P. Sam Koshy, J.

1. Heard Mr. K.R.K.V. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Mr. G. Venkateswarlu, learned Standing Counsel for CGHS appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.2 to 4.

2. The instant Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench (for short the ‘Tribunal’) in OA21/528/2026, decided on 19.06.2026.

3. Vide the impugned order; the Tribunal dismissed the aforesaid OA preferred by the petitioner assailing his order of transfer from the post of Social Security Officer at ESIC Super Specialty Hospital, Sanathnagar, to ESIC Sub Regional Office at Hubli, Karnataka.

4. The contention of the petitioner challenging the transfer order is primarily on the following grounds:-

               a) That the order of transfer is in violation of the transfer policy and guidelines framed by the Department governing the field of transfer.

               b) That the Department ought to have considered that the petitioner’s spouse is also an employee posted in Hyderabad, whose services are not transferable to Hubli, Karnataka.

               c) That the petitioner’s daughter is a Class X student and therefore a mid-session transfer at this juncture is contrary to the transfer policy.

               d) That the order of transfer does not seem to be on administrative exigency as there is no replacement in the place of petitioner.

               e) According to the petitioner, in the present office where he is working, he has not completed even three years of tenure. Whereas, under the policy, in one office the maximum period someone can stay is 5 years. This aspect has not been properly considered by the Tribunal.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Director of School Education, Madras vs. O. Karuppa Thevan(1994 SCC SUPL. (2) 666) wherein it was held that an order of transfer can be kept in abeyance at least till the end of the academic session.

6. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for CGHS submits that it is a case where the petitioner has been posted at Hyderabad city since 2011 i.e. for more than 15 years and therefore, the petitioner, now at this stage cannot oppose the transfer seeking judicial intervention.

7. Learned Standing Counsel for CGHS further submits that the petitioner for the last 15 years has been accommodated in and around different cities in Hyderabad and now after 15 years if the petitioner has been sent out of Hyderabad and that too, to the neighboring State of Karnataka, he cannot cry foul and challenge the order of transfer. That upon verification of fact, it would reveal that the distance between the two places is just around 500 kms., which is not too far away from Hyderabad. Thus, the order of transfer does not warrant any interference.

8. Referring to the mid-session transfer, learned Standing Counsel for CGHS submits that the order of transfer in fact was one which was passed on 10.04.2026 i.e. a transfer order made in the month of April can never be considered to be a mid-session transfer. The petitioner having not complied with the order and on the contrary having gone in for a litigation before the Tribunal and later to the High Court, the petitioner therefore cannot take the plea of the order of transfer being violative of the transfer policy and guidelines of the Department as the policy and guidelines do not have a mandatory or statutory force of law. The guidelines are always laid down to be adhered as far as possible and the petitioner having remained at Hyderabad for the last 15 years would by itself go to show that the petitioner’s case cannot be brought within the purview of violation of the transfer policy.

9. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, particularly taking into account the factual matrix those are narrated in the writ petition as also the undisputed facts brought before the Bench by the learned Standing Counsel for CGHS, it stands established that the petitioner has been in the city of Hyderabad since 2011 i.e. for the last 15 years. Merely because the petitioner has been shifted from one office to another within the city of Hyderabad by itself would not give a right to the petitioner for his tenure at Hyderabad to be revised at every change of office, treating every shifting of office to be a beginning of fresh tenure.

10. The fact which needs to be appreciated is that an order of transfer can be interfered with only in the event if the transfer order is in any manner violative of any of the service conditions or the service rules governing the field. Further, an order of transfer can also be interfered with under the scope of judicial review by the Courts in the event if the order of transfer has been made on mala fides. In the instant case, upon a bare perusal of the petition and the contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner, nowhere is the contention raised of the order of transfer being contrary to the service rules and neither is the contention that the transfer order being issued with mala fides.

11. Now the question that needs to be considered is “in the absence of grounds under which the Courts have the right to interfere with an order of transfer, is there any scope of interference with the order dated 10.04.2026 transferring the petitioner from Hyderabad to Hubli, Karnataka?”

12. Unless an order of transfer is held to have been issued with mala fides or has been issued contrary to the service rules governing the field, it has to be presumed that the order of transfer has been made on administrative exigency and also with full bona fides. Moreover, the scope of interference in an order of transfer under the service law jurisprudence has in the recent past, more particularly in the last 2-3 decades, seen a paradigm shift by restricting the scope of interference with each judgment starting from:-

               a) Mrs. Shilpi Bose and Ors. vs State of Bihar and Ors.( AIR 1991 SC 532)

               b) Union of India and Ors. vs. S.L. Abbas((1993) 4 SCC 357)

               c) M. Sankaranarayanan, IAS vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.( AIR 1993 SC 763)

               d) N. K. Singh vs. Union of India and Ors.( AIR 1995 SC 423)

               e) State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. vs. S. S. Kourav & Ors.( AIR1995 SC 1056)

               f) State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Gobardhan Lal((2004) 11 SCC 402)

The aforesaid judgments being the landmark judgments on the scope of interference in transfer matters still hold to be good law and these very judgments have been reiterated on numerous occasions even in the recent past.

13. The gist of the judgments referred to in the preceding paragraph is that a transfer order when made in public interest amounts to be a part of the condition of service. An employee for that matter has no right vested insofar as the tenure at one place is concerned and also in choosing the place of posting. Transfer is an administrative decision which lies exclusively under the domain of the employer. It is for the employer to determine as to which employee or officer has to be posted at which place and for how long.

14. It has been repeatedly reiterated by the Supreme Court that there is very little scope of judicial review available for a Court or a Tribunal in the course of testing the veracity of a transfer order unless it is in contravention to the statutory rules or is issued with mala fides which needs to be established with cogent proof. Neither can an order of transfer be held to be bad only because it leads to certain personal inconvenience to the employee or to his family members, which again is only within the power of the employer and for which the only remedy available is to make a representation before the employer leaving it for the employer to consider the grievance on the administrative side and take a decision. In the instant case, the petitioner has already made a representation before the Department which is still pending consideration.

15. Recently this Bench had an occasion of dealing with yet another departmental transfer matter in the case of Venumadhav Vurugonda vs. Union of India and Others(Writ Petition No.7492 of 2026, decided on 13.03.2026). In the said judgment, this Bench had made the following observations:

               “16. It has been repeatedly held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as also practically by every High Court in the country that a transfer of an employee or an Officer from one station to another is ordinarily an incidence of service. Since it is an incident of service and unless the action smacks mala fides, the order of transfer does not have any scope of interference, particularly in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

               17. In the case of Major Amod Kumar vs. Union of India and Others2 the Hon’ble Supreme Court again in somewhat similar circumstances reiterating the aforesaid principles has dismissed the writ petition. The Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in the case of Sri Pubi Lombi vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. 3 has dealt with this issue extensively and referring to the case of N.K. Singh vs. Union of India and Others4 has in very categorical terms held that unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norms or principles governing the transfer to hold the transfer to be contrary to the statutory rules governing the service conditions, the Courts, particularly the High Courts and the Hon’ble Supreme Court should not interfere with the order of transfer when it is otherwise made on administrative exigency.

               18. All of these facts and legal position referred to above has also been duly considered by the Tribunal in the course of dismissing the O.A., including the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thus, we do not find any strong case made out by the petitioner calling for an interference to the impugned order passed by the Tribunal.”

16. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in the submissions put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The judgments relied upon by him; both of the Supreme Court as also of the High Court of Chhattisgarh are entirely on different contextual backdrop and cannot be applied to the facts of the present case, nor can it be of any assistance to the petitioner in the instant case.

17. In view of the same, the instant writ petition deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. However, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Gobardhan Lal (supra), the only recourse available to the petitioner is to ventilate his grievance before the Department by moving a suitable representation. The rejection of the instant writ petition is only on the ground of the scope of interference. Non-interference with the transfer order by itself would not take away the right of the petitioner in approaching the Department highlighting his grievance in the course of execution of the transfer order. Since the petitioner in the instant case has already made a representation which is pending consideration, it is expected that the Department shall consider the said representation with an open mind dealing with the contentions raised in the representation without being in any manner influenced by the decision of this Bench in the present writ petition or for that matter the order of the Tribunal, which stands affirmed in this order.

18. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.