005 is filed by the petitioner-bank with the following prayer: “to issue a direction or an order or a writ more particularly one in the nature of writ of Certiorari call for the records pertaining to the award passed by the second respondent in I.D.No.257 of 2002 and quash the same in so far as granting of compensation to the first respondent of Rs.44,000/- in default with interest @ 6 % p.a. to be paid by the petitioner as illegal arbitrary and contorary to the facts evidence in I.D.No.257 of 2002 and pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case”.
02. The Writ Petition No.22997 of 2005 is filed by the petitioner-employee with the following prayer:
“to issue an appropriate writ order or direction more particularly in the nature of writ of Certiorari and call for the records relating to and connected with the Award dated 27.09.2004 in I.D.No.257 of 2002 passed by the Central Government Industrial cum Labour Court Hyderabad and quash or set aside the same and to issue a consequential direction to the respondent to reinstate the petitioner into service with all consequential benefits and to pass such other order or orders”.
03. For the sake of convenience, the petitioner in W.P.No.17948 of 2005 shall hereinafter be referred to as “the Bank” and the petitioner in W.P. No.22997 of 2005 as “the Employee”.
04. Since both the writ petitions have been filed by the respective parties against each other, arise out of the same industrial dispute, and challenge different parts of the impugned Award dated 27.09.2004 passed in I.D.No.257 of 2002, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.
05. Heard Sri P. Suresh, learned counsel appearing for the Bank in W.P. No.17948 of 2005, and Sri A. Rajendra Babu, learned counsel appearing for the Employee in W.P. No.22997 of 2005. The material available on record has also been perused.
06(a). Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bank submitted that the employee had served the Bank for nearly 22 years up to the year 1999. During the course of his service, he was subjected to disciplinary proceedings on more than one occasion on account of acts of misconduct. It is submitted that a charge-sheet dated 26.05.1994 was issued to him for threatening an officer and forcibly snatching away a loan application from the hands of the concerned officer. Upon conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, the punishment of censure was imposed on him on 14.07.1994.
06(b). It is further submitted that the employee again indulged in misconduct, resulting in issuance of another charge-sheet dated 22.11.1994 for manhandling the Senior Manager of Mettuguda Branch, Sri Yagnya Narayana, and for hurling his briefcase against the wooden cabin, thereby causing damage to the cabin. Pursuant to the enquiry conducted in respect of the said charges, he was imposed with the punishment of stoppage of one increment for a period of three years with cumulative effect. Despite the imposition of the aforesaid punishments, the employee allegedly continued his unruly and threatening behaviour and is stated to have threatened the Senior Manager and the Line-II Manager with dire consequences.
06(c). Learned counsel further submitted that while the employee was working as a Clerk at Lallapet Branch, Hyderabad, on 08.11.1999, he entered the cabin of the Senior Manager at the commencement of business hours and threatened him by alleging that the Senior Manager had denied him festival advance and had recommended to the Staff Section not to sanction the same. It is alleged that the employee openly threatened the Senior Manager by stating that he would “see his end” and would not spare him. Thereafter, he created a commotion in the branch premises by loudly abusing and shouting at the Senior Manager. It is further alleged that on the very same day, at about 4.00 p.m., the employee again threatened the Senior Manager and the Line-II Manager, stating that although he had earlier assaulted two Managers, he would not physically touch them again but would instead have them eliminated in a staged lorry accident by making a phone call to certain persons from Vijayawada.
06(d). It is contended that in view of the gravity of the misconduct and the repeated acts of intimidation and threats extended towards superior officers, a detailed departmental enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with the applicable service regulations and principles of natural justice. Upon conclusion of the enquiry, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement vide proceedings dated 21.08.2000.
06(e). It is further submitted that the Industrial Tribunal, while upholding the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry and confirming the punishment of compulsory retirement, nevertheless adopted a sympathetic approach and directed the Bank to pay a sum of Rs.44,000/- to the employee within thirty days from the date of publication of the award, failing which the said amount would carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum. According to the learned counsel, once the Tribunal had upheld the validity of the disciplinary proceedings and the punishment imposed, there was no justification for awarding monetary compensation to the employee. It is therefore contended that the direction issued by the Tribunal directing payment of Rs.44,000/- with consequential interest is illegal, arbitrary, and unsustainable in law, and accordingly, the petitioner-Bank seeks allowance of W.P. No.17948 of 2005 by setting aside the said portion of the award.
06(f). In support of his contentions, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The General Manager Personnel Syndicate Bank and others v. B S N Prasad(2025 INSC 89) wherein at Paragraph Nos.16 and 17 that:
“16. It is well settled that an acquittal in a criminal case is no ground to exonerate a delinquent in disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof differs in these proceedings. It is well settled that the adequacy of the evidence adduced during disciplinary inquiry cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others, in paragraphs 12 and 13, this court held thus:
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718: AIR 1964 SC 364: (1964) 1 LLJ 38], this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”
(emphasis added)
17. It is well settled that the Bank officers are expected to maintain a higher standard of honesty, integrity, and conduct. In paragraph 17 of the decision of this court in the case Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank & Another v. Munn Lal Jain7 , it was held thus:
“17. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69: 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194], there is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulting in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organisation more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct.
The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.”
(emphasis added)”
06(g). Further, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Purushottam(Civil Appeal No. 7133 of 2008) wherein it was held at Paragraph No.13 that:
“13. In R. P. Kapur vs. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 787 the question before the Constitution Bench was that the Petitioner therein had been suspended owing to the pendency of criminal proceedings against him which was challenged on the anvil of Article 314 of the Constitution. Thus, this decision is not of much relevance for the resolution of the legal nodus before us, save for the observations that "if criminal charge results in conviction, disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against the public servant is convicted, even in case of acquittal proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable." However, on this aspect of the law we need go no further than the recent decision in Deputy General of Police vs. S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598, since it contains a comprehensive discourse on all the prominent precedents. This Court has concluded, and we respectfully think correctly, that acquittal of an employee by a Criminal Court would not automatically and conclusively impact Departmental proceedings. Firstly, this is because of the disparate degrees of proof in the two, viz. beyond reasonable doubt in criminal prosecution contrasted by preponderant proof in civil or departmental enquiries. Secondly, criminal prosecution is not within the control of the concerned department and acquittal could be the consequence of shoddy investigation or slovenly assimilation of evidence, or lackadaisical if not collusive conduct of the Trial etc. Thirdly, an acquittal in a criminal prosecution may preclude a contrary conclusion in a departmental enquiry if the former is a positive decision in contradistinction to a passive verdict which may be predicated on technical infirmities. In other words, the Criminal Court must conclude that the accused is innocent and not merely conclude that he has not been proved to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt.”
06(h). Further, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Dilip Uttam Jayabhay(Civil Appeal No. 7403 of 2021) wherein it was held at Paragraph No.10.4 that:
“10.4 Even from the judgment and order passed by the criminal court it appears that the criminal court acquitted the respondent based on the hostility of the witnesses; the evidence led by the interested witnesses; lacuna in examination of the investigating officer; panch for the spot panchnama of the incident, etc. Therefore, criminal court held that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary in the departmental proceedings the misconduct of driving the vehicle rashly and negligently which caused accident and due to which four persons died has been established and proved. As per the cardinal principle of law an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in different fields and with different objectives. Therefore, the Industrial Court has erred in giving much stress on the acquittal of the respondent by the criminal court. Even otherwise it is required to be noted that the Industrial Court has not interfered with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority holding charge and misconduct proved in the departmental enquiry, and has interfered with the punishment of dismissal solely on the ground that same is shockingly disproportionate and therefore can be said to be an unfair labour practice as per clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971.”
07(a). Learned counsel appearing for the employee submitted that, in relation to the alleged incident dated 08.11.1999, a complaint was lodged by the Line-II Manager, Lallapet Branch, before the Osmania University Police Station. In the said complaint, it was alleged that the employee had entered the cabin of the Senior Manager and misbehaved with him in an indecent manner in the presence of customers on the issue of rejection of his festival advance by the Circle Office. Based on the said complaint, Crime No.275 of 1999 was registered against the employee for the offence punishable under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code.
07(b). It is further submitted that, pursuant to the registration of the said crime, the employee was prosecuted in C.C.No.389 of 2000 on the file of the learned VI Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. After trial, the learned Magistrate, by judgment dated 19.06.2002, acquitted the employee of the charge levelled against him. Learned counsel contended that the criminal prosecution and the departmental proceedings arose out of the very same incident and were founded on identical allegations. It is further contended that the witnesses examined in the departmental enquiry were substantially the same as those cited and examined in the criminal proceedings.
07(c). Learned counsel submitted that, during the pendency of the criminal case, the employee had requested the disciplinary authority to defer the departmental enquiry until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. However, the said request was not considered, and the Enquiry Officer proceeded with the enquiry by directing the employee to appear before him on 21.08.2000. It is submitted that the employee attended the enquiry and requested that the proceedings be dropped on the ground that the departmental action had been initiated at the instance of the Senior Manager due to personal animosity and mala fides. Notwithstanding the said request, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement.
07(d). It is further submitted that aggrieved by the order of compulsory retirement, the employee raised an industrial dispute before the Labour Court. It is contended that, under the impugned Award, the Labour Court failed to properly appreciate the case of the employee and erroneously upheld the punishment of compulsory retirement. Though the Labour Court directed payment of a sum of Rs.44,000/- taking into consideration the employee's 22 years of service and other attendant circumstances, it nevertheless sustained the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority.
07(e). Learned counsel further contended that the charge in the criminal case and the charge in the departmental proceedings were one and the same, arising out of the same set of facts and supported by the same witnesses. It is also submitted that, at the time the punishment of compulsory retirement was imposed, the employee had approximately sixteen years of service left before attaining the age of superannuation. Therefore, it is contended that the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate and unsustainable in law. Hence, he prayed that W.P.No.22997 of 2005 be allowed by setting aside the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the order of compulsory retirement as well as the impugned Award passed by the Tribunal, and by directing reinstatement of the employee into service with all consequential service and monetary benefits.
07(f). In support of his contentions, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan and others(2023 INSC 1047) wherein at Paragraph Nos.23 to 27 it was held that:
“Effect of Acquittal in the Criminal Proceeding – Question No.2:
23. With this above background, if we examine the criminal proceedings the following factual position emerges. The very same witnesses, who were examined in the departmental enquiry were examined in the criminal trial. Jagdish Chandra, Bhawani Singh, Shravan Lal, Raj Singh and Karan Sharma were examined as PW2, PW3, PW6, PW9 and PW13 respectively at the criminal trial. Apart from them, eight other witnesses were also examined. The gravamen of the charge in the criminal case was that the appellant had submitted an application for recruitment along with his marksheet and he, by making alteration in his date of birth to reflect the same as 24.04.1972 in place of 21.04.1974, and obtained recruitment to the post of Constable. Though the Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 420 of IPC, the Appellate Court recorded the following crucial findings while acquitting the appellant:
“….Mainly the present case was based on the documents to this effect whether the date of birth of accused is 21.04.1972 or 21.04.1974. Exh. P-3 is original Marksheet, in which, the date of birth of accused has been shown as 21.04.1972 and same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution.
Whatever the documents have been produced before the Court regarding the date of birth of 21.04.1974 are either the letters of Principal or are Duplicate T.C. or Marksheets. Neither the prosecution has produced any such original documents in the Subordinate Court to this effect that when the admission form of accused was filled, what date of birth was mentioned by the accused in it, what was the date of birth in Roll Register of School, what date of birth was mentioned by accused in the Examination Form of Secondary, and nor after bringing the original records from the concerned witnesses, same were got proved in the evidence. In these circumstances, this fact becomes doubtful that date of birth of accused was 21.04.1974, and accused is entitled to receive it’s benefit. In the considered opinion of this Court, the conviction made by the Ld. Subordinate Court merely on the basis of oral evidences and letters or duplicate documents, is not just and proper. It is justifiable to acquit the accused.
Resultantly, on the basis of aforesaid consideration, the present appeal filed by the Appellant/Accused is liable to be allowed.” [Emphasis supplied]
24. What is important to notice is that the Appellate Judge has clearly recorded that in the document Exh. P-3 – original marksheet of the 8th standard, the date of birth was clearly shown as 21.04.1972 and the other documents produced by the prosecution were either letters or a duplicate marksheet. No doubt, the Appellate Judge says that it becomes doubtful whether the date of birth was 21.04.1974 and that the accused was entitled to receive its benefit. However, what we are supposed to see is the substance of the judgment. A reading of the entire judgment clearly indicates that the appellant was acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and after noticing that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge [See S. Samuthiram (Supra).]
25. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honorably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Exh. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21.04.1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used.
26. We are satisfied that the findings of the appellate judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, “not proved” - in fact the charge even stood “disproved” by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor “disproved” [See Vijayee Singh and Others v. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC 190].
27. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank (supra).”
07(g). Further, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, EOW, CBI and another(Criminal Appeal No. 575 of 2020 (Arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 5422 of 2015) wherein it was held at Paragraph No.7 that:
“7. A number of judgments have held that the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding, being based on preponderance of probability is somewhat lower than the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding where the case has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1, the question before the Court was posed as follows:-
“3. The short question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether the respondent is justified in pursuing the prosecution against the appellant under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 notwithstanding the fact that on an identical charge the appellant was exonerated in the departmental proceedings in the light of a report submitted by the Central Vigilance Commission and concurred by the Union Public Service Commission.” This Court then went on to state:
“17. At the outset we may point out that the learned counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the present case, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute the findings rendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it.” This being the case, the Court then held:
“23. Even though all these facts including the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have already held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated above. These are the reasons for our order dated 27-3-1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs.” In Radheshyam Kejriwal vs. State of West Bengal and Another, (2011) 3 SCC 581, this Court held as follows:-
“26. We may observe that the standard of proof in a criminal case is much higher than that of the adjudication proceedings. The Enforcement Directorate has not been able to prove its case in the adjudication proceedings and the appellant has been exonerated on the same allegation. The appellant is facing trial in the criminal case. Therefore, in our opinion, the determination of facts in the adjudication proceedings cannot be said to be irrelevant in the criminal case. In B.N. Kashyap [AIR 1945 Lah 23] the Full Bench had not considered the effect of a finding of fact in a civil case over the criminal cases and that will be evident from the following passage of the said judgment: (AIR p. 27) “… I must, however, say that in answering the question, I have only referred to civil cases where the actions are in personam and not those where the proceedings or actions are in rem. Whether a finding of fact arrived at in such proceedings or actions would be relevant in criminal cases, it is unnecessary for me to decide in this case. When that question arises for determination, the provisions of Section 41 of the Evidence Act, will have to be carefully examined.”
xxx xxx xxx
29. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Mr Malhotra that the finding in an adjudication proceeding is not binding in the proceeding for criminal prosecution. A person held liable to pay penalty in adjudication proceedings cannot necessarily be held guilty in a criminal trial. Adjudication proceedings are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence of a little higher degree whereas in a criminal case the entire burden to prove beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution.
xxx xxx xxx
31. It is trite that the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings is higher than that required before the adjudicating authority and in case the accused is exonerated before the adjudicating authority whether his prosecution on the same set of facts can be allowed or not is the precise question which falls for determination in this case.” After referring to various judgments, this Court then culled out the ratio of those decisions in paragraph 38 as follows:-
“38. The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions can broadly be stated as follows:
(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously;
(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiating criminal prosecution;
(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent in nature to each other;
(iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for criminal prosecution;
(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit, prosecution may continue; and
(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal cases.” It finally concluded:
“39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the court.” From our point of view, para 38(vii) is important and if the High Court had bothered to apply this parameter, then on a reading of the CVC report on the same facts, the appellant should have been exonerated.”
07(h). Further, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in G.M.Tank v. State of Gujarat and others((2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 446) wherein it was held at Paragraph No.31 that:
“31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.”
08. Having heard the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing on either side and upon perusal of the material available on record, the principal question that falls for consideration is whether the Tribunal was justified in sustaining the punishment of compulsory retirement imposed upon the Employee and, if so, whether it was justified in simultaneously awarding compensation of Rs.44,000/- in his favour.
09. A careful examination of the record reveals that the Employee had been in the service of the Bank for a considerable period of 22 years. It is not in dispute that, prior to the incident giving rise to the present proceedings, he had been subjected to disciplinary action on more than one occasion. The record discloses that a charge-sheet dated 26.05.1994 was issued against him on allegations of threatening a Bank officer and forcibly snatching a loan application from the hands of the concerned officer. Upon conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, the penalty of censure was imposed upon him. Thereafter, another charge-sheet dated 22.11.1994 was issued alleging that the Employee had manhandled the Senior Manager of the Mettuguda Branch and caused damage to the branch property. The disciplinary proceedings culminated in the imposition of the punishment of stoppage of one annual increment for a period of three years with cumulative effect.
10. The present disciplinary proceedings arose out of an incident that occurred on 08.11.1999 while the Employee was working at the Lallapet Branch of the Bank. The allegations levelled against him were that, aggrieved by the rejection of his request for festival advance, he entered the cabin of the Senior Manager, abused and threatened him, created a commotion within the branch premises, and subsequently extended threats of serious consequences to both the Senior Manager and the Line-II Manager. In view of the gravity of the allegations, the Bank initiated disciplinary proceedings and conducted a domestic enquiry in accordance with the applicable service regulations. Upon completion of the enquiry and consideration of the findings recorded therein, the disciplinary authority, by proceedings dated 21.08.2000, imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement from service.
11. The learned Tribunal, after considering the entire material, upheld the validity of the domestic enquiry as well as the findings recorded therein and consequently sustained the punishment of compulsory retirement. However, taking a sympathetic view, it directed payment of Rs.44,000/- to the Employee.
12. It is the case of the Employee that, having been acquitted in the criminal proceedings arising out of the very same incident, the disciplinary proceedings could not have been sustained against him. However, a perusal of the Judgment dated 19.06.2002 passed by the criminal Court discloses that the acquittal was not founded upon a categorical finding that the allegations levelled against the Employee were false, nor was he honourably exonerated on merits. On the contrary, the acquittal was primarily based on the failure of the prosecution to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The criminal Court recorded that one of the material witnesses had turned hostile and further noticed certain procedural lapses in the investigation, including non-compliance with the requirements prescribed under Section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the prosecution case was found insufficient to warrant a conviction. As rightly observed by the learned Tribunal, the acquittal of the Employee was not on merits of the allegations but on account of the prosecution's inability to prove the charges in accordance with the stringent standard of proof applicable in criminal proceedings. It is a settled principle of law that departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings operate in distinct spheres and are governed by different standards of proof. While, in a criminal trial, the prosecution is required to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt, a disciplinary proceeding is adjudicated on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Consequently, an acquittal in a criminal case does not, by itself, render the findings recorded in a departmental enquiry unsustainable.
13. It is equally well settled that only where the acquittal is honourable and founded upon a clear finding that the allegations are wholly false or devoid of substance, thereby completely demolishing the substratum of the departmental charge, can the disciplinary action be said to have been adversely affected. In the present case, the acquittal was not based upon any positive finding of innocence in favour of the Employee. The criminal Court merely held that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt owing to the fact that certain material witnesses had turned hostile and because of procedural infirmities noticed in the investigation. Such an acquittal cannot be equated with an honourable exoneration on merits.
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that acquittal in a criminal case does not ipso facto invalidate disciplinary proceedings and that the findings recorded in a domestic enquiry can be sustained independently, provided the enquiry has been conducted in accordance with law and the conclusions arrived at therein are supported by some evidence. The scope of judicial review in matters arising out of disciplinary proceedings is also well defined. This Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the learned Tribunal and cannot reappreciate the evidence as if exercising appellate jurisdiction.
15. In the case on hand, neither before the learned Tribunal nor before this Court has the Employee been able to establish any violation of the principles of natural justice or point out any procedural irregularity vitiating the conduct of the enquiry. The learned Tribunal, upon a detailed consideration of the material available on record, has categorically upheld the fairness of the enquiry as well as the findings recorded therein. This Court finds no perversity, patent illegality, or jurisdictional error in the said conclusion warranting interference in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
16. On a careful perusal of the entire record, the misconduct proved against the Employee cannot be viewed in isolation because it is evident that he had previously been subjected to disciplinary action for acts involving intimidation, indiscipline and misconduct. Despite earlier punishments, he allegedly continued to indulge in similar behaviour. The disciplinary authority was therefore justified in taking into consideration the past service record while determining the quantum of punishment. Having regard to the nature of the proved misconduct and the previous disciplinary history, the punishment of compulsory retirement cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
17. A perusal of the impugned Award further discloses that no cogent reasons whatsoever were assigned by the learned Tribunal for quantifying compensation at Rs.44,000/-. The Award does not disclose any legal principle or factual basis justifying grant of such compensation after affirming the punishment. As rightly contended by the Bank, the direction appears to have been issued merely on sympathetic considerations. Sympathy, however, cannot substitute legal reasoning nor can it constitute a valid ground for granting monetary relief once the misconduct and punishment have been upheld. Therefore, once the learned Tribunal upheld the validity of the disciplinary proceedings, accepted the findings of guilt recorded in the enquiry and sustained the punishment of compulsory retirement, there was no legal basis for directing payment of compensation to the Employee. Therefore, the learned Tribunal, having concluded that the disciplinary action was valid and justified, could not have simultaneously granted compensation in favour of the delinquent employee. Such a course is internally inconsistent and legally unsustainable. The direction awarding compensation is therefore arbitrary and liable to be set aside.
18. Accordingly, the Writ Petition No.17948 of 2005 filed by the Bank is allowed and the direction contained in the impugned Award dated 27.09.2004 in I.D.No.257 of 2002 directing payment of compensation of Rs.44,000/- together with interest, is hereby set aside. The Writ Petition No.22997 of 2005 filed by the Employee is devoid of merits and the same is dismissed. In both Writ Petitions, there shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
