Heard learned counsel for the Petitioner and learned counsels for the Opposite Parties.
1. The Petitioner-Sarpanch of Kantipal Gram Panchayat assails the issuance of notice dated 03.12.2025 fixing the date of the meeting to be held on 19.12.2025 at about 11.30 A.M. for consideration of a no-confidence motion against him, inter alia, on the ground that the same in patent infraction of the provisions contained under Section 24(2)(a), (c) and (h) of the Orissa Grama Panchayats Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1964”).
Relevant extract of the relief sought for is quoted hereunder for convenience of reference:
“xxx xxx xxx
And may be pleased to quash the notice dt.03.12.2025 and the no-confidence meeting scheduled on 19-12-2025 passed by the Opp. Party No.3 impugned herewith vide Annexure- 5 to the Writ Petition, by issuing a Writ in the nature of Certiorari,
And may further be pleased to declare that the adjournment of the meeting scheduled on 03. 12. 2025 by the Sub-Collector is illegal, without jurisdiction, and void ab initio, by issuing a Writ in the nature of Appropriate,….
xxx xxx xxx”
2. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that, notwithstanding her discharge of duties in a diligent manner, the Naib-Sarpanch and certain Ward Members, on extraneous considerations, connived and sought to bring a no-confidence motion against her. Pursuant to such conspiracy, they submitted a requisition along with a proposed resolution seeking initiation of a no-confidence motion against the Petitioner. Upon receiving information from reliable sources regarding the same, the Petitioner made a representation on 26.09.2025 to the Sub-Collector, Anandpur with the specific plea that the signatures of two members, namely, Smt. Alaka Barik and Smt. Umamani Naik, had been obtained without their consent and, as such, fraud had been perpetrated.
3. It is his further submission that without considering the specific ground of the Petitioner, the sub-collector, Anandpur, Opposite Party No.3 fixed the no confidence meeting on 03.12.2025.
4. It is asserted that the fixation of such meeting without verification of signature of requisitionists smacks of non-application of mind and is contrary to the provisions as contained in Section 24(2) of the Act, 1964. As such, the very requisition is bad in law.
5. Assailing the action of fixation of the meeting on 03.12.2025 by the Sub-Collector, Anandpur, Opposite Party No.3, notwithstanding the representation of the Petitioner questioning the genuineness of some of the requisitionists having not been considered, the Petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.34408 of 2025 and, by order dated 02.12.2025, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court dismissed the Writ Petition and, while dismissing the same, the learned Co-ordinate Bench relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Kusum Deep v. State of Odisha (Kusum Deep v. State of Odisha & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 26627 of 2024, decided on 07.11.2024.)
It is stated at the Bar that the said order has attained finality.
6. The three grounds of challenge in the present writ petition run thus:
i. The Petitioner’s representation relating to the genuineness of the signatures of the requisitionists ought to have been taken into account before fixing the date of the no-confidence meeting. As such, the fixation of the date, being contrary to the provisions contained in Section 24(2)(a) of the Act, 1964, cannot be stated to be in accordance with law and, therefore, all the consequential steps are liable to be treated as non est in law.
ii. The statutory procedure for dispatch and service of notice for fixing the date on 19.12.2025, as enjoined in Section 24(2)(c) of the Act, 1964 has been violated.
iii. The Opposite Party No.3 has no authority to shift the date from the originally scheduled date, i.e., 03.12.2025 to 19.12.2025 and in doing so, he has, in essence, violated the provisions contained in Section 24(2)(h) of the Act, 1964.
7. To fortify his submissions, learned senior counsel Mr. Agarwal relies on the following judgments;
A. State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, (1957) 2 SCC 759)
B. Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE (Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 8 SCC 519)
C. Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswa, (1954) 1 SCC 710)
D. Nazir Ahmad V. King Emperor ( Nazir Ahmad V. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253)
E. Taylor V. Taylor (Taylor V. Taylor, (1876) 1 Ch D 426)
F. Om Prakash v. State of U.P., (2021) 6 SCC 243,
G. P. Venugopal v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 145”
7-A. On verification it is seen that the Judgments cited at Serial No. F and G are non-existent. It is baffling as to how the same escaped the scrutiny of the learned Sr. Counsel, Mr. Agarwal.
7-B. Judgments at Serial No. A to D had been relied upon, oblivious of the factual backdrop of the case at hand. In as much as;
A. In Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (supra)2, the Apex Court considered the effect of non-compliance with procedural requirements and drew a distinction between mandatory and directory constitutional provisions. It was held that unless a provision is mandatory in nature and unless prejudice is shown to have been caused by its non-compliance, the action would not be vitiated. The Court further clarified that although consultation with Public Service Commissions plays an important role in maintaining administrative standards and morale, their opinions remain advisory and non-binding, and non-consultation does not by itself vitiate administrative action.
B. In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. (supra)3, the Apex Court held that although the failure to issue a show-cause notice prior to the recovery order amounted to a breach of the principles of natural justice, in the peculiar facts of the case, such non-compliance did not vitiate the action. Since the determination of the amount was undisputed, the grant of an opportunity to the petitioner would have served no practical purpose and would merely have been a futile exercise, thereby attracting the application of the “useless formality theory”.
C. In Kiran Singh (supra)4, the Apex Court considered the effect of jurisdictional defects and held that a decree passed by a Court lacking inherent jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity can be raised whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced. The Court also examined the impact of errors relating to valuation and forum and emphasized the requirement of prejudice in the context of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.
D. In Nazir Ahmad (supra)5, the Privy Council reiterated the necessity of strict compliance with procedural laws in the process of obtaining confessions, thereby protecting the rights of the accused and ensuring a fair trial.
8. The intervention of the requisitionists has been allowed and they have been arrayed as Opposite Party Nos.5 to 12, which includes Opposite Party Nos.8 and 9 (Smt. Umamani Naik and Smt. Alaka Barik, respectively), whose signatures were stated to have been forged.
9. Per contra, the learned Sr. counsel for the requisitionists, Mr. Samal as well as the learned counsel for the State, Mr. C.R. Swain, ASC submit that the writ petition is a desperate attempt by the Petitioner, who has lost the confidence of the people's representatives, to somehow or the other to lach on to power.
10. To fortify his stand that there is no illegality or irregularity in the issuance of the first notice as well as the notice at Annexure-5 fixing the meeting on 19.12.2025, learned Senior Counsel for the requisitionists relies on the following judgments;
a. Govinda Chandra Pradhan v. S.D.O. (Govinda Chandra Pradhan v. S.D.O., 1964 SCC OnLine Ori 99)
b. Balmiki Pradhan v. State of Orissa (Balmiki Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2006 SCC OnLine Ori 179)
c. Jadaba Bhue v. State of Orissa (Jadaba Bhue v. State of Orissa, 2011 SCC OnLine Ori 230)
10-A. The learned counsel for the State, while relying on the aforementioned citations, additionally relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Rushinath Rout v. State of Orissa (Rushinath Rout v. State of Orissa, 2004 SCC OnLine Ori 105).
11. So far as Ground No. 1 relating to the alleged forging of the signatures of the requisitionists is concerned, as already noted, the said contention has already been set at rest by this Court by order dated 02.12.2025 in W.P.(C) No. 34408 of 2025, which has attained finality.
12. It is pertinent to note that the very two requisitionists, whose signatures are alleged to have been forged, have appeared independently and have been arrayed as Opposite Parties 8 and 9, as noted hereinabove, and they have supported the requisitions and resolution qua the no-confidence motion.
13. The second ground of non-service of notice also does not stand to reason. As apart from a bald assertion that the same has not been received, there is nothing on record to substantiate such stand. It is apt to note that while fixing the date to 19.12.2025 by Letter No. 10826 of the Gram Panchayat dated 03.12.2025, the same has been endorsed to the office of the Gram Panchayat and a direction was also given to serve the same on all concerned.
14. It is the submission of Opposite Party Nos.5 to 12, the requisitionists, that the notice fixing the date as 09.12.2025 has been received by them. In light of the same, the assertion of non-receipt of notice by the Petitioner is not acceptable and is to be treated as a desperate attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court on an alleged infraction of procedure, which, on the facts of the present case, has to be regarded as a figment of the Petitioner’s imagination.
15. The third ground the notice having been issued to conduct the meeting on 03.12.2025 and subsequent intimation that the meeting would be held on 19.12.2025 amounts to a clear infraction of Section 24(2)(h), is the main contention of the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Gopal Agarwal on which the case of Petitioner rests.
15-A. For convenience of reference the Section 24(2)(h), (i) and (j) as well as Section 24(3)(a) of the Act, 1964 are extracted hereunder;
“24. Vote of no confidence against Sarpanch or Naib-Sarpanch-
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) In convening a meeting under Sub-section
(1) and in the conduct of business at such meeting the procedure shall be in accordance with such rules, as may be prescribed/subject however to the following provisions, namely:
(a) to (g) xxx xxx xxx
(h) no such meeting shall stand adjourned to a subsequent date and no item of business other than the resolution for recording want of confidence in the Sarpanch or Naib-Sarpanch, as the case may be, shall be taken up for consideration at the meeting;
(i) if the number of members present at the meeting is less than two-thirds of the total membership of the Grama Panchayat, the resolution shall stand annulled;
(j) if the resolution is passed at the meeting supported by the majority as specified in Sub-section (1) the Presiding Officer shall immediately forward the same in original along with the record of the proceedings to the Collector who shall forthwith publish the resolution in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (1); and
xxx xxx xxx
(3) When a meeting has been held in pursuance of Sub-section (2) for recording want of confidence in the Sarpanch or Naib-Sarpanch, as the case may be, no fresh requisition for a meeting shall be maintainable-
(a) in cases falling under Clauses (i) and (j) of the said sub-section or where the resolution is defeated after being considered at the meeting so held, before the expiry of one year from the date of such meeting; or
xxx xxx xxx”
16. It is the submission of the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Agarwal, that on a plain reading language of Section 24(2)(h) of the Act, 1964, does not permit the meeting for a no-confidence motion to be held on any date other than the date as notified.
17. It is his submission that, if such meeting is not held on the designated date, at the ipse dixit of the authorities, it will undermine the democratic process and will only empower unscrupulous modalities to be adopted so as to garner two-thirds of the total membership, thereby depriving a democratically elected Sarpanch from functioning, contrary to the spirit of the Act.
It is his further submission that, in view of the stipulation contained therein, no fresh requisition for a meeting shall be maintainable in cases falling under clauses (i) and (j) of sub-section (2) of Section 24, the provisions contained in Section 24(2)(h) have to be strictly construed.
18. It is his contention that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the State as well as the learned Senior Counsel for the intervenor-requisitionists have not dealt with the fallout as being urged in the present case are, as such, distinguishable.
19. This Court perused the decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Agarwal. The same have no bearing at the point of the issue and the ground which is urged in the present case is no longer res integra, having been set at rest by the judgment of Division Bench of this Court Govinda Chandra Pradhan (supra)7.
20. The notice not to hold the meeting on 03.12.2025 as well as the notice to hold the meeting 19.12.2025 in vernacular are extracted hereunder for convenience of ready reference;
IMAGE
21. Before examining the import of these two notices, it would be profitable to refer to the judgment of this Court reported in the case of Govinda Chandra Pradhan (supra)7, which dealt with the no confidence motion relating to Chairman of Panchayat Samity of Bahanga.
In the said judgment, this Court referred to the sub section 2 of Section 46-B of the Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959, which runs thus;
“46-B. Vote of no confidence against Chairman and Vice- Chairman of Samiti- (1) xxx xxx xxx
“(2) In convening a meeting under sub-sec. (1) and in the conduct of business at such meeting the procedure herein specified shall be followed:—namely
(a) No such meeting shall be convened except on a requisition signed by at least one third of the members with a right to vote, along with a copy of the resolution proposed to be moved at the meeting:
(b) the requisition shall be addressed to the Collector of the district in the case of the Parishad and to the Sub-Divisional Officer in the case of a Samity.
(c) the Collector or the Sub-Divisional Officer as the case may be, on receipt of such requisition, shall fix the date, hour and place of such meeting and give notice of the same to all members with a right to vote, along with a copy of requisition and of the proposed resolution at least seven days before the date so fixed.
(d) The Collector, or when he is unable to attend the Additional District Magistrate shall preside at, and conduct the proceedings of the meetings in case of Parishad, and the Sub-Divisional Officer shall preside over and conduct such proceedings in the case of a samity.
(e) The voting at all such meetings shall be by secret ballot:
(f) No such meeting shall stand adjourned to a subsequent date and no item of business other than the resolution for recording want of confidence in the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman, shall be taken up for consideration at the meeting.
(f-l) no such resolution shall be taken up for consideration [unless it has been proposed by one member and has been seconded by another member at the meeting;
(f-2) after the resolution is taken up for consideration the member proposing the resolution may open the discussion thereon and other members may speak on the resolution in the order in which they are called upon by the Presiding Officer:
Provided that no member shall, unless so permitted by the Presiding Officer, the right to speak more than once and if any member who is called upon does not k he shall not be entitled, except by the permission of the Presiding Officer, to speak at a later stage of the discussion;
(f-3) where the Chairman or as the case may be, the Vice-Chairman, against whom the resolution has been tabled, is present, he shall be given an opportunity to speak by way of reply to the resolution and the discussion made at the meeting;
(f-4) the Presiding Officer may fix the time within which each member, including the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, shall conclude his speech;
(g) If the number of members present at the meeting is less than the majority of members having a right to vote the resolution shall stand cancelled and
(h) If the resolution is passed at the meeting supported by the majority of members having the right to vote, the Collector, or the Sub-Divisional Officer as the case may be, shall forward the resolution to the authority prescribed in pursuance of sub-section (1).”
The Clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 46-B of the Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959 is Pari materia with Section 24(2)(h) of the Act, 1964.
21-A. In the said decision, this Court was dealing with the issue of postponement of a no-confidence meeting which was initially scheduled for 10.08.1963 and was subsequently held on 02.09.1968, and, placing reliance on Section 22 of the Odisha General Clauses Act, this Court held that:
“xxx xxx xxx
8. ……… the statutory power conferred on him by Section 46B(2)(c) of the Orissa Zilla Parishad and Punchayat Samiti Act read with section 22 of the Orissa General Clauses Act. Hence we see no invalidity in the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer.
xxx xxx xxx”
21-B. While doing so this Court cautioned that once there is commencement of proceeding “by presiding over the meeting, the stage of convening the meeting is closed and the stage of conducting the business of the meeting is reached.”
21-C. This Court had also referred to the Manual on the Law of Meetings by Sebag Shaw and H.A.R.J. Wilson (1947 Edition) (Sir Sebag Shaw and H. A. R. J. Wilson, Manual on the Law of Meetings: Their Conduct and Procedure (London: Macdonald & Evans, 1947). to draw a distinction between adjournment and Postponement and referring to the same, this Court held that there is no infraction in deferring the meeting before it has commenced.
22. Such view has been reiterated by this Court in the cases of Sri Balmiki Pradhan (supra)8 as well as Jadaba Bhue (supra)9.
23. It is apt to note that aforementioned decisions also dealt with the provisions as contained in the Act, 1964, as in the case at hand.
24. In the case of Jadaba Bhue (supra)9, while exercising jurisdiction in an intra-Court appeal, this Court took note of the special feature in the said case, in Jadaba Bhue, that on the scheduled date of holding the no-confidence meeting, i.e., 22.04.2009, no further date was fixed, and the subsequent meeting was scheduled for 07.10.2009.
As such, it was held that the notice issued on 30.09.2009 for holding the meeting on 07.10.2009 could not be sustained in law for violating the stipulation of 15 days’ clear notice.
25. Learned counsel for the State, referring to the judgment of this Court in Rushinath Rout (supra)10, submits that it is the settled position of law that where a meeting for consideration of a motion of no confidence has not been held at all and has been postponed/adjourned to another date, there is no infraction of Section 24(2)(h) of the Act, 1964.
26. On perusal of the said judgment, it is seen that taking note of the absence of any definition of the word “adjourn”, this Court relied upon the dictionary meaning of the said term. Further, relying upon the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in P Venkata Somaraju v. Principal Munsif- Magistrate, Bhimavaram, West Godavari Dist. (P Venkata Somaraju v. Principal Munsif- Magistrate, Bhimavaram, West Godavari Dist., AIR 1968 AP 22) , held that “since the meeting was not at all held”, Section 24(2)(h) of the Act, 1964 has no application.
27. Hence, on a conspectus of the materials on record and taking into account the recitals of the notice at Annexure-4 that, for unavoidable reasons, the meeting could not be held and that the date would be intimated very soon, and further that the meeting was subsequently rescheduled to 19.12.2025 vide Annexure-5, it cannot be said that there has been any violation of the provisions contained in Section 24(2)(h) of the Act, 1964 in light of the discussion made above and the precedents referred to. And, there is no infraction of procedure for which reliance was placed on the Judgment of Tylor (supra)6.
28. Hence, this Court does not find any merit in the writ petition. The same stands rejected.
29. The interim order dated 16.12.2025 restraining publication of notification under Section 24(1) of the Act, 1964 stands vacated.
30. The Writ Petition and I.As are accordingly disposed of. Costs made easy.
