1. This writ petition is submitted by the owner of a part of a building, bearing door No.V/697 (Old No.5/82D) on the 2nd floor of a multi-storied building. The total plinth area of the building claims to be 626 sq.m. The challenge raised in this writ petition is against the Constitutional validity of sub section (11) of Section 509 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, since it imposes a condition to the building owner, to pay the entire property tax demanded, as a pre-condition for submitting an appeal before the appellate authority, against the demand of tax. According to the petitioner, the same is arbitrary, onerous and unreasonable and therefore, it is to be declared as unconstitutional, being in conflict with Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner also seeks a further relief to direct the 5th respondent, the Standing Committee for tax of the 3rd respondent-Municipality to consider the appeal submitted by the petitioner, without insisting for the pre-deposit as mentioned above.

2. The petitioner purchased the building in the year, 2007 and she was paying the property tax in respect of the said building at the rate of Rs.1,560/- per annum. Exhibit P1 series are the property tax receipts evidencing such payments and the last receipt is dated 9.2.2017.

3. According to the petitioner, in the year, 2018-19, the petitioner was directed to pay huge amounts towards property tax and as the same was not legally sustainable, the petitioner submitted representations seeking to revise the same. Without considering the same, the 3rd respondent has issued Ext.P2 communication dated 1.10.2020, requiring the petitioner to pay property tax @ Rs.17550/- per annum. In Ext.P2, it is stated that, the tax originally fixed for the said building was Rs.15,600/-, which was revised by increasing 25% thereof and accordingly the tax payable was determined as Rs.17550/-. The petitioner submitted an objection to the same, but rejecting the same, Ext.P3 notice was issued to the petitioner on 30.10.2020. As against the same, the petitioner submitted an appeal before the 5th respondent-appellate authority, as contemplated under Section 509 of the Municipality Act. Ext.P4 is the said appeal.

4. However, the said appeal was not entertained by the 5th respondent, as according to the said respondent, the appeal could be considered, only upon the petitioner depositing the entire tax demanded, which was for the period from 2002-2003 onwards. Challenging the decision not to entertain the appeal, the petitioner submitted WP(C)No.15274/2021, mainly seeking a direction to re-assess the property tax of the said building. A relief for directing the respondents to consider Ext.P4 was also sought.

5. However, this Court, as per Ext.P6 judgment, disposed of the writ petition, without entering any finding on merits, relegating the petitioner to pursue the remedy of appeal, by depositing the amount payable under Section 509 (11) of the Kerala Municipality Act, within a period of three weeks from the date of the said judgment. The petitioner challenged Ext.P6 judgment by filing SLP(C) No.2738/2022 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which resulted in Ext.P8 order. As per Ext.P8, the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to interfere with the order of the learned Single judge, but liberty was granted to the petitioner to challenge the provisions of law. It was also specifically observed in the said order that, the impugned order would not come in the way of the petitioner on the ground of res judicata or constructive res judicata. In the meantime, the petitioner was issued with Ext.P7 and P7(a) notices, where an amount of Rs.3,23,508/- was demanded towards the property tax, pertaining to the period from 2002-2003 to 2021-2022. This writ petition  is  submitted  by  the  petitioner  in  such  circumstances, challenging the Constitutional validity of Section 509(11) of the Kerala Municipality Act.

6. A detailed counter affidavit is submitted by the 2nd respondent denying the averments contained in the writ petition and also explaining the circumstances under which, the impugned demands are made.

7. I have heard Sri. Saju Jakob, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Smt. K.R.Deepa, the learned Special Govt.Pleader and Sri. C.S. Ajith Prakash, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents 3 to 5.

8. The challenge raised by the petitioner against Section 509(11) is mainly in the ground that, according to the petitioner, it imposes an onerous condition upon the aggrieved building owner, which results in denial of the right of the appeal of such person itself. Thus, the same is amounting to violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Arts. 14,19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel argued in detail, the hardships that are caused to the petitioner, due to the requirement of depositing the entire tax amount as a pre-condition for submitting the appeal and it is pointed out that, since the petitioner is unable to fulfil the said condition due to the non affordability of the same, the petitioner is deprived of a valuable right to file appeal, against a demand which is per se illegal. It is pointed out that, since it is an onerous and unreasonable condition that denies the right of the appeal to the petitioner, the same has to be interfered with. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals Limited v. Union of India and Others [(2004) 4 SCC 311], the decision rendered by the Delhi High Court in Gagan Makkar and Anr. v. Union of India [WP(C)No.4683/2008] and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singha Roy and Others [AIR 1931 Cal.100].

9. On the other hand, the learned Special Govt.Pleader as well as the learned Standing Counsel for the Municipality, opposed the contentions of the petitioner, by relying upon the judgments rendered by this Court in Francis v. R.D.O [1989(1) KLT 550], Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Ernakulam and Others [2009 (4) KHC 819(DB)], Syriach Kurian v. Union of India and Others [2014(2)KHC 325] and Managing Director, KSRTC v. Union of India and Others [2010(1)KHC 49(DB)].

10. I have carefully gone through the records, examined the relevant statutory provisions and considered the contentions raised by all the parties. Before proceeding to determine the issue, it would be profitable to refer Section 509(11) of the Kerala Municipality Act, which reads as follows:

                  Section 509 (11) - “No appeal or revision shall be filed against the levy of  tax, if the tax shown in the demand notice has not been paid.”

11. From the above provision, it is clear that, in order to entertain an appeal against an order imposing tax, the appellant will have to deposit the entire tax amount as a pre-condition. The statute does not provide for any exemption to any person from making the said deposit. The challenge raised in this writ petition is to be considered in the above factual and legal background.

12. Since the challenge raised is in respect of the Constitutional validity of a statutory provision enacted by the State Legislature, the power of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain such a challenge and the circumstances under which such declarations could be made by this Court, are to be examined. On scanning through the various judicial precedents in this regard, it is seen from a series of decisions that, a statutory provision can be declared as invalid, by the Constitutional courts, only in exceptional cases where, the court is satisfied that, the relevant provision suffers from a serious infirmity, as it violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution or that the Legislature which passed such a law, is not having any competence to enact the same. It was also consistently held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a series of decisions that, the hardship arising from such statutory provision by itself cannot be a reason to declare such provision as unconstitutional. The settled legal position is also to the effect that, in relation to the fiscal statutes, the criteria to be adopted for interference, is more stringent than the cases in which the challenge is raised against the other statutes relating to the civil rights of the parties.

13. In State of A.P. v. MacDowel and Co.[(1996) 3 SCC 709], it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that, no enactment can be struck down just saying that, it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or the other Constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that, the Courts thinks it unjustified. Parliament and Legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The Court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom.

14. In R.K. Garg v. Union of India and Others [(1981) 4 SCC 675], a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, clearly laid down that, the laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than the laws touching civil rights, such as, freedom of speech, religion etc..

15. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rakesh Kohli and Another [(2012)6 SCC 312], the principles that are to be followed while considering the Constitutionality of a statutory provision were laid down in paragraph 32, which reads as follows:

                  “32. While dealing with constitutional validity of a taxation law enacted by Parliament or State Legislature, the court must have regard to the following principles:

                  (i) there is always presumption in favour of constitutionality of a law made by Parliament or a State Legislature,

                  (ii) no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable or irrational but some constitutional infirmity has to be found,(iii) the court is not concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom, the justice or injustice of the law as Parliament and State Legislatures are supposed to be alive to the needs of the people whom they represent and they are the best judge of the community by whose suffrage they come into existence,

                  (iv) hardship is not relevant in pronouncing on the constitutional validity of a fiscal statute or economic law, and

                  (v) in the field of taxation, the legislature enjoys greater latitude for classification.”

16. In Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81], the scope of considering the hardships arising from a statute, as a ground for challenge against a statutory provision was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in paragraph 12, the following observations were made:

                  “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”

                  The very same view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rohitash Kumar and Others v. Om Prakash Sharma and Others [(2013)11 SCC 451].

17. In Seth Nand Lal and Another v. State of Haryana and Others [1980 (Supp.) SCC 574], a five judges bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considered the vires of a statutory provision in the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, where, the statutory provision contemplated for a pre-deposit for entertaining the appeal. After elaborately discussing the legal position on the point, and after referring to the decision in Anand Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1975 SC 1234], the Hon'ble Supreme Court  rejected  the  contentions  and  upheld  the  validity  of  the provision. In the said decision, it was clearly held that, the right of appeal is a creature of statute and there is no reason why the Legislature while granting the right cannot impose conditions for the exercise of such rights so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost illusory. Thus, going by the aforesaid observations, it is clear that, in a case in which, it is demonstrated that the condition for appeal is so onerous and it makes the appellate remedy illusory, an interference could be made. In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Laxmi Devi [(2008) 4 SCC 720], the onerous nature of the condition of the statute and its consequences were considered, and in paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 it was observed as follows:

                  “28. We may, however, consider a hypothetical case. Supposing the correct value of a property is Rs 10 lakhs and that is the value stated in the sale deed, but the registering officer erroneously determines it to be, say, Rs 2 crores. In that case while making a reference to the Collector under Section 47-A, the registering officer will demand duty on 50% of Rs 2 crores i.e. duty on Rs 1 crore instead of demanding duty on Rs 10 lakhs. A party may not be able to pay this exorbitant duty demanded under the proviso to Section 47-A by the registering officer in such a case. What can be done in this situation?”

                  29. In our opinion in this situation it is always open to a party to file a writ petition challenging the exorbitant demand made by the registering officer under the proviso to Section 47-A alleging that the determination made is arbitrary and/or based on extraneous considerations, and in that case it is always open to the High Court, if it is satisfied that the allegation is correct, to set aside such exorbitant demand under the proviso to Section 47-A of the Stamp Act by declaring the demand arbitrary. It is well settled that arbitrariness violates Article 14 of the Constitution  vide Maneka  Gandhi v. Union  of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597] . Hence, the party is not remediless in this situation.

                  30. However, this would not mean that the proviso to Section 47-A becomes unconstitutional. There is always a difference between a statute and the action taken under a statute. The statute may be valid and constitutional, but the action taken under it may not be valid. Hence, merely because it is possible that the order of the registering authority under the proviso to Section 47-A is arbitrary and illegal, that does not mean that the proviso to Section 47-A is also unconstitutional. We must always keep this in mind when adjudicating on the constitutionality of a statute.”

18. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxmi Devi's case (supra) in paragraph 46 is also relevant, which reads as follows:

                  “46. In our opinion, there is one and only one ground for declaring an Act of the legislature (or a provision in the Act) to be invalid, and that is if it clearly violates some provision of the Constitution in so evident a manner as to leave no manner of doubt. This violation can, of course, be in different ways e.g. if a State Legislature makes a law which only Parliament can make under List I to the Seventh Schedule, in which case it will violate Article 246(1) of the Constitution, or the law violates some specific provision of the Constitution (other than the directive principles). But before declaring the statute to be unconstitutional, the court must be absolutely sure that there can be no manner of doubt that it violates a provision of the Constitution. If two views are possible, one making the statute constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former view must always be preferred. Also, the court must make every effort to uphold the constitutional validity of a statute, even if that requires giving a strained construction or narrowing down its scope vide Rt. Rev. Msgr. Mark Netto v. State of Kerala [(1979) 1 SCC 23 : AIR 1979 SC 83] SCC para 6 : AIR para 6. Also, it is none of the concern of the court whether the legislation in its opinion is wise or unwise.”

19. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation’s case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court considered the validity of a provision in the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, where a similar condition was imposed. This Court upheld the validity of the said provision by observing that, if any arbitrary orders are issued by the statutory authorities, the parties aggrieved may file writ petition before the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, if they do not have the resource to deposit assessed tax and file appeal before the Tribunal. The said view is in tune with the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxmi Devi's case cited supra.

20. In Francis's case(supra), a Division Bench of this Court upheld the validity of making a pre-deposit of the amount as contemplated under the provisions of the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975. In Syriach Kurian's case (supra). this Court upheld the validity of the condition of deposit of 50% of the amount for filing appeal under section 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

21. Thus, from the above observations and judicial precedents, it is clear that, as far as the right to appeal is concerned, it is a statutory creation of the Legislature at its wisdom and nothing would preclude the Legislature from imposing appropriate conditions for availing such remedy. It is also evident that, the legal position is settled to the effect that, the court cannot sit in judgment of the conditions imposed by the Legislature, which consists of persons elected by the people, who know the difficulties and sufferings of the people better than the courts. The rigour in the matter of interference in fiscal statutes, is stringent, and only exceptional circumstances where an interference could be made, is a case in which, the court is fully satisfied that, the only way out is to invalidate the statute and no other choices are available.

22. Of course, when the condition is so onerous thereby making the remedy illusory, an interference could be made by the court. However, in this case, the statutory provision under challenge is dealing with the property tax payable by the owner of a building, annually. Normally, as the payment is to be affected year to year, the amount may not be that much higher to the extent of being beyond the affordability of the persons aggrieved by it. Apart from the above, the assessment of a building do not involve a complex method of assessment, as the same has to be completed based on the well-defined parameters, such as the plinth area, nature of the building, the purpose to which the building is used, the rates specified by the Local Self Government Institution through a statutory notification etc. Moreover, under normal circumstances, even if a party is challenging an assessment by invoking an appellate remedy, in most of the cases, the challenge would be confined to a portion of the demand made and not in its entirety. Therefore, even if the appeal is allowed in favour of the building owner, the actual relief received by the party may not be substantial. In other words, in most of the cases, substantial portion of the demand would be undisputed and therefore imposing a condition, to insist for a pre-deposit for filing an appeal may not be an onerous condition under normal circumstances. Of course, in certain cases where there are chances of huge amounts are being demanded, on account of any arbitrary decisions of the officers concerned, there may be hardships. However, in such cases, as observed in Laxmi Devi’s case (supra) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporations’s case (supra), it would be open to the aggrieved party to approach the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India highlighting the arbitrary nature of the demand. Merely because of the reason that, there are possibilities of arbitrary orders being passed by the statutory authorities imposing huge liability upon the building owner, thereby availing the remedy of appeal would be impossible due to the lack of affordability of the person aggrieved, a statutory provision as such cannot be declared as invalid. As regards arbitrary orders passed by the statutory authorities in violation of the specific statutory stipulations, the aggrieved party can very well invoke the public law remedies, instead of availing the statutory remedy.

23. When it comes to the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, I am of the view that, the same cannot be made applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. As far as the decision relied on in Mardia Chemical's case (supra) is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the Constitutional validity of the condition of pre- deposit in the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act (SARFAESI Act). The said Act provided for a speedy recovery of the amounts due to the Banking companies, where the disputed questions regarding the inter se claims of the creditor and debtor are involved. On the other hand, Section 509(11) deals with a condition imposed by a statute in respect of a tax liability of the person. As observed above, in respect of the statutory provision dealing with fiscal aspects of the State, the rigour of the condition for interference is very strict. Since, it is something that affects the revenue of the State as whole, and the financial management of the Government, the Courts should be very cautious in the matter of interference. The criteria which are applicable in the matter of interference in the other matters, may not be made applicable in the provisions dealing with economic matters of the State. Therefore, the circumstances under which the Hon'ble Supreme Court interfered with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, were completely different and hence those observations in Mardia Chemical's case (supra) cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case. With regard to the decisions of the High Court of Delhi and Calcutta, I wish to respectfully disagree with the same, in view of the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court and that of this courts referred to above. Moreover, in Nagendra Nath Bose’s case (supra), the principal issue considered by the Calcutta High Court was not the validity of the pre-deposit requirement itself, but whether the amended provision mandating such a deposit as a condition for entertaining an appeal could be applied retrospectively to appeals arising from proceedings that had been instituted prior to the amendment coming into force. The High Court held that the relevant date for determining the applicability of the amendment was the date on which the original proceeding was initiated  and  not  the  date  on  which  the  appeal  was  filed. Consequently, the amended pre-deposit requirement was invalidated , and the appeal was directed to be heard on merits without insisting on the deposit.

24. In such circumstances, the only conclusion possible is that, the Constitutional validity of section 509(11) of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 is only to be upheld and it is ordered accordingly.

25. However, even while rejecting the contentions of the petitioner on the question of Constitutional validity of the provision referred to above, I find a patent illegality in the demand made by the 3rd respondent-Municipality. This is because, even as per the averments in the counter affidavit submitted by the Municipality, the tax is revised in 2018-19 and the Municipality imposed a considerably higher tax amount, which the petitioner refused to pay. Thereafter, Ext.P2 notice was issued on 1.10.2020, requiring the petitioner to pay tax at the rate of Rs.17,550/-. Later, Ext.P3 was issued on 30.10.2020 intimating that, the petitioner has to pay tax at the rate of Rs.15600/- for the period from 2002-2003 onwards based on annual rental value and after the date of revision of tax, the same has to be paid at the rate of Rs.17550/-. Although the petitioner challenged the same by filing Ext.P4 appeal, the same was not entertained by the 5th respondent for want of pre-deposit. The petitioner challenged the same before this Court and as per Ext.P6 judgment the petitioner was directed to pursue the appeal, after making the pre-deposit. The challenge raised by the petitioner against the judgment of this Court was also not entertained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the meantime, Ext.P7(a) demand was raised for Rs.3,23,508/-.

26. The gross illegality in the said demand is that, the same is in violation of the statutory stipulations contained in Section 539 of the Kerala Municipality Act, which provides that, the Municipality cannot recover tax beyond a period of three years preceding to the demand. In this case, the documents indicate that, the demand for tax from 2002-2003 onwards was sought to be recovered, by Ext.P3 notice, which is beyond the period stipulated in Section 539. Thus, there is patent illegality in the said demand and hence an interference is required.

27. Of course, I am conscious of the fact that, in this writ petition, the petitioner did not challenge the validity of Ext.P7 and P7(a) and the relief is confined to the challenge against the validity of Section 509(11) of the Kerala Municipality Act. It is also true that, in the earlier writ petition that culminated in Ext.P6 judgment, the petitioner challenged the validity of the assessment. As regards the possible question of applying the principles of res judicata consequent to Ext.P6 judgment, when it comes to the question of sustainability of the demand referred to above, I am of the view that, since the challenge raised by the petitioner in the earlier writ petition against the assessment, is not considered or answered on merits, the principles of res judicata would not be applicable. In Erach Boman Khavar v. Tukaram Shridhar Bhat and Another [(2013) 15 SCC 655], it was clearly observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that, to attract the principles of res judicata, adjudication of claim on merits at the earlier stage is necessary. The same view is taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.M.A. Metropolitan and Others v. Moran Mar Marthoma and Another [AIR 1995 SC 2001]. Therefore, Ext.P6 judgment would not stand in the way of this Court in considering the legality of Exts.P2,P3,P7 and P7(a).

28. With regard to the lack of challenge against the notices referred to above, it is to be noted that, merely because of that reason, this Court need not refrain from interfering with the said notices. This is because, when a patent illegality is unfolded before this Court which affects the substantive rights of the parties, nothing would preclude this Court from invoking the powers under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to do justice to the parties, as held in a catena of decisions including State of Rajasthan v. Hindustan Sugar Mills Ltd., [(1988) 3 SCC 449], Rajesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, [(2013) 4 SCC 690], Nur Islam v. State of Assam [2025 SCC OnLine SC 305]. In Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement, (2008) 14 SCC 58, it was held ;

                  “98. From the above cases, it clearly transpires that powers under Articles 226 and 227 are discretionary and equitable and are required to be exercised in the larger interest of justice. While granting relief in favour of the applicant, the court must take into account the balancing of interests and equities. It can mould relief considering the facts of the case. It can pass an appropriate order which justice may demand and equities may project. As observed by this Court in Shiv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana [(1980) 2 SCC 437 : (1980) 1 SCR 1170] courts of equity should go much further both to give and refuse relief in furtherance of public interest. Granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon considerations of justice, equity and good conscience.”

29. It is also important to note that, the position of law with regard to the period of limitation contemplated under section 539 of the Act is clearly declared by this Court Gateway Hotels, EKM v. Kochi Municipal Corporation [2025(3) KHC 245], where this Court clearly laid down that, the Municipality cannot recover tax beyond the period of three years. Thus, the demand made by the 3rd respondent Municipality is patently wrong, being in violation of a specific statutory stipulation under section 539 of the Act, as well as the law declared by this court in Gateway Hotels’s case (supra) and therefore arbitrary.

30. In such circumstances, as it is something which can be determined even without any further enquiry, I am of the view that, an interference is required, irrespective of the question that, no challenge is raised in this writ petition with respect to the above. It is also to be noted in this regard that, the grievance highlighted by the petitioner is mainly on account of lack of affordability in complying the condition of pre-deposit, as the amount involved is huge. In fact, the substantial portion of the demand made by the 3rd respondent-Municipality is in respect of the tax pertaining to the years beyond the period of limitation contemplated under Section 539 of the Act. Therefore, an order granting relief, by interfering with such notices on the ground of limitation, based of the statutory provision and law declared by this court in Gateway Hotel’s case (supra), would do justice to the petitioner, against the patently illegal demand made by the 3rd respondent.

In such circumstances, while upholding the Constitutional validity of Section 509(11) of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, this Writ Petition is disposed of, quashing Exts.P2,P3,P7 and P7(a), with a  direction  to  the  3rd  and  4th  respondents,  to  re-assess  the petitioner’s building, by confining the period of assessment to three years preceding to the date of Ext.P3, which is the first demand notice pertaining to the period from 2002-2003 onwards. Needless to say, upon completing such an assessment, it shall be open to the petitioner to invoke the statutory remedies, challenging the rate of tax, by complying with the condition of statutory deposit contemplated under Section 509(11) of the Act.