Soumen Sen, C.J.

1. Heard Mr. Lal K. Joseph, learned counsel for the review petitioenrs, Mr. P.C. Anilkumar, lerned Standing Counsel for respondnt No.4 and Ms. O.A. Nuriya, learned Senior Government Pleader.

2. This Review Petition has been filed seeking a review of the judgment dated 18.12.2025 delivered by a Division Bench of this Court, in which the revenue recovery notices issued against the petitioners was considered. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that Section 71 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 (the Act of 1982) can come into play provided if there is already an adjudication, as one of the modes of recovery of the amounts is through the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 (the Act of 1968), as arrears of land revenue. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Bench which passed the judgment did not consider the dictum laid down in Corporation of Kozhikode v. Radha (2022 (4) KLT 433) and instead, relied upon the later decision rendered in Benzy Martin v. State of Kerala and others ( 2024 (5) KHC 602) . It is submitted that the decision in Benzy Martin (supra), insofar as it holds that there is no necessity of any pre-requisite adjudication for recovery of any amount due as land revenue, is contrary to the earlier decision in Corporation of Kozhikode (supra) and, in any event, is based on a complete misreading of the provisions of the two Acts.

3. The learned counsel has referred to Sections 33, 34 and 64 of the Act of 1982 and also Section 34 of the Act of 1968. The decision in Benzy Martin (supra) was rendered while interpreting the Chit Funds Act, 1982, whereas Corporation of Kozhikode (supra) pertains to the Municipal Act. The two Acts admittedly operate in different fields. Hence, the decision rendered under one statute may not have any relevance to the interpretation of the other statute. The purpose and object of both statutes are different, and the legislative intention has to be gathered from a reading of the provisions in light of the object and purpose for which the respective Acts were enacted. Hence, the submission that Benzy Martin (supra), rendered by a co-ordinate Bench, ought to have been considered as a decision rendered under a different Act, cannot be accepted. In any event, this cannot be a ground for review, as both decisions have been considered by the co-ordinate Bench while deciding the matter against the appellants. Section 34 of the Act of 1968 does not require prior notice, as the provision makes it clear that upon a written demand being served on the defaulter, it would be open to the defaulter to submit a reply to such demand and raise all objections permissible under law. At the stage of Section 34(1), the District Collector proceeds on the basis that the demand made in the revenue notices is prima facie correct. However, before any order is passed in exercise of the power conferred under the said Section and the subsequent provisions, the procedure laid down for recovery of land revenue under the Act of 1968 is followed after the objections are considered by the District Collector. Hence, the interpretation rendered by the co-ordinate Bench in Benzy Martin (supra) does not require any reconsideration. Moreover, the decisions of this Court require this Bench to follow the law laid down in Benzy Martin (supra), and the said decision is neither per incuriam nor sub silentio.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has fairly submitted that no dispute has been raised under Section 64 of the Act of 1982, and as on date, no award has been passed under the said Act. It is further submitted that the recovery proceedings have been initiated by a foreman, as defined under the Act of 1982, without the dispute being adjudicated under Section 64 of the said Act. The apprehension of the petitioners that the remedy is foreclosed by reason of proceedings under Section 34 of the Act of 1968 cannot be accepted, as under Section 34(2) of the Act of 1968, the alleged defaulter is entitled to object to the claim of arrears, wholly or in part, and it is the responsibility of the District Collector to consider such objections and record a decision before proceeding to attach the immovable property of the defaulter. Hence, the merits of the dispute are always to be decided by the District Collector if raised in the said proceedings. The judgment under review has not foreclosed the remedy available to the petitioners. It has only concurred with the view expressed in Benzy Martin (supra) with regard to the requirement of prior notice before initiation of proceedings under Section 34 of the Act of 1968. Hence, we do not find any merit in reviewing the judgment.

The Review Petition is accordingly dismissed.

However, there shall be no order as to costs.