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CDJ 2026 APHC 1069 My Notes print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Andhra Pradesh
Case No : Writ Petition No. 27025 of 2023
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
Parties : Katla Venkaiah Versus The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep.By It\'s Principal Secretary Department For Women, Guntur & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: D. Krishna Murthy, Advocate. For the Respondent: Government Pleader for Women Dev Child Welfare, V.V. Lakshmi Narayana, Advocate.
Date of Judgment : 24-06-2026
Head Note :-
Constitution of India - Article 226 -
Judgment :-

(Prayer: Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased topleased to issue a Writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari calling for the records in O.P. No.2 of 2019 dated 07.09.2023 on the file of Tribunal for Maintenance of Parents and Senior Citizens, Narasaraopet Division, Guntur District. and quash the same as illegal, arbitrary and without Jurisdiction and pass

IA NO: 1 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to suspend impunged order in O.P. No.2 of 2019 dated 07.09.2023 on the file of Tribunal for Maintenance of Parents and Senior Citizens, Narasaraopet Division, Guntur District. and quash the same as illegal, arbitrary and without Jurisdiction and pass

IA NO: 1 OF 2024

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to fix an early date for hearing of the above petition, and pass)

1. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue Writ of Certiorari, calling for records in O.P.No.2 of 2019 dated 07.09.2023 on the file of Tribunal for Maintenance of Parents and Senior Citizens, Narasaraopet Division, Guntur District and quash the same as illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner and Respondent No. 3 are son and mother. Respondent No. 3 filed an application on 16.02.2019 before the Tribunal under Section 4(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the Rules framed thereunder, seeking relief against the petitioner. Notices were issued to both parties. Respondent No. 3 stated before the Tribunal that she had suffered from COVID-19 and a brain stroke. During the enquiry, she alleged that the petitioner had taken her property but failed to look after her needs and requested the authorities to take appropriate action and render justice.

3. The Tribunal noted that Respondent No. 3 is a resident of Narasaraopet and is presently residing with her younger daughter, Smt. B. Sridevi. She has one son and two daughters. Her elder daughter and son-in-law had passed away several years ago. Respondent No. 3 had executed Gift Deed No. 9958/2011 dated 08.06.2011, transferring her ancestral land measuring Ac. 2.00 cents situated in Jonnalagadda Village, Narasaraopet Mandal, in favour of the petitioner. According to her, she did so believing the petitioner's assurance that he would take care of her in the future. However, after obtaining the property, the petitioner neglected her welfare and maintenance. She therefore requested cancellation of the gift deed and restoration of the property to her.

4. An enquiry was conducted by the Tahsildar, Narasaraopet, who submitted a detailed report to the Tribunal on 08.08.2023. The report stated that Respondent No. 3 was residing with her daughter, Smt. B. Sridevi, who was taking care of her medical expenses and other needs and had expressed willingness to continue supporting her in the future. The report further recorded that the petitioner had stated his willingness to provide shelter, medical care, and other amenities if Respondent No. 3 chose to reside at Jonnalagadda and a house maid also would be appointed to lookafter her.

5. After hearing both parties and considering the Tahsildar's report, the Tribunal observed that Respondent No. 3 had transferred the property to the petitioner with the expectation that he would maintain and care for her, but he had failed to do so. The Tribunal concluded that the petitioner had obtained the property by taking advantage of her trust and that the gift deed was liable to be cancelled. Accordingly, exercising powers under Section 23(1) of the Act, the Tribunal declared the gift deed is void and directed the Sub-Registrar, Narasaraopet, to take steps for cancellation of the document in accordance with law. Aggrieved by the said order dated 07.09.2023 passed in O.P. No. 2/2019-D, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.

6. During the hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner's wife had passed away after a prolonged illness, due to which he was unable to personally attend to the needs of Respondent No. 3. Consequently, Respondent No. 3 began residing with her younger daughter, Smt. B. Sridevi. It was further submitted that the petitioner had constructed a new house to provide accommodation for his mother and was willing to pay maintenance of Rs. 20,000/- per month, along with arranging a housemaid, if required, for the remainder of her life. The petitioner denied the allegations that he had neglected or driven Respondent No. 3 out of the house and asserted that he had always been concerned about her welfare.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Tribunal's order is contrary to Section 23(1) of the Act and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Vanitha v. Commissioner ((2021) 1 SCC 730). It was submitted that Respondent No. 3 had executed the gift deed in 2011 purely out of love and affection and without imposing any condition requiring the petitioner to maintain herself or look after her wellbeing. Therefore, in the absence of such a condition, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to cancel the gift deed under Section 23(1) of the Act.

8. Learned counsel also relied on statements given by three villagers, who stated that the petitioner had been willing to look after Respondent No. 3, but she had chosen to reside with her younger daughter. It was argued that the Tribunal's order is liable to be set aside because: (i) it is contrary to the law laid down in S. Vanitha v. Commissioner; and (ii) the essential conditions contemplated under Section 23(1) of the Act were not satisfied.

9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 3 submitted that, admittedly, Respondent No. 3 had been residing with her younger daughter for a considerable period. Although the application was filed in 2019 and remained pending until 2023, the petitioner had not taken any meaningful steps to ensure her welfare during that period. Apart from making assurances before the Tribunal and filing statements from certain villagers, the petitioner had not provided any actual support or maintenance.

10. It was further submitted that Respondent No. 3 had consistently maintained that the petitioner failed to care take of her after execution of the gift deed in 2011. It is undisputed that she has been living with her younger daughter for many years, and there is no evidence showing that the petitioner had provided for her welfare after receiving the gifted property. Counsel argued that the Tribunal, after considering the material on record, rightly concluded that the petitioner had failed to provide the basic amenities and necessities required for Respondent No. 3's well-being. Therefore, the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in cancelling the gift deed to protect the interests of the senior citizen. It was also submitted that the judgment relied upon by the petitioner had subsequently been overruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

11. Heard the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue appearing for Respondent No. 2, and learned counsel for Respondent No. 3, and perused the material available on record.

12. A bare perusal of the record shows that Respondent No. 3, is an 80-year-old senior citizen and mother of the petitioner, executed a gift deed in the year 2011 in respect of Ac. 2.00 cents of land in Sy. No. 341/1 of Jonnalagadda Village, Palnadu District, in favour of the petitioner. The gift deed was executed after the enactment of the 2007 Act. The recitals of the deed indicate that the transfer was made voluntarily, without consideration, and out of love and affection for her only son, with the intention of securing his welfare and livelihood. However, the deed does not contain any specific condition requiring the petitioner to maintain or care and well being of Respondent No. 3.

13. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the petitioner, in the absence of any express condition in the gift deed requiring the petitioner to maintain or look after the transferor, as contemplated under Section 23(1) of the Act, the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to cancel the gift deed. Its powers would be limited to considering claims for maintenance and other facilities necessary for the welfare and well-being of Respondent No. 3.

14. In Sudesh Chhikara vs. Ramti Devi ((2024) 14 SCC 225), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

               “When a senior citizen parts with his or her property by executing a gift or a release or otherwise in favour of his or her near and dear ones, a condition of looking after the senior citizen is not necessarily attached to it. On the contrary, very often, such transfers are made out of love and affection without any expectation in return. Therefore, when it is alleged that the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 23 are attached to a transfer, existence of such conditions must be established before the Tribunal. Careful perusal of the petition under Section 23 filed by respondent no.1 shows that it is not even pleaded that the release deed was executed subject to a condition that the transferees (the daughters of respondent no.1) would provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to respondent no.1. Even in the impugned order dated 22nd May 2018 passed by the Maintenance Tribunal, no such finding has been recorded. It seems that oral evidence was not adduced by the parties. As can be seen from the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, immediately after a reply was filed by the appellant that the petition was fixed for arguments. Effecting transfer subject to a condition of providing the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor – senior citizen is sine qua non for applicability of sub-section (1) of Section 23. In the present case, as stated earlier, it is not even pleaded by respondent no.1 that the release deed was executed subject to such a condition.”

15. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal is without recording any reasons and without jurisdiction. In Kranti Associates Private Limited vs. Masood Ahmed Khan ((2010) 9 SCC 496) the Hon’ble Supreme held as follows:

               “Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds:

               a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

               c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

               d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

               e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

               f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

               g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts.

               h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

               j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process.

               m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737).

               n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".

               o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process".

16. On perusal of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, referred supra, it is clear and categorical that, the Tribunal/Respondent No.2 is vested with the jurisdiction not only for ordering cancellation of gift deeds, in the event of failure to comply with the objects of the Act, as enumerated under Section 23(1) of the Act, and also the Tribunal is vested with the power to evict the beneficiary from the subject property and to hand over the same to the transferor.

17. On perusal of the order impugned in the writ petition, it is with sufficient reasons and after due enquiry and also after considering the detailed affidavit as well as statements submitted by the petitioner herein and his henchmen, who are the villagers. The Tribunal rightly came to a conclusion that the petitioner herein has failed to provide the amenities and necessities and well-being of the Respondent No.3/mother which amounts to violation of Section 23 of the Act.

18. As per the rulings laid down, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Tribunal ought not to have passed an order of cancellation of Gift Deed, the order is not valid and sustainable, in view of the latest ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Urmila Dixit vs. Sunil Sharan Dixit and others ((2025) 2 SCC 787), wherein it was held as follows:

               20. In Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi and Anr.10, this Court refused to grant the benefit of Section 23 in the absence of an averment that the transfer in question was subject to a condition for maintenance of the parents. It was observed:

               “14. When a senior citizen parts with his or her property by executing a gift or a release or otherwise in favour of his or her near and dear ones, a condition of looking after the senior citizen is not necessarily attached to it. On the contrary, very often, such transfers are made out of love and affection without any expectation in return. Therefore, when it is alleged that the conditions mentioned in sub- section (1) of Section 23 are attached to a transfer, existence of such conditions must be established before the Tribunal.” (emphasis supplied)

               21. Furthermore, in Sudesh (supra) for attracting the application of Section 23(1), the following essentials were expounded:

               (a) The transfer must have been made subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor; and

               (b) The transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor.

               22. Adverting to the facts at hand, we find that there are two documents on record. One, a promissory note dated 07.09.2019 which records that the promisor (Respondent) shall serve the Appellant and her husband till the end of their life, and in the absence of him fulfilling such obligation, the subsequent deed can be taken back by the Appellant. Second, the Gift Deed dated 07.09.2019 also records a similar condition, i.e. the donee maintains the donor, and the former makes all necessary provisions for the peaceful life of the Appellant-donor. Both these documents were signed simultaneously.

               23. The Appellant has submitted before us that such an undertaking stands grossly unfulfilled, and in her petition under Section 23, it has been averred that there is a breakdown of peaceful relations inter se the parties. In such a situation, the two conditions mentioned in Sudesh (supra) must be appropriately interpreted to further the beneficial nature of the legislation and not strictly which would render otiose the intent of the legislature. Therefore, the Single Judge of the High Court and the tribunals below had rightly held the Gift Deed to be cancelled since the conditions for the well-being of the senior citizens were not complied with. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench, because it takes a strict view of a beneficial legislation.

               24. Before parting with the case at hand, we must clarify the observations made vide the impugned order qua the competency of the Tribunal to hand over possession of the property. In S. Vanitha (supra), this Court observed that Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted under the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23, cannot order possession to be transferred. This would defeat the purpose and object of the Act, which is to provide speedy, simple and inexpensive remedies for the elderly.

               25. Another observation of the High Court that must be clarified, is Section 23 being a standalone provision of the Act. In our considered view, the relief available to senior citizens under Section 23 is intrinsically linked with the statement of objects and reasons of the Act, that elderly citizens of our country, in some cases, are not being looked after. It is directly in furtherance of the objectives of the Act and empowers senior citizens to secure their rights promptly when they transfer a property subject to the condition of being maintained by the transferee.”

19. A reading of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above makes it clear that the Tribunal is empowered not only to cancel a gift deed where the transferee fails to fulfill the obligations contemplated under Section 23(1) of the Act, but also to direct eviction of the beneficiary from the property and restore possession to the transferor, wherever necessary to protect the interests of the senior citizen.

20. On examining the impugned order, it is evident that the Tribunal passed the same after conducting a detailed enquiry and considering the affidavits, statements, and other material placed on record by the petitioner and the villagers supporting him. Upon such consideration, the Tribunal rightly concluded that the petitioner had failed to provide the necessary care, amenities, and support required for the welfare of Respondent No. 3, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 23 of the Act.

21. The material on record clearly shows that since the execution of the gift deed in 2011, the petitioner has not been taking care of the welfare and well-being of Respondent No. 3. It is undisputed that Respondent No. 3 has been residing with her younger daughter, Smt. B. Sridevi, and this fact has been admitted by the petitioner himself. Further, apart from making assurances and filing affidavits before the Tribunal, the petitioner has not demonstrated that he took any concrete steps, either before the filing of the application, during its pendency, or even after the Tribunal's decision, to provide maintenance or otherwise ensure the well-being of Respondent No. 3. Even the affidavits and statements relied upon by him indicate only a willingness to provide accommodation and maid services, if required, and do not reflect any commitment towards personal care or support his mother.

22. At an advanced age, senior citizens generally derive comfort, emotional support, and dignity from being cared for by their own family members rather than by hired attendants. In the present case, Respondent No.3, being more than 80 years old, has chosen to reside with her younger daughter, who has been taking care of her needs. Therefore, the petitioner's contention that Respondent No. 3 could be adequately looked after in a separate house with the assistance of a maid cannot, by itself, be considered a satisfactory fulfillment of his obligation towards her welfare and well-being.

23. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the order passed by Respondent No. 2/Tribunal is legal, valid, and in accordance with the provisions of the Act. No ground is made out for interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

24. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.

25. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand dismissed.

 
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