1. Preliminary objection regarding jurisdiction and the prayer for rejection of the plaint, were negatived by the learned single Judge. The defendants are in appeal. The plaintiffs have filed cross appeals challenging an adverse finding in the impugned order.
2. The cause for the proceedings is the sinking of the Vessel MSC ELSA 3, that occurred on 25.05.2025 at 14.6 nautical miles away from the Kerala coast. The incident occurred during her voyage from Vizhinjam port to Cochin port. Claiming compensation for the alleged damages, several cargo owners and fishermen have filed admiralty suits against the plaintiffs. The owner, bareboat charterer and the time charterer of the vessel, as plaintiffs, have instituted the present suit under Section 352-C of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 for limitation of liability.
3. The cause title of the plaint reads thus:-
“ADMIRALTY SUIT FOR THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FILED UNDER ADMIRALTY ACT 2017 READ WITH RULE 3 OF THE KERALA HIGH COURT ADMIRALTY RULES, 2019 AND PART XA OF THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1958 READ WITH MERCHANT SHIPPING (LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR MARITIME CLAIM) RULE 2015”.
According to the defendants, the suit for limitation of liability, does not lie under the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 (for short, “the Admiralty Act”).
4. The learned Single Judge held the suit to be maintainable.
5. We have heard Sri.Prashant S. Pratap (Sr.), Smt.Naira Jeejeebhoy, Sri.Pranoy K. Kottaram, Sri.V.J.Mathew (Sr.), Sri.Merline Mathew, Sri.Anirudh G. Kamath, Smt.Megha Madhavan, Sri.V.B.Hari Narayanan represented by Smt.Aashna Pathak, Sri.Joy Thattil Ittoop, and Sri.M.Rajeev, the learned counsel for the respective parties.
6. The question to be answered is, can a proceeding for limitation of liability under Section 352-C of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, be maintained under the Admiralty Act.
7. The right of an owner of a vessel to seek for limitation of his liability, is provided for under Part X-A of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. The evolution of the doctrine of limitation of liability leading to its incorporation in the Merchant Shipping Act have been explained by the Apex Court in World Tanker Carrier Corporation v. SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. [(1998) 5 SCC 310] thus:-
“14. Describing the nature of a limitation action, Baer in his book Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court at p. 154 traces the historic origins of limitation of liability as follows :
“ '[M]en would be deterred from employing ships, if they lay under the perpetual fear of being answerable for the acts of their masters to an unlimited extent.' Thus wrote the renowned Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, in 1625. To impose liability on shipowners for acts of their masters would be 'neither consonant to natural equity …nor … conducive to the public good'. Referring to the law of his own nation, Grotius continued, '[I]t is an established rule that no action can be maintained against the owner for any greater sum than the value of the ship and cargo.'
Although by no means uniform, some sort of rule of limited liability on the part of the shipowner has been the law of the leading maritime nations of continental Europe since the middle ages ….”
15. In 1924 several leading nations adopted the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the limitation of liability of owners of sea-going vessels. This is commonly referred to as the Brussels Convention of 1924. In 1957 a new contention on Limitation of Liability of Sea-Going Vessels was drafted to replace the Brussels Convention of 1924. The new convention, commonly referred to as the Brussels Limitation Convention of 1957 was signed by many leading maritime nations of the world. It is also signed by India. The convention fixes the limit of liability of an owner of a sea-going vessel on the basis of the tonnage of the vessel without regard to the vessel's value. It was to incorporate this Convention in our statute law that Part X-A was inserted in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958.”
In World Tanker's case (supra) the Apex Court explained that the whole purpose of limitation of liability is to protect the owner of a vessel, against large claims far exceeding the value of the ship and cargo.
8. Section 352-C of the Merchant Shipping Act confers jurisdiction on the High Court for, an action for limitation of liability, the constitution of a limitation fund, and for consolidation of claims arising out of an incident. In World Tanker's case (supra) the Apex Court held that the High Court having jurisdiction to entertain an admiralty action against the vessel, has jurisdiction to entertain an action for limitation of liability. It was also held that any Court where such claim is filed or is likely to be filed, will have jurisdiction to entertain a limitation action. The incident has occurred within the territorial waters within the jurisdiction of this Court, and claims have also been filed in this Court. The jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present action for limitation of liability is not in dispute.
9. Having found the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the action for limitation of liability, it is to be considered whether such action can be maintained as a suit under the Admiralty Act 2017.
10. In M.V.Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading [1993 Supp (2) SCC 433], “Admiralty jurisdiction” of the High Court was explained by the Apex Court thus:-
“88. Admiralty jurisdiction is an essential aspect of judicial sovereignity which under the Constitution and the laws is exercised by the High Court as a superior court of record administering justice in relation to persons and things within its jurisdiction. Power to enforce claims against foreign ships is an essential attribute of admiralty jurisdiction and it is assumed over such ships while they are within the jurisdiction of the High Court by arresting and detaining them.
89. All persons and things within the waters of a State fall within its jurisdiction unless specifically curtailed or regulated by rules of international law. …..
91. Admiralty jurisdiction, despite the peculiarities of its origin and growth — rooted as it is in history and nurtured by the growing demands of international trade— is nevertheless a part of the totality of jurisdiction vested in the High Court as a superior court of record, and it is not a distinct and separate jurisdiction as was once the position in England before the unification of courts...”
11. In World Tanker (supra), it was held that a limitation action falls under the High Court's admiralty jurisdiction.
12. “Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction” as understood in its common parlance, is depicted in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition thus:-
“In general
“Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” includes jurisdiction of all things done up-on and relating to the sea and all transactions and proceedings in relation to commerce and navigation including damages or injuries upon the sea, and it extends to and includes all maritime contracts whether executed at home or abroad and whatever may be the form of the stipulations, including charter parties. The Charles, 1 Haw. 161.
The term “admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” within constitution and statute relating to jurisdiction of courts includes jurisdiction of all things done upon and relating to the sea or, in other words, all transactions and proceedings relative to commerce and navigation and to damages and injuries upon the sea. Act of December 3, 1852, 2; U.S.C.A.Const. Art, 84, Spencer v. Bailey, 1 Haw. 187.”
Evidently, the terms have very wide amplitude.
13. The Admiralty Act defines “Admiralty Jurisdiction” thus:-
“3. Admiralty jurisdiction.—Subject to the provisions of sections 4 and 5, the jurisdiction in respect of all maritime claims under this Act shall vest in the respective High Courts and be exercisable over the waters up to and including the territorial waters of their respective jurisdictions in accordance with the provisions contained in this Act:
Provided that the central Government may, by notification, extend the jurisdiction of the High Court up to the limit as defined in section 2 of the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 (80 of 1976).”
Apparently, the jurisdiction is confined to maritime claims specified under the Act. Section 2(1)(f) defines a “maritime claim”, thus:-
“(f) maritime claim” means a claim referred to in section 4” Section 4 reads thus:-
“4. Maritime claim.—(1) The High Court may exercise jurisdiction to hear and determine any question on a maritime claim, against any vessel, arising out of any—
(a) dispute regarding the possession or ownership of a vessel or the ownership of any share therein;
(b) dispute between the co-owners of a vessel as to the employment or earnings of the vessel;
(c) mortgage or a charge of the same nature on a vessel;
(d) loss or damage caused by the operation of a vessel;
(e) loss of life or personal injury occurring whether on land or on water, in direct connection with the operation of a vessel;
(f) loss or damage to or in connection with any goods;
(g) agreement relating to the carriage of goods or passengers on board a vessel, whether contained in a charter party or otherwise;
(h) agreement relating to the use or hire of the vessel, whether contained in a charter party or otherwise;
(i) salvage services, including, if applicable, special compensation relating to salvage services in respect of a vessel which by itself or its cargo threatens damage to the environment;
(j) towage;
(k) pilotage;
(l) goods, materials, perishable or non-perishable provisions, bunker fuel, equipment (including containers), supplied or services rendered to the vessel for its operation, management, preservation or maintenance including any fee payable or leviable;
(m) construction, reconstruction, repair, converting or equipping of the
vessel;
(n) dues in connection with any port, harbour, canal, dock or light tolls, other tolls, waterway or any charges of similar kind chargeable under any law of or the time being in force;
(o) claim by a master or member of the crew of a vessel or their heirs and dependents for wages or any sum due out of wages or adjudged to be due which may be recoverable as wages or cost of repatriation or social insurance contribution payable on their behalf or any amount an employer is under an obligation to pay to a person as an employee, whether the obligation arose out of a contract of employment or by operation of a law (including operation of a law of any country) for the time being in force, and includes any claim arising under a manning and crew agreement relating to a vessel, notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of sections 150 and 151 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 (44 of 1958);
(p) disbursement incurred on behalf of the vessel or its owners;
(q) particular average or general average;
(r) dispute arising out of a contract for the sale of the vessel;
(s) insurance premium (including mutual insurance calls) in respect of the vessel, payable by or on behalf of the vessel owners or demise charterers;
(t) commission, brokerage or agency fees payable in respect of the vessel by or on behalf of the vessel owner or demise charterer;
(u) damage or threat of damage caused by the vessel to the environment, coastline or related interests; measures taken to prevent, minimise, or remove such damage; compensation for such damage; costs of reasonable measures for the restoration of the environment actually undertaken or to be undertaken; loss incurred or likely to be incurred by third parties in connection with such damage; or any other damage, costs, or loss of a similar nature to those identified in this clause;
(v) costs or expenses relating to raising, removal, recovery, destruction or the rendering harmless of a vessel which is sunk, wrecked, stranded or abandoned, including anything that is or has been on board such vessel, and costs or expenses relating to the preservation of an abandoned vessel and maintenance of its crew; and
(w) maritime lien.”
The admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court, under the Admiralty Act, is confined to the maritime claims arising out of clauses (a) to (w) mentioned in Section 4(1). Suffice to note that, it is possible to consider that the admiralty jurisdiction under the Admiralty Act lies in a narrower compass than the “admiralty jurisdiction” as understood in common parlance.
14. The contention of the plaintiff is that, though the jurisdiction of the High Court under the Admiralty Act is limited to a certain extent to the maritime claims specified under the Act, still, as is evident from Section 4 thereof, it is wide enough to determine “any question on a maritime claim” enumerated in the Section. The words “any question” is to be understood to encompass a claim for limitation of liability also since, it has a direct consequence on the maritime claim. The defendants would on the other hand contend that, limitation of liability is an independent proceeding, unconnected with a maritime claim and any question thereon, and hence does not fall within the Admiralty Act.
15. As was noticed supra, the concept of limitation of liability is incorporated in part X-A of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. The primary rationale of this concept is to promote maritime trade. An accident of a vessel could result in unlimited liability to the ship owner. This would discourage investment in shipping and would affect maritime trade. The provision for limitation of liability enables the ship owner to have his liability against claims to be capped. Section 352-C of the Merchant Shipping Act provides for the constitution of limitation fund, for consolidation of all the claims, and for ratable distribution among the several claimants. Section 352-B read with the Merchant Shipping (Limitation of Liability) Maritime Claim Rules 2015, provide the manner in which the quantum of liability is limited and fixed. The Rules make it explicit that the quantum of limitation fund is arrived at reckoning the tonnage of the ship. The number of maritime claims or the quantum thereof is not a relevant criteria upon which the liability is limited. Once the entitlement to limit liability is found and the quantum is fixed, the owner is to constitute the limitation fund. Once the claims against the ship/owner are proved, the fund is rateably distributed among the claimants, as is provided for under Section 352-C (4) of the Merchant Shipping Act.
16. In World Tanker (supra), the Apex Court held that a limitation action falls under the High Court’s admiralty jurisdiction but, is different from an ordinary admiralty action. It was held to be a defensive action against claims by various claimants. It was also held that the limitation action need not be filed in the same forum as a liability action. The plea of limitation can be taken as a defence by the owner against maritime claims. Both sides rely on the above to buttress their respective contentions. The defendants would also contend that, on the coming into force of the Admiralty Act, 2017, the earlier judgments in M.V. Elisabeth (supra) and World Tanker (supra) are no more relevant to decide on jurisdiction since, jurisdiction under the Admiralty Act is defined thereunder.
17. We are of the considered view that the objections raised by the defendants, opposing the jurisdiction of the High Court under the Admiralty Act over a limitation action, has no force. The words, “..any question on a maritime claim…” would necessarily take within its sweep, the “settlement of a maritime claim”. Questions regarding settlement of a maritime claim cannot be said to be not “questions on a maritime claim”. The Act itself is titled “THE ADMIRALTY (JURISDICTION AND SETTLEMENT OF MARITIME CLAIMS) ACT, 2017”. Evidently, the Act is intended to provide for “jurisdiction” and “settlement” of maritime claims. The preamble to the Act reads thus:
“An Act to consolidate the laws relating to admiralty jurisdiction, legal proceedings in connection with vessels, their arrest, detention, sale and other matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”
Where the framers of the Act was of the opinion that there is conflict with the provisions in the Merchant Shipping Act, they did expressly provide an overriding clause. This is seen at Section 4(1)(o), which has been extracted supra. We have already noticed that, the Apex Court has described a limitation action as a “defensive action”.
18. To conclude, we hold that, setting up of a limitation fund and its ratable distribution, are questions regarding settlement of a maritime claim and hence falls within the scope of “any question on a maritime claim” under Section 4(1) of the Admiralty Act. Though the defendants relied on a host of decisions including Raja Soap Factory And Others v. S. P. Shantharaj And Others (AIR 1965 SC 1449) and A.R. Antulay vs R.S. Nayak & Anr [1988 (2) SCC 602] to contend that, where jurisdiction does not exist under a statute, it cannot be created by Court, the said principle has no application in view of our finding that the proceedings fall within Section 4(1) of the Admiralty Act. The defendants would further contend that it is not the duty of the Court to enlarge the scope of the legislation and that when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for a further interpretation. Among others, the decisions in Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323] and Padma Sundara Rao and Others v State of Tamil Nadu and others [2002(3) SCC 533] were relied on in support thereof. In Padma Sundara Rao it was held:-
"It is well settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama *(AIR 1990 SC 981)”.
Our finding as above, is only in consonance with the observation of Judge Learned Hand, which was accepted by the Apex Court in the judgments referred above. The mere fact that the Act or the Rules [Kerala High Court Admiralty(Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Rules, 2019], do not make specific mention of a limitation action, does not mean that it does not fall within the scope of the Act and the Rules.
19. In Anthoniyarpicha & Anr. v. M.V.Mayuree Naree & Ors. [2018 (4) KHC 303], a learned single judge of this Court held that a proceeding under Section 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act is not an Admiralty Suit under the Admiralty Act. The Section deals with detaining of a foreign vessel in contemplation of an award in a legal proceeding that may be instituted for damages. The scope of a limitation action has been referred to by us in extenso supra. Evidently, it has no similarity with an action under Section 443. In this proceeding we do not consider it necessary or appropriate to look into the correctness of the law laid down in Anthoniyarpicha, which dealt with an entirely different right under the Merchant Shipping Act. We only notice that, the judgment in Anthoniyarpicha has no application to the present case. The reliance placed on the said judgment by the defendants, is misconceived.
20. Rule 2 (e) of the Kerala High Court Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Rules, 2019 read thus:
“‘Suit’ shall mean any suit, action or other proceedings, instituted in the court in its Admiralty Jurisdiction.”
In the notification No. D1(A)-2010/98 dated 11.04.2003 issued by the High Court of Kerala with regard to nomenclature of cases, Entry No.6 in Part IV under the head “Civil Original Jurisdiction” of the High Court, proceedings in the nature of admiralty suits are given the nomenclature of “Admiralty Suit” with the abbreviation “ADML.S”. A proceeding for limitation of liability is within the “Civil Original Jurisdiction”. Therefore, the nomenclature of an action for limitation is to be as “Admiralty Suit” and is to be numbered as “ADML.S”. We do not find any error in the invoking of jurisdiction or in the procedure adopted by the plaintiff.
In the result, F.A.O (Admiralty) No.1/2026, F.A.O (Admiralty) No.2/2026 and F.A.O (Admiralty) No.3/2026 are dismissed and F.A.O(Admiralty) No.4/2026, F.A.O (Admiralty) No.5/2026 and F.A.O (Admiralty) No.6/2026 are allowed. No costs.
