Soumen Sen, C.J.

1. This writ petition has been filed in the nature of Habeas Corpus by the mother of the detenue, who is under preventive detention. In effect, this is an application challenging the order of detention passed by the State Authorities.

2. Heard Ms.M.Neema, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri.Biju Meenattoor, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner’s daughter was arrested in connection with below mentioned crimes:-Crime No.231 of 2025 of Aluva East Police Station, Ernakulam, Crime No.75 of 2025 of Palluruthy Police Station, Ernakulam, Crime No.50 of 2025 of Fort Kochi Police Station, Ernakulam, Crime No.33 of 2025 of Mattanchery Police Station, Ernakulam and Crime No.34 of 2025 of Mattanchery Police Station. In paragraph 4 of the writ petition, the petitioner has referred to five cases, in which the detenue was granted bail. It is contended that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and Ext.P1 detention order has already been snapped. The last prejudicial activity reported against the detenue is Crime No.50 of 2025 of Fort Kochi Police Station registered for offences under Sections 22(b), 8(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act. The said crime was registered against the detenue on 31.01.2025. However, the detention order was passed against the detenue only on 11.09.2025 , ie., almost after nine months from the date of last prejudicial activity. It is contended that there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in passing the detention order.

4. The 1st respondent has filed a counter affidavit. It is stated therein that the order of detention was passed after considering the proposal submitted to the Government of Kerala, by the Sponsoring Authority, the Deputy Commissioner of Police (L&O), Kochi City as per letter dated 29.03.2025. The said letter was forwarded to the Government by the State Police Chief vide letter dated 15.04.2025. The Government examined the proposal and placed the same before the Screening Committee constituted in this regard under the chairmanship of Law Secretary on 05.05.2025. The Screening Committee examined the same in detail and observed that the detenue is continuing in judicial custody and there is no chance of her coming out and becoming a threat to the society at that time. Hence, the Screening Committee concluded that both subjectively and objectively, the case does not warrant the issuance of detention order under Section 3(1) of the PIT NDPS Act, 1985 and did not recommend that proposal. The Screening Committee however also suggested to resubmit the proposal whenever she applies for bail. The Sponsoring authority, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Kochi City reported that the detenue filed bail application before the District and Sessions Court, Ernakulam on 29.05.2025 in Crime No.34 of 2025 of Mattanchery Police Station. Subsequently, bail was granted to the detenue by the Court on 02.06.2025. The Government examined the proposal again and placed the same before the Screening Committee constituted in this regard under the chairmanship of Law Secretary on 17.07.2025. This time, the Screening Committee on a subjective and objective satisfaction, found that the case to be a fit one for issuing order of detention under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act.

5. Later, the report of the Screening Committee was forwarded to the Screening Committee members and Sponsoring Authority concerned for getting their authentication and returned to the Government on 30.07.2025. The Government examined the proposal along with the opinion of the Screening Committee in detail, and ultimately, an order of detention was passed on 11.09.2025.

6. Pursuant to the direction, the recommendation of the Advisory Board is produced along with the reasons for the opinion. The Advisory Board accepted the recommendation for detention after taking into consideration that Crime No.231 of 2025 was committed on 31.01.2025 at 3.30 p.m, and hence, the said crime shall be considered to be the last crime. The said crime was under investigation and the detenue was found in possession of narcotic drugs in respect of the offences already registered under the NDPS Act. The detenue is thus found to be involved in drug trafficking. ‘Illicit trafficking’ has been defined under Section 2(viiib) of the Act. The previous crimes read with the last prejudicial act would show that the detenue has repeatedly engaged in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs. The purpose of preventive detention is to prevent the detenue from indulging in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs. The Advisory Board has taken taken into consideration 5 cases, that are reckoned by the detaining authority namely Crime No.33 of 2025 of Mattanchery Police Station, Ernakulam, Crime No.75 of 2025 of Palluruthy Police Station, Ernakulam, Crime No.50 of 2025 of Fort Kochi Police Station, Ernakulam, Crime No.34 of 2025 of Mattanchery Police Station and also Crime No.231 of 2025 of Aluva East Police Station. In respect of the four cases, trial has already commenced and in all such matters. Final Report has been filed before the Sessions Court, Ernakulam, whereas, in respect of Crime No.231 of 2025, as on the date of the opinion, the case was under investigation. The offences attract Sections 8, 22(c) and 20(B)IIA of the NDPS Act. In all the aforesaid matters, seizure took place on 30.01.2025. All these crimes are registered within two days, but in different police stations. At this stage we are required to find out whether on the basis of the materials on record, it was possible for the detaining authority and the Advisory Board to form a subjective satisfaction to pass an order of detention and in giving such order, whether such satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority are supported by reasons and corroborated by materials.

7. Coming to the contentions put forth on behalf of the petitioner, the main submission appears to be delay in disposing of the representation. This has been taken into consideration by the Advisory Board in paragraph 18 and being explained in the context of report filed by the authority concerned.

8. We note that the last crime being Crime No.34 of 2025 of Mattancherry Police Station are reported on 30-01-2025. Deputy Commissioner of Police, Kochi City, sponsoring authority recommended detention on 11-09-2025. Additional reports were filed on 05-06-2025 and 20-08-2025 calling for more details. It was forwarded to the Government by State Police Chief on 15-04-2025, 08-07-2025 and 26-08-2025. Government placed the matter before screening committee on 05-05-2025. It was rejected. When bail was granted, matter was placed again before the Screening Committee and it recommended detention on 17-07-2025. Report of the screening committee was received back on 30-07-2025. Detention was ordered on 11-09-2025. Reasonable time alone has thus been taken for passing the detention order. There is no delay. Even otherwise detenue is in judicial custody. Arrest was made on 22.09.2025 after obtaining the order from court.

9. Detenue even though granted bail in Crime No.34/2025, is in judicial custody in Crime No.33/2025, 75/2025, 50/2025 and Crime No.231/2025. The detenue was in judicial custody at the time of consideration by the Advisory Board. The sequence of events disclosed from the records indicates continuous processing of the matter through the various statutory and administrative stages without any unexplained hiatus or indifference on the part of the authorities. We are therefore satisfied that the time taken in the matter has been adequately explained. In the absence of any material to show lethargy, inaction or unexplained delay on the part of the authorities, we are unable to accept the contention that the live and proximate link between the prejudicial activities and the order of detention stood snapped.

10. The limited scope with which the Court shall approach an order of detention has been laid down in Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu and another ( (2012) 4 SCC 699] [(2012) 4 SCC 699] in which in paragraph 11, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

                  “It is well settled that the Court does not interfere with subjective satisfaction reached by the Detaining Authority except in exceptional and extremely limited grounds. The Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the Detaining Authority when the grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant, that sufficiency of grounds is not for the Court but for the Detaining Authority for the formation of subjective satisfaction that the detention of a person with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order is required and that such satisfaction is subjective and not objective. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive and further that the action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, normally, the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authority. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct in an exhaustive manner. The satisfaction of the Detaining Authority, therefore, is considered to be of primary importance with certain latitude in the exercise of its discretion.”

11. The said judgment has reiterated the principle that the object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive, but only preventive and further that the action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, normally, the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authority.

12. This principle has been laid down much earlier in Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B ((1975) 3 SCC 198) followed in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal and others ( (1975) 2 SCC 81)  . At this stage, it is worthwhile to refer the following passage from Haradhan Saha (supra) which reads as follows:

                  “32. The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution.

                  33. Article 14 is inapplicable because preventive detention and prosecution are not synonymous. The purposes are different. The authorities are different. The nature of proceedings is different. In a prosecution an accused is sought to be punished for a past act. In preventive detention, the past act is merely the material for inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part of the detenu.

                  34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject are many. The decisions in Borjahan Gorey v. State of W.B. [Borjahan Gorey v. State of W.B., (1972) 2 SCC 550 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 888 : (1973) 1 SCR 751] , Ashim Kumar Ray v. State of W.B. [Ashim Kumar Ray v. State of W.B., (1973) 4 SCC 76 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 723] , Abdul Aziz v. District Magistrate, Burdwan [Abdul Aziz v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, (1973) 1 SCC 301 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 321 : AIR 1973 SC 770] and Debu Mahato v. State of W.B. [DebuMahato v. State of W.B. [Debu Mahato v. State of W.B., (1974) 4 SCC 135 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 274] correctly lay down the principles to be followed as to whether a detention order is valid or not. The decision in Biram Chand v. State of U.P. [Biram Chand v. State of U.P., (1974) 4 SCC 573 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 609] , which is a Division Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. The principles which can be broadly stated are these. First, merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances.”

13. In fact, a Full Bench of this Court in Stenny Aleyamma Saju v. State of Kerala of Others ( 2017 (3) KHC 517 (FB) , while considering the provisions in the KAAPA Act held that, it is not necessary that investigation is completed in order to qualify for considering under the Act. This is because provisions in the Act are preventive and not punitive.

14. It follows from the dictum laid down in the above discussed precedents that the question before the detaining authority is not whether the detenue is likely to be convicted in the criminal cases, but whether his/her past conduct, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, furnishes a reasonable basis to apprehend his future involvement in prejudicial activities. In the present case, the materials relied upon by the detaining authority disclosed the alleged involvement of the detenue in more than one offence under the NDPS Act. Whether such materials are ultimately sufficient to secure a conviction is a matter for the competent criminal court to decide. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction in a challenge against a preventive detention order, is not expected to examine the evidentiary value or admissibility of the materials relied upon as if it were conducting a criminal trial.

15. In the instant case, we have found that in all the cases where bail was granted, it was either due to failure on the part of the prosecution to file the FSL within the statutory period, or it had succeeded on the technicality of non furnishing of grounds of arrest, and significantly few of such orders would also clearly show that the learned Single Judge had opined prima facie that there are considerable materials on record to connect the detenue with the commission of the crime. In these matters the learned Single Judge appears to have interpreted Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 47 of the BNSS in favour of granting bail, on the basis that the grounds of arrest were not provided to the accused or the family members.

16. Considering the entirety of the fact and the conduct of the detenue and applying the law laid down in Kamarunnisa v. Union of India and another(1990 (1) SCC 128) , we are of the view that the triple test laid down therein has been squarely applicable in the instant case. The three test contemplated under the said decision are: Firstly, it is to be ascertained that the detenue is in custody. Secondly, it is to be satisfied that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is real possibility of the detenue being released on bail, and that on being released she would in all probability engage in more crimes and thirdly, if it is felt essential to detain him/her to prevent from so doing. As regards the case at hand, the record speaks for itself. It cannot be doubted that there is every possibility of the d etenue being released on bail on technical grounds.

17. The fact that the detenue had been granted bail in all the criminal cases have been duly considered by the detaining authority and the Advisory Board. The fact that the detenue has been granted bail in the criminal cases cannot by itself render the detention order illegal.

18. There are prima facie materials suggesting her connection to the commission of the crime and the materials considered by the detaining authority as well as the Advisory Board would show that the detenue is a person who consistently engages in possession, transportation and sale of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The opinion of the Advisory Board that had culminated in the order of preventive detention fulfills both subjective and objective criteria and hence, does not call for any interference.

The Writ Petition fails and is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

The original file produced in the sealed envelope shall be returned to the learned Public Prosecutor.