Oral Judgment:

1. The Applicant/accused no. 2, being aggrieved by the order dated 06.01.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, below Exhibit 43, in Special Case Child Prot. No. 18/2019, whereby rejecting the application for discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr. P. C.), has preferred this Revision Application.

2. The facts which led to the filing of this Application in a nutshell are as follows:

                   a) On 18.04.2018, the Informant/victim had lodged the report against accused Vijay, Nanda and the brother-in-law of Vijay, alleging that from 2012 to the filing of the complaint, the accused Vijay had committed forcible sexual intercourse with her with the assistance of the accused Nanda and his brother-in-law. In 2013, she was pregnant; at that time, she was a child/minor. As her date of birth is 15.05.1996. The accused persons forced her to have an abortion and caused an abortion. They also forcibly administered poison to her with the intention of killing her.

                   b) Based on her complaint, the Crime was registered against them vide Crime No. 128/2018 at Police Station, Beed Rural, for the offences punishable under Section 376 (2) (i), 307, 323, 504 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short ‘the POCSO Act’).

                   c) In the First Information Report, it was alleged that since 2012, the victim was residing with accused Vijay at his house, where he had committed forcible sexual intercourse with her against her will and, therefore, she had lodged the report against them on 17.04.2018.

                   d) Pursuant to the registration of the offence, the editor of ‘Dainik Parshwabhumi’ has published a news article on 26.04.2018, and the other accused also published the said article in Dainik ‘Zunjar-Neta’ on 27.04.2018.

                   e) In the said article, the victim’s name was mentioned along with her address. Accordingly, the victim lodged a complaint against the Applicant and one Ajit Motiram Warpe, alleging that they disclosed her identity in news articles, thereby defaming her.

                   f) Based on her report, an offence came to be registered against the Applicant, and another at City Police Station Beed vide Crime No. 265/2018, for the offences punishable under Sections 228(A), 500, 501 of the IPC and Section 23 of the POCSO Act.

                   g) Based on the said report, the Investigation Officer has completed the investigation, and the charge-sheet has been filed against the Applicant and another in the Court.

                   h) Accordingly, the Applicant has filed an Application under Section 227 of the Cr. P. C., before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Beed, for his discharge from the offence punishable under Sections 228-A, 500, 501 of the IPC, and Section 23 of the POCSO Act. The State opposed the said Application.

                   i) The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Beed, after considering the material on record on 06.01.2025, passed the impugned order, holding that under Sub-Section 3 of Section 23 of the POCSO Act, the publisher or owner of the media or studio or photographic facilities is held jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions of his employee. Therefore, the Application filed by the Applicant was rejected. Aggrieved by the same, the Applicant has preferred this Revision Application.

3. Heard the learned Advocate Shri V.D. Salunke, for the Applicant and learned Advocate Mr. Choure, for Respondent No. 2 / Victim and learned APP for the State/Respondent No.1.

4. The thrust of the argument of the learned Advocate for the Applicant is that when the offence was registered, at that time, the victim was a major and she was not a child as contemplated in Section 23 of the POCSO Act. He further forcefully argued that the Applicant has no intention of defaming the child, as at the time of publication of the news article, she was a major and, therefore, no ingredients of Section 23 of the POCSO Act are attracted against the Applicant. As such, the provisions of Section 23 of the POCSO Act do not apply against him.

                   a) He has drawn my attention to Section 23 of the POCSO Act, as well as the definition of ‘child’ under Section 2 (d) of the POCSO Act, and vehemently contended that when the offence was registered, at that time, the victim was not a child, but she was 21 years old. Therefore, the provisions of the POCSO Act do not apply against the Applicant. He further propounded that there is a delay of seven months for lodging the complaint, and the victim has not given any explanation for lodging the FIR belatedly. However, he argued that other offences are not made out against the Applicant.

                   b) During the course of arguments, he urged that he is only pressing that the provisions of Section 23 of the POCSO Act do not apply to the present crime. However, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not considered the same and erred in rejecting the Application, holding that the FIR, prima facie, made out the offence for breach of the mandate under Section 23 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, he submitted that the learned Judge has not applied his mind and, as such, the order passed by the learned Judge is liable to be set aside and urged that the Application be partly allowed to the extent of discharge of the Applicant under Section 23 of the POCSO Act as no case is made out as mandated therein. The said section was wrongly applied.

                   c) In the course of the argument, he also hypothesised/put forward that if Section 23 of the POCSO Act applied, then the matter would be tried and entertained by the Special Court. If the Applicant is discharged under Section 23 of the POCSO Act, then the matter would be tried by the learned Magistrate.

                   d) To buttress his submissions, he has relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gangadhar Narayan Nayak @ Gangadhar Hiregutti Versus State of Karnataka and Others, 2022 (12) SCC 72 and Sanjay Upadhya Versus Anand Dubey, 2024 AIR (SC) 811. He has taken me through paragraphs nos. 6, 8, 9, 39, 40, 44, 49, and 58, as well as paragraphs 15 and 20 of the co-judge's divergent opinion. He further canvassed that in the said judgments, the two Judges have given their distinct opinions, and the said matter was placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for further consideration, and the final verdict is still pending. Therefore, he submitted that the impugned order be stayed till the decision by the appropriate bench.

5. On the other hand, the learned Advocate Shri Choure, for the Respondent no. 2 / Victim, strenuously opposed the Revision Application contending that the offence is registered under the POCSO, Act, as such publication of the news article by disclosing the identity of the victim lowers her reputation or infringes upon her privacy is prohibited under Section 23 of the POCSO, Act, and contrary to the mandate in the Section 23 of the POCSO, Act. Publication of the news article, prima facie, indicates that the offence is made out by the Applicant. The Applicant did not obtain any permission from the competent Court to publish the news article and, therefore, he submitted that the prima facie offence is made out under Section 23 of the POCSO Act, as well as 228(A), 500, 501 of the IPC and the learned Additional Sessions Judge has rightly considered the same and passed the impugned order. Therefore, no interference is warranted. He further submitted that, as per Section 155 of the Cr.P.C., the offence is cognizable. Therefore, he urged the dismissal of the Application.

6. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Sangita W/o. Yeshwant Tanpure Versus The State of Maharashtra and others, in Criminal Public Interest Litigation No. 1 of 2016, and pointed out paragraphs no. 6, 8 and 9 and submitted that in view of the law laid down by this Court, the victim's identity shall be concealed in the proceedings also. By disclosing the victim's identity in news items, the offence is prima facie made out; as such, no interference is required.

7. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harbhajan Singh and Another Versus State of Punjab and Another, reported in 2009 AIR SCW 5428, and submitted that if the correctness of a portion of the judgment is doubted by another case dealing with the said proposition and has been referred to a larger bench, the same would not mean that the Court should wait for the decision of the larger bench, particularly when the same, instead of assisting the appellants, runs counter to their contention.

8. The learned APP adopted the argument of the learned Advocate for Respondent No. 2; however, he advanced a further argument that publishing the victim child's identity in the newspaper is a gross violation of Sections 23 of the POCSO Act and 228(A) of the IPC. The incident occurred between 2012 and 2018. The victim was a minor in 2012 when the incident began. Therefore, the case was duly registered under the POCSO Act. As such, he urged that the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is just and proper, that no interference is warranted, and urged the dismissal of the Application.

9. Having heard the rival contentions of the parties at length and gone through the record, at the outset, it appears that the Applicant has moved an Application for discharge from the offences punishable under Sections 228(A), 500, 501 of the IPC, and 23 of the POCSO Act, before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the settled trite law on the point of discharge of the accused.

10. It is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering an application for discharge in State of Gujarat v/s Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023)17 SCC 688, held that :

                   “The Court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged.

                   However, if the accused is able to demonstrate from the charge-sheet material at the stage of framing the charge, which might drastically affect the very sustainability of the case, such material should be considered and not ignored by the Court while deciding the application for discharge.

                   At the time of framing of the charges and taking cognizance, the accused has no right to produce external material and call upon the Court to examine the same.

                   The main intention of granting a chance to the accused to make submissions as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. is to assist the Court to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial.”

11. Apart from that, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a catena of judgments, has held that the power and jurisdiction of the higher Court under Section 397 of the Cr. P. C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior Court, is for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceedings or order made in the case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect, or an error of jurisdiction or law, or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. The revisional jurisdiction of the higher courts is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not, ex facie, lead to injustice, as held in State Represented by Inspector of Police, CBI, ACB, Visakhapatnam Versus Eluri Srinivasa Chakravarthi and Others, reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 633.

12. In view of the rival submissions and facts, the following questions arise for consideration:

                   i. Whether the Applicant is entitled to seek discharge from the proceeding ?

                   ii. Whether the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is just and proper ?

13. While dealing with these points, it would be appropriate to reproduce Section 23 of the POCSO Act and Section 228 (A) of the IPC, as under:

                   “Section 23 of the POCSO ACT - Procedure for media.-

                   (1) No person shall make any report or present comments on any child from any form of media or studio or photographic facilities without having complete and authentic information, which may have the effect of lowering his reputation or infringing upon his privacy.

                   (2) No reports in any media shall disclose, the identity of a child including his name, address, photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood or any other particulars which may lead to disclosure of identity of the child:

                   Provided that, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Special Court, competent to try the case under the Act, may permit such disclosure, if in its opinion such disclosure is in the interest of the child.

                   (3) The publisher or owner of the media or studio or photographic facilities shall be jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions of his employee.

                   (4) Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment of either description for a period which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to one year or with fine or with both.

                   Section 228 (A) - Disclosure of identity of the victim of certain offences, etc.

                   (1) Whoever prints or publishes the name or any matter which may make known the identity of any person against whom an [offence under section 376, [section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB] or section 376E] is alleged or found to have been committed shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine.

                   (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) extends to any printing or publication of the name or any matter which may make known the identity of the victim if such printing or publication

                   (a) by or under the order in writing of the officer-in-charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation into such offence, acting in good faith for the purposes of such investigation; or

                   (b) by, or with the authorisation in writing of, the victim; or

                   (c) where the victim is dead or minor or of unsound mind, by, or with the authorisation in writing of, the next of kin of the victim:

                   Provided that no such authorisation shall be given by the next-of-kin to anybody other than the chairman or the secretary, by whatever name called, of any recognised welfare institution or organisation.”

14. Bare perusal of the above Sections reveals that Section 23 of the POCSO Act and Section 228 (A) of the IPC are pari materia. The entire object of these provisions is to prevent disclosure of the identity of the victim. The identity of the victim should not be discernible from any matter published in the media. In other words, they clearly prohibit the printing or publishing “the name or any matter which may make known the identity of the person.” Section 23 of the POCSO Act deals with non-disclosure of the identity of the child in any media or reports. But Section 228 (A) of the IPC deals with non-disclosure of the identity of the victim by printing or publication under certain circumstances described therein. Similarly, neither the IPC nor the Cr.P.C. defines the phrase ‘identity of the victim’.

15. It is obvious that not only the publication of the name of the victim is prohibited, but also the disclosure of any other matter which may reveal the identity of such a victim is also prohibited. Thus, I am clearly of the view that the phrase “the matter which may reveal the identity of the victim” does not solely mean that only the name of the victim should not be disclosed, but it also means that the identity of the victim should not be discernible from any matter published in the media. The intention of lawmakers was clear that the victims of such offences should not be identifiable, so they would not face any hostile discrimination or harassment in the future.

16. The legislature intends to introduce the POCSO Act to protect children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, pornography, and other crimes. It is necessary for the proper development of a child that his or her right to privacy and confidentiality be protected and respected by every person, by all means, and through all stages of the judicial process involving the child. The interests and well-being of the child are regarded as of paramount importance at every stage to ensure the child’s healthy physical, emotional, intellectual, and social development.

17. Section 2 (d) of the POCSO Act dealt with the definition of a child, “which means any person below the age of 18 years.” Section 23 of the POCSO Act deals with the non-disclosure of the identity of the child, including his name, address, photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood, or any other particulars.

18. In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that on 18.04.2018, the victim/informant lodged the report against Vijay, Nanda and the brother-in-law of Vijay, alleging that from 2012 till 2018, Vijay had committed sexual intercourse with her and, therefore, she was pregnant, and her pregnancy was aborted. Based on said report, offence came to be registered at Beed Rural Police Station, vide Crime No. 128/2018, for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(i), 307, 323, 504 read with 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act. Sections 3 and 4 dealt with penetrative sexual assault and punishment for it, respectively. It is undisputed that, after completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet has been filed; however, Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act still remain in force, as a part of the charge-sheet. None of the accused persons has challenged the same for quashing Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, those sections remain as they are in the FIR.

19. Subsequently, on 26.04.2018, the news item was published in ‘Dainik Parshwabhumi’, wherein the editor of the newspaper disclosed the identity of the victim by specifying not only her name but also her address in it. The headline of the news item is that (by registering a false crime, the police defamed the relationship; the lady who lodged the FIR is a liar). The Applicant also did not dispute that he had published the victim's name and address in the newspaper. The only contention of the Applicant is that at the time of publication of the name of the victim, she was not a child; she was a major. Alternatively, it is contended that he has no intention to defame the child as she was a major at the time of publication of the news article and, therefore, no ingredients of Section 23 of the POCSO Act are attracted in the present crime.

20. Learned Advocate for the Applicant has also argued that the victim is educated and there is a delay of more than seven months to lodge the report. No explanation was given by the victim for the delay in lodging the FIR; therefore, he urged that the Applicant be discharged from the present offence under Section 23 of the POCSO Act. Similarly, he has urged that at the time of publication of the news item, the victim was a major and, therefore, it cannot be said that due to the publication of the news article, the identity of the child was disclosed, and the intention of the Applicant was to defame the child.

21. Before pondering on the above questions, I would like to reproduce the directions given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nipun Saxena and another Versus Union of India and Others, reported 2018 Supreme Court (SC) 1238, which are as under :

                   “1. No person can print or publish in print, electronic, social media, etc., the name of the victim or even, in a remote manner, disclose any facts which can lead to the victim being identified and which should make her identity known to the public at large.

                   2. In cases where the victim is dead or of unsound mind, the name of the victim or her identity should not be disclosed even under the authorization of the next of the kin, unless circumstances justifying the disclosure of her identity exist, which shall be decided by the competent authority, which at present is the Sessions Judge.

                   3. FIRs relating to offences under Sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB, or 376E of IPC and offences under POCSO shall not be put in the public domain.

                   4. In case a victim files an appeal under Section 372 CrPC, it is not necessary for the victim to disclose his/her identity, and the appeal shall be dealt with in the manner laid down by law.

                   5. The police officials should keep all the documents in which the name of the victim is disclosed, as far as possible, in a sealed cover and replace these documents by identical documents in which the name of the victim is removed in all records which may be scrutinised in the public domain.

                   6. All the authorities to which the name of the victim is disclosed by the investigating agency or the court are also duty-bound to keep the name and identity of the victim secret and not disclose it in any manner except in the report, which should only be sent in a sealed cover to the investigating agency or the court.

                   7. An application by the next of kin to authorise disclosure of identity of a dead victim or of a victim of unsound mind under Section 228(A)(c) of IPC should be made only to the Sessions Judge concerned until the Government acts under Section 228A(1)(c) and lays down a criteria as per our directions for identifying such social welfare institutions or organisations.

                   8. In case of minor victims under POCSO, disclosure of their identity can only be permitted by the Special Court, if such disclosure is in the interest of the child.

                   9. All the States/Union Territories are requested to set up at least one ‘one stop centre’ in every district within one year from today.”

22. Bare perusal of the above directions reveals that no person can print or publish in print, electronic, social media, etc., the name of the victim or even, in a remote manner, disclose any facts which can lead to the victim being identified, which should make her identity known to the public at large. As per direction no. 3, FIRs relating to offences under Section 376 of the IPC and offences under POCSO should not be put in the public domain.

23. Undisputedly, in the case at hand, the offence has been registered under Section 376 of the IPC as well as Section 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act. As per the mandate in Nipun Saxena (supra), it was incumbent on the Applicant not to disclose her identity in the public domain, as the said FIR was in force until the publication of the news item. Therefore, I am not in agreement with the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate for the Applicant, who claimed that the victim was a major at the time of publication; it cannot be said that she was defamed as a child. On the contrary, it seems that the ingredients of Section 23 of the POCSO Act are indeed attracted.

24. Although the Sections are so clear and unambiguous, and the consequences of their breach are inescapable, and the question whether the disclosure was intended, bona fide, or made without knowledge of the law has no relevance; ignorance of the law is not an excuse. Hence, the provision of Section 23 of the POCSO Act and Section 228 (A) of the IPC, prohibiting the disclosure of the victim’s name by an accused, prima facie, is absolute and cannot be diluted. For example, if assuming that an offence has been committed on the child who was 17 years and 364 days old, and on very next day, she attained the age of majority and after attaining the age of majority, if the offence was registered and news item is published, in that case, whether, it would be appropriate to say that at the time of publication of the news item by the publisher has no intention to disclose the identity of the child victim or defame the child and, therefore, the provisions of the POCSO, Act, would not attract. Then, in such circumstances, the very object of the POCSO Act would be frustrated. Therefore, in my view, the intention or knowledge of the accused is immaterial when the offence was registered under the POCSO Act itself. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in direction no. 2 categorically mandated that in cases where the victim is dead or of unsound mind, the name of the victim or her identity should not be disclosed even under the authorization of the next of the kin, unless circumstances justifying the disclosure of her identity exist, which the competent authority shall decide. In case of a dead victim, it would not be proper to disclose her identity as they have their own dignity. Similarly, in the case at hand, though at the time of publication of the news item, the victim was a major, it does not mean that she was not a child when the offence occurred.

25. It is pertinent to note that in the FIR dated 18.04.2018, the victim categorically stated that from 2012 to 2018, the accused therein forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her repeatedly, which means the incident had begun when she was a minor/child. Therefore, I also do not find merit in the argument advanced by the learned Advocate for the Applicant that at the time of publication of the news item, the victim was a major and, therefore, it cannot be said that the victim was a child/minor. Prima facie, it appears that her identity was disclosed in contravention of the mandate set out in Section 23 of the POCSO Act. On the other hand, the intention of the lawmakers was that the victims of such offences should not be identifiable, so they would not face any hostility or harassment in the future.

26. Apart from that as per mandate in Section 23 of the POCSO, Act, as well as 228(A) of the IPC, it clearly laid down that no report in any media shall disclose the identity of a child including his name, address, photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood, or any other particulars which may lead to disclosure of identity of the child. This clearly shows that the intention of the legislature was that the identity of the child should not be disclosed, directly or indirectly. Similarly, the legislature's intention is that a child's privacy and reputation are not to be harmed. Ergo, information that could reveal a child's identity cannot be disclosed by the media. The media has to be circumspect. A duty is cast upon the media to ensure it publishes no information that directly or indirectly reveals the identity of a child.

27. No doubt, it is the duty of the media to report the crime that is committed. The media can publish it without disclosing the name and identity of the victim in cases of rape and sexual offences against children. Reports of such cases should be handled sensitively, keeping in mind the trauma of the victim, whether an adult or a child. Thus, in my view, the media is not only bound not to disclose the identity of the child but, by law, is also mandated not to disclose any material that could lead to the disclosure of the identity of the child. In violation of this will attract an offence under Section 23 of the POCSO Act.

28. In light of the fact that the FIR was registered under Sections 376(2)(i), 307, 323, 504 read with 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act, in such circumstances, it was incumbent on the publisher not to disclose the identity of the victim, whether she is a minor, major or dead. The age of the victim at the time of publication of the news item or registration of the offence is immaterial. Still, the registration of the offence under the POCSO Act is itself a matter of paramount importance. While determining the question in the case at hand, it is undisputed that the offence has been registered under Sections 376(2)(i), 307, 323, 504 read with 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act, and the charge-sheet was also filed pursuant to the same in the Court. As such, prima facie, publication of the name or disclosure of the identity of the victim is certainly in contravention of the provisions of Section 23 of the POCSO Act and 228 (A) of the IPC. Therefore, I do not find substance in the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate for the Applicant, in that regard that the Applicant did not have the intention to defame the child as she was a major at the time of publication of the news article.

29. In the case of Gangadhar (supra), the question that arose was whether Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C. applies to the investigation of an offence under Section 23 of the POCSO Act?, and whether the offence is cognizable or non-cognizable offence, and if it is the non-cognizable the police could have investigated the offence without obtaining an order of the Magistrate and, accused therein, has moved application for discharge. However, the same was rejected by the trial Court and confirmed by the higher Court. Before the Hon’ble Supreme Court the two judges bench have recorded the dissenting findings i.e. one Judge (Ms. Banerjee Indira, J. then she was Judge of the Hon’ble Supreme Court) confirmed the order passed by the High Court and dismissed the Criminal Appeal, however, the another judge (Mr. Justice J. K. Maheshwari, J.) disagreed with the opinion expressed by the then Judge Ms. Banerjee Indira, J. and recorded the separate findings that the offence under Section 23 of the POCSO Act, is non cognizable and Special Court is required to look into the procedure followed in the investigation. The said issue was referred to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for the assignment before an appropriate bench. The facts in the said case are distinguished from the case at hand. Here, the Applicant has not raised the grounds that the offence under Section 23 of the POCSO Act is cognizable or non-cognizable. Still, his contention was only that at the time of publication of the news item, the victim was a major and, therefore, it cannot be termed as having the intention to defame the child; therefore, the findings recorded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment are hardly of any assistance in support of his contention.

30. In Sanjay Upadhya (supra), the question was raised before the Court that the article published by the accused therein was with intention to defame the complainant or not, to attract the ingredients of Section 500 of the IPC, wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the news article was published in good faith and in exercise of the Fundamental Right of Freedom of Speech and Expression enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. However, in the case at hand, there is a categorical bar under Section 23 of the POCSO Act, as well as Section 228(A) of the IPC, when the offence has been registered under Section 376 of the IPC and provisions of the POCSO Act. Therefore, in my view, the law laid down in the said judgment is hardly of any assistance to the Applicant in support of his case.

31. Perused the impugned order, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, after considering the material on record, has categorically observed that :

                   “On perusal of news article published in Daily newspaper Parshwabhumi on 26.04.2018 ( Newspaper is produced on record), it transpires that the title of the news is “By registering false crime police defend the relationship, the lady who lodged the FIR is lier”. The applicant/accused No.2 has given verdict in the news article that the FIR lodged by present informant is false and concocted. It is pertinent to note here that in the news article accused No.2 has not only disclosed the name and address of the informant but has given summary of the allegations made by her in her FIR dated 7th April, 2018.

                   It is evident from the FIR that the informant has made an allegation that she was subjected to sexual harassment by the accused therein since the year 2012. Undoubtedly, the informant was a minor at the relevant time, and therefore, it cannot be said that the FIR lodged by the informant does not come within the purview of the provisions of the POCSO Act. Age of the informant at the time of commission of offence must be taken into consideration and not the age when FIR was lodged.”

32. It is further observed that “Under sub-Section 2 of Section 23 of the POCSO Act, it is laid down that ‘no reports in any media shall disclose the identity of a child, including her name and address’. If it is disclosed, then under Sub-Section 3 of Section 23 of the POCSO Act, the publisher or owner of the media, studio or photographic facilities is held jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions of their employee. The offence of breach of the mandate under Section 23 of the POCSO Act, the intention or motive of the accused is of no importance. Hence, held that the offence is prima facie made out; therefore, he rejected the application for discharge. Prima facie, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order to interfere with it in revisional jurisdiction.

33. In the wake of the above discussion, in my view, the Applicant, prima facie, failed to make out the case for seeking his discharge from Section 23 of the POCSO Act, and Section 228(A), 500, 501 of the IPC. On the contrary, prima facie, it appears that in the FIR Crime No. 128/2018, the offence has been registered against the accused persons therein under Section 376(2)(i) of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act.

34. Therefore, the publication of the news item by disclosing the name, address and identity of the victim is prima facie in contravention of Section 23 of the POCSO Act, and Section 228(A) of the IPC. The age of the victim at the time of publication of the news article is immaterial. As such, I answer question no. 1 in the negative and question no. 2 in the affirmative.

35. As a result, the Revision Application, being bereft of merits, stands dismissed.