Nandesh S. Deshpande, J.

1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the parties.

2. The present Petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenges order dated 16.02.2024, passed by the Respondent No. 7, namely Deputy Director of Education, Kolhapur (hereinafter referred to as ‘DDoE, Kolhapur), thereby denying the benefit of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, i.e. Old Pension Scheme to the Petitioner.

3. Facts, short of details, as can be best stated are as under :

                    (a) The Petitioner, being duly qualified and eligible, applied for the post of a part-time teacher on 06.06.1998 in the Commerce Faculty to the Respondent No. 6, namely Venutai Chavan College, Satara (hereinafter referred to as ‘the College’), which is an educational institution having 100% grant-in-aid from the State of Maharashtra.

                    (b) In pursuance to the said application of the Petitioner, the Respondent No.5, namely Shri Shivaji Education Society, Satara(hereinafter referred to as ‘Education Society’), conducted an interview on 11.07.1998 and the Petitioner was appointed on the post of a part-time teacher with effect from 20.07.1998 to 20.04.1999 by an appointment order dated 18.08.1998 in the College.

                    (c) Accordingly, the Petitioner joined the establishment i.e., the College from 20.07.1998 and continued till 18.09.2006. The appointment of the Petitioner was initially for one year, i.e. from 20.07.1998 to 20.04.1999, and thereafter, her tenure of service extended without any break in service till the year 2006. Admittedly, the appointment of the Petitioner was on a grant-in-aid and sanctioned post and therefore the DDoE, Kolhapur approved the said post for each year till 2006. This fact is evident from the orders of approval placed on record with the Petition.

                    (d) It is the submission of the Petitioner that the said part-time post came to be upgraded to a full-time teacher post as per the policy of the Maharashtra State Government. Thereafter, the Petitioner was appointed as a full-time teacher in the Commerce faculty with effect from 18.09.2006 vide order dated 11.09.2006. Eventually, the Petitioner, having attained the age of superannuation, retired on 30.11.2022.

                    (e) It is stated in the Petition that the State of Maharashtra introduced a policy decision vide Government Resolution dated 31.10.2005, declaring that the employees appointed after 1st November 2005 would be governed by the Defined Contributory Pension Scheme(hereinafter referred to as ‘DCP Scheme’) and would not be entitled to the benefits enumerated in the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, i.e. the ‘Old Pension Scheme’. The said Government Resolution exhaustively enumerates the policy of the Maharashtra State Government.

                    (f) In pursuance to the said policy, the Petitioner preferred representation on 20.03.2019 and subsequently on 20.04.2019, to the Respondent Nos. 2, namely Minister of Education, Mantralaya, Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as ‘MOE’) and Respondent No. 4(hereinafter referred to as ‘DDoE, Pune’) to consider her part-time service under the Old Pension Scheme. However, since there was no reply to the said representations, the Petitioner was constrained to file a Writ Petition bearing No.9702 of 2021 before this Court. The said Writ Petition was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 08.12.2022, thereby directing the respondents to consider the representations of the Petitioner and take a decision by 31.03.2023.

                    (g) The Petition further states that the Petitioner preferred an application before the Respondents on 18.01.2023 pursuant to the order of this Court, but no steps were taken by the Respondents till May 2023. Belatedly, on 08.05.2023, the Petitioner received a letter from the Respondents to provide necessary documents, which were accordingly provided by her. On 12.01.2021, hearing was conducted by the DDoE, Kolhapur and after a gap of about 3 years i.e., 16.02.2024, an order invalidating her claim to the Old Pension Scheme was passed by the DDoE, Kolhapur. It is this order which is impugned in the present Petition on the grounds stated in the Petition.

4. We have heard Mr. Sagar Mane, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. B.V. Samant, learned Additional Government Pleader, with Mr. V. M. Mali, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the Respondents-State.

5. The Learned counsel for the Petitioner, by taking us through the impugned order, submits that the DDoE, Kolhapur gravely erred in relying on the Government Resolution dated 31.10.2005, as the same would not be applicable to the present Petitioner, since she was appointed in the year 1998, i.e., much before the said Government Resolution.

6. He further states that the impugned order does not take into consideration the binding precedent as stated in the Judgment dated 07.09.2021 in Writ Petition No.3696 of 2021 in the matter of Renuka Chandrabhan Umredkar Versus State of Maharashtra and Ors. By relying on the said Judgment, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the facts of the said matter and the ratio laid down therein by a Co-ordinate bench of this Court are squarely applicable in the present case.

7. It is his further submission that it ought to have been appreciated by the DDoE, Kolhapur that the total period of service of the Petitioner was 20 years and 3 months i.e., 16 years as a full-time Assistant Teacher and 4 years and 1 month as a Part-Time Teacher, and therefore the benefit of the Old Pension Scheme ought to have been granted to the Petitioner. He therefore prays that the order be quashed and set aside and the benefit of the Old Pension Scheme be granted to the Petitioner.

8. Per contra, the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the Respondent-State Authorities opposes the contentions made by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. Even though he does not dispute the ratio of the Judgments of this Court, including the Judgment of Renuka Chandrabhan Umredkar (supra), he disputes the same on facts. He submits that none of those Judgments take into consideration the Rule 19 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981(hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules of 1981’), as also Rule 30 and Rule 57(a) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 and the effect thereof on the case of the Petitioner. He therefore submits that the Petition is lacking merit and is liable to be dismissed.

9. The learned Additional Government Pleader has relied upon various Judgments to support his contentions. The list of which are as under :

                    (a) Jayshree wd/o Narayan Mhaske Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., 2005 (3) Mh.L.J. 492 (09.02.2005)

                    (b) Shivappa Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2005(6) BomCR437 (date of Judgment 7.04.05)

                    (c) Homraj Hansaram Bisen Vs State of Maharashtra 2005(6) BomCR437 (20.11.2012)

                    (d) Dnyaneshwar s/o Shankarrao Marotkar Vs. State of Maharashtra W.P. No.2087 of 2012 (07.12.2012) (Bombay High Court, Nagpur)

                    (e) Jyoti Prakash Chougule Vs State of Maharashtra. 2014 SCC Online Bom 5114 (07.01.2014)

                    (f) Shalini Asaram Akkarbote Vs State of Maharashtra Writ Petition No.8289 of 2013 (29.04.2014)

                    (g) Satish Ganpatrao Patil Vs State of Maharashtra MANU/MH/0547/2015. Writ Petition No. 2311 of 2013 (31.03.2015)

                    (h) Mone Rashmi Shriram Vs. State of Maharashtra 2017(6) Mh.L.J. 570 (04.05.2017)

                    (i) Darshana Adikrao Gailwad Vs State of Maharashtra AIRONLINE 2018 BOM 532 (09.10.2018)

                    (j) Deshmukh Dilipkumar Bhagwan and Ors. Vs State of Maharashtra. 2019(3) Mh.L.J.903 (30.04.2019)

                    (k) Deshmukh Dilipkumar Bhagwan and Ors. Vs The State of Maharashtra. W.P. No. 8387 of 2013 (26.08.2019) Bombay High Court, Principal Bench.

                    (l) Murlidhar Mahadeo Godbole Vs State of Maharashtra Writ Petition No. 1574 of 2017 (04.01.2020)

                    (m) Prema Narsinha Herkal Vs State of Maharashtra Writ Petition No. 3719 of 2019 (11.03.2020)

                    (n) Purshottam Shirsekar Vs State of Maharashtra 2022(2) Mh.L.J. 390 (25.08.2021)

                    (o) Kalpana Dahiwale Vs. State WP No. 1673 of 2021 (04.08.2021)

                    (p) Vina Upasani Vs. State W.P. No. 3386 of 2021 (04.08.2021).

                    (q) Renuka Umredkar Vs. State W.P. No. 3696 of 2021 (07.09.2021)

                    (r) Nilesh Namdev Gurav Vs State of Maharashtra 18 2022(3) Mh.L.J 615 (01.10.2021)

                    (s) Anil Popat Chobhe Vs State of Maharashtra 2022(5) ALLMR 651 (24.08.2022)

                    (t) Sunil Subhash Ekhande Vs State of Maharashtra 2023(6) ABR255 (01.08.2023)

                    (u) Babaso Ganpati Awate Vs. State of Maharashtra W.P. No. 3796 of 2021 (9.10.2024) Bombay High Court

                    (v) Municipal Corp. of Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101.

                    (w) A-One Granite Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (2001) 3 SCC 537

                    (x) Union of India and others Vs. Dhanwanti Devi & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 44.

                    (y) Sarva Shramik Sanghatana Vs. State of Mah. & Ors. (2008) 1 SCC 494

10. As far as the Judgments of Jayshree wd/o Narayan Mhaske Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra), Shivappa Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra), Homraj Hansaram Bisen Vs State of Maharashtra (supra), Jyoti Prakash Chougule Vs State of Maharashtra (supra) and Shalini Asaram Akkarbote Vs State of Maharashtra (supra) is concerned, the said Judgments have stated that the period of service of the employee who was working on a part- time basis has to be considered. However, it is the primary contention of the learned Additional Government Pleader that the said Judgments do not take into consideration Rule 57 (a) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982. He heavily relies on a judgment in Writ Petition No.2311 of 2013, dated 31.03.2015, of the Aurangabad Bench of this Court, in Satish Ganpatrao Patil Vs State of Maharashtra (supra). Furthermore, the judgments in Mone Rashmi Shriram Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra), Deshmukh Dilip Bhagwan Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) are concerned, the same are also on the identical lines.

11. Heavy reliance is also placed on the Judgment of Satish Ganpatrao Patil Vs State of Maharashtra (supra). By relying on the said judgment, it is the contention of the learned Additional Government Pleader that the judgment expressly refers to the judgment of Shivappa Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra) and states that the ratio is misplaced. However, a careful perusal of the Judgment of the Satish Ganpatrao Patil (supra) would reveal that the facts therein were totally different. In the said case, the Petitioners were working as part-time librarians in different aided schools situated at different places in District Latur. A committee was constituted by the State which considered the strength of student as the basis of appointments for full-time or part-time librarians in various schools. The committee recommended that the strength of school for appointment of Part-time librarians was scaled down from a minimum of 1000 students per school to 500 students. Accordingly, a Government Resolution was issued and part-time librarians like that of the Petitioners therein were absorbed as full-time librarians. However, even though they were absorbed as per Clause 3 of the said Government Resolution, the appointments were treated as fresh appointments. The grievance of the Petitioners was that the said Government Resolution does not carry a retrospective effect and thus the past service as part-time librarians shall not have retrospective effect of the salary scale. In that context, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court stated that the reliance placed on the Judgment of this Court in the case of Shivappa Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra) is misplaced. Furthermore, the co-ordinate Bench states that in the case of Shivappa Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra), the issue was that the Zilla Parishad had rejected the claim of the employee for pensionary benefits stating that he had put less than ten years of service and thereby applying Note 2 of the Rule 57 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982. The court held that the Note 2 was wrongly applied and the case falls under Note 1 of the Rule 57 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982. The court went on to record that the facts in Satish Ganpatrao Patil (supra) case are different from that of Shivappa Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra) case. Thus, the reliance placed by the learned Additional Government Pleader on Satish Ganpatrao Patil (supra) case that a co-ordinate bench has taken a different view is entirely misplaced.

12. The learned Additional Government Pleader has also relied on a judgment of Full Bench in Deshmukh Dilipkumar Bhagwan and Ors. Vs State of Maharashtra(2019 (3) Mh.L.J.). However, the relevant question which was before the full bench were regarding the entitlements of schools and colleges receiving less than 100% grant-in-aid, i.e. whether they can also be termed as aided institutions. Other ancillary questions were also before the Full Bench which would not be of relevance in the present case. After taking into consideration the entire case law, the issue was answered that only those institutions which are receiving 100% grant-in-aid from the State can be termed as an aided institution. However, in the same judgment, Rule 19 of the Rules of 1981 has also been considered which is also a line of defense of the learned Additional Government Pleader. As has been held by the Full Bench that Rule 19 of the Rules of 1981, only recognizes the right of the employees of the aided schools and colleges to receive pension at the rates and in accordance with the rules as sanctioned by the Government to the employees of such schools. The said Rule does not prescribe any pension scheme, it only refers to payment of pension at such rates and in accordance with such rules as sanctioned by the Government. Thus, the second limb of the defense of the learned Additional Government Pleader relying on Rule 19 of Rules of 1981 has also been answered against the Government in the said Full Bench Judgment. The other judgments on which reliance is placed by the learned Additional Government Pleader and more particularly the judgment of Sunil Subhash Ekhande Vs State of Maharashtra (supra) and the companion Writ Petitions, judgment in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur (supra) and A-One Granite Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (supra) are concerned, the same are relating to the scope of precedential value of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the law regarding per incuriam and sub silentio.

13. The propositions in that judgments are well known and cannot be disputed. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in A-One Granite Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (supra), relying on earlier judgment in State of U.P. Vs. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.((1991) 4 SCC 139) in para 12 is reproduced as under-

                    “A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141.”

Furthermore, in para 13 of the same judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court relying on Arnit Das V. State of Bihar((2000) 5 SCC 488), stated as under-

                    “a decision not expressed, not accompanied by reasons and not proceeding on a conscious consideration of an issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. That which has escaped in the judgment is not the ratio decidendi. This is the rule of sub silentio, in the technical sense when a particular point of law was not consciously determined.”

14. Taking support from the abovementioned judgments, it is the submission of the learned Additional Government Pleader that the judgments of Jayshree and Ors. (supra) do not lay down a binding precedent in view of the judgment of Satish Patil (supra). However, in our considered opinion, the judgment of Satish Patil (supra) proceeded on entirely different premise as has been elaborated by us above.

15. We have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned counsels for the respective parties and gone through the record with their able assistance.

16. The only question which falls for our consideration is whether the Petitioner would be entitled for the old Pension Scheme or the DCP Scheme in view of the fact that the Petitioner was continuously working as a part-time teacher for a period of 8 years and 2 months. The Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 were framed by the State of Maharashtra in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India.

17. Rule 9(39) defines ‘Pensionable Service’ as meaning thereby the said service which qualifies the Government servant performing it to receive a pension from the Consolidated Fund.

18. Rule 30 is with regard to ‘Commencement of Qualifying Service’ and states that the qualifying service of a government servant shall commence from the date he takes charge of the post to which he is first appointed, either substantively or in an officiating or temporary capacity.

19. Rule 57 is in the nature of an exception to Rule 30 and carves out various exceptions regarding ‘Non-pensionable Service’.

20. The learned Additional Government Pleader has relied on clause (a) of Rule 57 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, which contemplates that the government servants who are paid for work done for the government but whose whole time is not retained for the public service would not be considered to be in pensionable service.

21. Relying on this provision, it is the submission of learned Additional Government Pleader that since admittedly the Petitioner was employed as a part-time teacher for a period of 4 years and 1 month, (one half of the period from July 1998 to September 2006), she would not be entitled for the benefit of the Old Pension Scheme.

22. We are hardly impressed by the contentions canvassed by the learned Additional Government Pleader, since the said contention does not take into consideration Note 1 appended to the said Rule 57. Note 1 clearly states that in cases of employees paid from contingencies who are subsequently brought on a regular pensionable establishment by conversion of their posts, one half of their previous continuous service shall be allowed to count for pension. It is, thus, clear from the narration of Note 1 that those employees who were subsequently brought on a regular pensionable establishment by conversion of their posts, one half of their previous continuous service would be allowed to count for pension.

23. There remains yet another aspect that is to be considered. Rule 57 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, cannot be considered and interpretated in isolation or as a standalone position. The said Rules would have to be read in its entirety and would have to be interpreted in the backdrop of the purpose/object with which they are made. Rule 35 provides for counting of leaves for pension. Rule 36 provides for counting of probationary period for pension. Rule 49 provides for service of Government servant paid by piece-work to be treated as pensionable. Rule 38 provides for counting of service on contract as pensionable on fulfillment of certain contingencies mentioned therein.

24. For a clearer comprehension it is beneficial to understand the meaning of the terms, ‘piece-work’ and ‘part-time employment’. The term ‘piece-work’ as defined in the ‘Advanced Law Lexicon, Vol. - 3’ meaning thereby that work that is paid per unit of output (instead of per hour of time worked). By linking earnings to output, the worker is given an incentive to increase productivity. The term “part-time employment’ as defined in ‘Advanced Law Lexicon, Vol. - 3’, meaning thereby a long-term employment that entails an employee putting in less that a full working week. Thus, a conjoint reading of aforementioned rules and definitions in the backdrop of the legislative intent would make the scheme of the Rules clear. As stated supra, if a piece-work employment and probationary period can be considered as a qualifying service for pension, there is no reason that a person working on a part-time aided post in an aided institution can be denied such benefit. Thus, Note 1 appended to the Rule 57 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, would squarely apply in case of part-time employee working on an aided post in a fully aided institution.

25. Another aspect is the doctrine of Stare Decisis. The Hon’ble Apex Court, by a long line of judgments, has elaborated that a judgment cannot be read in isolation, keeping its facts away. It has to be understood in the backdrop of the factual matrix of the case. A beneficial reference can be drawn from the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sarva Shramik Sangathana (supra), more particularly in following paragraphs:

                    “14. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn v. LeathemZ: (All ER p. 7 G-I)

                    "Before discussing Allen v. Flood and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make; and one is to repeat what I have very often said before-that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.

                    (emphasis supplied)

                    We entirely agree with the above observations.

                    15. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat (vide SCC p. 221, para 18) this Court observed:

                    "18. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.

                    16. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. (vide SCC p. 130, para 59) this Court observed:

                    "59. It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision."

                    (emphasis supplied)

                    17. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9 -12),

                    "9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton (AC at p. 761), Lord MacDermott observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D)

                    'The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge, ...'

                    10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. Lord Reid said, 'Lord Atkin's speech is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.' (All ER p. 297g)

                    Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2), observed: (All ER p. 1274d)

                    'One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament;'

                    And, in British Railways Board v. Herrington Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761c)

                    'There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.'

                    11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

                    12. The following words of Hidayatullah, J. in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT10-a, AIR p. 688, para 19)

                    19. Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.'

                    Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." "

                    (emphasis supplied)

26. Furthermore, in the very judgment relied on by the learned Additional Government Pleader, and more particularly in the Judgment of Union of India and Ors. Vs. Dhanwanti Devi & Ors. (supra), the law regarding binding precedent is elaborately discussed. In paragraph 9 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court records as under-

                    “……that the only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates - (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent.”

27. Furthermore, in the same judgment, in para 10, the Hon’ble Apex Court states as under-

                    “Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which was to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law.”

Thus, it is very clear that the judgments cannot be read as statutes.

28. It is amply clear that the judgment in Satish Patil(supra), which is tried to be put into service and to buttress the point that the other judgments do not lay down a law as has been canvassed by the learned Additional Government Pleader is without any substance. As can be seen from the series of judgments from way back in 2005, consistent view of this Court is that if an employee has rendered a service on a part-time post which is in a fully aided school and the post was sanctioned, the benefit of the said part-time service has to be granted to the Petitioner. The reliance placed by the learned Additional Government Pleader on Rule 57 clause (a) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 is entirely misconceived since Note 1 of the said Rule 57 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 , according to us, is the answer to the situation in hand. As has been observed by the earlier division Benches of this Court, there is no specific provision for part-time employees in the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982. However, a meaningful reading of the said Rules in the light of the settled propositions of law is that pension is a right and not a bounty. The Rules are supposed to be interpreted in favour of the employee in case of any ambiguity. Thus, Note -1 of Rule 57 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, which states that employees who are paid from contingencies and who are subsequently brought on a regular pensionable establishment by conversion of their post, one half of their previous continuous service shall be allowed to counted for pension squarely applies in the situation in hand.

29. From the facts stated (supra), along with the length of service of the Petitioner, which is not disputed, we are of the considered opinion that the case of the Petitioner squarely falls within Note 1 of the Rule 57 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982. The exception sought to be carved out by the learned Additional Government Pleader is that the said part-time service would not be considered as a pensionary service, since it was only part-time and not full-time, is liable to be rejected in view of Note 1 of Rule 57 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982.

30. As far as Rule 19 of the Rules of 1981 is concerned, the same would not be applicable here, since the said Rule clearly states that the employees appointed on or after the dates mentioned in the said Rule shall be eligible for pension in accordance with the rule as sanctioned by the Government specifically to the employees of Privates Schools. Thus, in the instant case, the Maharashtra Civil Service (Pensions) Rules, 1982 would cover the issue and not Rule 19 of Rules of 1981, which is more or less generic in nature.

31. We find support for our view in the Judgment of Renuka Chandrabhan Umredkar (supra), which, after considering the entire earlier judgments on the said issue, lays down that the benefit of the part-time service i.e., half of the length of service, has to be calculated.

32. We are in respectful agreement with the Judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench (supra) as also the Judgment in Writ Petition No.5421 of 2017 of the Nagpur Bench of this Court in Smt. Darshana wd/o Adikrao Gaikwad Versus State of Maharashtra.

33. In the Judgment of Renuka Chandrabhan Umredkar (supra) the facts were more or less identical, since for some period of time, the Petitioner therein came to be engaged on a part-time basis on an aided post. The same are the facts of the present case, the College in question is admittedly an aided institution and the post was a sanctioned post. Moreover, one glaring fact which also needs to be noticed is that the approval was granted on 30.12.2006 to the Petitioner with effect from 18.09.2006. It is, thus, clear that even the Respondent-Authorities were not having any quarrel about the fact that the Petitioner was appointed on a clear sanctioned and aided post and was therefore duly approved by the College. The reasons stated in the order impugned are, therefore, unsustainable. We, therefore, pass the following order:

ORDER

a) The Writ Petition is allowed.

b) The order dated 16.02.2024 passed by the Respondent No.4 is quashed and set aside.

c) It is declared that the Petitioner is entitled to get pensionary benefits as per the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, i.e. Old Pension Scheme for a total period of 20 years and 3 months, including 16 years 2 months as full time Assistant Teacher and half of the continuous qualifying service to the post of part-time Teacher i.e. 4 years and 1 month.

d) Respondents are further directed to release all pensionary benefits as per the Old Pension Scheme in favour of the Petitioner within a period of three months from the date of this Order.

e) Writ Petition is disposed of. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.