Soumen Sen, C.J.

1. Heard Mr. S. Vishnu, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sumeet Kumar Gadodia, assisted by Ms. Cristy Theresa Suresh, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, and Ms. O.A. Nuriya, learned Senior Government Pleader.

2. The appeal arises out of the judgment dated 11th February 2026 in W.P. (C) No. 23588 of 2024, which was filed praying inter alia for recovery of the price of the goods sold and delivered to the present appellant. The brief facts, which are undisputed for the present purpose, are as follows:

3. Pursuant to Purchase Order No. TP/MTL/CPC/4217/2022-2023 dated 27th March 2023, the entire required quantity was supplied by the writ petitioner to the appellant within 11 months at the rate of Rs. 74,000/-per Metric Tonne FOR basis. The purchase order contains all the essential terms and conditions, which inter alia include the price and delivery schedule. The said clauses are reproduced below:

                  “1) Price:

                  The accepted Basic Price shall be Rs. 74,OOO /- per MT FOR basis. This price shall be fixed and firm during the tenure of the contract and the tenure shall be for a period of l0 months from 01/04/2023. However, in case of any balance quantity to be supplied at the end of this period, then this quantity shall be supplied within the span of another three months, at the same price and terms & conditions, on mutual agreement. In such cases you cannot seek any escalation in the price within the validity of this period.

                  5) Delivery Schedule:

                  Delivery of Calcined Petroleum Coke shall be @ 248 MT per month, with a minimum quantity of approximately 62 MT per week. However, we reserve the right to regulate supplies by increasing / decreasing / suspending dispatches according to our monthly production schedule, which shall be intimated to you. You shall strictly adhere to our delivery schedule and in case you fail to supply material as per this schedule, KMML reserves the right to make alternate purchase at your risk and cost.

                  As soon as the material is dispatched, intimation should be given to us, furnishing the particulars of supply, such as Delivery Challan / Invoice Number & Date, LR Number & Date, total value, total number of bags, total weight etc.”

4. Admittedly, the entire quantity was not supplied by 31st January 2024, that is to say, within a period of 10 months from 1st April 2023. The balance quantity was supplied in February under invoices dated 3rd February 2024 and 28th February 2024. The invoices showing supply of the materials have been disclosed in the writ petition. The dispute arose with regard to the price to be paid by the appellant for the balance quantity supplied beyond 31st January 2024.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued that a true and proper interpretation of Clause 1 read with Clause 5 of the purchase order would mean that the price for the balance quantity supplied beyond the validity period is required to be determined by negotiation and that there has to be a mutual agreement between the parties with regard to the fixation of price for such balance quantity supplied beyond the validity period.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to paragraph No. 13 of the affidavit filed in opposition to the writ petition to show that the price bid for a new tender in respect of the same goods, opened on 5th March 2024, would show that the price quoted by the L1 party was Rs. 46,700/- per Metric Tonne, which was later negotiated to Rs. 46,600/- per Metric Tonne, and the present appellant had quoted a price of Rs. 68,000/- per Metric Tonne. Since the rate quoted by the writ petitioner was on the higher side, the said offer was not accepted. The learned counsel has referred to the said paragraph to show that the writ petitioner would be entitled to Rs. 46,600/- per Metric Tonne and not Rs. 74,000/- per Metric Tonne, as the supply was made beyond the validity period and Clause 1 of the purchase order clearly stipulates that the balance quantity would be supplied within a span of another three months at the price to be mutually agreed upon. Learned counsel has also submitted that the dispute is purely contractual and that the writ petition is not maintainable for deciding such contractual disputes between the parties.

7. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has referred to the observations in favour of the writ petitioner in the judgment and has referred to the invoices to show that the goods have been delivered to the appellant and that the appellant had accepted and consumed the same. After acceptance of the said goods, it is no longer open to the appellant to deny payment. Learned counsel has emphasised the phrase “at the same price and terms and conditions” found in Clause 1 of the purchase order to show that even for the extended validity period, the contract contemplates that the price of the goods would be the same as it was before the expiry of the validity period.

8. We first address the issue with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition which will actually mean whether the writ court exercises its discretionary power to entertain the writ petition. The maintainability would really mean the entertainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The power exercised by the writ court is generic in nature. However, such power must be exercised with circumspection. It has been categorically settled in a catena of decisions that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not excluded in contractual matters. If the State instrumentality violates its constitutional mandate under Article 14 of the Constitution to act fairly and reasonably or has without just cause or for any valid and legitimate reason denied the legitimate claim of a party, the writ court in exercise of its plenary power under Article 226 of the Constitution can issue appropriate writ and grant appropriate reliefs to redress the grievance of the petitioner. The existence of an alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Merely because the disputed questions of fact arise for consideration, the same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. A writ petition involving a consequential relief or monetary claim is also maintainable. The court may refuse to exercise its discretion if the court finds that there exists a more efficacious alternative remedy available in law where the issues can be more effectively and conveniently decided. It is not the statement of law that for every disputed questions of fact a party is required to be relegated to suit. It is only such disputed questions of fact which cannot be conveniently decided by affidavits by the writ court that the writ court may refuse to exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The mere fact that a party can also file a suit for recovery of the amount would not stand in the way of the writ court in allowing monetary relief when the State or its instrumentality acts arbitrarily or unfairly. The filing of suit for recovery of money cannot be considered as an efficacious alternative remedy in all circumstances. Every case has to be decided on its own facts. The State or its instrumentality do not have a blanket immunity to resist the writ petition merely on the ground that their business dealings may come within the realm of the contract. The jurisprudential difference between public law and private law in relation to contract has become thin to thinner as would be evident from a catena of decisions wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has allowed enforcement of contractual obligations which may fall in the realm of contract. When it manifestly appears to the court that the action is arbitrary and the plea of alternative remedy is raised only to defeat the legitimate claim of the petitioner, the court shall not be hesitant to exercise its discretionary power and grant appropriate relief to the writ petitioner even in cases where it involves a money claim.

9. In M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and Others (2023 KLT OnLine 1073 (SC) = AIR 2023 SC 781), the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution vis-a-vis alternative remedy was lucidly explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:

                  “4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as "not maintainable" merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs Under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the Petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power Under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court Under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition "not maintainable". In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the "maintainability" of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a Rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a Rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that "entertainability" and "maintainability" of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to "maintainability" goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of "entertainability" is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the Petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the Petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.

                  5. A little after the dawn of the Constitution, a Constitution Bench of this Court in its decision reported in (1958 KLT OnLine 1322 (SC) = 1958 SCR 595) (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Nooh) had the occasion to observe as follows:

                  “10. In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 11, p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subor - dinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this Rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a Rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a Rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. ..”

                  6. At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15 of the its decision reported in (1999 (1) KLT OnLine 908 (SC) = (1998) 8 SCC 1) (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors. carved out the exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ Court would be justified in entertaining a writ petition despite the party approaching it not having availed the alternative remedy provided by the statute. The same read as under:

                  (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;

                  (ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice;

                  (iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or

                  (iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged.

                  7. Not too long ago, this Court in its decision reported in (2021 (5) KLT OnLine 1142 (SC) = (2022) 16 SCC 447) (Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. M/s. Commercial Steel Limited) has reiterated the same principles in paragraph 11.

                  8. …………...where the controversy is a purely legal one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact but only questions of law, then it should be decided by the high court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being available.”

10. It is elementary that an alternative remedy is a plea which does not affect the jurisdiction of a Constitutional Court in exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is a matter of choice for the Constitutional Court not to exercise its discretionary high prerogative power if there is an efficacious alternative remedy available under the Statute.

11. The maintainability of a writ petition to decide a contractual dispute is no longer res integra in view of various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which inter alia include in ABL International Ltd. and Another v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Others ((2004 3 SCC 553) , Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Another ((2006) 10 SCC 236) , Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India and Others ((2015) 7 SCC 728) and Unitech Limited and Others v. Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (TSIIC) and Others ((2021) 16 SCC 35).

12. In the instant case, the facts are admitted. There is an admission that the appellant received the balance quantity within the span of another three months contemplated in Clause 1 of the purchase order and that the invoices raised during such period clearly stipulated the rates and quantities. If the appellant was not agreeable to the said rates, it could have returned the goods instead of retaining and consuming them. Moreover, insofar as the price of Rs. 46,600/- per Metric Tonne is concerned, it appears that, upon opening the tender on 5th March 2024, the L1 bidder had offered the said price, which was ultimately negotiated to Rs. 46,600/- per Metric Tonne.

13. Learned counsel has referred to Section 9(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, to contend that, in the instant case, the price was not determined in accordance with Clause 1 of the purchase order and hence, the buyer can only expect the seller to charge a reasonable price and what constitutes a reasonable price is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each particular case. In the instant case, there is no scope for ascertainment of the price having regard to Section 42 of the Act, which reads as follows:

                  “The buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them, or when the goods have been delivered to him and he does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller, or when, after the lapse of a reasonable time, he retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he has rejected them.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

14. The appellant has not only accepted the goods but has also dealt with them in a manner inconsistent with the ownership of the seller. The goods were never returned. Once the appellant accepted the goods with the price clearly mentioned in the two invoices and consumed the materials, it cannot deny its liability to pay the price mentioned in the invoices. Moreover, the price clause refers to the same price to which the seller would be entitled if the balance quantity was supplied within a span of another three months. Thus, it cannot be contended at this stage that the appellant is not liable to pay for such goods at Rs. 74,000/- per Metric Tonne FOR basis. The invoices quoted the same price charged for the goods delivered within the original period. The seller has supplied the balance quantity within the extended period at the same price. The appellant never disputed the said price earlier to the filing of the writ petition. In the meantime the entire quantity supplied was consumed. In view thereof, we do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge.

15. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.