Oral Judgment:

Hiten S. Venegavkar, J.

1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. With the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties, the Petition is taken up for final disposal.

2. The present Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India raises a challenge to the decision of the Tender Evaluation Committee declaring the technical bid of the Petitioner as non-responsive in relation to the tender issued by the Public Works Department for the work of construction of approaches to Bagwada Bridge at Morle in Poriem Constituency, Sattari Taluka. Consequentially, the Petitioner seeks to question the decision of the Authorities in proceeding further with the financial bid, accepting the bid of Respondent No.4 as the successful bidder and awarding the work in its favour. The challenge is founded essentially on the interpretation sought to be placed by the Petitioner upon the corrigendum dated 16 October 2025 and the Circular dated 13 October 2025 introduced during the tender process. According to the Petitioner, the Authorities have adopted an erroneous interpretation of the said conditions resulting in wrongful rejection of his technical bid despite the Petitioner allegedly satisfying the substantive requirements of the tender. The Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Petitioner failed to comply with an essential eligibility condition forming part of the tender document and was therefore rightly declared technically non-responsive. The controversy, therefore, lies in determining whether the rejection of the Petitioner's technical bid suffers from arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides or procedural impropriety so as to warrant interference in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.

3. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would be appropriate to notice the relevant facts which have culminated in the filing of the present petition.

The case of the Petitioner is that he is a registered Class IA contractor carrying on contractual work in the State of Goa for more than three decades and has executed several public works entrusted by the Public Works Department. According to the Petitioner, during the course of his business, he has successfully completed numerous infrastructure projects involving substantial financial value and possesses all the requisite technical qualifications and experience prescribed by the Public Works Department. In support of such assertion, reliance has been placed upon various work completion certificates issued by different Executive Engineers of the Public Works Department certifying satisfactory execution of works entrusted to him. The Petitioner asserts that his experience and technical competence have never been doubted by the authorities and that he has throughout maintained a valid contractor's registration and other statutory compliances required for participation in Government tenders.

It is further the case of the Petitioner that Respondent No.3 issued an e-tender notice dated 6 October 2025 inviting online bids for the work of "Construction of approaches to Bagwada Bridge at Morle in V.P. Morle in Poriem Constituency in Sattari Taluka" at an estimated cost of approximately Rs.3.21 crores. The Petitioner states that being fully eligible and interested in executing the said work, he submitted his online bid on 11 October 2025 within the prescribed time together with all documents then required under the tender conditions. According to him, at the time of submission of the bid, no issue existed regarding the requirement of any affidavit relating to the hot mix plant nor was the Bill of Quantities then available so as to enable the bidders to ascertain the exact value of the bituminous work comprised in the tender.

The Petitioner states that after submission of his bid, Respondent No.3 issued a corrigendum dated 14 October 2025 whereby certain portions of the original tender notice were postponed due to administrative reasons while all other terms and conditions were continued without alteration. Thereafter, on 16 October 2025 another corrigendum came to be issued whereby the Authorities made applicable to the present tender the Circular dated 13 October 2025 issued by the Public Works Department prescribing special conditions relating to hot mix items. According to the Petitioner, these conditions were introduced after submission of his bid and, therefore, required careful interpretation in the context of the nature of work covered under the present tender.

The Petitioner contends that the Circular dated 13 October 2025 prescribed certain special conditions governing execution of hot mix works. The first condition required mandatory use of a Batch Type Hot Mix Plant of a specified capacity only in respect of road works where the value of the hot mix items exceeded Rupees One Crore. The second condition specifically provided that where the value of the work relating to hot mix items was below Rupees One Crore, a Drum Type Hot Mix Plant of lower capacity could be utilised. The Petitioner contends that these two clauses are mutually exclusive and operate in entirely different fields depending upon the value of the hot mix component of the work. According to him, the fifth condition requiring submission of an affidavit regarding ownership, possession, lease or hiring of a Batch Type Hot Mix Plant necessarily derives its operation from the first condition and cannot be read independently. In other words, according to the Petitioner, unless Clause 1 itself became applicable, Clause 5 requiring an affidavit on stamp paper never came into operation.

It is the specific case of the Petitioner that after the Bill of Quantities was uploaded, it became apparent that only Item Nos.20 and 22 related to Dense Graded Bituminous Macadam work and that the aggregate value of such items was approximately Rs.66,94,996/-, which admittedly was below the monetary threshold of Rupees One Crore contemplated under the Circular. According to the Petitioner, once the value of the hot mix items was below the prescribed limit, the mandatory requirement of possessing a Batch Type Hot Mix Plant of 100-120 TPH and the corresponding requirement of filing the affidavit contemplated under Clause 5 became wholly inapplicable to the present tender. It is, therefore, contended that the Authorities committed a manifest error in reading Clause 5 independently of Clause 1 and treating the affidavit as an essential requirement notwithstanding the fact that the work itself did not satisfy the threshold contemplated under the Circular.

4. The case of the Petitioner, as unfolded in the pleadings and elaborated during the course of arguments by the learned Counsel appearing on his behalf, is that the decision of the Tender Evaluation Committee in rejecting the technical bid is founded upon an erroneous understanding of the tender conditions and the corrigenda issued during the tender process. According to the Petitioner, the rejection is not attributable to any deficiency in his technical capability, financial eligibility or previous experience, but solely on account of an incorrect interpretation of the Circular dated 13 October 2025 introduced through the Corrigendum dated 16 October 2025. It is submitted that once the Authorities proceeded on a fundamentally incorrect construction of the tender conditions, the entire decision-making process stood vitiated and consequently all subsequent actions including opening of the financial bid of Respondent No.4 and acceptance of its offer are liable to be set aside.

5. Learned Counsel submitted that the Petitioner is a Class IA contractor having more than three decades of experience in execution of public infrastructure works under the Public Works Department. It was urged that the Petitioner has successfully executed several works of considerable magnitude and has consistently fulfilled contractual obligations entrusted by different divisions of the Public Works Department. Various work completion certificates placed on record, according to the petitioner, sufficiently establish not only his technical competence but also the confidence reposed in him by the Government Authorities over a prolonged period. It was therefore contended that rejection of the Petitioner's technical bid on what is described as a purely technical objection has resulted in exclusion of an otherwise fully competent contractor from the zone of consideration.

6. Learned Counsel invited our attention to the sequence of events commencing with issuance of the tender notice dated 6 October 2025. It was submitted that the Petitioner submitted his bid online on 11 October 2025 strictly in accordance with the tender conditions prevailing on that date. According to the petitioner, no controversy regarding the affidavit relating to the hot mix plant existed when the bid was submitted. It was only thereafter that Respondent No.3 issued the Corrigendum dated 14 October 2025 postponing certain portions of the tender notice and subsequently issued another Corrigendum dated 16 October 2025 making applicable the Circular dated 13 October 2025 prescribing special conditions relating to hot mix items. Learned Counsel submitted that these additional conditions necessarily required harmonious construction with the original tender document and could not be read in isolation or divorced from the context in which they were introduced.

7. Developing the submission further, learned Counsel contended that the Circular dated 13 October 2025 creates two separate classes of works depending upon the value of the hot mix component. It was argued that the first clause mandates use of a Batch Type Hot Mix Plant of capacity not lower than 100–120 TPH only in respect of road works where the value of the hot mix items exceeds Rupees One Crore. The second clause expressly provides that where the value of such work is below Rupees One Crore, a Drum Type Hot Mix Plant of 40–60 TPH may be used. According to the petitioner, the language employed by the Circular unmistakably demonstrates that the applicability of the subsequent conditions must necessarily depend upon the threshold prescribed under Clause 1 and cannot be mechanically extended to every tender irrespective of the value of the hot mix work involved.

8. Learned Counsel submitted that after the Bill of Quantities became available, it was evident that only Item Nos.20 and 22 pertained to Dense Graded Bituminous Macadam and allied hot mix work. On a plain reading of the Bill of Quantities, according to him, the cumulative value of these items worked out to approximately Rs.66,94,996/-, which was substantially below the threshold of Rupees One Crore contemplated under the Circular. It was therefore argued that the mandatory requirement of using a Batch Type Hot Mix Plant never became applicable to the present tender. Once Clause 1 itself stood excluded by virtue of the value of the work, the petitioner submits that Clause 5 requiring an affidavit regarding ownership, possession, lease or hiring of such Batch Type Hot Mix Plant automatically ceased to have any application.

9. Learned Counsel submitted that the Authorities committed a manifest error by reading Clause 5 independently of Clause 1. According to him, Clause 5 is merely consequential in nature and presupposes applicability of Clause 1. It was urged that no condition contained in a tender document can be interpreted in isolation while ignoring the context and object of the entire stipulation. The Petitioner therefore contends that the affidavit contemplated under Clause 5 was intended only in those cases where a bidder was required to possess or utilise a Batch Type Hot Mix Plant by virtue of Clause 1. Since the present work admittedly involved hot mix items valued below Rupees One Crore, insistence upon such affidavit amounted to introducing an obligation which the Circular itself never contemplated.

10. Learned Counsel thereafter submitted that notwithstanding the above legal position, the Petitioner had, in fact, furnished a communication dated 2 March 2023 issued by Shantadurga Metal Industry indicating availability of the requisite plant. According to him, the said communication substantially established that the Petitioner possessed access to the necessary machinery required for execution of the work. It was argued that the purpose underlying Clause 5 stood fully satisfied by production of this document and therefore rejection of the bid merely because the document was not in the form of an affidavit on stamp paper amounted to elevating form over substance.

11. It was submitted that tender conditions must always be construed keeping in view their underlying object. Learned Counsel contended that the purpose of requiring disclosure regarding availability of the hot mix plant is only to satisfy the employer that the successful contractor possesses the necessary infrastructure for timely execution of the work. According to him, that object stood fully achieved by the documents already placed on record by the Petitioner and therefore insistence upon a notarised affidavit, when the substantive requirement itself stood satisfied, amounted to adopting an unduly technical approach inconsistent with the larger public interest.

12. Learned Counsel further submitted that the Petitioner has throughout expressed his willingness to furnish the affidavit in the precise format contemplated by the Circular. He invited our attention to the affidavit annexed to the Writ Petition and submitted that even assuming there was any procedural deficiency at the stage of submission of the technical bid, the same was capable of being rectified without causing prejudice either to the respondents or to any competing bidder. According to him, rejection of the Petitioner's bid without affording any opportunity to cure such alleged defect is arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to the principles governing fair administrative action.

13. Elaborating this submission, learned Counsel urged that no prejudice whatsoever would have been caused if the Petitioner had been permitted to submit the affidavit after clarification by the Tender Committee. It was submitted that the Petitioner never lacked the infrastructure or technical capability required under the tender conditions. The alleged deficiency was only in the form in which the information regarding availability of the plant had been disclosed. According to the Petitioner, the Respondents ought to have adopted a pragmatic approach particularly when the Petitioner possessed all substantive qualifications required for execution of the work.

14. Learned Counsel then contended that the Authorities themselves have not uniformly applied Clause 5 while evaluating the bids. It was argued that the affidavit submitted by Respondent no.4 also does not strictly satisfy the requirement of the Circular. According to him, the affidavit relied upon by the successful bidder is not an affidavit of Respondent No.4 but is an affidavit allegedly executed by a third party. It was therefore submitted that if such document has been accepted as sufficient compliance in the case of Respondent No.4, there was no justification for rejecting the Petitioner's technical bid when he had produced documentary material indicating availability of the requisite plant. The Petitioner contends that different standards have been applied to similarly situated bidders resulting in hostile discrimination.

15. Learned Counsel urged that the Respondents cannot adopt one standard while examining the documents submitted by the successful bidder and another while scrutinising the Petitioner's bid. According to him, equality in public procurement demands uniform application of eligibility conditions to all participating bidders. If the respondents were prepared to treat the document submitted by respondent no.4 as substantial compliance with Clause 5, fairness required that the Petitioner's communication dated 2 March 2023 should also have been accepted as adequate compliance.

16. Learned Counsel thereafter drew our attention to the financial implications arising from rejection of the Petitioner's bid. It was submitted that the Petitioner had quoted an amount substantially lower than the financial bid accepted by the Respondents. According to him, the difference between the Petitioner's quotation and the accepted bid is approximately Rs.85 lakhs. It was urged that public procurement is intended to secure maximum value for public funds and therefore exclusion of the Petitioner from the financial bidding process has resulted in avoidable financial burden upon the State exchequer. Learned Counsel submitted that had the Petitioner's financial bid been opened, the Government would have been in a position to award the work at a considerably lower cost, thereby effecting substantial savings of public money.

17. Learned Counsel submitted that the concept of public interest cannot be divorced from prudent utilisation of public funds. According to him, where the lowest bidder has been excluded on account of a curable procedural defect, constitutional courts ought to lean in favour of advancing public interest rather than perpetuating a technical irregularity. It was urged that insistence upon rigid technical compliance, despite the Petitioner satisfying all substantive requirements, has defeated the very purpose underlying competitive public procurement.

18. Learned Counsel further submitted that no pre-bid meeting was conducted in respect of the present tender. According to him, had such meeting been convened, the Petitioner would have sought clarification regarding the applicability of the Circular dated 13 October 2025 and the requirement of filing the affidavit contemplated under Clause 5. It was urged that the absence of any pre-bid clarification deprived the Petitioner of an opportunity to raise legitimate doubts regarding interpretation of the newly introduced conditions. According to the Petitioner, he could not have challenged the condition earlier because the ambiguity became apparent only after his technical bid was rejected.

19. Learned Counsel submitted that immediately upon learning from the minutes of the Tender Committee dated 29 October 2025 that the Petitioner's technical bid had been rejected, he approached this Court without undue delay. It was contended that the Petitioner has throughout acted bona fide and has never sought to delay or obstruct the tender process. The present petition, according to him, seeks only a declaration that the Petitioner's technical bid ought to have been treated as responsive and his financial bid ought to have been considered along with other eligible bidders.

20. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned Counsel placed considerable reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Poddar Steel Corporation v. Ganesh Engineering Works and Others((1991) 3 SCC 273), particularly paragraph 6 thereof. It was contended that the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised the distinction between essential conditions of eligibility and conditions which are merely ancillary or procedural in nature. According to the Petitioner, where the object of the condition stands substantially fulfilled and the deviation does not affect fairness of competition or confer any undue advantage upon the bidder, rejection of the bid would be wholly unjustified. Learned Counsel submitted that the requirement of filing an affidavit in the present case was procedural in character and therefore substantial compliance ought to have been accepted.

21. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.334 of 2011, particularly paragraphs 19 to 22 and 28 to 29. Learned Counsel submitted that this Court has consistently held that procedural prescriptions in tender conditions should not be interpreted in a manner that defeats genuine competition or results in exclusion of otherwise qualified bidders where the essential object of the tender stands fulfilled. According to him, the principles enunciated therein fully support the Petitioner's contention that his technical bid ought not to have been rejected for want of an affidavit on stamp paper when the requisite infrastructure was otherwise available and disclosed.

22. On the aforesaid premises, learned Counsel submitted that the rejection of the Petitioner's technical bid deserves to be quashed and set aside; the Respondents be directed to treat the Petitioner's bid as technically responsive; the financial bid submitted by the Petitioner be opened and considered; and all consequential actions taken pursuant to the acceptance of Respondent no.4's bid be suitably annulled in accordance with law.

23. The case of Respondent nos.1 to 3, as emerging from the affidavit-in-reply and the submissions advanced by the learned Advocate General and the learned Government Advocate appearing on their behalf, is that the writ petition proceeds on a complete misconception of the tender conditions and seeks to invite this Court to undertake an exercise which is impermissible in the limited jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is submitted that the challenge is not founded upon any allegation of mala fides, favouritism, bias, corruption or procedural impropriety in the decision-making process. The petition is essentially an attempt by an unsuccessful bidder to persuade the Court to substitute its own interpretation of the tender conditions in place of the interpretation adopted by the Tender Evaluation Committee. According to the Respondents, such an exercise lies wholly outside the permissible limits of judicial review governing contractual matters.

24. Learned Advocate General submitted that the tender in question was an e-tender governed entirely by the terms and conditions incorporated in the tender document together with the corrigenda issued from time to time. Every intending bidder, including the Petitioner, voluntarily participated in the tender process after accepting all the terms and conditions without raising any objection either to the original tender conditions or to the corrigenda issued thereafter. It is therefore submitted that once the Petitioner consciously elected to participate in the tender process without questioning any of the conditions, it is not open for him, after suffering rejection at the technical stage, to contend that one of the eligibility conditions ought to receive a different interpretation.

25. It is submitted that the tender conditions constituted the governing charter of rights and obligations of all participating bidders. The Respondents contend that certainty, uniformity and equal treatment amongst all participants constitute the foundation of every public procurement process. Any relaxation granted to one bidder after opening of the technical bids would necessarily prejudice every other bidder who had understood and complied with the conditions in the manner intended by the employer. According to the Respondents, judicial interference at the instance of an unsuccessful bidder cannot be permitted to disturb the level playing field which the tender conditions sought to maintain.

26. Learned Advocate General submitted that the Circular dated 13 October 2025 and the Corrigendum dated 16 October 2025 formed an integral part of the tender document and became binding upon every bidder. According to the Respondents, the Petitioner cannot seek to dissect individual clauses of the Circular in isolation while ignoring the intention of the authority issuing the same. It was submitted that the Circular was introduced with the object of ensuring quality control in execution of bituminous works and simultaneously requiring every participating contractor to disclose, through an affidavit, the source and availability of the hot mix plant proposed to be utilised during execution of the work. The affidavit requirement, according to the Respondents, was not an empty formality but constituted an essential component of technical evaluation intended to establish the bidder's readiness and capability to execute the work in accordance with departmental standards.

27. Learned Advocate General submitted that the interpretation sought to be placed by the Petitioner upon Clause 5 is wholly artificial and contrary to the language employed in the Circular. According to the Respondents, once the corrigendum expressly incorporated the Circular into the tender conditions, every bidder was obliged to comply with the documentary requirements stipulated therein. The Tender Evaluation Committee uniformly applied the said requirement while scrutinising all technical bids. It is therefore submitted that the Petitioner cannot seek to rewrite the eligibility conditions by contending that one clause should be treated as inoperative merely because, in his opinion, another clause does not apply.

28. The Respondents further submitted that the Tender Evaluation Committee was not expected to undertake an exercise of inferential reasoning or presume compliance on the basis of documents which the bidder himself had chosen not to submit in the prescribed manner. Public tenders involving substantial public expenditure require objective evaluation based upon documentary compliance existing on the date fixed for submission of bids. According to the Respondents, permitting bidders to explain, supplement or substitute essential documents after opening of the technical bids would introduce uncertainty, subjectivity and avoidable disputes into the tender process and would seriously compromise the integrity of competitive public procurement.

29. Learned Advocate General submitted that the communication dated 2 March 2023 relied upon by the Petitioner could never be treated as a substitute for the affidavit specifically contemplated under the Circular. The two documents, according to the Respondents, operate in entirely different fields. While the communication relied upon by the Petitioner merely indicates certain factual aspects regarding availability of a plant, the affidavit contemplated under the Circular requires the bidder himself to make a solemn declaration on oath regarding ownership, possession, lease, hiring or legal entitlement, the exact location of the plant, its capacity, its availability throughout the execution period and the obligation to intimate any subsequent change to the Executive Engineer. Such declaration, it is submitted, carries legal consequences and creates accountability which an ordinary communication issued by a third party can never achieve.

30. Learned Advocate General further submitted that the Petitioner seeks to convert a mandatory eligibility requirement into a curable procedural irregularity. According to the Respondents, the distinction sought to be drawn by the Petitioner between substantive eligibility and documentary compliance is misconceived in the facts of the present case. The authority issuing the tender consciously required the affidavit to accompany the bid itself so that every bidder could be evaluated on identical parameters at the stage of technical scrutiny. Once the prescribed document was absent on the last date fixed for submission of bids, the bid necessarily became non-responsive and the Tender Evaluation Committee had no discretion to overlook such deficiency.

31. It was emphatically submitted that acceptance of the Petitioner's contention would amount to permitting modification of the technical bid after its opening. Such a course, according to the Respondents, would be fundamentally inconsistent with the principles governing public tenders. If one bidder is permitted to furnish an essential document after opening of the bids, every unsuccessful bidder would claim a similar indulgence, thereby rendering the last date for submission of bids entirely meaningless. The Respondents submit that fairness in public procurement lies not in granting repeated opportunities to individual bidders but in ensuring equal enforcement of the prescribed conditions against all participants.

32. Learned Advocate General also disputed the Petitioner's submission regarding the alleged saving of approximately Rs.85 lakhs. It was argued that public interest in tender matters cannot be measured merely by comparison of financial quotations. Public interest encompasses transparency, certainty, equality amongst bidders, adherence to prescribed standards, timely execution of public works and preservation of institutional integrity. A technically non-responsive bidder, according to the Respondents, cannot rely upon the amount quoted in his unopened financial bid to contend that public interest requires relaxation of mandatory eligibility conditions.

33. Learned Advocate General submitted that the Petitioner proceeds on an erroneous assumption that the State is under an obligation to maximise financial savings irrespective of compliance with technical eligibility conditions. The tender process, according to the Respondents, follows a sequential methodology whereby only those bidders who satisfy every prescribed technical requirement become entitled to participate in financial evaluation. A bidder whose technical bid has been validly rejected acquires no vested or enforceable right to insist that his financial bid be opened merely because his quoted amount may be lower than that of the successful bidder.

34. The Respondents further submitted that the contention regarding absence of a pre-bid meeting is wholly irrelevant. It was argued that no bidder is prevented from seeking clarification during the currency of the tender process if any ambiguity exists regarding interpretation of the conditions. The Petitioner admittedly never addressed any representation, sought any clarification or questioned applicability of the Circular prior to submission of bids or before opening of the technical bids. According to the Respondents, the present interpretation has surfaced only after rejection of the Petitioner's bid and therefore lacks bona fides.

35. Learned Advocate General submitted that significantly the writ petition contains no averment alleging mala fides against any member of the Tender Evaluation Committee. There is no allegation of favouritism, bias, personal animosity, collateral considerations, corruption, fraud or manipulation in the evaluation process. The Petitioner has not questioned the constitution of the Tender Committee, the competence of its members or the fairness of the evaluation undertaken by them. According to the Respondents, the entire challenge rests solely upon a difference of opinion regarding interpretation of the tender condition, which by itself furnishes no ground for judicial interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

36. It was further submitted that the Petitioner has also not pleaded that the tender condition itself is arbitrary, unconstitutional or tailor-made to exclude any particular bidder. On the contrary, the Petitioner accepted the validity of the tender conditions, participated in the process and submitted his bid in accordance therewith. Having taken a calculated commercial decision to participate under the tender conditions, the Petitioner is estopped from contending, after rejection of his bid, that one of the eligibility conditions ought to be interpreted differently so as to accommodate his own non-compliance.

37. Learned Advocate General concluded by submitting that the decision of the Tender Evaluation Committee is based upon objective evaluation of the documents submitted by the bidders, does not suffer from arbitrariness or irrationality and is fully consistent with the tender conditions governing the procurement process. It was therefore urged that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed with costs, leaving the parties to proceed with execution of the public work without further delay.

38. The case of Respondent no.4, the successful bidder, as disclosed from the affidavit-in-reply and the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel appearing on its behalf, is that the writ petition is devoid of any legal merit and is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. According to Respondent no.4, the Petitioner, having consciously participated in the tender process with full knowledge of the terms and conditions governing the tender, cannot, after having been declared technically non-responsive, seek judicial intervention for rewriting the eligibility conditions or for securing a second opportunity to cure a defect which existed on the last date fixed for submission of bids. It is submitted that the challenge proceeds on assumptions which are contrary both to the tender conditions and to the settled principles governing judicial review in contractual matters.

39. Respondent no.4 submitted that Respondent no.4 participated in the tender process strictly in accordance with every requirement prescribed under the tender document together with the corrigenda issued by the Public Works Department. It is submitted that Respondent no.4 submitted all documents considered necessary by the Tender Evaluation Committee within the stipulated period and, upon being found technically responsive, became entitled to participate in the financial bidding process. According to Respondent no.4, the financial bid submitted by it was opened only after completion of technical scrutiny of all participating bidders and after the Petitioner had already been declared technically disqualified. It is therefore contended that Respondent no.4 acquired a valuable right upon being declared the successful bidder, which cannot now be unsettled in the absence of any established illegality affecting the decision-making process.

40. Respondent no.4 submitted that the petition proceeds on the erroneous premise that the Court should independently interpret the tender conditions and substitute its own understanding for that of the employer. According to Respondent no.4, the employer is the author of the tender document and is therefore the best authority to understand the meaning, scope and object of the conditions incorporated therein. Once the Tender Evaluation Committee interpreted the conditions in a particular manner and uniformly applied the same to all bidders, the Court ought not to interfere merely because another interpretation may also appear to be possible.

41. Respondent no.4 submitted that the Petitioner seeks to read Clause 5 of the Circular in isolation and to make its applicability contingent upon Clause 1. According to Respondent no.4, such an interpretation is contrary to the intention of the authority issuing the Circular and contrary to the manner in which every participating bidder understood the tender conditions. It was urged that the Petitioner is not entitled to invite the Court to adopt an interpretation which was never accepted by the employer and which would have the effect of fundamentally altering the eligibility criteria after completion of the tender process.

42. Respondent no.4 strongly disputed the Petitioner's contention that the affidavit submitted by Respondent no.4 was defective or non-compliant. It was submitted that the allegation is factually incorrect and has been made only to create an artificial parity between the Petitioner and Respondent no.4. According to Respondent no.4, the Tender Evaluation Committee, after examining every document submitted by all participating bidders, found Respondent no.4 fully compliant with the eligibility conditions and accordingly declared its technical bid responsive. It is submitted that the Petitioner has neither pleaded nor established any material demonstrating that the evaluation undertaken by the Tender Evaluation Committee was either arbitrary or discriminatory.

43. Respondent no.4 has already altered its position pursuant to acceptance of its bid. The Letter of Acceptance has been issued, the contractual relationship has come into existence and consequential steps have been taken for execution of the work. According to Respondent no.4, interference at this stage would not merely unsettle a concluded tender process but would also adversely affect execution of an important public infrastructure project, leading to escalation of costs, administrative uncertainty and avoidable delay in implementation of the work.

44. Respondent No.4 therefore submitted that the decision of the Tender Evaluation Committee is based upon objective application of the tender conditions, does not suffer from arbitrariness, irrationality or procedural impropriety and has been uniformly applied to all participating bidders. It was accordingly prayed that the writ petition be dismissed.

45. In rejoinder, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner denied the submissions advanced on behalf of the Respondents and reiterated that the entire controversy revolves around the true interpretation of the Circular dated 13 October 2025. It was submitted that the Respondents have proceeded on an interpretation which is not borne out from the plain language of the Circular itself. According to the Petitioner, the Court is not being invited to rewrite the tender conditions but only to give effect to their proper and harmonious construction.

46. Learned Counsel submitted that the Respondents have consistently proceeded on the assumption that Clause 5 constitutes an independent eligibility condition. According to the Petitioner, such assumption ignores the scheme of the Circular, under which the affidavit requirement is merely ancillary to the obligation of using a Batch Type Hot Mix Plant wherever Clause 1 becomes applicable. It was urged that unless Clause 1 is first attracted, there can be no occasion to invoke Clause 5. The Petitioner therefore maintained that rejection of the technical bid proceeds on an erroneous legal premise and consequently stands vitiated.

47. Learned Counsel further submitted that the Respondents have failed to answer the Petitioner's principal contention that the value of the hot mix items under the present tender is admittedly below Rupees One Crore. According to him, once this factual position is accepted, the entire basis for insisting upon compliance with Clause 5 disappears. It was urged that the Respondents have concentrated only upon the absence of the affidavit while completely overlooking the threshold requirement which governs applicability of the Circular itself.

48. Learned Counsel also reiterated that the Respondents have not satisfactorily explained the documents accepted from Respondent no.4. According to the Petitioner, if the authorities have adopted a liberal approach while examining the documents submitted by Respondent no.4, there exists no rational basis for refusing a similar approach in relation to the Petitioner's documents. It was urged that unequal application of the same condition constitutes arbitrariness offending Article 14 of the Constitution.

49. Learned Counsel finally submitted that the petition does not seek any undue indulgence but merely seeks equal treatment in the matter of evaluation of technical bids. It was argued that constitutional courts have consistently held that public authorities are expected to act fairly, reasonably and in furtherance of public interest. According to the Petitioner, if the tender conditions are interpreted correctly, the rejection of the Petitioner's bid cannot be sustained and the consequential acceptance of Respondent no.4's bid necessarily becomes liable to be interfered with.

50. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid rival pleadings and submissions that the questions arising for determination require consideration. The controversy before us does not merely concern interpretation of one clause of the tender document. It also requires examination of the limits of judicial review over decisions taken by expert Tender Evaluation Committees, the extent to which a constitutional court can interfere with the employer's understanding of its own tender conditions, and the legal consequences flowing from participation in a tender process without questioning the conditions governing such participation.

51. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having carefully examined the pleadings, the documents placed on record, the original tender conditions, the corrigenda issued during the tender process and the affidavits exchanged between the parties, we are of the considered view that the controversy which falls for determination is considerably narrower than the elaborate arguments advanced at the Bar may suggest. The issue before the Court is not whether another interpretation of the tender conditions is possible. Nor is the Court required to determine whether, if it were itself the tendering authority, it would have adopted the same understanding of the conditions governing eligibility. The controversy essentially concerns the permissible limits of judicial review over a decision taken by an expert Tender Evaluation Committee acting within the framework of a public procurement process.

52. The Petitioner has invited this Court to undertake an independent construction of the Corrigendum dated 16 October 2025 and the Circular dated 13 October 2025 and thereafter to hold that the affidavit contemplated therein was not required in the facts of the present tender since the value of the bituminous component of the work was below Rupees One Crore. The Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the requirement formed part of the mandatory conditions governing technical responsiveness and that every participating bidder was evaluated uniformly on that basis.

53. It is, therefore, necessary at the threshold to identify the precise nature of the jurisdiction which this Court exercises while examining challenges to public tenders. The distinction between judicial review and appellate review is neither one of form nor of mere semantics. It flows from the constitutional distribution of powers between the executive and the judiciary.

54. The evaluation of tenders, determination of technical responsiveness, assessment of engineering requirements and formulation of eligibility criteria constitute matters which primarily fall within the domain of the executive. Such decisions are informed by technical expertise, administrative experience, financial considerations and project-specific requirements. Constitutional courts neither possess nor claim institutional expertise in these specialised fields. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is therefore not intended to convert the High Court into an appellate authority examining the correctness of every commercial or technical determination made by the State.

55. An appellate forum proceeds upon the premise that it is entitled to substitute its own conclusions for those of the primary decision-maker. Judicial review proceeds upon an entirely different constitutional foundation. The Court does not ask whether another view is preferable. It asks whether the view adopted by the authority is lawful. The enquiry is directed not towards the merits of the commercial decision but towards the legality of the decision-making process. Once this distinction is lost sight of, constitutional review imperceptibly transforms into judicial administration of contracts, a consequence repeatedly cautioned against by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

56. This distinction assumes even greater significance in the field of public procurement. A Government tender is not merely an invitation to compete for a commercial contract. It is a structured public process through which State largesse is distributed in accordance with constitutional norms of equality, transparency and fairness. The integrity of that process depends upon certainty of the rules governing participation. Every bidder prepares its bid, arranges its finances, mobilises technical resources and formulates its commercial strategy on the assumption that the conditions governing eligibility shall remain uniform and shall be enforced alike against every participant.

57. The constitutional guarantee contained in Article 14 is therefore not exhausted merely by requiring the State to act fairly. Article 14 simultaneously demands certainty, consistency, predictability and equal application of declared norms. If the rules governing participation are permitted to fluctuate after submission of bids or are interpreted differently for different participants, the equality of opportunity which public tendering seeks to secure stands fundamentally impaired. Uniform application of tender conditions is itself an incident of equality before law.

58. These constitutional principles furnish the backdrop against which the rival submissions require examination. The Petitioner undoubtedly possesses extensive experience as a contractor and has executed public works over several decades. The issue before us, however, is not whether the Petitioner is otherwise competent to execute the work in question. Equally, it is not for this Court to compare the commercial wisdom of the competing bidders. The sole question is whether the process adopted by the Tender Evaluation Committee in declaring the Petitioner's bid technically non-responsive suffers from any recognised public law infirmity warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

59. It is at this stage that one undisputed factual circumstance assumes decisive significance. The Petitioner admittedly participated in the tender process after acceptance of every condition governing the invitation to tender. The Corrigendum dated 16 October 2025 incorporating the Circular dated 13 October 2025 had become part of the tender conditions before completion of the evaluation process. The Petitioner neither questioned the validity of the corrigendum nor sought any clarification regarding its applicability. No representation was addressed to the tendering authority suggesting that the conditions were ambiguous. No challenge was laid to the eligibility requirements before submission of the bid or before technical evaluation commenced.

60. Participation in a public tender is a conscious commercial decision. Every bidder evaluates the risks and obligations arising from the tender conditions before electing to compete. Having voluntarily entered the field with full knowledge of the governing conditions, a bidder cannot ordinarily be permitted, after suffering an adverse result, to seek reinterpretation of those very conditions in a manner which would render his own bid compliant. Such a course would not merely unsettle the concluded evaluation but would prejudice every other participant who arranged his affairs on the assumption that the tender conditions would be administered in the manner understood by the employer.

61. The doctrine that a bidder who participates without demur cannot subsequently challenge the conditions after being declared unsuccessful is not founded upon any technical rule of estoppel alone. It is rooted in the larger principle that certainty of the rules of competition constitutes an indispensable element of fairness itself. Permitting unsuccessful bidders to reopen the meaning of eligibility conditions after completion of technical evaluation would undermine the finality of the procurement process and inevitably invite avoidable litigation in every commercial tender involving public funds.

62. Before examining the rival interpretation sought to be placed upon the Circular dated 13 October 2025, it is necessary to notice another feature of the present proceedings which, in our considered opinion, has a direct bearing upon the maintainability of the challenge itself.

63. Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is essentially a public law remedy. Though contractual decisions of the State are undoubtedly amenable to judicial review, the jurisdiction is invoked not because the dispute concerns a contract but because the decision-making process of a public authority is alleged to have transgressed constitutional or public law limitations. Consequently, every challenge to a Government tender must disclose, at its foundation, some recognised public law infirmity affecting the exercise of administrative power.

64. We have carefully examined the pleadings contained in the writ petition. Equally, we have scrutinised the amendments, the rejoinder and the oral submissions advanced before us. Significantly, the Petitioner has not alleged that any member of the Tender Evaluation Committee acted with mala fides. There is no allegation that Respondent no.4 was favoured for extraneous reasons. No plea has been raised alleging bias against any officer participating in the evaluation process. Fraud has neither been pleaded nor even suggested. Corruption finds no place in the pleadings. No allegation of collusion between the successful bidder and the authorities has been made. The petition does not allege that irrelevant considerations entered the decision-making process. Equally absent is any assertion that relevant material was deliberately ignored with the object of excluding the Petitioner from competition.

65. These omissions are not matters of mere pleading. They go to the very root of the jurisdiction sought to be invoked. Constitutional courts do not exercise judicial review in abstraction. The jurisdiction is attracted only where the exercise of public power is demonstrated to have been vitiated by one or more recognised public law infirmities. Mere disagreement with the conclusion reached by an administrative authority does not convert a commercial dispute into a constitutional controversy.

66. The distinction assumes considerable significance in tender matters. Every unsuccessful bidder invariably believes that its own interpretation of the tender conditions is preferable. If such subjective dissatisfaction were by itself sufficient to invoke judicial review, every concluded tender would become vulnerable to reopening through constitutional proceedings. Judicial review would then cease to be a supervisory jurisdiction and would effectively become a second stage of technical evaluation before constitutional courts. Such an approach has consistently been disapproved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

67. The present case illustrates precisely why this distinction is important. The Petitioner does not challenge the fairness of the evaluation process. The challenge is directed exclusively against the conclusion reached by the Tender Evaluation Committee while construing the eligibility requirements. In substance, therefore, what is sought is not review of the legality of the process but reconsideration of the correctness of the technical evaluation itself.

68. We are unable to accede to such invitation. The Constitution does not envisage constitutional courts assuming the role of Tender Evaluation Committees. Technical responsiveness is determined by authorities entrusted with administration of the tender. Unless the conclusion reached by such authority is shown to be so arbitrary or irrational that no reasonable authority acting fairly could possibly have arrived at it, judicial substitution of another view would amount to transgressing the well-defined limits of Article 226.

69. At this stage, another equally important principle requires emphasis. Every tender process necessarily proceeds upon a declared cut-off date. The significance of such date extends far beyond administrative convenience. It serves to preserve equality amongst all competing bidders. Every participant is required to demonstrate eligibility by reference to the material submitted before expiry of the stipulated period. The level playing field created by the tender conditions would be fundamentally disturbed if one bidder were permitted, after technical scrutiny has commenced, to furnish additional documents or improve the contents of the bid.

70. The Petitioner repeatedly submitted that even today he is ready and willing to furnish the affidavit contemplated under Clause 5 and has annexed such affidavit to the writ petition. Attractive though this submission may appear at first impression, acceptance of such contention would necessarily amount to altering the rules of the competition after commencement of evaluation. Constitutional courts cannot direct the employer to evaluate bids on the basis of material which admittedly did not form part of the technical bid on the date fixed for submission.

71. Such a direction would have consequences extending much beyond the present dispute. Every unsuccessful bidder would thereafter contend that the omitted document could now be produced and that the authority ought to reconsider the technical evaluation. The certainty attached to the last date prescribed for submission of bids would gradually disappear. Competitive bidding would then become an evolving process rather than a concluded one. Public procurement cannot function under such uncertainty.

72. The Petitioner's argument founded upon the saving of approximately Rupees Eighty-five Lakhs also deserves careful consideration. We have no hesitation in observing that prudent utilisation of public funds undoubtedly constitutes an important facet of public interest. Yet public interest in Government contracting is neither singular nor one-dimensional. It is constituted by several equally important constitutional values operating simultaneously.

73. Transparency is public interest. Equal treatment of bidders is public interest. Uniform application of declared eligibility conditions is public interest. Certainty of procurement is public interest. Timely execution of infrastructure projects is public interest. Institutional confidence in governmental contracting is public interest. Lowest financial quotation represents only one component of that broader constitutional framework.

74. If the submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioner were accepted, every bidder who quoted a comparatively lower price but failed to satisfy the prescribed eligibility conditions would legitimately contend that the financial advantage offered by him outweighs the requirement of technical compliance. Such reasoning would inevitably compel public authorities to reopen concluded technical evaluations whenever a lower financial quotation is discovered. The resulting uncertainty would gradually erode the integrity of public procurement itself. Constitutional courts cannot adopt an interpretation which produces such institutional consequences.

75. It is, therefore, necessary to evaluate the Petitioner's submission not merely from the standpoint of the present tender but from the standpoint of the constitutional principles which must uniformly govern every public procurement undertaken by the State. Viewed from that perspective, the argument founded solely upon comparative financial advantage cannot furnish a valid basis for directing relaxation of an eligibility condition uniformly applied during technical evaluation.

76. Before adverting to the authorities cited at the Bar, it would be appropriate to examine the legal consequence flowing from the Petitioner's own conduct during the tender process. The Petitioner does not dispute that he participated in the tender after acceptance of every condition governing the invitation to tender. The Corrigendum dated 16 October 2025 and the Circular dated 13 October 2025 formed part of the tender conditions before the process of technical evaluation attained finality. At no stage prior to rejection of the technical bid did the Petitioner challenge the validity of the corrigendum, question the competence of the authority issuing it, or seek any declaration that the requirement of filing the affidavit was either arbitrary or inapplicable. The challenge to its interpretation has emerged only after the Petitioner came to be declared technically non-responsive.

77. Such conduct assumes legal significance. A public tender is not a unilateral declaration by the State. It is a structured invitation inviting willing participants to compete upon a defined set of conditions. Every bidder voluntarily decides whether to accept those conditions and participate or to question them before entering the arena of competition. Once a bidder consciously elects to compete without reservation, the bidder accepts not merely the textual contents of the tender document but also the authority of the employer to administer those conditions uniformly. Judicial review cannot thereafter be invoked as an instrument for renegotiating the conditions of participation after the bidder has failed in the competition.

78. This principle is not founded merely upon estoppel. It is rooted in the larger constitutional requirement of equality. Every participant structures his commercial bid upon the legitimate expectation that the eligibility conditions declared by the employer shall remain constant throughout the process and shall be uniformly enforced. If one bidder is permitted, after technical evaluation has concluded, to persuade the Court to reinterpret the conditions so as to accommodate his own bid, every other participant who arranged his affairs on the basis of the declared conditions would suffer prejudice. Equality in public procurement therefore extends beyond equal opportunity to participate. It equally encompasses equality in the administration of the rules governing participation.

79. The Court must also bear in mind that the employer who formulates the tender conditions is required to administer those conditions consistently across all bids received in response to the invitation. Consistency is itself an incident of fairness. Once it is shown that the authority has adopted one interpretation of the eligibility condition and has uniformly applied that interpretation while scrutinising every technical bid, judicial intervention merely because another interpretation appears possible would itself introduce inconsistency into the process. The Court would then become the source of inequality which Article 14 obliges it to prevent.

80. In the present case, the Petitioner does not contend that the Respondents adopted one interpretation for him and another for similarly situated bidders. Nor is there any material to demonstrate that the interpretation applied by the Tender Evaluation Committee was selectively enforced. The grievance of the Petitioner is directed against the interpretation itself. Such grievance, in the absence of arbitrariness, mala fides or discriminatory application, does not furnish a sufficient ground for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

81. The submission that the Petitioner ought to have been afforded an opportunity to furnish the prescribed affidavit after rejection of the technical bid is equally unsustainable. Acceptance of that contention would not merely permit production of an additional document. It would alter the legal position of one participant after expiry of the last date prescribed for submission of bids. Such alteration would inevitably affect every other bidder who complied with the conditions as understood by the employer. The Court cannot, under the guise of advancing fairness to one bidder, disturb fairness owed to all bidders.

82. We are equally unable to accept the submission that the comparative financial advantage offered by the Petitioner should outweigh the alleged deficiency in technical compliance. Public procurement is not an auction where price alone determines the outcome. The process is consciously structured in stages. Technical responsiveness precedes financial evaluation because the employer is entitled to ensure that only those bidders who satisfy the prescribed eligibility requirements enter the zone of financial competition. To permit the financial quotation of a technically non-responsive bidder to influence the legality of technical evaluation would collapse the distinction between these two stages and render the technical scrutiny largely redundant.

83. Public interest cannot therefore be measured solely by reference to the difference between two financial quotations. Public interest equally lies in maintaining confidence that Government contracts are awarded through a process which is transparent, predictable and uniformly administered. That confidence would be seriously impaired if mandatory conditions could be relaxed after opening of technical bids merely because the bidder offering such relaxation happened to quote a lower price.

84. The conclusions which we have independently reached are fully supported by the contemporary jurisprudence governing judicial review of public procurement. The law in this field has undergone significant refinement over the last three decades. While the earlier decisions recognised that, in appropriate cases, deviations from certain tender conditions may not necessarily invalidate a bid, the subsequent development of the law has consistently emphasised institutional restraint, deference to the tendering authority and preservation of the integrity of public procurement.

85. In N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain((2022) 6 SCC 127), the Hon’ble Supreme Court comprehensively revisited the law relating to judicial review in tender matters. The Court reiterated that constitutional courts must remain conscious of the limits of their institutional role while examining commercial decisions taken by expert authorities. It observed that the award of public contracts involves technical and administrative considerations in respect of which the tendering authority possesses expertise unavailable to constitutional courts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further emphasised that judicial interference in public projects frequently results not merely in delay but also in escalation of costs and corresponding prejudice to public interest.

86. Of particular significance is the reiteration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 is not concerned with determining whether another commercial decision might also have been possible. The enquiry remains confined to the legality of the decision-making process. Unless the action of the authority is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, actuated by extraneous considerations or so irrational that no reasonable authority could have arrived at such conclusion, judicial intervention is unwarranted. These observations, in our considered opinion, answer the principal submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioner.

87. The principle was earlier explained in Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India((2020) 16 SCC 489). The Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that judges do not possess technical expertise in commercial procurement and that constitutional courts should not examine tender conditions with the precision of a commercial evaluator. Recognising that governmental procurement necessarily involves practical considerations and administrative discretion, the Court held that the State must be allowed a reasonable degree of latitude in matters of contractual administration, provided its decision remains bona fide and consistent with constitutional requirements.

88. Equally important is the principle reiterated in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.((2016) 16 SCC 818) that the author of the tender document is the best person to appreciate its requirements and to interpret its conditions. This principle is founded upon sound constitutional and administrative considerations. The authority framing the tender alone is fully aware of the technical, engineering and commercial considerations which necessitated incorporation of a particular eligibility condition. Courts exercising judicial review cannot ordinarily substitute another plausible interpretation merely because such interpretation also appears reasonable. So long as the understanding adopted by the employer is bona fide, uniformly applied and not arbitrary, judicial deference becomes a constitutional necessity rather than a matter of discretion.

89. Applying these principles to the present case, we find no material which would justify departure from the settled rule of judicial restraint. The Petitioner has not demonstrated that the interpretation adopted by the Tender Evaluation Committee was actuated by mala fides or applied selectively nor has it been shown that the interpretation is so manifestly irrational that no reasonable authority entrusted with administration of the tender could possibly have adopted it. The petition essentially invites this Court to prefer one interpretation over another. Such an exercise lies beyond the permissible limits of judicial review under Article 226.

90. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed considerable reliance upon Poddar Steel Corporation v. Ganesh Engineering Works and Ors. (supra) particularly paragraph 6 thereof. The principle enunciated therein, namely that every deviation from a tender condition does not necessarily entail rejection of the bid, is well settled. Equally settled, however, is the proposition that the application of that principle depends upon the nature of the condition under consideration and the factual matrix of each case.

91. In the present matter, the Tender Evaluation Committee has uniformly treated the requirement in question as an essential component of technical responsiveness. The Petitioner does not allege that such understanding was adopted to favour Respondent no.4 or to exclude the Petitioner. The Court cannot therefore invoke the doctrine of substantial compliance to reclassify, after completion of the bidding process, a condition which the employer bona fide regarded as essential. To do so would amount to rewriting the tender conditions after conclusion of the competition, a course consistently discouraged by the subsequent jurisprudence of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

92. There is yet another aspect of the matter which, in our considered opinion, is of considerable significance. The petition proceeds substantially on the assumption that the controversy before this Court concerns the correct interpretation of Clause 5 of the Circular dated 13 October 2025. We are unable to subscribe to that formulation of the issue. The dispute, in its true perspective, is not whether another interpretation of the Circular is possible. The dispute is whether, after the employer has interpreted its own tender conditions in a particular manner and has uniformly applied that interpretation to every participating bidder, this Court should substitute its own understanding merely because another interpretation may also appear plausible.

93. The answer, in our respectful opinion, must necessarily be in the negative. Once the constitutional limits governing judicial review are properly appreciated, the possibility of another interpretation ceases to be determinative. Judicial review is concerned with the legality of the interpretation adopted by the authority and not with its comparative superiority over every other conceivable interpretation. Unless the interpretation adopted by the employer is so manifestly unreasonable that it defies accepted standards of rational administrative decision-making, constitutional courts must refrain from substituting their own view.

94. It is important to bear in mind that every tender condition has two distinct dimensions. The first concerns its textual meaning. The second concerns the administrative purpose sought to be achieved by incorporating the condition into the tender document. Courts are ordinarily equipped to interpret legal instruments. They are not equally equipped to reassess technical or administrative considerations which prompted incorporation of a particular eligibility requirement. That exercise necessarily falls within the institutional competence of the authority framing the tender.

95. The Circular dated 13 October 2025 did not emerge in isolation. It was issued by the Public Works Department in the course of administration of public works involving bituminous construction. Whether the requirement of the affidavit was introduced to ensure traceability of the source of the hot mix plant, to secure accountability of the contractor during execution, to facilitate quality control, to verify logistical readiness, or to achieve any combination of these objectives, are matters lying essentially within the domain of the employer. Once the employer has consciously regarded such declaration as part of technical evaluation, it is not for the Court to enquire whether another form of declaration might equally have served the same purpose.

96. The submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioner that the communication dated 2 March 2023 substantially satisfies the requirement of the affidavit also proceeds on an assumption which this Court cannot accept. The question before us is not whether the information contained in the communication resembles the information required under the affidavit. The question is whether the employer, having consciously prescribed one form of documentary compliance, can be compelled by judicial direction to accept another document as its equivalent. Acceptance of such submission would necessarily transfer the authority to determine compliance from the Tender Evaluation Committee to the Court itself. Such substitution would be inconsistent with the well-recognised limits of judicial review.

97. Equally unsustainable, in our opinion, is the submission that the Petitioner should have been called upon to cure the alleged deficiency before rejection of the technical bid. The argument overlooks the distinction between clarification of an existing document and production of a document which did not accompany the bid in the prescribed form. A clarification explains what already exists. It does not create compliance where compliance was required to exist on the last date prescribed for submission of bids. Were constitutional courts to direct acceptance of essential documents after technical evaluation, the certainty attached to the cut-off date would become wholly illusory.

98. The significance of the cut-off date cannot be understated. Every bidder participating in a public tender proceeds on the understanding that eligibility shall be determined uniformly with reference to the material submitted before expiry of the prescribed period. The cut-off date therefore serves not merely an administrative function but a constitutional one. It preserves equality amongst participants by ensuring that every bidder is assessed on an identical footing. Relaxation of that principle in favour of one participant necessarily disturbs the level playing field which Article 14 requires the State to maintain.

99. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner repeatedly emphasised that the Petitioner possessed the requisite infrastructure and that rejection of the bid on account of absence of the prescribed affidavit amounts to sacrificing substance for form. Attractive though this submission appears, it overlooks an important principle governing public procurement. In competitive tendering, documentary compliance is not merely evidentiary in nature. It constitutes the objective basis upon which every bidder is uniformly evaluated. If one bidder is permitted to establish eligibility through documents different from those prescribed, or at a stage subsequent to the prescribed date, the process itself ceases to remain objective. Administrative discretion would then replace predetermined standards, thereby increasing rather than reducing arbitrariness.

100. We also find no substance in the argument that absence of a pre-bid meeting prevented the Petitioner from seeking clarification regarding the applicability of the Circular. A pre-bid meeting is undoubtedly one recognised mechanism for obtaining clarification. It is not, however, the only mechanism available to an intending bidder. Nothing prevented the Petitioner from seeking clarification in writing before submission of the bid if any genuine ambiguity existed. The record does not disclose any such representation. The challenge to the interpretation of the Circular has emerged only after the Petitioner was declared technically non-responsive. Such conduct assumes significance while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226.

101. Much emphasis was laid on the circumstance that the Petitioner's financial quotation was lower by approximately Rupees Eighty-five Lakhs. While the submission has considerable emotional appeal, constitutional adjudication cannot proceed upon considerations of arithmetic alone. Public interest in governmental procurement is not exhausted by the lowest financial quotation. The constitutional obligation of the State extends equally to ensuring that every bidder competes under one declared set of rules administered uniformly and transparently. A process that secures a lower price at the cost of unequal application of eligibility conditions cannot be regarded as constitutionally fair. Conversely, a process which uniformly enforces the declared conditions does not become arbitrary merely because a technically non-responsive bidder happened to quote a lower amount.

102. Acceptance of the Petitioner's submission would also produce consequences extending well beyond the facts of the present case. Every technically disqualified bidder whose financial quotation is lower than that of the successful bidder would thereafter contend that public interest requires relaxation of the eligibility condition in his favour. The Court would then be required to compare commercial quotations before determining the legality of technical evaluation. Such an approach would fundamentally alter the architecture of public procurement. Technical scrutiny would cease to be an independent stage of evaluation and would become subordinate to comparative financial advantage. Neither the tender conditions nor the constitutional principles governing judicial review permit such a result.

103. We are therefore unable to persuade ourselves that the decision of the Tender Evaluation Committee suffers from any infirmity recognised in public law. The Petitioner has not established arbitrariness. Mala fides have neither been pleaded nor proved. Bias has not been alleged. No material suggesting favouritism, collateral purpose or unequal treatment has been placed before the Court. The interpretation adopted by the Tender Evaluation Committee cannot be characterised as irrational or perverse. At the highest, the Petitioner has demonstrated that another interpretation may also be possible. That, however, is not the test upon which judicial review under Article 226 proceeds.

104. Furthermore, the cumulative effect of the material placed before us leaves no manner of doubt that the Petitioner has failed to establish any recognised ground warranting interference with the tender process. The decision of the Tender Evaluation Committee is shown to have been taken after scrutiny of the documents submitted by the participating bidders. The Petitioner has not established that irrelevant considerations entered the decision-making process, that relevant considerations were ignored, that any bidder was accorded preferential treatment or that the interpretation adopted by the Committee was so irrational as to invite correction in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In these circumstances, judicial restraint is not merely desirable; it is constitutionally imperative.

105. We therefore hold that the Petitioner has failed to establish any legal right to seek reopening of the technical evaluation, any entitlement to production of additional documents after rejection of the technical bid or any enforceable right to insist upon opening of the financial bid. The consequential challenge to the acceptance of the bid submitted by Respondent no.4 must necessarily fail.

106. Before parting with the matter, we deem it appropriate to observe that the object of judicial review in contractual matters is not to identify the contractor whom the Court considers commercially preferable. The constitutional obligation of the Court is far more restrained, yet far more significant. It is to ensure that the State acts fairly, uniformly and within the bounds of law. Once that constitutional threshold is found to have been satisfied, judicial intervention merely because another interpretation or another commercial outcome appears possible would itself become inconsistent with the discipline of Article 226. The rule of law is strengthened not only when courts correct arbitrary executive action but equally when they recognise the constitutional limits of judicial power.

107. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in the writ petition. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged.

108. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

109. Registry to waive office objections and number the Writ Petition.