1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.

2. By the present petition, the Petitioner No.1 and 2 have challenged the judgment and order dated 29.09.2011 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Amravati in Appeal No.22/2011, whereby the appeal preferred by respondent No.1 came to be allowed, the resignation tendered by respondent No.1 was held to be ineffective and the petitioners were directed to reinstate respondent No.1 in service with continuity and full back wages.

3. The case of the Petitioners is that Respondent No. 1 was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in Petitioner No. 2 School on 01.01.2000. The petitioners submit that at the time of her appointment, the school was not receiving grant-in-aid and respondent No.1, who had no prior teaching experience, voluntarily joined the institution to gain experience as an Assistant Teacher. It is further the case of the petitioners that the institution was subsequently brought on 100% grant-in-aid and respondent No.1 continued in service thereafter. According to the petitioners, Respondent No. 1 was not performing her teaching duties satisfactorily despite being repeatedly advised to improve her performance. Consequently, she voluntarily tendered her resignation on 30.04.2011 in her own handwriting, stating therein that she was not eligible to teach the students of the school. The resignation was thereafter forwarded by the Head Mistress to Petitioner No. 1 Society for appropriate decision, and, in the meeting of the Managing Committee held on 09.05.2011, the same came to be accepted. The resolution accepting the resignation was subsequently confirmed in the meeting of the Managing Committee held on 17.05.2011.

4. According to the petitioners, the acceptance of resignation was communicated to respondent No.1 by communication dated 21.05.2011. Thereafter, respondent No.1 addressed a communication dated 25.05.2011 alleging that her resignation had been obtained under pressure and sought to withdraw the same. The petitioners, by communication dated 28.05.2011, informed respondent No.1 that her resignation had already been accepted. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No.1 preferred Appeal No.22/2011 before the learned School Tribunal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, contending that the resignation had been obtained under coercion and that the cessation of her service amounted to an "otherwise termination".

5. The petitioners appeared before the learned School Tribunal and resisted the appeal by filing their written statement. Upon consideration of the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned School Tribunal framed the following issues:

                   (i) Whether the school is recognized under the MEPS Act, 1977?

                   (ii) Whether the appointment of the appellant was made in accordance with Section 5 of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder?

                   (iii) Whether the appellant proved that the resignation dated 30.04.2011 was tendered due to pressure exerted by the Management?

                   (iv) Whether the Management proved that it had accepted the resignation before the appellant withdrew the same?

6. The learned School Tribunal answered Issue Nos.1 and 2 in the affirmative, whereas Issue Nos.3 and 4 were answered against the Management. However, despite recording a finding that respondent No.1 had failed to establish that the resignation was obtained under coercion or pressure, the learned School Tribunal proceeded to allow the appeal on the ground that the Management had failed to prove acceptance of the resignation before its withdrawal. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the learned School Tribunal, the petitioners have preferred the present writ petition.

7. Mr. D. V. Mahajan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the learned School Tribunal committed a manifest error in allowing the appeal despite recording a categorical finding that respondent No.1 had failed to establish that the resignation dated 30.04.2011 was obtained under coercion or pressure. He further submitted that the resignation, having been voluntarily tendered, was duly accepted by the Managing Committee, which is the competent authority under the MEPS Act. According to the learned counsel, once the resignation had been accepted by the competent authority, the subsequent communication issued by respondent No.1 seeking withdrawal thereof was of no legal consequence. He emphasized that the learned School Tribunal erred in holding that communication of acceptance was a condition precedent for the resignation becoming effective, though neither Section 7 of the MEPS Act nor Rule 40 of the MEPS Rules prescribes any such requirement. It was, therefore, contended that the impugned judgment and order deserves to be quashed and set aside. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions in Writ Petition No. 2484 of 1983; decided on 17.12.1991 (Secretary Vikas Shikshan Mandal and Another v Smt. Sindhu B. Patil and Another), Utkranti Mandal, Jarud and another v Shriram Manohar Bande and others [2022 (5) Mh. L. J 547] and Shriram Manohar Bande v Utkranti Mandal and Others [2024 SCC OnLine SC 647].

8. Per contra, Mr. H. A. Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 supported the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned School Tribunal. It was submitted that respondent No.1 had withdrawn the resignation before its acceptance was communicated to her and, therefore, the resignation never became effective. According to the learned counsel, a mere internal resolution passed by the Managing Committee could not bind respondent No.1 unless the decision accepting the resignation was duly communicated to her. It was contended that communication of acceptance forms an integral part of the decision-making process and, till such communication, respondent No.1 was entitled to withdraw the resignation. It was further submitted that the resignation and its acceptance were not in conformity with the requirements of Section 7 of the MEPS Act and Rule 40 of the MEPS Rules and, therefore, the learned School Tribunal rightly granted relief. Learned counsel also invited the attention of this Court to the additional submissions styled as cross-objections, whereby respondent No.1 has questioned the finding recorded by the learned School Tribunal on Issue No.3 and has contended that the resignation dated 30.04.2011 was not voluntarily tendered but had been obtained under coercion and pressure. It was further submitted that respondent No.1 had joined the petitioner-school at a time when it was an unaided institution. According to the learned counsel, the institution was subsequently brought on 100% grant-in-aid and, having continued in service even thereafter, there was no plausible reason for respondent No.1 to voluntarily resign. It was, therefore, prayed that the writ petition be dismissed, the relief granted by the learned School Tribunal be maintained and the finding on Issue No.3 be reversed. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions in Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [2020 SCC OnLine Bom 686], W.P. No. 5547/1998 decided on 07.08.2025 [Somnath Tukaram Kuber v. Meghraj Medeppa Kadadi] , Jagannath Bhivsan Mistry v. Satpuda Shikshan Prasarak Mandal [2016 SCC OnLine Bom 16061], Sayyed Maksood Ali Sayyed Roshid Ali v Uruj-E-Urdu Education Society and Another [2011 ALL MR 874], Neminath Jain Bramhacharya Ashram v Rajendra Sitaram Nikam and Others [2004 (2) Mh.L.J 909] and Siddheshwar Kreeda Mandal , Sillod v Uttam Kisanrao Shrikhande and Others [2009 (2) Mh.L.J 275].

9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner No. 1 and 2 as well as the learned counsel for Respondent No.1. We have also perused the pleadings, the impugned order dated 29.09.2011 and the original record and proceedings produced before us.

10. Before adverting to the principal issue arising in the present petition, it is necessary to deal with the additional submissions styled as cross-objections filed by respondent No.1. By the said additional submissions, respondent No.1 has assailed the finding recorded by the learned School Tribunal on Issue No.3, whereby it was held that respondent No.1 had failed to establish that the resignation dated 30.04.2011 was obtained under coercion or pressure. It has been prayed that while sustaining the ultimate relief granted by the learned School Tribunal, the aforesaid finding be reversed and it be held that the resignation was involuntary and obtained under coercion. In support of the said contention, learned counsel for respondent No.1 has placed reliance upon the decision in Ambuja Cements Limited (supra) to contend that although a formal cross-objection under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure may not be maintainable in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court is nevertheless competent to examine the correctness of an adverse finding while deciding the writ petition. There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition and, accordingly, this Court proceeds to examine the challenge raised by respondent No.1 to the finding recorded on Issue No.3 on its own merits. For the similar contention, the petitioner has also relied on the judgment of this Court in Somnath Kuber (supra).

11. A perusal of the impugned judgment would show that the learned School Tribunal has extensively considered the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the parties while recording the aforesaid finding. The resignation is admittedly in the handwriting of respondent No.1 and bears her signature as well as the date written by her. The allegations are founded solely upon the interested testimony of the respondent No. 1 and are unsupported by any independent evidence. The contents thereof are clear and unambiguous. The Tribunal has taken note of the fact that no contemporaneous complaint alleging coercion or undue pressure was made immediately after submission of the resignation. The record further does not disclose any material indicating threat, duress or undue pressure exercised by the management. The decision in Neminath Jain Bramhacharya Ashram (supra) also emphasizes that where the voluntariness of a resignation is disputed, the Tribunal is required to decide the issue on the basis of the evidence and surrounding circumstances. In the present case, the learned School Tribunal has undertaken precisely such an exercise and, upon appreciation of the evidence, has recorded a categorical finding that respondent No.1 failed to establish coercion. The said decision, therefore, does not advance the case of respondent No.1, rather, it supports the approach adopted by the learned School Tribunal while deciding Issue No.3. Merely because respondent No.1 seeks to rely upon Rule 15 of the MEPS Rules or the surrounding circumstances to contend that there was no occasion for her to resign, would not, by itself, dislodge the findings recorded by the Tribunal.

12. In support thereof, reliance has been placed upon the decision in Jagannath Bhivsan Mistry (supra) and the other authorities referred to hereinabove to contend that a resignation obtained by coercion or in breach of the safeguards prescribed under Section 7 of the MEPS Act cannot be sustained. There can be no quarrel with the said proposition. However, the applicability of a precedent necessarily depends upon the factual foundation on which it rests. In Jagannath Bhivsan Mistry (supra), the controversy centered around genuineness of the resignation itself and the compliance with Section 7 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. In the present case, respondent No.1 has admittedly tendered the resignation in her own handwriting, bearing her signature and the date written by her, and the learned School Tribunal has, upon appreciation of the evidence, recorded a categorical finding that the plea of coercion has not been established. The rest of the authorities also proceed on factual situations where coercion, fraud or violation of the statutory safeguards stood established.

13. The Tribunal, which had the benefit of appreciating the evidence first hand, has recorded a categorical finding that the plea of coercion has not been established. Such a finding is essentially a finding of fact. It is well settled that in exercise of writ jurisdiction this Court would not ordinarily interfere with findings of fact unless the same are demonstrated to be perverse, arbitrary or based on no evidence. Respondent No. 1 has failed to point out any such infirmity in the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal. This Court, therefore, finds no reason to interfere with the said finding. Consequently, the cross-objection insofar as it challenges the voluntariness of the application deserves to be rejected. In view of these findings, the said decisions do not advance the case of respondent No.1.

14. The remaining authorities relied upon by respondent No.1 reiterate the settled propositions that a resignation obtained by coercion or fraud cannot be sustained, that the safeguards under Section 7 of the Act are mandatory, and that an employee is entitled to withdraw a resignation before it becomes effective. There can be no quarrel with these propositions. However, those decisions proceed on factual situations where either the voluntary nature of the resignation itself was in dispute or the statutory requirements were found to have been violated. In the present case, the Tribunal has itself recorded findings that the resignation was voluntarily tendered, that the requirements of Section 7 stood complied with and that Rule 40 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools Rules, 1981 was not violated. Those findings have not been shown to suffer from perversity warranting interference. Consequently, the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions do not govern the controversy involved in the present case.

15. Having upheld the finding recorded by the learned School Tribunal on Issue No.3, the controversy now narrows down to the correctness of the finding recorded on Issue No.4. Though the learned School Tribunal held that respondent No.1 had failed to establish that the resignation was obtained under coercion, it nevertheless allowed the appeal on the premise that the resignation stood validly withdrawn before its acceptance was communicated to respondent No.1. The principal question, therefore, is whether the learned School Tribunal was justified in holding that the resignation became ineffective merely because the acceptance thereof was not communicated to respondent No.1 before the withdrawal was sought.

16. Before examining the aforesaid issue, it would be apposite to advert to the statutory scheme governing resignation under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 and the Rules framed thereunder. Section 7 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 prescribes the manner in which a resignation is required to be tendered by an employee, while Rule 40 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools Rules, 1981 regulates resignation by a permanent employee. Neither the Act nor the Rules have been shown to contain any provision conferring upon an employee an unrestricted right to withdraw an application for voluntary resignation after the same has been accepted by the competent authority. Equally, no provision has been brought to the notice of this Court which stipulates that acceptance shall become effective only upon communication thereof.

17. The petitioners have placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Utkranti Mandal, Jarud (supra), which has subsequently been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shriram Manohar Bande (supra). The said decision, in the opinion of this Court, squarely governs the controversy involved in the present case.

18. In the said case of Utkranti Mandal, Jarud (supra), the employee had tendered resignation, which was accepted by the Management. The employee subsequently sought to withdraw the resignation and questioned the validity of its acceptance. The School Tribunal had granted relief by holding that the Management had failed to establish due acceptance and communication of the resignation before its withdrawal. Interfering with the said view, this Court held that neither Section 7 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 nor Rule 40 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools Rules, 1981 prescribes communication of acceptance of resignation as a condition precedent for the resignation becoming effective. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Shriram Manohar Bande (supra) while affirming the judgment of this Court, has reiterated that once the resignation is voluntarily tendered and accepted by the competent authority in accordance with law, subsequent withdrawal thereof does not invalidate the acceptance, unless the governing statutory provisions specifically require communication of such acceptance. The relevant paragragh no.18 of judgment has been reproduced below-

                   “18. ……… . In light of the intent and interpretation of the relevant Section 7 of MEPS and Rule 40 of the Rules, we conclude that the High Court was right in holding that mere noncommunication of acceptance of resignation to the employee would not render the termination invalid. We answer the Issue in the negative, thereby upholding the findings of the High Court.”

19. The Tribunal has proceeded on the premise that unless acceptance is communicated to the employee, no concluded decision comes into existence. In the considered view of this Court, such an approach does not correctly appreciate the distinction between the formation of a decision by the competent authority and the communication of such decision.

20. The distinction between acceptance and communication cannot be overlooked. Acceptance is the decision-making process culminating in a determination by the competent authority. Communication is the subsequent act of conveying that decision to the concerned person. While communication may be necessary for implementation of a decision, it does not necessarily follow that the decision itself does not exist until communication takes place.

21. The Tribunal appears to have treated communication as constituting the acceptance itself. Such reasoning, in the considered view of this Court, overlooks the legal effect of the resolution passed by the Managing Committee. The moment the competent authority considered the request and resolved to accept it, a final administrative decision came into existence. The respondent's subsequent withdrawal was admittedly after the date of such acceptance.

22. If the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal is accepted, a situation may arise where a validly concluded decision of the competent authority can be nullified merely because formal communication has not yet been dispatched or received. Such an interpretation would introduce uncertainty into administrative decision-making and would render the finality of decisions dependent upon accidental delays in communication rather than the actual exercise of statutory power by the competent authority.

23. It is equally significant that the respondent has not demonstrated any prejudice caused by non-communication. The challenge is not founded upon lack of authority, procedural illegality or violation of any statutory provision. The entire challenge rests upon the premise that the withdrawal application was submitted before communication of acceptance. In the absence of a statutory provision preserving such right after acceptance by the competent authority, this Court is unable to subscribe to the view adopted by the learned School Tribunal.

24. Having regard to the totality of circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned School Tribunal correctly rejected the plea of coercion but erred in law in holding that the respondent validly withdrew the application for voluntary resignation after the same had already been accepted by the Managing Committee. The finding recorded by the learned School Tribunal on this aspect is contrary to the statutory scheme governing the parties and cannot be sustained.

25. Accordingly, it is held that the resolution passed by the Managing Committee accepting the respondent's voluntary resignation constituted a valid and effective exercise of power by the competent authority. The subsequent withdrawal application did not have the effect of nullifying or superseding the earlier acceptance. The cessation of service pursuant to the voluntary retirement, therefore, cannot be termed illegal.

26. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition consequently deserves to be allowed. The finding recorded by the Tribunal granting relief to the respondent is liable to be set aside. The cross-objection filed by the respondent challenging the finding on coercion is devoid of merit and is accordingly rejected. Hence, the following order:

                   ORDER

                   (i) The writ petition is allowed.

                   (ii) The judgment and order dated 29.09.2011 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Amravati in Appeal No.22/2011 is hereby quashed and set aside.

                   (iii) Appeal No.22/2011 filed by respondent No.1 before the School Tribunal stands dismissed.

                   (iv) The cross-objection filed by the respondent challenging the finding on coercion is rejected.

27. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No order as to costs.