Nivedita P. Mehta, J.

1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

2. By the present writ petition, the petitioner seeks a direction to grant admission to KG-I (Junior KG) in respondent No.2-School under the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (for short, "RTE Act").

3. The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner had applied for admission under the RTE Act for the academic year 2025-26. Pursuant to the online admission process, the petitioner was provisionally allotted respondent No.2-School. During the course of physical verification of the residential address furnished by the petitioner in the online application, the verification team found that the house mentioned in the application did not exist. According to the petitioner, his father informed the verification team that the house was under renovation and reconstruction and, therefore, the family had temporarily shifted elsewhere. He further informed the authorities that the petitioner's sister was already studying in respondent No.2-School under the RTE quota. The explanation furnished by the petitioner's father was, however, not accepted by the authorities and, consequently, the petitioner was not included in the final admission list for the academic year 2025-26.

4. It is further the petitioner's case that his father thereafter submitted a representation to respondent No.1 - the Secretary, School Education and Sports Department, Government of Maharashtra, pointing out the aforesaid circumstances and enclosing documentary evidence to establish the petitioner's permanent residential address, however, no action was taken despite passage of several months. It is the petitioner's case that, on legal advice, a fresh application was submitted under the RTE Act for the academic year 2026-27. As the petitioner was to attain the age of five years in November, 2026, he became eligible for admission to KG-I (Junior KG). However, he was informed that no vacancy was available in respondent No.2-School. Aggrieved by the denial of admission, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition.

5. Shri Amit Kinkhede, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner had placed reliance upon documentary material, including the Aadhaar Card and electricity bills dated 16.11.2004, 19.08.2024, 19.05.2025 and 17.01.2026, to substantiate his claim that the family was permanently residing at CTO Compound, Civil Lines, Nagpur. He submitted that although the family had temporarily shifted owing to renovation and reconstruction of the residential house, the authorities rejected the petitioner's claim without giving any cogent reason or properly considering the explanation furnished by his father and the documents placed on record.

6. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner's elder sister had already secured admission in respondent No.2-School under the RTE quota and that the said circumstance ought to have been duly considered while examining the petitioner's claim. He further contended that the verification report was never furnished to the petitioner and no opportunity was afforded to explain the alleged discrepancy regarding the residential address before denying admission. According to the learned counsel, the action of the respondents was, therefore, in breach of the principles of natural justice.

7. Learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dinesh Ashitkar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2026 INSC 56, and submitted that the Supreme Court has recognized the wide powers of constitutional courts to mould appropriate relief in order to protect the educational rights of children. It was urged that the RTE Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation enacted to secure the fundamental right to education under Article 21-A of the Constitution of India and, therefore, deserves a liberal and child-centric interpretation. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner ought not to suffer because of procedural lapses or deficiencies on the part of the authorities.

8. It was further submitted that although there may presently be no vacant seats in KG-I or KG-II for the academic year 2026-27, the petitioner ought not to have been denied admission during the academic year 2025-26 itself. Had the respondents properly considered the petitioner's explanation and documentary evidence at the relevant time, the present situation would not have arisen. Reliance was also placed upon various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to contend that any administrative decision affecting valuable rights must be supported by reasons and must be preceded by observance of the principles of natural justice.

9. In response to the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of availability of an alternate statutory remedy under the RTE Act, learned counsel submitted that the existence of an alternate statutory remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was contended that where the impugned action is arbitrary, violative of the principles of natural justice, or infringes fundamental rights, this Court would be justified in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the availability of an alternate remedy. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel relied on the following judgments:

                   1. St. Mary’s Education Society Vs. Rajendra Prasad reported in 2022 INSC 856;

                   2. Dinesh Ashtikar Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2026 INSC 56;

                   3. Lucknow Public School V. State of UP reported in 2026 INSC 422;

                   4. Akhil Bhartiya Samajwadi Adhyapak Sabha V. State of Maharashtra (PIL No. 61 of 2024 (Bombay Bench);

                   5. Commissioner of Central Excise V. M/s Ratan Melting and Wire SC in Civil Appeal No. 4022 of 1999;

                   6. Dalpat Kumar V. Prahlad Singh reported in 1992 (1) SCC 719;

                   7. Deoraj V. State of Maharashtra reported in 2004(4) SCC 697;

                   8. Zenit Mataplast V. State of Maharashtra reported in 2009 (10) SCC 388;

                   9. S. Krishna Shradha Vs. the State of Andhra Pradesh and others in Civil Appeal No. 1081 of 2017;

                   10. Mashalkar Prasad V. Terna Medical College in WP No. 17047 of 2024;

                   11. Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuram Vs. State of Kerala and others reported in 1979(4) SCC 782.

                   12. Ramchandra Adke v. Govind Chavare reported in (1975) 1 SCC 559

                   13. Kranti Associates v. Masood Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496

                   14. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust and ors. reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 998

                   15. Bombay Restaurant v. Deputy Director reported in (2009) 9 SCC 61

                   16. Badshah v. Urmila Godse reported in (2014) 1 SCC 188

                   17. Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar reported in (1998) 8 SCC

                   18. Popcorn Entertainment Platinum Entertainment reported in (2007) 9 SCC 593

10. Per contra, Mr. M G. Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.2, assisted by Mr. Ninad Lande, learned counsel, submitted that admissions under the RTE Act are conducted exclusively through a centralized online admission process administered by the School Education Department, Government of Maharashtra. According to the learned counsel. the role of respondent No.2 - School is confined to implementing the allotment made by the competent educational authorities and complying with the directions issued by them. The school has no independent authority to grant admission under the RTE quota..

11. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that for the academic year 2025-26, the petitioner was initially allotted respondent No.2 - School. Pursuant to the directions issued by the Deputy Education Officer, Nagpur, the school conducted physical verification of the residential address furnished by the petitioner in the online application. Upon inspection, the verification team found that neither the petitioner nor his family was residing at the address mentioned in the application. The verification report was accordingly forwarded to the competent educational authorities, pursuant to which the petitioner was excluded from the final admission list under the RTE quota for the academic year 2025-26. It was submitted that the petitioner did not challenge the said decision before the competent forum and, therefore, the same has attained finality.

12. Learned Senior Counsel emphasized that respondent No.2-School has a pre-primary section comprising Nursery, KG-I and KG-II and that the entry level for admission under Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act is Nursery where the reservation of twenty-five per cent seats is implemented only at that entry level. He submitted that the students admitted to Nursery under the RTE quota during the academic year 2025-26 have since progressed to KG-I in the academic year 2026-27, and, consequently, no separate RTE seat is available in KG-I. It was further submitted that the petitioner has failed to place on record any statutory provision, rule or Government policy permitting direct admission to KG-I under the RTE quota where the entry level is Nursery. According to respondent No.2, no such provision exists in law.

13. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the grievance of the petitioner essentially arises out of the refusal of admission during the academic year 2025-26. Having not challenged the said decision before the appropriate forum, the petitioner cannot now seek a writ of mandamus directing respondent No.2 - School to grant admission in the subsequent academic year contrary to the statutory admission process. It was, therefore, submitted that the writ petition is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed.

14. Mr. A. R. Chutke, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the State and Mr. Gopal G. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 9, while adopting the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent No.2, also raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. They submitted that the petitioner has an efficacious alternate statutory remedy under the provisions of the RTE Act and the Rules framed thereunder, which has not been availed of. On that ground alone, according to the learned AGP, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

15. We heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and upon perusal of the material placed on record. Though the petitioner seeks a direction to grant admission to KG-I (Junior KG) for the academic year 2026-27, the foundation of his claim lies in the denial of admission under the RTE Act for the academic year 2025-26. The principal question, therefore, is whether, in the facts of the present case, this Court ought to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India despite the availability of an alternate statutory remedy and issue a direction for admission as prayed for.

16. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had applied for admission under the RTE Act for the academic year 2025-26 and was provisionally allotted respondent No.2 - School for admission under the RTE Act for the academic year 2025-26. However, upon verification of the residential address furnished in the online application, it was found that the petitioner was not residing at the address mentioned in the application. The competent educational authority declined to grant admission. Though the petitioner seeks to justify the discrepancy by contending that the family had temporarily shifted on account of renovation of its residential house, the petitioner was not included in the final admission list.

17. It is also not in dispute that admissions under the RTE Act are undertaken through a centralized online admission process administered and controlled by the School Education Department, Government of Maharashtra. The role of the concerned school is limited to acting upon the allotment made by the competent educational authorities and carrying out such verification as may be directed by such authorities. It has no independent authority either to allot a seat under the RTE quota or to grant admission dehors the statutory admission process.

18. The grievance sought to be projected in the present petition essentially arises from the denial of admission to the petitioner for the academic year 2025-26. The relief presently sought for admission to KG-I for the academic year 2026-27 is merely a consequential relief founded upon the assertion that the petitioner was wrongly denied admission at the entry level in the previous academic year. At the same time, it is equally evident from the record that after the petitioner was not included in the final admission list for the academic year 2025-26, no challenge was raised before the competent statutory authority at the relevant point of time. The petitioner neither preferred the statutory appeal nor questioned the decision immediately before this Court. The decision regarding the admission process for the academic year 2025-26, therefore, attained finality.

19. It is the petitioner's contention that sufficient documentary evidence, including the Aadhaar Card and electricity bills, was available to establish the permanent residence of the family and that no opportunity of hearing or clarification was afforded before denying admission. The petitioner further contends that his elder sister is already studying in respondent No.2-School under the RTE quota and, therefore, the authorities ought to have considered the petitioner's case sympathetically. According to the petitioner, the rejection of admission without assigning reasons violates the principles of natural justice and defeats the beneficial object of the RTE Act.

20. The submission advanced on behalf of respondent No.2-School deserves consideration. It is specifically contended that the entry level in the pre-primary section under the RTE quota is Nursery and that the twenty-five per cent reservation contemplated under Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act is implemented only at the entry level. The students admitted to Nursery under the RTE quota in the academic year 2025-26 have automatically progressed to KG-I during the academic year 2026-27. Consequently, no separate RTE seats are available in KG-I unless specifically provided by the statutory scheme.

21. Significantly, the petitioner has not placed on record any statutory provision, rule, Government Resolution or policy of the State Government demonstrating that direct admission to KG-I under the RTE quota is permissible where the entry level is Nursery. In the absence of any such statutory provision, this Court cannot issue a writ directing the creation of a seat or directing admission contrary to the admission procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules.

22. There can be no dispute with the proposition canvassed on behalf of the petitioner that the RTE Act is a beneficial and child-centric legislation intended to effectuate the mandate of Article 21-A of the Constitution, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar (supra) and Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust (supra). Equally, constitutional courts possess ample powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to mould relief in an appropriate case. However, the existence of such power does not permit the Court to ignore the statutory framework governing admissions. A beneficial interpretation cannot be stretched to create a right which the statute itself does not recognize or to bypass the procedure prescribed under the Act. Thus, the extraordinary jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be invoked to direct admission in derogation of the statutory admission process, particularly when the petitioner has failed to establish an existing legal right under the statutory framework.

23. Equally significant is the objection regarding maintainability raised by the respondents. Sections 32 of the RTE Act, read with the applicable Rules framed by the State Government, provide a statutory mechanism for redressal of grievances arising out of the implementation of the Act. Ordinarily, when an efficacious statutory remedy is available, this Court would be slow in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226. The High Court is not bound to entertain a writ petition merely because allegations of inaction, arbitrariness or negligence are made against a statutory authority. Where the statute provides a complete and efficacious mechanism for redressal of grievances, the party is ordinarily expected to exhaust the same before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is well settled, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation (supra), that although the existence of an alternate remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court would ordinarily decline to entertain a writ petition where an efficacious statutory remedy is available, except in well-recognized exceptional circumstances. The decision in Popcorn Entertainment (supra) also turned on the peculiar facts of that case where such exceptional circumstances were found to exist. In the present case, the petitioner's grievance essentially arises from the denial of admission under the RTE Act for the academic year 2025-26. The said decision was never challenged by availing statutory remedy. Having allowed the said decision to attain finality, the petitioner cannot seek, by way of the present writ petition, a direction for admission to KG-I for the subsequent academic year 2026-2027 by indirectly questioning the earlier decision. Thus, in the present case, we do not find that the petitioner has made out such an exceptional case.

24. Likewise, there can be no dispute with the proposition laid down in Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuram (supra) that a quasi-judicial authority is required to adhere to the principles of natural justice and assign reasons while taking a decision affecting civil rights. However, assuming that the petitioner was aggrieved by the manner in which the decision denying admission for the academic year 2025-26 was taken, the appropriate course available to him was to challenge the said decision before the statutory authority under the RTE Act. Having failed to avail the statutory remedy, the petitioner cannot now rely upon the alleged violation of the principles of natural justice as a ground to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

25. We have also considered the various decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, upon consideration, this Court finds that the issues involved and the factual matrix in the said decisions are materially distinguishable. Consequently, the principles laid down therein do not assist the petitioner in the present case.

26. The grievance of the petitioner essentially arises out of the denial of admission during the academic year 2025-26. However, the present relief sought is for admission in the subsequent academic year 2026-27. The admission process for the academic year 2025-26 has long concluded and the petitioner has not sought any substantive challenge to the final admission list or the decision of the competent educational authority refusing admission for that academic year. Moreover, the petitioner has not challenged any specific decision of the educational authorities refusing admission for the academic year 2026-27 under the applicable statutory scheme.

27. This Court is not unmindful of the fact that education of a child is of paramount importance and that procedural irregularities should not ordinarily defeat substantive rights. Nevertheless, equitable considerations cannot override the statutory scheme governing admissions under the RTE Act. In the absence of any vacant seat under the RTE quota at the entry level and in the absence of any statutory provision permitting direct admission to KG-I, no mandamus can be issued directing respondent No.2-School to admit the petitioner.

28. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to establish any legal or enforceable right warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

29. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.