1. Heard the counsel for the petitioner and the learned AGA.

2. The present petition has been filed seeking quashing of the FIR dated 08.05.2026 in Case Crime No.0091 of 2026 under Sections 103(1), 61(2) BNS, P.S. Kohandaur, District Pratapgarh.

3. In terms of the FIR, allegations were levelled against one accused Pinki and an unknown person alleging that the brother of the informant aged about 35 years did not return back on the night of 28.04.2026. Subsequently, the brother was found dead. Allegations were levelled with regard to the character of the accused no.1 named in the FIR. The petitioner was not even named in the FIR. Subsequently, during investigation, the name of the petitioner surfaced in the statement of one of the witness.

4. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner apprehending arrest in the said FIR. While arguing the petition, the counsel for the petitioner argues that the FIR is liable to be quashed on the ground that the same was lodged after about ten days of the alleged incident on 08.05.2026 whereas the incident is said to have occurred on 28.04.2026. It is further argued that the petitioner is being falsely implicated by the SHO on account of an old enmity. It is further argued that the petitioner was wrongly apprehended. Based upon the said, the petitioner argues that the FIR is liable to be quashed.

5. In support of his submissions, the counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur @ Banti vs. State of Chhatisgarh passed in SLP (Crl) No.1400 of 2024 decided on 15.05.2024 wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court, as per the petitioner, has observed in para 14 as under :

                  "14. A bare perusal of the impugned FIR would reveal that the same was lodged by complainant-Barkat Ali on 29th June, 2019 with the allegation that the offences alleged were committed by the appellant and co-accused some time prior to 20th May, 2019. Thus, the complainant was not even sure of the date on which the alleged offences were committed. No reason whatsoever has been given in the FIR for huge delay of more than 39 days in approaching the police. The Investigating Officer prepared a site plan during the course of investigation which has been made a part of the record. A perusal of the said site plan would reveal that so far as the plot of Purnima Begum, wife of Barkat Ali is concerned, it is fully encumbered by a boundary wall and no damage is shown to this structure. The site plan indicates that there is some damage to the under-construction house of Sushma Kashyap. In the FIR, the damage suffered by the complainant was quantified at Rs. 6 lakhs whereas the damage suffered by Smt. Sushma Kashyap was quantified as Rs. 4 lakhs owing to the demolition of her under construction house. However, admittedly, Smt. Sushma did not lodge any complaint to the police."

                  In the said case, the FIR was lodged after about 39 days in respect of the incident under sections 447, 427, 294, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The said case is clearly not applicable as in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had exercised its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which is not available to this Court.

6. The counsel for the petitioner further relies upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Court in the case of Sekaran vs. The State of Tamil Nadu; Criminal Appeal No.2294 of 2010 decided on 12.12.2023 and lays emphasis on paragraph 11 and 12, which are as under :

                  "11. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution version. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.

                  12. In the present case, we have noticed that the FIR was admittedly lodged on 15th March 1996 at about 09.00 a.m. although the incident was of 12th March 1996 and in between Palas was treated initially in a private nursing home and then in the government hospital where he passed away on 14th March 1996 around 07.15 p.m. From the evidence on record, what we find is that the crime was not reported to the police because, first, none of the doctors who had attended to Palas had advised PWs 2 and 3 to so report; secondly, PW-2 did not report out of fear as the appellant had threatened PWs 2 and 3; and thirdly, PW-3 wanted to save her husband. It is the oral evidence of a head constable who was posted at Arumanai Police Station (PW-10) that PW-1 had visited the police station on 15th March 1996 and given a statement (Ex. P7) based whereon the FIR (Ex. P8) was prepared. He admitted that no message was received prior to the FIR (Ex. P8) and that one police outpost is there within the campus of the Trivandrum Medical College. He also admitted that generally an FIR should be registered at the police outpost prior to admitting the patient for treatment and that such FIR should be forwarded to the police station. It is also in the evidence of the Inspector of Police, Arumanai Police Station (PW-11) that the place of occurrence is at a distance of 15 kms. from his police station."

                  The said judgment was rendered in an appeal preferred against the conviction order. No parameters for quashing of the FIR were either considered or recorded in the said judgment.

7. The counsel for the petitioner further relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haji Iqbal and Bala vs. State of U.P. and others; Criminal Appeal No.2345 of 2023 arising out of SLP (Criminal Appeal No.3613 of 2023) decided on 08.08.2023 in which Hon'ble the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the manner of exercising the power under section 482 Cr.P.C. and under Article 226 for quashing of the proceedings of the FIR and has observed as under :

                  15. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

                  16. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held:-

                  “5. …Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

                  6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p.869, para 6)

                  (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;

                  (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

                  (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

                  7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death…..” (Emphasis supplied)

8. The counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra; (1984) 4 SCC 116 and lays emphasis on paragraph 153.

                  "153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:

                  (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

                  It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra(') where the following observations were made:

                  "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."

                  (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

                  (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.

                  (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

                  (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

9. A perusal of the said paragraph does not indicate as to on what grounds, the petitioner seeks to place reliance on the said judgment.

10. Both the said judgments cited above, do not in any way help the petitioner wherein the grounds as recorded above have been taken and there is no material to suggest malafide at the instance of the SHO for falsely implicating the petitioner whose name has surfaced in the statement of one of the witness and thus, the said judgments do not benefit the petitioner.

11. Learned AGA has relied upon the judgement in the case of Punit Beriwala vs. The State of NCT of Delhi; MANU/SC/0596/2025 with emphasis on paragraph 37, which is as under :

                  37. It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held, “The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents…

12. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment in the case of State vs. M. Maridoss and another; (2023) 4 SCC 338 with emphasis on para 7, 8 and 11, which are as under :

                  "7. From the impugned judgment and order [M. Maridoss v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 13703] passed by the High Court and the reasoning given by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has quashed the criminal proceedings as if the High Court was conducting the mini trial. The scope and ambiguity of powers to be exercised under Section 482CrPC has been elaborately dealt with and considered by this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure [Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315] . In SCC para 13, it is observed and held as under : (Neeharika Infrastructure case [Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315] )

                  “13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in Khawaja Nazir Ahmad [King Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29 : (1943-44) 71 IA 203] , the following principles of law emerge:

                  13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences.

                  13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences.

                  13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.

                  13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the “rarest of rare cases”. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482CrPC is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court).

                  13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.

                  13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage.

                  13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule.

                  13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482CrPC.

                  13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping.

                  13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.

                  13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice.

                  13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.

                  13.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court.

                  13.14. However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866] and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; and

                  13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.”

                  8. Even otherwise, it is a settled position of law that while exercising powers under Section 482CrPC, the High Court is not required to conduct the mini trial. What is required to be considered at that stage is the nature of accusations and allegations in the FIR and whether the averments/allegations in the FIR prima facie disclose the commission of the cognizable offence or not.

                  11. As per the settled position of law, it is the right conferred upon the investigating agency to conduct the investigation and reasonable time should be given to the investigating agency to conduct the investigation unless it is found that the allegations in the FIR do not disclose any cognizable offence at all or the complaint is barred by any law.

13. In the present case, the contentions with regard to the quashing of an FIR under section 103(1) BNS have already been recorded above; none of the said grounds are made out for exercising the extraordinary power of quashing the FIR, moreso, when the investigation reflects that the name of the petitioner has surfaced in the statement of one of the witnesses.

14. The contention raised by the petitioner and as recorded above, clearly did not make out a case for quashing of the FIR.

15. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.