1. Present writ petition is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India seeking following relief:

               “to issue any writ order or direction, particularly one in the nature of MANDAMUS, declaring all the proceedings commencing from No.A/Per/Appeal/ MPRR/2002, dt.23.12.2002, as confirmed by the 1st Respondent under Proceedings C-16011/3/2003/ PE-1, dt.16.11.2004, as communicated by the 2nd respondent under Order No.QPER/DCell/Admn/ MPRR/15/0371, dt.07.01.2005, as arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction and set aside the same and direct payment of all the monetary benefits duly treating my husband as retired on reaching the age of superannuation and pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.”

2. (a) Petitioner’s husband was working as Secretary, Visakhapatnam Port Trust. He was served with charge memo attributing various irregularities committed by misusing his official position while selecting certain of the candidates for the posts of clerks. The departmental enquiry ultimately ended in petitioner’s husband being removed from service by proceedings dated 05.02.1999.

               (b) Challenging the same, W.P. No.4113 of 1999 was preferred on the ground that the proceedings were conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. By order dated 08.06.2001, the writ petition came to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of dismissal. The respondent Port Trust preferred W.A. No.1585 of 2001, which eventually came to be dismissed vide order dated 15.10.2001. However, in further appeal before Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.8238 of 2001, the matter came to be remanded back to the disciplinary authority with a direction to continue the enquiry from the stage where proceedings were held to be improperly conducted. (c) Eventually, the enquiry came to be completed and by order dated 23.12.2002, the disciplinary authority once again imposed penalty of dismissal from service from 31.03.2001. The petitioner’s husband attained age of superannuation on the said date of 31.03.2001. Aggrieved by the same, he preferred appeal before the 1st respondent on 04.02.2003. By impugned order dated 07.01.2005, the 2nd respondent has intimated that appeal so preferred came to be rejected by the 1st respondent, however, ordered for payment of subsistence allowance for the period from 05.02.1999 to 30.03.2001.

               (d) Assailing the same, present writ petition is preferred.

3. Heard Sri K.R.S.Prakash Rao, learned counsel, representing Smt.A.V.S.Laxmi, learned counsel for petitioner on record. Despite service of notice, none appears for respondents and have not filed any counter so far.

4. As the matter is of the year 2005, this Court is not inclined to wait for the respondents to file counter any more.

5. Perused the record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for petitioner.

6. The facts narrated above are not in controversy. Petitioner’s husband suffered order of dismissal not once but twice. In the earlier ground of litigation, the order of dismissal from service came to be interdicted by this Court, which was later got confirmed by the Division Bench. However, in appeal, the Hon’ble Apex Court has remanded the matter back with following observation:

               “We, therefore, maintain the order and judgment of the High Court on the ground that principles of natural justice were not complied with by the enquiry officer and permit the enquiry officer to proceed with the enquiry from the stage it was held to be vitiated by the High Court. During the pendency of the proceedings, the respondent superannuated. The retirement of the respondent herein shall be subject to the result of such enquiry, which may be undertaken by the appellant.”

7. Eventually, the disciplinary authority has embarked on the enquiry and by order dated 23.12.2002, yet again, punishment of dismissal from service came to be awarded. The said order being appealable before 1st respondent, petitioner’s husband chose to prefer appeal on 04.02.2003. But curiously, the order dated 07.01.2005, which is communicated by the disciplinary authority on behalf of the appellate authority, merely intimates the decision being made by the appellate authority. It is not known as to whether any separate order was passed by the appellate authority.

8. Be that as it may, it is the case of petitioner that no such order ever came to be communicated and the only order that was communicated being the one dated 07.01.2005, under challenge. Aforesaid order does not set out the reasons as to why appeal came to be disposed of.

9. On perusal of record, it is very much apparent that petitioner’s husband preferred appeal which nearly ran into 63 pages, therefore, the appellate authority, before passing any order, ought to have given the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and recorded reasons in support of its decision.

10. It is trite law that recording or providing reasons by quasi-judicial authority is basic requirement as the aggrieved party is required to know the reasons on which the decision has been made for the purpose of assailing it before higher forums. In Kranti Associate (P) Limited v. Masood Ahmed Khan ((2010) 9 SCC 496), the Hon’ble Apex Court at Paragraphs 12 and 47 held as follows:

               "12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognised a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262: AIR 1970 SC 150]

               47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:

               (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

               (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

               (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

               (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

               (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

               (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

               (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

               (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

               (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

               (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

               (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

               (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubberstamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

               (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decisionmaking not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 73137].)

               (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence.

               (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.”

11. As seen from the record, it is very much apparent that the petitioner’s husband passed away on 17.05.2004, after filing of appeal on 04.02.2003. Immediately, thereafter, writ petitioner by letter dated 30.06.2004, brought the same to the notice of 1st respondent and also requested to consider the appeal and pass orders expeditiously. Only thereafter, the 2nd respondent has, by order dated 07.01.2005, communicated the decision of 1st respondent rejecting the appeal.

12. The procedure adopted by 1st respondent in dealing with appeal is clearly in violation of principles of natural justice. Firstly, 1st respondent ought to have heard the writ petitioner before embarking on disposal of the appeal. Further, even otherwise, as 1st respondent has not passed speaking order setting out reasons dealing with the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant in coming to final decision, the same also clearly stands vitiated.

13. For the reasons stated above, the order dated 07.01.2005 passed by 2nd respondent communicating the outcome of appeal, as decided by 1st respondent, is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the 1st respondent to reconsider the appeal. The 1st respondent shall provide an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner to represent the case either by herself or through appropriate legal counsel and thereafter pass a speaking order. The entire exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

14. Accordingly, this writ petition is disposed of. No costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending in this case, if any, shall stand closed.